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Within conventional medicine, transplantation is widely viewed as the 'gold standard' in the 
treatment of organ disease. However, there is a chronic shortage in the availability of 
several types of organ, including kidneys. Reducing the shortfall, and indeed removing it, 
is acknowledged as the major aim in transplantation today. However, in most transplanting 
jurisdictions, the uncontroversial methods of increasing supply have largely already been put 
into practice. At the same time the number of people diagnosed with organ disease is 
increasing - rapidly so in the case of kidneys. 
It is uncertain if, or when, xenotransplantation or artificial organs will supply large numbers 
of organs effectively. The global choice now is relatively simple; adopt controversial 
methods of increasing cadaveric supply (such as elective ventilation and/or use of non-heart 
beating donors) and/or increase living donation OR endure continued damaging effects of 
shortage (lower quality of life on dialysis and death where dialysis is not available). 
Increases in living donation alone may be capable of delivering the additional numbers of 
organs to remove the organ shortage. However, use of living organ donation raises novel 
and very significant legal and ethical issues. These issues arise primarily from the inevitable 
fact of donation: that it causes a degree of harm, and risk of further harm, to the donor. In 
addition, there is the relatively unexplored question of what the unique relationship of donor 
and recipient means for both legally and ethically. In the context of other options, an in- 
depth ethical analysis of LDT is required in order to establish the parameters within which its 
use can be justified. This thesis, along with EUROTOLD's Final Report, breaks new 
ground by considering all major ethical issues within a single document. 
A regulatory framework for LDT is the main method of stipulating the ethical parameters 
within which it may acceptably take place. It also provides the foundation for defining the 
relevant autonomy at each level of the LDT process; the role and content of law, codes of 
practice, protocols and the ambit of individual professional and participant discretion. A 
number of reviews of transplant law have been produced including Fuenzalida-Puelma! s 
survey of legislation pertaining to 16 South American countriesl and the World Health 
Organization's recent book 'Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation. '2 While the 
latter was limited to setting out, without analysis, the organisational and statutory regulation 
of transplantation activity the former was limited in geographical area. This prompted Sev 
I Organ Transplantation: The Latin American Legislative Response. In S. S. Connor and Fuenzalida-Puelma 
(eds. ) Bioethics: Issues and Perspectives, Pan, 4merican Health Organization, 1990,67-86. 
2Martinus Nyhoff 1994. 
Fluss in a recent review to suggest the possibility of an up-to-date global survey. 3 This 
thesis produces the first such survey - critically with a landmark analysis of core ethico-legal 
issues in LDT (disclosure, informedness, voluntariness and capacity in relation to consent 
and regulation of financial exchange in LDT4). 
Ethico-legal issues in LDT interact with the practical context. The thesis examines current 
studies of attitudes, practice and experience of participants and professionals in LDT and 
builds on them through a programme of empirical investigation (Transplant Centre 
Questionnaire, a Professional Attitudes Questionnaire and Donor and Recipient 
Questionnaires) unique in content and scope of jurisdictions covered. 5 
Authors Note: the oral defence of this thesis was successfully completed in May 1998, 
submission to the De Montfort University library in June 1998. Readers should, be aware of 
new developments since write up of the PhD in 1997. These include: 
" publication of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe); 
" ongoing development of transplant legislation (e. g. in Germany) - abstracts of new 
legislation tend to appear in the WHO's International Digest of Health Legislation.; 
" more current statistics for transplantation will now be available from the Council of 
Europe and national (and cross national transplant bodies). The broad picture of 
spiralling demand for kidneys continues; and 
the setting up of UKXIRA a public body regulating xenotransplantation issues in the UK. 
(The grave danger, from this authors point of view, is that clinical trials of 
xenotransplantation may soon go ahead despite lack of resolution of either the ethical and 
public safety issues or a public debate and public consensus. Some of these issues will 
3Trade in Human Organs: National and International Responses in Transplantation in the European Union: 
Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors, (ed. Yvon Englert), Martinus Nýhqff, 1995 at 
75. 
41t involves fundamental analysis of world-wide statutory provisions and some broad approaches ofjudge made 
law. This original global analysis was made in conjunction with the development of LEGISEARCH, 
EUROTOLD's database of European living donor transplant law. LEGISEARCH was developed by David Price 
and I with the assistance of several EUROTOLD's legal contacts who have written papers on living donor 
transplant law provisions and in some cases responded to EUROTOLD's legal questionnaire (see Appendix 3). 
Legisearch is available on the internet at http: //maths-ac. uk: 2080/MedStats/Eurotold. 
5There was a study of attitudes amongst 148 European Transplant Centres (see Editorial, Lancet, 1982, ii, 
696) but this was back in the early 1980's and covered a much narrower range of countries than the EUROTOLD 
investigation. The EUROTOLD project has also developed a Donor Health Registry with a donor health form' 
designed to elicit information about tests conducted on donors and the medical consequences of donation. Data 
return is still in iVs infancy and consýquently this work is not significantly discussed. The central intention of 
the form and Registry is to elicit a large body of data on the long term health consequences of donation. This 
will have important consequences in helping to assess any long term risks of donating a kidney, integrating this 
assessment into information provided to potential living donors and recipients and whether the amount of risk is 
ethically acceptable and within legally permissible limits. 
note doubt get a thorough and thoughtful airing in the forthcoming book being published 
on transplantation by David Price, one of the two supervisors to this PhD. 
EUROTOLD continues to exist as a project; collating information from across Europe for 
it's donor health registry and in the form of many of it's members continuing to write 
extensively on ethical, legal and other aspects of living donor organ transplantation. 
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Background to the Investigation and Acknowledgements. 
In 1987 a paper was written on living donor kidney transplant attitudes and practice amongst 
transplant centres in the UK. and Eire by members of the Leicester transplant centre-1 From 
this early beginning an ongoing study, focusing on ethical and legal aspects of living donor 
transplantation in Europe, was initiated by Leicester University Department of Surgery, De 
Montfort University School of Law and Newcastle University Department of Statistics. In 
February 19911 joined the existing De Montfort team of David Price and Ronnie Mackay for 
the purposes of research collaboration and to commence a Ph. D. on this subject. Early work 
focused on interviews with clinicians, lawyers and ethicists with an interest in the transplant 
field and developing and piloting an interview strategy with living donors and recipients. 
In 1993 the project adopted the title EUROTOLD an acronym for a 'Multidisciplinary 
European Study of Transplantation of Living Donors. ' EUROTOLD contracted with the 
European Community (Ref : BMHI-CT92-1841) to undertake research into the ethical and 
legal aspects of living organ donation extensively and systematically in Western Europe. 
The project had a number of clinical participants from transplant centres across Europe as 
well as other experts from a variety of other disciplines including law, ethics, psychology and 
economics. In 1994 - 1995 a further 6 countries from Eastern and Central sub-contracted 
with the European Community for devolved funding under the PECO programme to 
collaborate in the project with EUROTOLD acting as a co-ordinator. These countries were 
Estonia, Albania, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and Romania. 
As a member of the EUROTOLD project management group I was honoured to be 
extensively involved in project activities. The particular focus of my work was: 
attending a number of international workshops meetings and conferences 
Basing with leading researchers and practitioners in this area 
interviewing living organ donors and recipients 
helping to develop, administer and analyse professional questionnaires 
'P. K. Donnelly et al., Transplants From Living Donors in the United Kingdom and Ireland: A Centre Survey, 
BMI, 1989,298,490-493. 
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* being an ambassador for the project in Europe 
Ilis work provided a solid foundation for the development of the PhD thesis. I would like 
to thank all those who participated in the project and other members of the project 
management group for their collaboration and dialogue. My special thanks to David Price 
and Ronnie Mackay who provided invaluable advice and assistance as mentors and experts in 
medico-legal issues. 
xi 
Historical Context: 5 Key Phases in Organ Transplantation 
Transplantation has gone through several phases: 
" Firstly, very basic attempts at xenografting. ' Unger's conclusion from the limited graft 
survival of such attempts was that that there was a biochemical barrier to transplantation. 
3 
" Not surprisingly, the second phase was one of a lull in activity from around 1910 to the 
late 1940's. The exceptions to this were the development of corneal transplantation 
which had become routine by the 1940's4 and the notable event of the first allograft 
(human-human) transplant in Ukraine in 1933 which did not have significant graft 
5 survival. 
" The third significant phase began in 1947 when the first long term level of allograft 
survival was achieved from a living donor transplant in Boston, U. S. A. which utilised 
identical twins. 6 Here, by accident, the biochemical barrier had been side-stepped. As 
twins the donor-recipient pair had matched body materials .7 The 
first non-identical twin 
donor-recipient pair were operated on a few years later, again with successful graft 
survival. 8 Twin transplantation paved the way for the understanding that the biochemical 
barrier was the body's natural immunological response to foreign material. 
" The knowledge of immunological response founded afourth phase of primitive immune 
suppression; this began in 1959 with the use of sub-lethal doses of whole body 
irradiation! 9 
The fifth phase which exists today was founded on developed methods of immune 
response suppression. The key development was the use of a drug called cyclosporin 
from 1983. Cyclosporine could be used on ifs own or in combination with other 
immunosuppressants with sufficient success to revolutionise organ procurement. Now 
lesser matched genetic materials could be utilised with increasing success. An era of 
extensive use of cadaveric transplantation began in earnest, especially in Europe. 
'Ullmann has claimed the earliest attempt with kidneys in 1902 (Ann. Surg, 1914,60,195-219). Jaboulay has 
the first two recorded attempts (Lyon Med, 1906,107,575-577). 
'Berl. Klin. Wschr, 1909,1,1057-60. Unger's own 2 attempts had failed to produce significant graft survival. 
Unger's insight was proved correct by the later scientific understanding of the natural human immunological 
response to reject non-compatible materials from the body. 
'Anon., New Scientist, 1989,25. Comeal transplantation had begun in 1905. 
5D. Hamilton, A History of Transplantation in P. J. Morris (ed. ) Kidney Transplantation, 1988 at p4. 
6 lbid at p4. 
71954, Boston. See J. Murray et al., Successful Homotransplantation Between Identical Twins, Surg Forum, 
1955,6,432. 
1J. P. Merrill et al., Successful Hornotransplantation of the Kidney Between Non-Identical Twins. N. EngUMed, 
1960,262,1251. 
'See D. Hamilton, A History of Transplantation in P. J. Morris (ed. ) Kidney Transplantation, 1988 at p4. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to identify the following: the main 
purposes of and for the investigation; methodologies utilised (in conducting and 
writing up the thesis) to achieve the major aims; the ethics of the investigation; and 
limits of the investigation. 
. 
1.1. The Main Purposes of and for the Investigation. 
In some marginal or experimental areas the results of transplantation may not be 
acceptable either in their own right or in comparison to dialysis. ' However, it is 
uncontentious that transplantation is the 'gold standard' in terms of quality of life for 
conventional treatment of most forms of organ disease. In addition, with regard to 
treatment for End Stage renal Failure (ESRF), it has been stated that, 
"(t)ransplant is by far the cheaper option, especially when one considers that the vast 
majority of recipients are restored to full time work, with consequent savings in 
pensions or benefits to the remaining family members. ,2 
Data from the late 1980's gives an approximate cost for kidney transplantation of 
E10,000 with about E3,000 per annurn thereafter for follow-up care. This compares 
with roughly E18,000 for hospital haemodialysis, E13,000forCAPDandLI1,000for 
'There are several examples in the history of transplantation where its use was questionable within 
almost any framework of ethics. For instance after Dempster had discovered that radiation would 
delay rejection by weakening immunological response (W. J. Dempster, BritjSurg, 1953,40,447- 
465). Attempts at promoting extended graft survival bordered on the insane in some instances 
including the attempt to achieve a modest gain by the administration of sub-lethal doses of whole body 
irradiation. Even the modem regime dominated by cyclosporin has problems related to the inherent 
contradiction of suppressing a person's immunological system and attempting to maintain health at the 
same time. For instance, the New York Task Force has indicated that side effects of cyclosporine can 
include, "tremors, convulsions, swelling and inflammation of the gums, abnormal growth of body 
hair and increased incidence of lymphorna and Kasposi's sarcoma. " Hypertension, hepatitis and 
cancer are risks and the kidneys can be toxified by use. It isjust as well in one sense that 
transplantations last on average only about a decade because long term exposure to this drug may 
frequently have very serious side effects. Task Force, 1988,20. 
2 Organ Transplantation, Richard West, QJf1ce ofHealth Economics, 1991,25. For a further 
economic analysis see De Charro, papers presented at Warsaw and Rotterdam (transcripts from 
EUROTOLD). 
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home haemodialysis per annum. 3 With grafts on average lasting over a decade this 
means transplantation is less than half the price of the cheapest form of dialysis. 4 
The economic benefits of transplantation when utilised in preference to dialysis are 
also apparent when it is LDT specifically that is used. De Charro5 and Spita16 have 
produced cost benefit analyses that specifically highlight reduced costs and increased 
patient quality of life (this has led some clinicians to conclude they would conduct 
LDT's even if the result of CDT were as good 7). 
Economic and quality of life issues are now being combined in QALY's (quality 
adjusted life years). In 1990, Professor Alan Maynard 'guestimated' the quality 
adjusted life year of a kidney transplant at E4,710 compared with home dialysis at 
; C17,260 and hospital dialysis atf2l, 970.8 Use of QALY's has raised issues, 9 but not 
in transplantation because quality of life and economic factors point in the same 
direction. Consequently the clear aim should be to maximise transplantation (within 
sensible limits) with dialysis being confined to a complementary, supportive role. 
The fact that dialysis has gone way beyond this role is partly a consequence of their 
having been an insufficient supply of organs (particularly renal organs - see graphs 1-3 
pages 52-54)10 to meet demand. With the technical barriers to effective 
transplantation having fallen away, the 1980's and 1990's saw the ironic position of 
this insufficiency being the major issue to resolve in transplantation. The degree of 
insufficiency has meant long waiting times for prospective CDT patients are typical, 
with consequent deleterious economic and quality of life consequences even if the 
patient is on dialysis. The position is worsening over time with the increasing gap 
3 Ibid at 26. Similar data also exist for Spain see Trans Proc, 1991,23(5), 2574. 
4 1995 figures indicate that transplantation costs less than a third. The Sunday Times, 1995,30 July. 
5 Rotterdam Symposium (transcript held at the EUROTOLD project). 
6 R. Spital, M. Spital and A. Spital, The Donor's Decision in Renal Transplantation: A Cost Benefit 
Analysis, Am JKODis, 1987, IX(5 May), 396-403. A cost benefit analysis of transplantation was 
developed by Spital as a rough model for clinicians to allow living donation where the analysis was 
positive. The model was designed partly to encourage more discussion and openness with patients 
about the possible options and is generally supportive of living donation. 
7 For instance Weiland et al., state that: "We would continue to use living-related donors even if the 
results of cadaveric and LRD transplantation were equivalent, otherwise, ESRD patients would be 
denied transplantation because of the shortage of cadaver kidneys. " (Information on 628 Living-Related 
Kidney Donors at Single Institution With Long Term Follow-Up in 472 Cases, Trans Proc, 1984,16, 
5-7. ). 
'Ibid at 26 these figures are based on 1990 prices using the Rosser Valuation Matrix for analysis. 
9J. Harris, QALYfybg the Value of Life, J ofMed Eth, 1987,13,117-123. 1OThe supply-demand gap is examined in more detail in chapter 2. 
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between supply and demand (due partly to increased incidence, or at least diagnosis of 
organ disease. 
Solutions to the organ shortage are needed with some urgency. Ethically 'neutral' 
approaches to improving cadaveric supply must be the first recourse. Some supply 
improvements could be brought about by approaches like creating a proper 
infrastructure for CDT in countries where such an infrastructure does not exist or is 
deficient, " facilitating changes in attitudes toward CDT and clinical and 
organisational improvements on the success rate of current organs harvested. 
12 
However, such methods will probably not deliver anything like the increases required 
for supply to start matching demand. 
Of other options for increased supply, xenotransplantation (with 'mutagenic' pigs 
and/or higher primates) has already been conducted in experimental fashion between 
animal species. 13 However, it must be ruled out as a source of human organs in the 
short and medium term because of major public health concerns, 14 unresolved and 
divisive ethical issues, lack of public discussion of the issues and questions of 
cultural acceptability. An unquantifiable, but probably large, number of organs will 
have to be procured through LDT and/or use of 'ethically marginal' methods of 
cadaveric procurement. The acceptability of these options must be examined in the 
light of the alternatives (continued death through lack of dialysis and transplantation 
and/or lower quality of life on dialysis) as well as in isolation. All of these options 
"This applies to most third world and some second world countries many of which even if they conduct 
a limited amount of transplantation are hampered through not being able to afford comprehensive 
dialysis facilities. In some countries such as India this has resulted in the almost exclusive use of 
living donor transplant where the recipients unfulfilled need for dialysis (and possible resulting death) 
can be averted by the use of living donation before dialysis becomes essential. In several European 
countries lack of complete dialysis facilities increases the need for LDT (e. g. Poland). In Albania, 
neither dialysis or transplantation exist at this point. 
12 These are discussed ftirther in chapter 2. 
13 With regard to kidneys studies have suggested that non-human primate kidneys could function 
normally in a human and sustain life for as long as 9 months (see e. g. D. K. C. Cooper et al. (eds. ), 
Xenotransplantation: The Transplantation of Organs Between Species, Springer Verlag, 1991. For a 
favourable assessment of the ethical issues relating to xenotransplantation see A. L. Caplan, Is 
Xonografting Wrong?, Trans Proc, 1992,24(2), 722-727. For an animal rights perspective on the 
legal and ethical issues contact Sara Fovargue, Department of Law, University of Newcastle. 
Particular concerns have long been raised about the use of higher primates (see e. g. K. Reemstra, 
Ethical problems With Artificial and Transplanted Organs: An Approach to Experiental Ethics. In 
E. F. Torrey (ed. ), Ethical Issues in Medicine, Little Brown, 1968). 
14 E. g. danger of cross species transmission of mammalion viruses. 
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have flaws. The core problem with LDT use is that it breaches the ýrimum non- 
nocere? principle through the detriment it causes donors. 15 Hence, use of LDT is 
relative; in an era when average CDT results are nearly as good as average LDT 
results, the use of LDT would be confined to exceptional cases 
16 were there a 
sufficiency of cadaveric organs to meet the demand for them. Elective ventilation, 
use of non-heart beating donors and systems of presumed consent are marginal 
methods of cadaveric procurement that could deliver large numbers of organs but raise 
large ethical issues including those surrounding the violation of consent. 
This research is taking place in a critical context of the weight of opinion moving 
towards the view that LDT is the best option for dealing with shortage that cannot be 
addressed through 'ethically neutral' CDT procurement methods. After a methodical 
world-wide analysis of procurement problems and their potential solutions the recent 
King's Fund Institute Report entitled: 'A Question of Give and Take: Improving the 
Supply of Organs for Transplantation' recommended, 
"increased use of genetically related live donors if backed by new Department of 
Health Guidance. "17 
Shortly after this The 1995 Report of the British Transplant Society Working Party on 
Organ Donation 18 specifically reflected on the organ shortage in the UK recommended 
a package of measures including enhanced use of living donation within certain 
constraints, 
11.. renal units should be encouraged to perform more live donor transplants but with 
the strict proviso that any increase is not at the expense of a reduction in the strict 
selection criteria as far as donors are concerned. An increase in the number of live 
15 The Principle of First do no harm - see H. Nys, Desirable Characteristics of Living Donation 
Transplant Legislation, in Living Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, (ed 
D. Price and H. Akveld), EUROTOLD, 1996,117-127. 16 See for instance Eire which only does HLA identical matches as a deliberate change of policy when 
the waiting list was reduced to low levels. Some countries despite significant waiting times for kidney 
transplantation have very little living donation partly because of a high rate of cadaveric transplantation 
per million population - see Spain (see p64), Portugal (see p63) and Austria (see p57), for example. 17 Ibid. 
"Available from the BTS. 
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donor transplants will require a more active approach to the families of prospective 
recipients and this is required to be done with considerable care within nationally 
agreed guidelines and with reference to legal requirements. " 
19 
The 1995 Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report entitled, Human Tissue, Ethical and 
Legal Issues also concludes that there is a need to undertake more living donation. 
20 
However, the cautiousness of procurement recommendations in these reports tackles 
only the peripherary of the core issue of how a massive and rapidly spiralling gap 
between supply and demand is to be addressed. LDT is likely to be the central 
solution. It can clearly deliver the required increases. Currently, in virtually all 
transplant centres and countries, LDT contributes only a small percentage to the 
overall supply of organs (e. g. in most major transplant countries less than 10% of the 
volume of kidney transplants - see graphs 34-36 at pages 85-87). It can be projected 
that increasing LDT use to the point of it supplying between a quarter2l and a half of 
the total kidney organS22 used23 would result in demand being met in most major 
transplanting countries and organ distribution areas. 24 
Investigating LDT as a major provider of organs raises the stakes on finding a crystal 
clear resolution of core LDT ethical issues and the embodiment of these within a 
transparent regulatory framework. Legal and ethical issues are also very much a 
rationale for the research in their own right. The general legality of organ LDT is 
nowadays 25 well assured under general legal principles and in many jurisdictions, 
through explicit or implicit statutory authorisation. Nethertheless, LDT is a very 
important area for medical ethics and law. It raises novel ethical and legal issues and 
191bid at p34. 
20Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 28 Bedford Square, London WCIB 3EG. 
21E. g. USA, Denmark, Sweden, Norway (see graphs 33 and 34). 
22 This is so in Norway in some years (see graph 34). 
23 Some countries with lower transplant rates like Turkey, Japan and India almost exclusively rely on 
living donors, whilst Greece used to. In these countries it is low use of cadaveric transplantation that 
is the major obstacle to sufficiency. These countries provide examples of specific financial or 
religious / public attitude barriers to setting up an extensive cadaveric programme. 
24 See projection graphs 4-14 and 38-39 at pages 55-65 and 89-90 respectively 
25Historically the legality of organ LDT was questioned based on it involving risks and consequences to 
the donor without direct benefits and the argument that it constituted serious bodily harm falling outside 
the limits of what can be legally consented to. See for instance discussion of legality in the UK before 
the passing of HOTA in Bar Council Report of Organ Transplants, BMJ, 1971 (September), 716. 
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unusual variations to those raised in medical treatment generally. The uniqueness of 
LDT stems partly from the fact that neither the prospective donor or the prospective 
recipient is like a 'regular patient' - indeed the prospective donor is not a patient at all. 
A 'regular patient' may need to examine impact on family and/or friends as well as 
him/herself in reaching a rational decision about treatment. A prospective donor and 
recipient may need to do likewise but the difference is that the prospective donor and 
recipient must consider impact on each other to make a rational decision. The need 
tom make a decision collectively as well as individually binds donor and recipient 
uniquely together. Adding to the novelty of the situation is the fact that the 
prospective procedure is physiologically non-therapeutic for the prospective donor - 
not undertaken for his or her benefit in the ordinary sense, although psychological 
benefit may vicariously accrue to donors through undertaking the act 'altruistically' 
and/or through seeing the recipient become more healthy through receiving the organ. 
The application of ethical principles and philosophies is complex, multi-faceted and 
unusual in LDT. The most established philosophical theories used in medical ethics 
are deontological theory and consequentialism. 26 While deontological. theory insists 
that person's have intrinsic moral worth and should not be treated as means to the ends 
of other persons, consequentialism attempts to judge the rightness or 'wrongness' of 
an action by the consequences that flow from it. In it's extreme form this would 
allow people to be treated as ends for overall utility without reference to their rights as 
people. However Mill's modified utilitarianism somewhat integrates the two theories 
by stressing that respect for people as ends in themselves is essential for maximising 
overall Utility. 27 Extreme consequentialism is unacceptable because the individual is 
left continually vulnerable as noted by Gillon: 
".. if overall maximisation of welfare is the supreme moral objective the individual 
seems to be in permanent jeopardy before the overriding interests of society. , 28 
26 There is also totality theory which stems from Catholic moral theology and emphasises in the context 
of LDT that any body severability affects the physical completeness of a human being and is therefore 
an unacceptable interference with nature and God's order - other objections to LDT as a whole are 
outlined in chapter 1. 
27j. S. Mill emphasises this approach - see R. Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics, 1986. 2'R. Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics, 1986 at p25. 
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The result can also be state totalitarianism; where atrocities and abuses of power are 
justified in the name of social good. Medical treatment has historically included 
decisions based on extreme consequentialism - sterilisation on eugenics grounds is 
one example that has occurred in a number of countries within living memory with the 
backing of law. Today the importance of placing utility within the overriding 
context of respect for rights is widely accepted. Respect for the rights of prospective 
donors has been recognised as central to LDT by The Transplantation Society which, 
in The Statement of the Committee on Morals and Ethics, has declared that, 
"in all instances the risk to the donor and consideration of the donor's mental and 
physical health must be a primary consideration, and the benefit to the recipient 
,, 29 secondary. 
One of the key things to avoid in practice is members of the public being vulnerable to 
attempts to extract their organs without consent; a violation over and above that 
normally experienced where a medical procedure is not consented to because the act 
of donation is not for the donors benefit. In general this is easy to legislate against 
but what if there is a donor who is incapable of giving a legally valid consent? 
Should they be allowed to donate with their agreement? Be mandated to donate 
without their agreement? The prospect of such donation raises the issue of whether 
donation can reasonably be declared as in a donors best interests and if it can how can 
it be ensured that best interests rather than utilitarianism is the core reason for a 
decision to authorise donation in this situation? Another area where extreme 
utilitarianism can subtly occur is in the promotion of LDT to shorten waiting lists 
irrespective of whether it is the optimum remedium - an approach that could only be 
acceptable if it were a transparent non-compulsory policy where donor and recipient 
could freely choose living donation as an act of social solidarity. 
The 4 core principles of medical ethiCS30 - beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy 
and justice - are novel in their application to LDT - both in their own right and when 
29 Reprinted in Appendix I of WHO's Legislative Responses To Organ Transplantation, Martinus 
Nyhoff, 1994. 
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meshed with philosophical theories. While it is usual to encounter beneficence and 
non-maleficence in the consideration of limits placed on acceptable rationale for 
conducting medical procedures, such procedures do not normally involve a need to 
balance up the equation in the context of two people (the donor and the recipient) as 
individuals and as a pair. What does the fact that the donor is acting as a 'rescuer' 
mean for the circumscription of self-determination by non-maleficence - for instance 
the circumscription of levels of permissible detriment o the donor? 3 I What impact 
do beneficence and non-maleficence considerations - for the recipient, medical 
enterprise and the donor - have on determination of what level of financial exchange is 
legitimate in LDT? While dangers of utilitarian abuse amplify the need for informed 
consent, do these dangers simultaneously mean scope for detriment o the donor, and 
hence donor autonomy, should be stringently limited - more so than in an 'average' 
medical procedure? What 'supporting role, ' if any, can beneficence for the 
prospective recipient play in assessing limits to detriment a donor may undergo? 
What variations occur if the donor is incompetent? Can a societal or judicial 
conception of utility ever outweigh individual rights and autonomy, for instance via 
the development of a system that procures more cadaveric organs by presuming, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, consent of deceased persons to organ removal 
or insertion of a catheter or living persons to elective ventilation? 
Critical ethical questions, such as these, have to be analysed both in their own right 
and within the context of a 3-way interaction with practice and regulation. In this 
Phd, increased understanding of the ethical and legal dimensions of research hitherto 
conducted with the actors involved in the LDT process and a programme of 
questionnaires unique and wide ranging in their content and number of jurisdictions 
30Developed by Beauchamp and Chidress (see Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University 
Press, 1994) subjected to a certain amount of criticism (see for instance S. Holm, Not Just Autonomy - The principles of American Biomedical Ethics, JMedEth, 1995,21,332-338) but widely accepted 
and applied and cogently defended by Raanan Gillon who amongst his conclusions states that, "very few critics argue that any one of the four principles in incompatible with his or her preferred theory or 
approach to biomedical ethics" (Defending 'the four principles' approach to biomedical ethics, JMed Eth, 1995,21,323-324 at 324). 
"See chapter 6. 
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covered. 32 The main empirical data from this new programme and previous research 
consists of. 
" Statistical information relating to such matters as current waiting lists and use of 
cadaveric and living donor transplantation world-wide is supplemented by 
statistical information on these issues from transplant centres throughout Europe, 
derived from responses to the European Transplant Centre Questionnaire. 
"A Professional Attitudes Questionnaire addresses important clinical and ethical 
issues such as the circumstances in which transplant professionals will consider 
undertaking LDT, prefer it to cadaveric donation and their general receptivity to 
LDT. It also yields specific information on core LDT ethico-legal issues. 
" Questionnaire based interviews with donors and recipients provide further feedback 
on the core ethico-legal issues. 
" Numerical values are assigned to European LDT statutory provisions both as an 
analysis in it's own right and to enable correlation of law, practice and attitudes. 
Aside from empirical and strictly ethical aspects, it was apparent that no-one had yet 
discussed all the key ethico-legal dimensions of LDT within one document. 
Examinations of transplant law such as Fuenzalida-Puelma! s survey of legislation 
pertaining to 16 South American. countries, 33 the World Health Organization's recent 
book 'Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation 34 and EUROTOLD's 
LEGISEARCH database 35 are basically foundations for analysis of the ethico-legal 
dimensions of LDT. A regulatory framework for LDT is the main method of 
stipulating the ethical parameters within which LDT may acceptably take place. 
32 There was a study of attitudes amongst 148 European Transplant Centres (see Editorial, Lancet, 
1982, ii, 696) but this was back in the early 1980's and covered a much narrower range of countries 
than the EUROTOLD investigation. The EUROTOLD project has also developed a Donor Health Registry with a donor health form designed to elicit information about tests conducted on donors and 
the medical consequences of donation. Data return is still in it's infancy and consequently this work is 
not significantly discussed. The central intention of the form and Registry is to elicit a large body of data on the long term health consequences of donation. This will have important consequences in helping to assess any long term risks of donating a kidney, integrating this assessment into information 
provided to potential living donors and recipients and whether the amount of risk is ethically acceptable 
and within legally permissible limits. 
33 Organ Transplantation: The Latin American Legislative Response. In S. S. Connor and Fuenzalida- 
Puelma (eds. ) Bioethics: Issues and Perspectives, Pan American Health Organization, 1990,67-86. 34MartinUS Nyhoff 5 , 1994. 3'Available on the internet at http: //maths. ac. uk: 2080/MedStats/Eurotold 
9 
LDT is a classic example of Price's observation that the time has arrived when 
medical decision making has come to be perceived as a matter of public, and not just 
36 private, concern. Eser has identified 3 functions of law, which as Price has noted, 
are all appropriate to LDT. 37 Firstly, the norm setting function, reinforcing certain 
values and interests as requiring protection against infringement. Secondly, a 
protective function, balancing the protected values against other interests, providing 
sanctions for abuses and minimising risks to patients and others. Thirdly, a 
regulative or declarative function, securing clarity and certainty in handling 
controversial areas. In addition, creating an appropriate framework for LDT 
involves considering the roles of national policy and professional guidelines, centre 
policy and attitudes and the interests of potential donors and recipients. The key 
issues examined include: 
e the legality of LDT and legal preconditions for conducting it; 
* practitioner disclosure of information pertaining to LDT to donors and recipients 
and requirements of ensuring that information disclosed is understood; 
* voluntariness and pressure in LDT, including limits on certain classes of donor in 
this context and acceptable levels of informedness that voluntarism implies; 
" issues relating to competency and legality of donation in the context of minority 
and adult incapacity; and 
" financial exchange in LDT including the buying and selling or organs for profit and 
other levels of payment particularly as they relate to the donor. 
Depth of investigation in these areas is built on a unique world-wide comparative 
analysis of transplant legislation and general principles of law as they relate to LDT. 
1.2. Research Methodoloj! ies Adopted. 
The field of research methodology includes a multiplicity of often irreconcilable 
philosophical theories and an even greater number of approaches based upon them. 38 
36 D. P. Price, The Scope and Function of Living Organ Donor Transplant Laws, Trans Proc, Dec 1996. 37Sce Price ibid. 
38See e. g. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds. ), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage, 1994. 
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Theories can be broadly divided into two categories, those based on positivism and 
those adopting an alternative approach. Respectively these categories have spawned 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. There is an increasing tendency toward 
hybridisation, with researchers from each category becoming more eclectic in their 
approach. 39 This research reflects that trend and uses a wide range of approaches and 
techniques. 40 
Positivism is included in the research via the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables i. e. quantitative methodology. 
41 This can particularly 
be seen in chapter 9 which assesses professionals attitudes and practice in living donor 
transplantation. However, the overarching approach to this investigation is 
f CUS42 qualitative in respect of it's multi-method 0 and deliberate attempt to gain an in- 
depth and rounded understanding of the subject matter. The main methods used 
were: 
Comparativism (in chapters 4-8 for investigating different ethical approaches to 
understanding and resolving major ethical issues in LDT and different legal 
frameworks of regulation43 and in chapters 2-3 and 9-10 attitudes, practice and 
experience in LDT are the subject of comparative analysis); 
Psychology (assessing motivations in donation and other aspects of the consent 
process including informing of prospective donors and examination of pressure and 
voluntarism and a person-centred psychological approach was used in donors and 
recipient interviews and in an analysis of consent theory, practice and law"); 
391bid at p5. 
40 See e. g. C. Nelson et al., Cultural Studies, In L. Gossberg et al., Cultural Studies, Routledge, 1992, 
1-16. 
4 'The basic tenets of pure positivism are rejected for several reasons: Firstly the central tenet of pure 
positivism as "value free objectivist science" is incongruent with the whole notion of ethical 
investigation as an evaluation of the relative merits of different value systems (J. W. Carey, 
Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, Unwin Hyman, 1989 at p99). Secondly it 
is clear to this author that value choices are inevitably made throughout research Value choices are 
expressed in the design and aim of the research, the actual collection of data, the interpretation of the 
findings and the use that is made of them (T. May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, 
Open University Press, 1993,35). 
"J. Brewer and A. Hunter, Multimethod Research: A Synthesis of Styles, Sage, 1989. 
"'Comparativism can be defined as an analysis of different practices and attitudes in order to note and 
understand similarities and differences and to investigate underlying patterns of development. 
44 See Chapter 9 for further details of this approach. 
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More obviously, legal and ethical approaches to analysis were adopted. These 
were respectively based on conventions such as statutory interpretation and use of 
precedent and applying and balancing different philosophical theories (as they 
relate to medical ethics) and core principles of medical ethics. 
1.3. Research Tools and Techniques. 
Research tools were used including: 
" Literature searches and surveys; 
" development and use of electronic databases for the systematic categorisation and 
efficient organisation and retrieval of information such as addresses, bibliography 
and empirical data; 
" questionnaire surveys and face-to-face/telephone interviews to garner information 
from a sample of professionals and participants to learn about these populations as 
a whole 45 and draw out data and issues of wider significance including a relevant 
ethical and legal framework for living donor transplantation; and 
" statistics as a tool for the analysis of questionnaire and interview data and for 
understanding other issues including those relating to supply and demand in organ 
procurement. 
The main research technique used is coding. The purpose of coding has been 
defined as developing answers "into meaningful categories, so as to bring out their 
essential patterns. t06 In chapters 9 and 10 coding is used in its widest sense - as a 
broad "process of categorising and sorting data', 47 _ to organise data arising from the 
empirical research with professionals and participants. In chapter 10 coding is used 
with the professional questionnaires and statistical analysis of laws in its more strict 
context as a statistical system of values assigned to responses with emergent data 
cross correlated. The donor-recipient sample presented in chapter 9 produces vital 
45R. Ferber et al., What is a Survey?, American Statistical Association, 1980,3. 46C Moser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation, Heinemann, 19 3,414. 47K. 8 Charmaz, The Grounded Theory Method: An Explication and Interpretation, in R. M. Emerson (ed), Contemporary Field Research, Little Brown, 1983,111. 
12 
qualitative data but was not coded in this strict manner because it was not a formal or 
p 
large enough sample from which to make probability theory based estimates of living 
donor and recipient population characteristics. 
Miles and Hubennan have distinguished between descriptive, interpretative, 
explanatory and astringent codes. 48 This research displays all four of these 
dimensions of coding. In chapters 9 and 10 data is sorted and categorised according 
to the goals of describing it, explaining it and interpreting it but in chapter 10 the 
astringent code is also used - i. e. massive amounts of data are astringently drawn 
together to produce highly refined data, in this case professional responses to a large 
number of hypothetical case studies are coded to produce simple scales of favourable 
non-favourable attitudes towards different forms of renal treatment. 
1.4. Professional Research Ethics. 
Questions of professional research ethics arose and were addressed as follows: 
9 The patient interview and questionnaire aspect of the research was discussed 
extensively amongst a multi-disciplinary team before being passed on to the 
relevant ethical committees for approval. Participants gave informed consent 
prior to taking part and, in the case of the semi-structured interviews, given the 
49 option of not having them taped . Data relating to patients has been kept in a 
secure space and data protection laws and ethics have been observed. 50 Research 
findings relating to donors and recipients have been written up with pseudonyms 
in some cases and anonymously in others. Care has been taken to exclude 
sensitive information of a kind that may be liable to distress donor and recipient 
participants. I utilised my counselling knowledge and skills during interviews 
and made myself available for feedback wherever practicable, particularly where 
sensitive issues were raised. 
It 
48 Qualititive Data Analysis, Sage, 1984,57. 
49 See chapter 9.2. - the fully structured interviews were not tape recorded. 501ncluding not keeping identifying patient details on computer files. 
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* The professional questionnaires were widely distributed amongst experts coming 
from several different specialisms and having varying degrees of involvement in 
transplantation processes. A key aspect of this process was to ensure any bias 
toward or against particular modalities of conventional treatment of organ disease 
was eliminated. Case studies were also used to avoid an obviously 'defensive' 
approach and to assess attitudes subtly. 
1.5. Limitations of the Investigation. 
The primary limitation of the investigation is that in the absence of an empirical 
comparison of naturopathic and allopathic 'treatment' of organ disease the latter, 
involving replacement therapy and (in the case of kidneys) dialysis, is assumed to be 
beneficent. The basic ethical principle, enshrined in a number of transplant laws, 51 
that transplantation should not infringe 'primum non nocere' indicates potential value 
in comparison of holistic-naturopathic and allopathic approaches given that the 
former, if successful, could deliver more optimal quality of life outcomes in 
treatment of organ disease - i. e. return of the body to a state of balanced health rather 
than reasonable, but restricted, quality of life and life expectancy. 52 Another valid 
reason for such a study is that the mechanistic paradigm of science within which the 
allopathic approach is set has been subject to strenuous criticism on several levels 
including it's characterisation as being: 
5'See chapter 6. 
52 Quality of life outcomes in the mechanistic approach can be approximated as follows: Transplants last 
about a decade on average with the need for further transplants. There is an ever more acute shortage 
of organs. Waiting lists in different centres and countries vary but UK figures, which reflect a typical 
European position, show a patient will typically wait around two years for a kidney transplant (Gilks 
WE, Bradley BA et al. 'Predicting Waiting Time For a Beneficially Matched Graft', Trans Proc, 
1987,19,3640-1; waiting time has increased since this study). A patient may be on dialysis while 
waiting, or in the event of this not being available or suitable, a transplant is usually required quickly 
to avert death. LDT can avert the consequences of waiting which are deleterious even for patients on dialysis. Transplantation invariably involves the necessity of a drugs regime except where organs have 
a perfect or near perfect match as is the case with identical twins (making LDT a cheap option in such instances). Drugs are used to suppress the immune system which would naturally reject the foreign 
material. This is a non-holistic process with drugs causing 'toxic side effects' as a consequence of the 
suppression. Steroids and cyclosporine are commonly prescribed on a permanent or long term basis - the latter has been described as having effects including; "tremors, convulsions, swelling and inflammation of the gums, abnormal growth of body hair and increased incidence of lymphoma and 
Kaposi's sarcoma. " New York Task Force, 1988 at p20. Hypertension, hepatitis and cancer are also described as risks and the toxic impact can contribute negatively to internal organs including kidneys (Task Force at p14). Ironically drugs can even toxify the transplanted organ. The full impact of 
these drugs is uncertain. 
14 
nik 53 abusive of power in its historical suppression of a more holistic approach and it's 
contemporary consequences; 54 
9 iatrogenic, 55 fostering it's own counterproduCtiVity56 and in general a major threat 
to health in terms of it's empirical consequences; 57 
* misguided in it's costly dominant focus on treatment rather than prevention 58 with, 
ironically, the failure of health - which has been fostered by the very limited 
53 Historically a new male dominated profession destroying what was ostensibly community medicine 
based on more holistic principles and administered mainly by women (see e. g. D. Ehenrich and 
B. English, Witches, Midwives and Nurses: A History of Women Healers, The Feminist Press, 1973; 
A. Rich, Of Women Bom: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, Bantam, 1979; M. Daly, 
Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Beacon Press, 1978) 5411lich states that, "during the last generations the medical monopoly over health care has expanded 
without checks and has encroached on our liberty with regard to our own bodies. Society has 
transferred to physicians the exclusive right to determine what constitutes sickness, who is or might 
become sick, and what shall be done to such people ... The social commitment to provide citizens with 
almost unlimited outputs from the medical system threatens to destroy the environmental and cultural 
conditions needed by people to live a life of constant autonomous healing" (Limits to Medicine, 
Penguin Books, 1977 at 13-14). Transplantation itself is at the forefront of the centralisation of 
medicine and it's technical advance, "(t)herapies such as organ transplantation, open heart surgery and 
cancer chemotherapy move medicine one step further toward the bureaucratization, organization and 
specialization that is characteristic of almost every sphere in modem industrial society, particularly 
those influenced by technological advances. Medicine is becoming more of a specialized team 
operation and less of a relationship between an individual family physician and his patient" 
(R. G. Simmons et al., Gift of Life, 1977, Wiley and Sons, p380). Ironically, treatments forged 
within an allopathic system of responding to organ disease can become a justification for the limited 
attention paid to a truly patient-centred approach because they are difficult or impossible to operate at a 
grass roots level, "only relatively large hospitals can support so many personnel and special facilities. 
Transplantation, therefore, like other advanced medical technologies, tends to be concentrated in a 
number of large centers throughout the country... patients must adjust to the new experience of 
travelling away from their communities to these centers for medical treatment. " (R. G. Simmons, Gift 
ofLife, WileyandSons, 1977, p382). 
55p E. Sartwell, 'latrogenic Disease: An Epidemiological Perspective, International Journal ofHealth 
Services, 1974(winter), 89-93. 
561t 
.. some drugs are addictive, others mutilating, and others mutagenic, although perhaps only in 
combination with food colouring or insecticides. Insomepatients, antibiotics alter the normal bacterial flora and induce a superinfection, permitting more resistant organisms to proliferate and invade the host. Other drugs contribute to the breeding of drug resistant strains of bacteria.... Unnecessary surgery is a standard procedure ..... In a complex technological hospital, negligence becomes 'random human error' or 'system breakdown', callousness becomes 'scientific detatchmenf, 
and incompetence becomes 'a lack of specialized equipment! The depersonalization of diagnosis and therapy has changed malpractice from an ethical into a technical problem. " Illich, Limits To Medicine, 
Penguin, 1977 at 39. 
5711lich suggested that the medical system has become 'sickening' for three reasons; "Itmustproduce 
clinical damage that outweighs it's potential benefits: it cannot but enhance even as it obscures the 
political conditions that render society unhealthy: and it tends to mystify and expropriate the power of the individual to heal himself and to shape his or her environment .... The medical and paramedical monopoly over hygenic methodology and technology is an example of the political misuse of scientific 
achievement to strengthen industrial rather than personal growth. " Limits to Medicine, Penguin, 1977 
at 16. 
"Ethical issues are raised about the cost of health care including conventional treatments of organ disease, ".. now questions are being raised about the cost of saving lives that could not be saved before. 
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resources allocated for successful prevention - regularly used to support the 
introduction of expensive new treatments; 59 and 
9 based on an outmoded paradigm of science which has been superseded by a more 
holistic approach. 60 
Of course there are also more absolute criticisms of transplantation itself that should 
be mentioned including the view that it is an unacceptably artificial method of 
prolonging life; a view that can be connected with religious and spiritual perspectives 
concerning the nature of personhood, the acceptability of using another person! s body 
part 61 or simply the observation that its use relies on the 'artificiality' of suppression 
of intrinsic human functions. 62 
Should scientists be encouraged to develop expensive technologies that potentially can extend the lives 
of select groups of the fatally ill? ... in some ways the experience of organ transplantation parallels other less dramatic but almost equally expensive therapies and alerts us to the possible effects of future 
medical advances. " R. G. Simmons et al, The Gift of Life, 1977, Wiley & Sons, p3. 591n some sense those making profit out of mechanistic technologies have commercial vested interest in 
ill-health and a specific interest in propaganda that de/7ects attentionfrom effective prevention or non- 
mechanistic treatment ofdisease because it's consequence would be lower profitfor them. 60The Newtonian so-called 'mechanistic' paradigm of physics which gave rise to the medical model has been superseded by a quantum paradigm taken by most prominent 20th century scientists as indicating a humanistic, holistic basis for science (Rychlak, The Psychology of Rigorous Humanism, Wiley, 1977 
at 193). Bohm has suggested that, "we must drop the mechanistic order" (Wholeness and The 
Implicate Order, Routledge andKegan Paul, 1980,175). Dossey has noted that, "(w)e have built a 
model of health and illness, birth and death, around an outmoded conceptual model of how the 
universe behaves, one which was fundamentally flawed from the beginning. While the physicists 
have been painfully eliminating the flaws in their own models, we have in medicine ignored these 
revisions totally. We find ourselves thus with a set of guiding beliefs that are as antiquated as are body humors, leeching and bleeding" (Space, Time and Medicine, Shambala, 1982). 6 'The use of cadaveric transplantation meets objections regarding interfering with'the process of death! 
and this has resulted in minimal use in countries Re Japan. Some Muslim communities have low 
procurement rates coinciding with religious objections (EUROTOLD discovered this in Leicester for 
instance). 
6211lich, Limits to Medicine, Penguin, 1977 at p179. Even stronger objections exist to the 
experimentation and proposed use of animal organs. Many animals have died in this process and the development of transgenics is seeing the breeding of new Imutagenic' species of animals raising 
fundamental ethical questions. 
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Chapter 2 The LDT Context - Evaluatins! the Oman Shortfall and 
Possibilities for Expandins! Cadaveric Procurement. 
2.1. Introduction 
The justification for a medical procedure in an individual case can rarely be simply that 
its benefits outweigh its detriments. Usually other options must also be considered. In 
transplantation donor detriment in LDT sets up a presumption in favour of using CDT 
which would be almost the exclusive source of organs but for the organ shortage. The 
critical first step in uncovering the circumstances for justifiable use of LDT is to evaluate 
the current extent of the shortfall in organs and ifs significance and determine the ethical 
and practical limits to addressing the shortfall through increased levels of CDT. 
2.2. Evaluation of the Extent of the Or2an 'Shortfall. ' 
Since the 1950's, transplantation rates have been rapidly increasing but it was not until 
the 1980's and the advent of cyclosporine that they started to reach a very significant 
level. Increasing 'success rates' for organ transplantation, and escalating diagnosed 
incidence of organ disease (particularly ESRF), have fuelled the demand for organs. 
2.2.1. Waiting List Trends. 
The 1990's trend as a whole has been one of significant increases in the number of people 
waiting for kidneys. ' USA 2 Bel giUM, 3 Germany, 4 Greece5 and The NetherlandS6 are 
individual countries which potently reflect this. The EUROTRANSPLANT kidney 
transplant waiting list increased from 9,445 in 1989 to 12,849 in 1995 while the 
UKTSSA list increased from 3,704 in 1989 to 5,286 in June 1996. However, there is a 
sub-trend, with a few major transplant regions having reduced waiting lists including 
SCANDIATRANSPLANT (Scandinavia) 7 EFG (France)8 and most remarkably ONT 
1 Graphs 2 and 3- see pages 53 and 54. 
2 Graph2 -seepage 53. From 1989 to 1995 more than 11000 have been added to the US waiting list 
representing an increase of approximately two thirds. 
3 Graph 7- see page 58. 
4 Graph 9- see page 60. 
5Graph 10 - see page 61. 6 Graph II- see page 62. 
7 SCANDIATRANSPLANT down from 1214 in 1992 to 944 in 1994. 
8 See Graph 8 at page 59, EFG down from 4529 to 4516 in 1994. 
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(Spain)9 which has been adopting a much more rigorous and co-ordinated procurement 
policy. ' 0 Outside of kidney transplantation the trend in liver, pancreas and heart lung is 
almost pan European increases which are mirrored in the United States. 11 
Exceptionally, heart procurement rates have stabilised or decreased in most areas. 12 
2.2.2. Organ Procurement Levels. 
Overall, kidney organ procurement levels per million population during the 1990's are 
relatively stable. Typical figures are: EUROTRANSPLANT 28.7 p. m. p. in 1992 to 
28.8 p. m. p. in 1995; SCANDIATRANSPLANT 37.5 p. m. p. in 1992 to 34.4 p. m. p. in 
1995; UKTSSA 29.9 p. m. p. in 1992 to 31.2 p. m. p. in 1995; 13 and LUSO Transplant 
36.7 in 1992 to 37 p. m. p. in 1995.14 
The period 1992-1995 confirms the assessment of 1990-1992 by the authors of the Kings 
Fund Report that the 1990's have seen a plateau in procurement following large increases 
sustained in the 1980's. 15 There are a few exceptions to this trend - e. g. Spain increasing 
it's kidney transplantation quite sharply from 38.8 p. m. p. in 1992 to 46.9 in 1995 and, 
conversely, France decreasing from 30.5 p. m. p. in 1992 to about 26 in 1995. 
Inside the above 'Western block' countries, only Italy and Greece have kidney 
transplantation rates that are very low, whereas, in most other countries of the world 
there is an almost universally low rate of kidney transplantation P. M. P. 16 Of former 
Central and Eastern European countries the average rate of transplantation p. m. p. is very 
low, 17 the Czech Republic excepted. 18 Countries like Romania and Bulgaria have 
negligible transplantation and Albania has yet to start a programme. Outside Europe / 
9See Graph 13 at page 64. ONT down from 5151 in 1992 to 4621 in 1994 10See 2.3.2.4. 
"See respectively Council of Europe report on transplantation (1996) and UNOS statistics. 12 Ibid. 
13 See Graph 17 at page 68. 
14 Ibid. 
15B. New et al., Research Report 18 at p 15. 
16South America typifies this position; Argentina has one of it's higher procurement rates of approximately 4 p. m. p. - about one sixth of the average European country (see O. Lopez Blanco, Significant Increases of Organ Procurement in Argentina, 1992-1994, TransProc, 1996,28(l), 98-100). 17 See Graph 19 at page 70. 
18Liason with Ferenc Perner, Semmelweis Medical Institute, Budapest, Hungary (PECO Participant) 
informed the EUROTOLD project of the high rate in the Czech Republic which has now joined EUROTRANSPLANT. 
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USA only a handful of countries, including Israel and Cyprus'9 have a reasonable rate of 
kidney transplantation p. m. p. 
2.2.3. Conclusions on the Extent of Organ Shortfall. 
Comparisons of respective national positions must be approximate and generalised 
because of variations in the criteria used for acceptance onto the waiting liSt. 
20 In 1989, 
G. Koostra et al., 21 stated that in Western Europe less than half of those persons deemed 
suitable for organ transplant therapy are transplanted. The situation has become 
progressively worse with a spiralling supply and demand gap in most transplant areas. 22 
Whilst at least 40 kidneys p. m. p. are typically required to match demand there are only 
about 12 countries world-wide whose rate of kidney transplantation reaches above 30 
P. M. P. 23 Nethertheless, a few countries (e. g. Belgium, Austria, Eire, Portugal and 
Spain) reach high levels of kidney transplantation p. m. p. with only low percentage use of 
living donation. 24 Spain and Eire have reduced the gap between supply and demand 
whilst relying almost solely on cadaveric donation. Analysis of the options for 
improving cadaveric procurement may provide some clues as to whether such success 
without reliance on LDT can be replicated in other countries. 
2.3. Practical and Ethical Viability of Utilising Cadaveric Procurement 
Solutions to the OrIjan Shortage. 
The primary cause of the organ shortage, in a system that views transplant as the 'gold 
standard' response -to organ disease, is the increasing incidence of end stage renal 
19See Graph 18 at page 69. 
2OAustria, Belgium and West Germany have high waiting lists per million population compared with most 
other European countries but they also have high acceptance for transplant rates and high transplant rates. 
Cohen and Persijn, 1992, Eurotransplant Foundation Annual Report 199 1, EUROTRANspLANT 
Foundation, Leiden, Netherlands. Also EDTA 1992 statistical report. The position is even more 
contrasted with the United States of America which has a very broad treatment programme, "the USA 
treatment rate (incidence) was 2.2 times higher than in Canada and 3.8 times higher than the combined 
European rate. Only one European country, Austria, had a treatment rate more than half as high as that of 
the United States. " J. K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: The End Stage Renal Disease 
Programme, NewEngJMed, 1993,328(5), 366-371 
21TransProc, 1989,20,809. 
22 See Graphs 1-13 at p52-64. 
23 See Graph 19 particularly at p70. 
24 See Graph 17 at page 68 and Graph 35 at page 86. 
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failure. 25 This means that for supply to meet demand increases in procurement will be 
needed to clear current waiting lists and further increases will be needed to match 
increasing levels of demand. If transplantation is the treatment of choice for most non- 
marginal ESRF sufferers, powerful strategies are needed to optimise procurement. 
Cadaveric strategies can be divided into 3 areas: 
" First, those utilising methods involving new classes of donors; 
" Secondly, organisational factors internally and in relation to society; and 
" Thirdly, societal factors. 
2.3.1. Utilising Methods Involving New Classes of Cadaveric Donor. 
Price has highlighted the vagueness and ambiguity surrounding ethical and legal issues in 
elective ventilation and use of non-heart beating donors. 26 Both these methods need 
examination as strategies that could potentially yield large increases in organ 
procurement. 
2.3.1.1. Use of Non-Heart Beating Donors. 
Procurement could be increased by around 20-40% with use of non-heart beating donors 
(NHBD's). 27 The 2 methods for use are,, firstly, inserting of a catheter tube through 
the groin area of the deceased into the cadaver by which means the kidney can be chilled 
in situ as a stop-gap measure to maintain the organ until relatives are available to offer 
consent (or refusal) to organ removal; and, secondly, the University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center protocol where patients with profound brain damage are removed from 
ventilatory support, with relatives' or patients' consent and their organs are removed after 
death. The first approach has the advantage of not presuming consent of the deceased to 
25 For instance the quantity of people registered as having end stage renal disease registered in the United 
States of America more than doubled between 1975 and 1988 see 899-900 ibid. 
26 DPT Price, Organ Transplant Initiatives: The Twilight Zone, J Med Eth, 1997,23,170-175 at 170. 27 See e. g. R. Schlumpf et al., Transplantation of Kidneys From Non-Heart-Beating Donors: Protocol, 
Cardiac Death Diagnosis, and Results, Trans Proc, 1996,28(l), 107-100; G. Kootstra et al., Twenty Per 
Cent More Kidneys Through a Non-Heart Beating Programme, Trans Proc, 1991,23,910-911 and 
Daeman et al. 's more recent study at Koostra's Maastricht centre which indicated that a non-heart beating 
programme contributes 40% (J. H. C. Daeman, Non Heart-Beating Donor Program Contributes 40% of 
Kidneys For Transplantation, Trans Proc, 1996,28(l), 105-106). In this procedure kidneys can be 
removed after the cessation of heartbeat - studies indicate this is feasible up to 110 minutes after cessation 
of heart beat. For ethical analysis of this area see F. Th. De Charro et al., Donor Recruitment in F. Th. De 
Charro, et al., Europe in Systems of Donor Recruitment, Kluwer, 1992,5 
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organ removal but is applying presumed consent to insertion of the catheter! The Kings 
Fund Institute Report stated that, 
"such a small scale procedure may prove ethically acceptable. But if presumed consent 
legislation proves unacceptable, the precise ethical distinction between inserting a 
catheter and removing an organ should be clarified. Such a distinction is not obvious - 
both involve cutting a corpse without consent. There is a danger of inconsistency here. 
Ultimately, the ethical issues revolve around consent in both cases, and not the nature of 
the act to which consent is, or is not, presumed. 08 
If such a procedure can rightly be sanctioned at all, it should be subject to specific 
enabling legislation and wide public and professional agreement. The prima facie case 
is to prioritise LDT's that involve low levels of prospective detriment above the use of a 
method that violates the right to choose the manner of treatment of one's body after death. 
death. As a matter of degree, however, use of the catheter method is preferable to a 
presumed consent organ procurement system. It is also preferable to the Pittsburgh 
protocol under which organs are removed after 2 minutes of 'irreversible' loss of cardiac 
function which is before brain stem death has occurred. Even accepting the reliance on 
cardiopulmonary criteria for establishing death, 2 minutes of loss of function is not proof 
of irreversibility. The protocol, by current standards, must be regarded as unacceptable 
as through causing grievous bodily harm to a living person. 29 Evidence of consent by 
the patient (e. g. through an advance directive) cannot be sufficient to justify this harm but 
could justify use of the catheter method of removal. 
2.3.1.2. Elective Ventilation. 
The Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital was the first British hospital to develop an elective 
30 
ventilation protocol. This involved, with relatives consent, transferring patients in 
deep irreversible coma and believed to be dying imminently of intracranial haemorrhage 
to intensive care, so that artificial ventilation could be commenced immediately 
respiratory arrest occurred and until brain stem death tests could be satisfied. The organ 
2813ill New et al., * Kings Fund Research Report, 18at66. 
29For a further discussion of the ethical and legal issues arising from this method of NHBD use see DPT Price, Organ Transplant Initiatives: The Twilight Zone, JMedEth, 1997,23,170-175. 
30Feest T, Riad H et al., Protocol for Increasing Organ Donation After Cerebrovascular deaths in a District General Hospital, Lancet, 1990,335,1133-1135. 
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procurement result was evaluated as a 50% increase in organs over a four year period. 
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The Kings Fund Report suggested that, 
"Elective ventilation has provided initial evidence of a substantial impact on donation 
rates; implementation of this procedure is recommended if legal and ethical questions 
relating to the interests of the potential donor can be resolved. 02 
Elective ventilation for transplantation purposes was declared an unlawful battery by the 
Health Departments of England and Wales in guidelines of October 1994.33 The legal 
problem stems from the fact that the procedure is not in the patients best interests. The 
BMA has called upon the government to introduce legislation permitting use of elective 
ventilation for organ transplantation. 34 However, with a living patientýs there are not 
just legal but ethical concerns to evaluate, including: the view that "deliberately 
prolonging a patienfs dying is unacceptable for any reason; "36 the possibility that it might 
increase the number of patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS); and the view that 
scouting around an ICU unit for organs offends the dignity of the dying process. 37 
3 1B. New et al., Kings Fund Research Report, 18 at 55. An opponent of elective ventilation has pointed 
out that the number of donors involved was not statistically significant (G. Routh, Elective Ventilation For 
Organ Donation - The Case Against, Care of The Critically 111,1992,8,60-61). However, the increase 
is so extensive as to warrant further investigation. Attention has been drawn "to the relatively small impact 
such a policy would have on the intensive care community, whilst having a potentially enonnous impact on 
transplant activity. " B. New et al., (Kings Fund Report, 18 at 56). Estimated that it a national system 
would result in 0.46% extra usage of ICU beds. 32 B. New et al., Kings Fund Research Report, 18 at p8 
33 The use of elective ventilation before the establishment of brain stem death would constitute a battery in 
law unless prior consent was obtained form the patient. Prior consent from the relatives is not adequate 
because even in cases of incapacity any treatment must be in the patient's best interests which elective 
ventilation is not in such an instance as this where it is simply to facilitate the successful utilisation of the 
patient's organs. The alternative would be where a patient has made an advance directive consenting to 
this procedure but the legal validity of advance directives is uncertain. For the challenge to the legality of 
LDT see A. Somerville, Medical Ethics Today: It's Practice and Philosophy, BAM, 1993. The PIVOT 
(the potential of elective ventilation for organ transplantation) study was proposed to examine issues in 
elective ventilation but was abandoned due to the questionable legality of elective ventilation (Kings Fund 
Report, B. New et al. at 5 6). 
34 Report of the BTS Working Party on Organ Transplantation, BTS, 1995 at p32 351t is hardly convincing, and runs against the brain stem death test, to suggest hat "such patients die when 
breathing ceases; elective ventilation does not prolong the act of dying, for one is ventilating a corpse" 
(A. Nicholls and H-Riad, Organ Donation (letter), BMJ, 1993,306,517-518). 
36 G. R. Park et al., Organ donation (letter) BMJ, 1993,306,145. 
37Concerns exist that the procedure might leave a number of persons in a persistent vegetative state and also 
that it offends the dignity of the dying process, "I take exception to the idea ... that we should scant around the wards, look for patients about to die and take them to the Intensive Care Unit, intubate them and 
ventilate them until they are brain dead so that their organs can be used for the purposes of transplantation" 
(D. Bihari (1993) quoted from the Kings Funds Report at p65). 
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Justifying the procedure as not being against the patients best interests may be acceptable 
but only where this reflects the clear will of the patient (e. g. expressed in an advanced 
directive) rather than simply the utilitarian ideals of professionals and/or relatives. 
Elective ventilation reflecting the patienfs will may be acceptable (perhaps somewhat 
excepting concerns about PVS) - although it will not be likely to greatly increase organ 
procurement rates in the short term. 38 
2.3.2. Organisational Factors in Cadaveric Procurement. 
Several changes in the organisational structuring of the procurement system might 
increase organs available for transplantation. 
2.3.2.1. Links Between I. C. U. s and Transplant Units. 
Better links between I. C. U. 's and transplant Units may result in a significant increase in 
available organs. Gore's survey of intensive care units in the UK indicates that better 
funding of ICU's may be required. 39 This is confirmed in the BTS report which calls for 
urgent address of the national shortage of ICU beds having concluded that "ICU provision 
may be an important constraint on organ donor numbers. vOO 
2.3.2.2. Size of Procurement Area. 
Evidence from the US indicates that organ procurement organisation size is correlated to 
public willingness to donate cadaver organs, smaller organisations having more 
success. 41 Spain's localised co-ordination and procurement systen, 42 may have 
positively impacted its transplant rates in the 1990's. 
Any future proposal to use elective ventilation will need to take account of public attitudes as it is well 
documented that these can have a serious impact on donation rates (See T. Patel, France's Troubled 
Transplant Trade, New Scientist, 1993,3 July, 12-13). 
MAdvance directives are only enforcable in some jurisdictions and, equally to the point, they are not 
commonly made in most. 
390ften competition for beds leads to a practitioner withdrawing or not instituting ventilatory or 
haemodynamic support which can lead to potential donors failing to become actual donors. See 
S. M. Gore, Intensive Care Unit Funding: Survey of Staffing and Bed Occupancy in November 1989, Care 
of The Critically 111,1991,8,79-80. 
40BTS Working Party Report on Organ Donation, BTS, 1995 at p29 
4 'Probably because of the more personal contact available, lesser transportation times and a knowledge 
amongst the relevant local community that those around them will be the ones to benefit (July 1990 Report 
of the United Network for Organ Sharing reported by F. Rapaport et al., Trans Proc, 1991,23,899-900). 
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2.3.2.3. Geollraphical and Infrastructural. 
The geography and infrastructure of a country and it's spread of transplant centres are a 
potential factor influencing procurement, 
"In general, the less densely populated a country the longer the average distance between 
hospitals, transplant centres, and those suffering from a cerebrovascular ccident. All 
these factors will make it harder to reach and transport patients to ICU, and more 
difficult and time consuming to collect and transport organs without affecting their 
suitability. Cadaveric organ procurement, it could be argued, is therefore more 
problematical in less densely populated countries. 103 
Comparing 17 countries, the Kings Fund Report indicated that five of the bottom six 
cadaver procurement nations also corresponded to the lowest population density 
nations. 44 Some improvements in transplantation rates will inevitably occur through 
improved transportation and infrastructure. 
2.3.2.4. Svstems of Co-ordination. 
The Spanish transplant system involves a comprehensive and sophisticated network of 
co-ordination applying to all donating hospitals not just those that actually do transplants. 
45 The co-ordination team involves doctors and nurses and works at a localised level . 
There has been a sharp increase in levels of procurement since the inception of this 
system. Spain is now a world cadaveric procurement leader. 46 This could be 
attributable to other factors such as worsening road traffic death rates but is probably at 
least partly a product of co-ordination changes which might be replicable in other 
42 For a commentary on the Spanish approach see B. Miranda et al., Integrated Ways to Improve Cadaveric 
Organ Donation, Trans Proc, 28(l), 1996,96-97. 
43 B. New et al., Kings Fund Research Report, 18 at p28. This is common sense for countries like Norway 
which has just one transplant centre in the South (Oslo) and is a disparate population with limited 
transportation facilities in some areas. 44 These five were Finland, Sweden, Norway, Australia and Canada with the exception being the United Kingdom, B. New et al., ibid. They suggested that population densities of less than 20 per square km have a significant impact on a country's ability to procure cadaveric kidneys. 45 For a commentary on the Spanish approach see B. Miranda et al., Integrated Ways to Improve Cadaveric 
Organ Donation, Trans Proc, 28(l), 1996,96-97. 
46 See Graph 21 at page 72. 
24 
countrieS47 - for instance, the BTS Working Party Report, after examining the Spanish 
model, concluded that, "(d)evelopment of the UK co-ordinator network should 
undoubtedly be a central element in the drive to increase organ donation. v08 
2.3.3. Societal Factors in Cadaveric Procurement. 
2.3.3.1. Obiections to Transplantation 
Cadaveric procurement figures in the United Kingdom also indicate that in about 30% of 
cases the deceased potential donor does not become an actual donor because of the 
refusal of his / her relatives to allow donation to occur . 
49 Cleiren's study 50 indicates this 
is partly due to the way relatives are asked5l whilst other studies relate refusal partly to 
factors like ethnic background and age. 52 Some refusals are clearly connected to real 
objections to transplantation. Some people will not donate organs for religious, 53 
47 However Persijn has commented that "as the definition and tasks of a transplant co-ordinator differ from 
country to country. Some are more involved in administrative work such as registration of transplant 
candidates, looking after the logistical aspects (transportation arrangements, financial aspects etc. ) and 
follow-up activities, while others are really involved with organ donation, assisting and advising local 
doctors in charge of a potential donor. Additionally, the professional background of transplant co- 
ordinators varies from nurses to anaesthesiologists, from psychologists to surgeons in training. " How 
Severe is Organ Shortage in Eurotransplant p9 in Organ Shortage the Solutions (ed J. L. Touraine, Kluwer, 
1995). A comment from the Spanish about their own system probably sums the situation up accurately, 
"we do not really know whether the particular approach used in Spain to organise organ procurement and 
transplantation can be directly applied to other countries with different health systems. Nethertheless, we 
hope the information on the Spanish system can be useful when organisational structures are under 
consideration in other countries. " R. Matesanz, Organ Procurement in Spain: The National Organization of 
Transplants, 167-177 at 176 ibid. 48 BTS, 1995 at p3 0. 
49S M. Gore et al., Organ Donation From Intensive Care Units in England and Wales: Two Year 
Confidential Audit of Deaths in Intensive Care, BMJ, 1992,304,349-355. 
"Which indicated the following 'complaints' from families; *Procedure too hasty, there was no time to 
think it over *Doctor was too businesslike, showed no emotion *Not enough information was given *There 
was neither opportunity nor time enough to say the last 'good-bye' to the deceased *Consent was asked at 
the wrong moment (before the death was confirmed; at the same time that the family was informed of the 
death of the relative) *Family felt pressured by request for organs *After consent was given there was a 
second request for more organs. (see M. P. H. D. Cleiren, Life After Giving. A Research Into the Experience 
of the Next of Kin of the Organ and/or Tissue Donor, D-S W. O. Press, 1992). 5 'Medical professionals are not always comfortable with dealing with relatives. One survey indicated that 
a sizeable percentage of U. S. neurosurgeons are uncomfortable with dealing with social issues like 
requesting organ donation (J. M. Prottas and H. L. Batten, Neurosurgeons and The Supply of Human Organs, 
HealthAffairs, 1989,119-131.10% of all US Neurosurgeonswere surveyed by questionnaire). 52 Seee. g. D. Noury, Information on Relatives of Organ and Tissue Donors. A Multicenter Regional Study 
for Consent or Refusal, TransProc, 1996,28(l), 135-136 which inan analysis of 300 interviews indicated that refusals decreased sharply as age of the relatives being asked increased. 53 See Kostakis et al., Trans Proc, 1990,22,1432-1433. 
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spiritual or other reasons. 54 Around 15% of people have indicated in public surveys they 
are against donating their own organs after death. 55 About half of this number say they 
would not even accept a transplant for themselves. 56 Only about 30% of people have a 
donor card (not all of whom will carry them) 57 and recent studies in USA 58 and Holland" 
indicate only 36% and 38% of people respectively claim to be potential organ donors. 
In totality the evidence suggests, 
"it is not clear to what extent the rate of relatives' refusal to give consent to donation can 
be reduced below present levels. iM 
2.3.3.2. The Societal System for Organ Procurement 
De Charro et al ., 
6 1 distinguish five types of organ procurement system: 
1. Collective solidarity (the compulsory taking of organs from deceased persons); 
2. Strict opting out (reusing donor organs in all cases where no legal evidence of a 
decision to opt out of donating is available); 
3. Broad opting-out (next of kin may refuse to donate); 
4. Broad opting-in (the next of kin have the authority to opt-in to donating where 
there is no evidence of a prior decision by the deceased); and 
5. Strict opting-in (donation only occurs if deceased has made his/her willingness to 
donate known). 
54 E. g. misunderstanding or misconceptions about transplantation or simply intuitive feelings not to donate. 
55 1992 surveys by OPCS, RSGB and Gallop Poll. The combined results of these 3 major recent surveys 
of attitudes to donating own organs after death indicates around 70% of people in favour with about half of 
the remainder neutral or undecided. 
56 For instance reservations about the medico-legal method of establishing death were 7% in the OPCS 
survey and 5% in a survey conducted by Wakeford and Stepney, Br JSurg, 1989,76(5), 435-439. 
57 Statistical surveys are the OPCS Omnibus Survey, September 1992; RSGB Omnibus Survey, July 1992 
and Gallup Poll, April 1992.. A Poll conducted by SOFRES among the French population in 1992 shows 
that 37% those who would not donate had religious and moral motives, 22% were concerned about bodily 
integrity not being protected and 26% were uncertain as to why they were against organ donation. 58D. S. Kittur et al. Incentives for Organ Donation, The Lancet, 1991,338,1441-1443. 
59W. Kokkedee, Kidney Procurement Policies In the Eurotransplant Region: 'Opting in' Versus'Opting 
Out', Social Science and Medicine, 1992,35(2), 177-182. 
60Kings Fund Research Report, 18 at p46. 
61F. Th. De Charro et al., Donor Recruitment in F. Th. De Charro et al. (ed), Europe in Systems of Donor 
Recruitment, Kluwer, 1992,5. 
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The fifth alternative most respects donor autonomy but is not operated in practice in any 
country of the world - probably because of the small number of people making their 
62 
wishes known before death. The first alternative, collective solidarity, does not 
appear to be operated anywhere in the world either. 63 Most countries have adopted a 
broad opting-in64 or a broad opting-out system '65 although Austria operates a strict opting 
out system where organs can be removed without the views of close relatives being taken 
into account. 66 Some countries using an opting-out system still seek consent by relatives 
in practice as a matter of respect and avoiding bad publicity for organ donation. 67 The 
formulation of the law in France and Spain only allows removal to occur where no 
explicit or informal objection has been made by the deceased to donation at any time. 
This effectively means doctors have to check with relatives. 68 
Which system is more effective in practice? Comparing the cadaver procurement rates 
of countries operating an opt-out system in practice with those operating an opt-in system 
is fallible because of the influence of other factors such as road deaths. However, the 
Kings Fund Report have noted 2 countries where clear evidence of the impact of 
presumed consent is available, 
"the evidence suggests that the introduction of presumed consent in Belgium had a 
significant impact on the availability of organs" and "the evidence from Singapore adds to 
that of Belgium as to the efficacy of presumed consent legislation. , 69 
62 The main evidencing of such a wish is the carrying of the donor card. The number of people carrying a 
donor card in Western European countries and the United States varies between the small percentages of 
10% and 25%. Hessing et al., Psychological Aspects of Organ Procurement System, Organ replacement 
Therapy, Ethics Justice Commerce (ed. W. Land and J. B. Dossetor) Springer Verlag, 1991,287-290; 
R. W. Evans and D. L. Manninen, US Public Opinion Concerning the Procurement and Distribution of Donor 
Organs, Trans Proc 1988,20(5), 781-5; H. Gabel and K. Lindskoug, A Survey of Public Attitudes 
Toward Cadaveric Organ Donation in a Swedish Community, Trans Proc 1988,20(3), 43 1. 63 Excepting the'lawful'use of executed prisoners organs (e. g. in China and Iraq) and instances of illegal 
force in using organs. 
64 E. g. UK, Eire, United States and the proposed system in Holland under the Dutch Organ Donation Bill, 
Germany, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. 65E. g. Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France and Spain. 66Conference of European Health Ministers (1987), Current legislation in Council of Europe Member states 
and Finland and Results of European Co-operation, Council of Europe Strasbourg. 67COuntries in this position include Greece Italy and Spain. 6'For the position in France see J. Hors et al., France Transplant in R. Matesanz et al. (eds. ) Transplant, 4 (Produced with the Council of Europe, Paris). For the position in Spain see R. Matesanz and B. Miranda (1992) Organizacion Nacional de Transplantes, in Transplant ibid. 
69Kings Fund Research Report, 18,58-59. 
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P. Michielson suggests the Belgian legal position, where the deceased's family is granted 
the possibility to object in the absence of a statement of the deceased's will on the matter, 
has, "apparently succeeded in working out a compromise acceptable to all (In 
Belgium). 00 However, consensus might be against adopting the Belgian position in 
many countries, particularly those with a strong rights tradition of rights. 71 G. Pennings 
suggests a system of "confirmed opinion and forced commitment 02 could be the answer. 
Under this system all persons would have to register their wishes regarding disposal of 
their body after death, but as well as registering "yes" or "no" they could register "cannot 
answer the question. " I have suggested elsewhere that, 
"(t)his system, which would place people's choice at the heart of cadaveric donation, 
would probably result in increased numbers of people registering as donors, thereby 
improving organ harvesting. 03 
The improvement might come directly by simply denying relatives any right of refusal on 
the ethical basis that, "allowing the next-of-kin to object to a donation would come down 
to treating a person! s altruistic desires as suspect, as something which has to be 
corroborated by others. 04 If relatives were asked, the clear evidence of the deceased's 
will would be a deterrent to them saying no. This system looks promising providing 
registration can be ensured. 75 
In terms of organisational factors in relation to society, Gore discovered in a 1989 audit 
study in the United Kingdom that a 10% potential loss in organs was sustained by failure 
70Effect of Transplantation Laws on Organ Procurement, P-Michelson, 34-39 at 39 in J. L. Touraine ed. 
Organ Shortage the Solutions, Kluwer, 1995. 
7 'Opposition to this system ranges from 30-75% - see Kings Fund Research Report, 18 at p43. In the UK: OPCS study opposition 48%; Department of Health study 43%.; British Kidney Patients Association 
study 30%. A study in the USA found 52% against such a system (D. S. Kittur et al., Incentives For Organ 
Donation? The Lancet, 1991,33 8,1441-1443. A Dutch study indicated 75% of people in Holland 
wanting to keep their present opting in system (W. Kokkedee, Kidney Procurement Policies in the 
Eurotransplant Region, Social Science and Medicine, 1992,35(2), 177-182). 72 Ch 22 in Organ and Tissue Transplantation in the European Union: Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors, Ed. Y. Englert, Martinus NUhoff, 1995. 
73 Review of Organ and Tissue Transplantation in the European Union: Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors (Ed. Y. Englert, Martinus Nyhoff, 1995) in IDHL, 1996,47(l), 126-127. 74 Pennings, Organ and Tissue Transplantation in the European Union: Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors, Ed. Y. Englert, Martinus Nyhoff, 1995, at Ch 22. 75 A parallel exists in the form of registration for political elections - most people register but gaining the 
same success rate for transplantation may be harder. 
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of doctors to approach relatives. 
76 It is possible to address this problem (as is being 
attempted in the U. S. ) through routine enquiry and/or required request laws and policies. 
2.3.3.3. Monetary Investment in Transplantation and Political Factors. 
Availability of ICU support and beds is influenced by financial factors, but beyond this, 
procurement in 'western bloc' countries is relatively unaffected by financial concerns. 
This is due to the large amounts of money spent on health care and also the specific 
recognition that transplantation is generally more cost effective than dialysis. However, 
the same position does not apply to many countries outside the 'western bloc' where 
money and political factors can often lead to insufficient funds to buy the required 
equipment / have sufficient resources. 77 Many'non-western bloc' countries have rates of 
kidney transplantation below 10 or 15 p. m. p - partly as a result of lack of money in some 
cases. 
2.4. Conclusions. 
Better ICU arrangements, better transplant co-ordination arrangements and routine 
enquiry/required request arrangements and catheter NHBD where in accordance with the 
patient's will are likely to have a significant impact on transplantation rates in many 
countries. However, in most countries such methods are probably insufficient to meet 
demand without being combined with high levels of LDT use. Italy, Greece and most 
countries outside Europe have a low rate of cadaveric transplantation further amplifying 
the need for living donation. The alternatives to this approach (EV, Pittsburgh Protocol 
NHBD and a presumed consent system of procurement) are ethically objectionable and 
likely to get a mixed reception publicly and professionally. If nothing else, presumed 
consent and 'twilight zone' methods of procurement should be avoided to protect levels 
of public support for transplantation which are critical for overall willingness to donate. 
76S M. Gore et al., Organ Donation From Intensive Care units in England and Wales: A two year 
Confidential Audit of Deaths in Intensive Care, BMJ, 1992,304,349-355. This is likely to be a 
problem in most countries. 
77 For instance, in Romania there is insufficient money to buy the machinery necessary to meet best practice 
in ensuring porspective living donors are in a fit and healthy state to donate. This has been a major reason 
behind the rare use of LDT in Romania (Personal Communication with Professor Proca, Bucharest Centre). 
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Chapter 3 General Limits to LDT Use. 
Introduction. 
The need to maximise use of transplantation is already clear but under what general 
circumstances is it ethical to use LDT? 1 Within the limits of LDT being supplemental to 
CDT the critical questions are: 
1. how many organs can LDT yield?; 
2. what practices are generally required to maximise yield?; and 
3. what practices are acceptable given a combined assessment of the clinical benefits 
of LDT to the recipient (vis-A-vis cadaveric donation and other alternatives 
available), the benefits and detriments for the donor and the general impact of 
using living donation? 




Use of LDT varies markedly between countries and even between individual centres. 2 
Most countries have a rate around 1-2 p. m. p. both within Europe and outside of it 
(partially illustrated by graph 28). Some countries do no or virtually no LDT's (see 
graphs 30-32). In 1995 only USA, Denmark, Sweden, Holland and Switzerland had 
an LDT rate p. m. p exceeding 5 (see graph 26). Heavy and primary reliance on LDT has 
generally been confined to countries with relatively undeveloped cadaveric programmes. 3 
However, in Norway and USA, very high LDT rates p. m. p. are sustained alongside 
relatively well developed cadaveric programmes - if replicated, this approach could have 
1 The primum non nocere principle demands that LDT be used essentially as a supplement to cadaveric 
transplantation and only exceptionally in preference. 
2 See chapter 10 for breakdown of European centres. 
3 Turkey and Greece are potent examples. 
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fundamental global ramifications. Even if through various obstacles4 cadaveric 
procurement remained low in some countries, the impact of high rates of LDT would 
remain pronounced. Several graphs illustrate this point: 
Graph 385 illustrates Norway's 1990 rate of 22.8 LDT's p. m. p. as a theoretically 
obtainable goal for other countries. If other major transplant countries had obtained 
this rate of LDT in 1995 they would all have a transplant rate of around the 40 p. m. p. 
mark or above. Even if this left a slight shortage in some procurement areas 
improvements in cadaveric procurement could realistically make up the remaining 
shortfall. In many procurement areas (e. g. Spain, Portugal, USA) the rate would be 
high enough to reduce the current waiting list. The overall status of cadaveric 
procurement would still require substantial improvement in many former Eastern and 
Central European areas, South America, India etc. in order for supply to meet 
demand in these countries with their'new projected rate of LDT. ' 
Graph 396 illustrates the increases in LDT p. m. p. in main European areas that would 
be sufficient to avoid increases in waiting list sizes between 1990 and 1995. Most 
European countries would need to increase their LDT p. m. p. by less than 10. 
Graph 47 illustrates how the major European countries could all have reduced their 
waiting lists between 1990 and 1994 by matching Norway's LDT rate p. m. p. over this 
period. Graphs 6 to 138 illustrate how individual countries would quickly eliminate 
their waiting list altogether by matching the Norwegian approach. 
Graph 149 indicates LDT strategies to a) stabilise b) reduce by 25% and c) reduce by 
50% waiting lists of various European countries and the USA over a five year period 
(1990-1994). In most cases a rate of LDT less than 10 p. m. p suffices to maintain 
waiting list levels and a 25% decrease can generally be brought about by an LDT rate 
of less than 15 p. m. p. 
4 Such as lack of finance, ethical concerns and public attitudes. 
5At page 89. 
6 At page 90. 
7 At page 55. 
8At pages 57-64. 
9At page 65. 
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3.3. Changes Required in Transplant Practice to Extensively Increase 
LDT Rates P. M. P. 
To some extent the rate of LDT's p. m. p. depends on public attitudes, which can only be 
influenced, not determined, by medical professionals. However, medical professionals 
can create conditions in which LDT is likely to be extensively utilised. The 1995 BTS 
Working Party Report, which surveyed UKTSSA transplant centres, found LDT usage 
was correlated with whether a proactive or reactive approach is taken to addressing the 
issue of LDT with recipients and their families. 10 15 out of 31 centres with an LDT 
programme approached families in a prospective fashion by setting up a personal 
interview; about half of these followed up with an information booklet. " 
Norway has the highest rate of kidney LDT's p. m. p. and its system could act as a 
development model. Prominent features of the Norwegian approach are: 
o The acceptance of all types of tissue mismatch; 12 
e Not placing donors on a waiting list if a suitable live donor is willing to 
donate; using pre-dialysis LDT regularly so as to improve graft survival of 
LDT's; 
o Informing the patient and his/her family of the availability of LDT as a matter 
of course; 
9 Utilising spouses to a significant extent; 13 and 
* Not using a high level of cadaveric donation as a justification for lesser use of 
LDT when there are still high waiting lists. 14 
10P. S. Veitch, Recent Initiatives From the British Transplantation Society in Living Organ Donation In The 
Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives (ed. D. Price and H. Akveld, EUROTOLD, 1996 at 19-23). 
1 1BTS Working Party Report, BYS, 1995 at p25. 
'2A. Jacobsen - EUROTOLD collaboration. "Ibid. 
14 This justification may be being used in Belgium and Austria in some instance (Kings Fund Report p20). 
The Eire approach is more sound - living donation only occurs in cases of a full-house match but this 
narrowly defined approach was a clear response to the fact that waiting lists have been reduced to a low 
level and current cadaveric supply is approximately meeting demand. 
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3.4. Wehihine Benefits and Detriments in LDT. 
Calculating prospective benefit and detriment in a procedure, and ifs alternatives, is a 
core part of medical practice. The complexity in LDT is that it involves two parties - it 
is not just a comparison of living donation, cadaveric donation and dialysis for the 
prospective recipient but also an evaluation of the significance of living donation for the 
prospective donor. For a donor, living donation involves some inevitable harm plus 
risks of further harm. There are also concerns relating to informed voluntary consent of 
the donor. Finally, aside from direct benefit and detriment to the donor and recipient, 
there is also the question of whether LDT has any negative impact generally such as 
reducing levels of cadaveric procurement and increasing levels of trade in organs. 
3.4.1. Benefits of LDT to the Prospective Recipient vis-a-vis Cadaveric 
Transplantation. 
3.4.1.1. The Relative Graft Survival of Transplanted Cadaveric and Livinj! Donor 
Organs. 
Statistically, graft survival results are difficult to quantify. 15 There are specific 
difficulties in making generalised comparisons between cadaveric and living donor 
grafts. 16 Despite these qualifications an approximate analysis of graft survival and 
specifically cadaveric graft survival vis-a-vis living donation, can be made. 
"With transplantation as a whole this is so primarily because of varying clinical hurdles for recipients (e. g. 
whether clinically marginal patients are accepted, the presence or otherwise of age restrictions) and for 
HLA matching (closeness of the match required from centre to centre and country to country varies and this 
will effect graft survival). There are also variations in computation of graft survival and inaccuracies in 
recording it (see P. K. Donnelly et al. Transplants From Living Donors in the United Kingdom and Ireland: 
A Centre Survey. BMJ, 1989,298,490493). 
16Firstly there is no uniform centre approach as regards HLA matching for LDT. Match requirements tend 
to be stricter than those used for cadaveric transplantation. Better graft survival results will obviously 
somewhat mirror increases in selectivity of use in HLA matching terms. The number of centres attaching 
strong importance to HLA is clearly increasing while the number attaching no or little importance is 
decreasing and is now a fairly small minority (F. P. Brunner et al. Combined Report on Regular Dialysis and 
Transplantation in Europe, 1988. Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1989,4 (supp 4), 5-29). Secondly general 
conditions under which living donation is considered. For instance the stage at which living donation is 
used is clearly influential, pre-dialysis LDT being the'gold standard'method of transplantation 
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Extensive study by D. E. R. Sutherland et al. in the US suggests that LDT produces better 
results than cadaveric. 17 This conclusion is supported by research in Norway 
18 and 
indeed by most clinicians. 19 Often the graft superiority of LDT is considerable and acts 
as a counterbalancing factor when considering harm caused to the living donor. 
20 
Reasons for LDT producing better results include: More freedom in choice in timing of 
the operation, allowing for better planning with better work-up and better timing of the 
operation for the recipient; the probability of better HLA matches with LDT, the 
significance of this factor depending on the choices of living donor available and the 
degree of selectivity used in choosing living donors; better quality matches benefiting 
recipient health by lessening drug levels; 21 (usually) decreased time in hospital and on 
dialysiS22 which may produce graft survival benefits via improved quality of life; 
23 the 
possibility of immunising the future recipient with the future donor's blood; and, finally, 
the likely good health of living donors leading to better organs on average than those 
from cadaveric donors (although this depends on stringency of selection in LDT and 
CDT). 
Data concerning comparisons of LDT and cadaveric transplantation of other organs is 
inevitably limited by the fact that such procedures are relatively rare. LDT liver 
(P. K. Donnelly, Pre-Dialysis Living Donor Renal Transplantation - Is it Still the Gold Standard for Cost, 
Convenience and Graft Survival? Trans Proc, 1995,27(l)). 
17 Trans Proc 1985,17,1503 and Trans Proc 1985,17,110. 
18A. Jakobsen, Living Renal Donors - The Norwegian Experience, paper presented at the Warsaw 
conference, publication forthcoming in Transplantation Proceedings. 
19Spital et al., The Living Kidney Donor: Alive and Well. Arch Intern Med, 1986,146 at 1993; W-Bay 
& L. Herbert, The Living Donor in Kidney Transplantation, Annals Intern Med, 1987,106,719; 
H. Wilms, Indication for Living Donation in Kidney Transplants, Trans Prop, 1988,20,797; 
V. Bonomini, Ethical Aspects of Living Donation, Trans Proc, 1991,23,2497; A. Jacobsen, A Second 
Opinion In Defence of Living Donor Transplant, Health Policy, 1990,16,123-126. 
20 See also R. Gabriel, A Patient's Guide to Dialysis and Transplantation (4th Ed 1990) where results are 
presented with living donor graft survival at around 77% after 10 years as distinct from around 5 8% for 
cadaveric. 
2'Canadian Transplant Study Group, Am JKidney Dis, 1985,5,328-332. 
22 E. R. Maher et al., Mortality and Morbidity of Long Term Haemodialysis, Lancet, 1987, i, 452453. 
23Such as less stress and financial hardship see N. G. Kutner et al., End Stage Renal Disease Treatment 
Modality and Patient Quality of Life, Am JNephrol, 1986,6,396-402. 
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donation has similar results to cadaveric liver donation. The justification for using it is 
founded more on clinical need than results; there is a chronic shortage of transplantable 
livers. 24 Shortage of paediatric livers is particularly acute and living donation of a lobe 
of liver is usually from an adult to a child. 25 The main risks to the recipient of a liver 
segment are connected with the implantation procedure, but when transplanted into a 
child the lobes grow with the child. Statistics on long term risks are not available but 
there is little indication that there will be significant problems. Living donation of other 
organs is less established but preliminary comments can be made. LDT small-bowel 
segment donation is experimental and so is its cadaveric counterpart. 26 Living donor 
pancreas segment donation is extremely rare partly due to the fact that there is no shortage 
of available cadaveric pancreases, and also because of the serious risks involved. 
Living donor lung lobe donation has had reasonable results so far. 27 
3.4.1.2. Relative Graft Survival of Cadaveric vis-h-vis LDT With Specific Kinds of 
Donor. 
In nearly all countries the primary LDT source is from within the close genetic family. 28 
The major source is parent to child donation, the next is sibling donation and in a very 
small number of cases donations occur from child to parent. However, since the 1960's, 
a significant minority of donations have been between genetically unrelated pairs. 29 
24 See for example C. E. Broelsch et al., Liver Transplantation Including the Concept of Reduced Size Liver 
Transplants in Children. Ann Surg, 1988,208(4), 410-420; S. Raja et al., Liver Transplant From Live 
Donors Lancet, 1989, ii, 497. 
25 The University of Chicago estimates that it will do 50% of its paediatric transplantations using this 
method. Donation generally allows the donor's liver to carry on functioning (approximately regenerating 
to it's previous structure) while the recipient usually as a small child could only physically accommodate a 
small amount of liver and is particularly unlikely to get a small liver from a cadaver. 26 Graft survival for both modalities is not yet clear. 27 L. R. Shaw et al., quotes graft survival rates at 65% for one year and 53% at 3 year (see The Lancet, 199 1, 338,678-681). ULTRA allowed a friend living lung lobe donation in 1996 (reported by David Price after 
meeting Bob Pilling, Chair of ULTRA, in 1996. 
28This might not be the case in countries where rewarded gifting and rampant commercialisation of organs 
occurs on a large scale, such as India, since these are done by emotionally and genetically unrelated donors. 29H. H. Sadler et al., Semin, 1971,3,86. 
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Besides questions of commerce and voluntarineSS30 use of different classes of donor 
raises graft survival issues. The view that unrelated donors are per se inferior is 
unjustified. A study by B. A. Elick et al. has suggested that distant related and unrelated 
donors produce similar graft survival to HLA mismatched close relatives. 3 I R. J. Ploeg et 
al. recently surveyed 990 living donors. Results indicated that living unrelated donors 
had a far better graft survival after 4 years (85%) than either mismatched relative 
donation (70%) or cadaveric donation (75%), with a rate very similar to haploidentical 
32 living related donors (86%). Terasaki established similar results over 3 years, finding 
that spousal donation was considerably superior to cadaveric donation'and slightly better 
33 than parental donation. Alfani et al., recently reported a 12 year experience of 153 
living unrelated donors at their centre in Rome which concluded there were no significant 
differences in using living related and living unrelated, with the latter even being 
34 superior to cadaveric grafts with ischernia less than 3 hours. Norway has used spouses 
extensively and has reported good results, as well as noting the advantage of the likely 
35 close affinity between donor and recipient. The usage criteria were that the spouse 
was the best available living related donor and that the patient preferred this alternative to 
remaining on the waiting list. Norway has also used mismatched donors with 
36 reasonable success. 
Studies do not really prove that unrelated donation is superior to other forms of donation 
since a higher degree of selectivity may have been used. Clearly what matters is not 
30See chapters 6 and 7. 
3 'Trans Proc, 1990,22,343-344. P. Berloco et al. 's study of 140 related and 74 unrelated donors and found the latter to have better graft survival (Trans Proc, 1991,23,912-913). 32 R. J. Ploeg et al., Living Unrelated Kidney Donation: An Under-utilised Resource? Trans Proc, 1993, 
25(l), 1532-4 at 1533. 
33p. j Terasaki et al., High Survival rates of Kidney Transplants From Spousal and Living Unrelated 
Donors, NewEngJMed, 1995,333(6), 333-336. 
34 Living Unrelated Kidney Transplantation: A 12-Year Single Centre Experience, Trans Proc, 1997,29, 
191-194 at 193. 
35D. Albrechtsen et al., Trans Proc, 1990,22,1435. This paper indicates that since 1985 Norway 
procures around 6% of its total supply from spousal donation. See more recently A. Jacobsen, Living Donor Practices and Processes in Europe in D. Price and H. Akveld (ed. ), Living Organ Donation in the 
Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,1-12. 36 Jacobsen ibid. 
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donor source but the quality of the match and other clinical factors 37 at hand in the 
individual situation. 38 There is a prima facie case (subject to ethical issues) to use 
spouses and other unrelated donors extensively at least within the limits of choosing 
LDT's comparable to average CDT's. In nearly all countries large scale expansion of 
LDT is feasible without resorting to mismatched living donors - i. e. living donors likely 
to have a graft survival inferior to the average cadaveric match. 
3.4.2. Detriment and Benefit to the Donor. 
3.4.2.1. Detriment in Living Donor Kidney Transplantation. 
Aside from a small amount of inevitable detriment (such as pain and scarring to the 
wound site) living donor kidney transplantation has a number of risks to the donor 
including risks of having an operation in itself (e. g. approximately 1/4000 risk of death39) 
and risks related to nephrectomy and living with one kidney. The risks can be grouped 
into risks of mortality, risks of morbidity and long term complications and risks. 
Risk of Mortaii1y. 
It is not always easy to discern whether deaths are caused by donation or by other 
independent factors, additionally, not all donor deaths are reported. A methodical and 
consistent world-wide method of reporting donor death would be beneficial. 
EUROTOLD's donor health registry, which has limited data because it only started in 
1996, provides a confidential method for European transplant centres to provide data on 
37 Such as age matching of donor and recipient (see e. g. P. K. Donnelly et al., Matching For Age in Renal 
Transplantation, New Engl JMed, 1990,322(12), 851-852. ) and age of the donor (However, Kostakis et 
al., Trans Proc, 1990,22,1432-1433, found that there was no statistical difference for graft survival 
with recipients whose donors were over 60 than those who were under. What would appear to matter more 
than age per se is health screening of donors to a sound standard). 38Gaber et al. Trans Proc, 1990,22,340-34 1. 
39R. A. Sells, Voluntarism and Informed Consent in Systems of Donor Recruitment ed. De Charro et al., Kluwer, 1992,87. 
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mortality incidences and might ultimately be utilised world-wide. Whilst data is being 
gathered estimations of mortality must suffice. 
A number of studies estimate the risk of mortality to be around 0.1%. 
40 Studies specific 
to the US tend to report a mortality rate of less than 0.1% and nearer 0.03%. 
41 In many 
studies it is 0%. 
42 In general terms, the risk to the donor can probably be summed up 
as minimal43 or very 10W. 
44 Although living donor nephrectomy has become a routine 
procedure it's complexity is likely to mean risks are slightly increased in centres that have 
little experience. 
Risks of Morbidily. 
The incidence of serious postoperative morbidity can be assessed as low; within the 
range of 1-3%45 although a few studies have reported higher 46 and lower 47 rates. The 
40 See W. J. Bay et al., The Living Donor in Kidney Transplantation, Ann Intern Med, 1987,106,719-727 
reviewing 16 studies from around the world and identifying 3 deaths from 2495 donors. See also 
Bonomini et al., Is Living Donation Still Justifiable, Neph Dial Trans, 1990,5,407409. 
41J. S. NaJarian et al., 20 Years or More of Follow-up of Living Kidney Donors, The Lancet, 1992,340 at 
807. 
42 For instance the Oslo experience (Jakobsen, personal communication 1996) see also University of 
Wisconsin Medical School (M. J. Waples et al., Living Donor Nephrectomy: A 20 Year Experience, 
Urology, 1995,45(2), 207-210). A study of 681 donors over a 20 year period). Spital et al. 's mid 
nineteen eighties study of US transplant centres had 79 out of 83 responding centres answer a question 
about donor mortality 94% of which had not experienced a donor death (A. Spital et al., The Living Kidney 
Donor, Arch Intern Med, 1986,1993, See also M. D. Smith et al., Study of 9 U. S. Centres (536 donors 
over 12 years), Am JKidDis, 1986,8(4), 223-233. . 43 E. g. Williams et al., Ann Intern Med, 1986,105,1; Talseth et al., Kidney Int, 1986,29,1072. 
W. J. Bay et al., The Living Donor in Kidney Transplantation, Ann Intern Med, 1987,106,719-727. 
44J. S. Najarian et al., 20 Years or More of Follow-up of Living Kidney Donors, The Lancet, 1992,340 at 
807, Survey of all members of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons discovering 17 
postoperative deaths over a period of 20 years in the USA and Canada. The figure of 0.03% is derived 
from a study of 19368 living related donor nephrectomies between January 1980 and January 1991. The 
major cause of death was pulmonary emboli. 45 Such as R. M. R. Taylor et al., Renal Transplantation in the United Kingdom and Ireland- The Centre 
Effect, The Lancet, 1985, i, 798-802; T. Sherwood et al., Renal Angiography Problems in Live Donors, 
Br J Radiol 1978,51,99-105; Levey et al., Kidney Transplantation From Unrelated Living Donors, New 
EngJMed 1986,314,914; D. A. Ogden. Consequences of Renal Donation in Man, AmJKidneyDis, 
1983,2,501-511. 
46 E. g. J. F. Dunn, Living Related Kidney Donors: A 14 Year Experience, Ann Surg, 1986,203,637-643 
(7%) see also M. J. Waples et al., Living Donor Nephrectomy: A 20 Year Experience, Urology, 1995, 
45(2), 207-210 (17%). 
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incidence of simple complications (e. g. infection of the wound site) is within the 15-30% 
range in most studies. 48 Taking minor and major complications over a range of studies 
Tilney and Kirkman have found complications rates within the range of 15-47%. 
49 
Wide variations in rates of complication between different studies may partly be dues to 
different ideas about what constitutes a complication. It is also influenced by the degree 
of rigour applied to follow-up; many studies focus on the more immediate postoperative 
50 
period when some complications may not become apparent until later. While patients 
are likely to come back to the transplant centre in the event of a serious complication they 
may be commonly failing to do so in the event of more minor complications which may 
result in serious under-reporting of such complications as a result. It is to be hoped that 
EUROTOLD's donor health registry will encourage a trend towards systematic annual 
follow-up of all donors. 
Lou Term Comnlications and Risks. 
Possible longer tenn risks of donation include hypertension, proteinuria and progressive 
failure of the remaining kidney. Some studies have found that kidney donation poses no 
risk with regard to these conditions. 51 However, other studies have identified one or 
more of these conditions as material risks in donation. 52 
47 E. g. T. Yasamura et al., Experience with 246 Living Related Donor Nephrectomy Cases at a Single 
Institution in Japan, JpnJSurg, 1988,18,252-258. 
48 Sollingeretal., Transplantation, 1984,38,664-668. M. Hoetteetal. KidneyInt, 1986,29,430; 
P. Berloco, TransProc, 1985,17(2), 13-17. R. Simmons, TransProc, 1977,9,143 reports28.2% 
from an extensive 1974 University of Minnesota study. More recently Weiland has reported the 
University experience as 17% (1984) 
49Consideration of Kidney Donation Using Living Related Sources, Transplantation and Clinical 
Immunoloýy, 1985,16,207-213. 
50 E. g. depression, pain and discomfort at the wound site, chronic urinary infection, incisional hernia. 
5 'E. g. G. M. Beekman et al., Analysis of Donor selection procedure in 139 Living Related Kidney Donors 
and Follow-up Results For Donors and Recipients, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1994,9,163-8; 
C. F. Anderson et al., The Risks of Unilateral Nephrectomy: Status of Kidney Donors 10-20 Years 
Postoperatively, Mayo Clin Proc, 1985,60,367-374; F. Vincenti et al., Long Term Renal Function in 
Kidney Donors, Sustained Compensatory Hyperfiltration With No Adverse Effects, Transplantation, 
1983,36,626; D. Weiland et al., Trans Proc, 1984,16,5-7; S. L. Williams et al., Long Term Renal 
Function in Kidney Donors: A Comparison of Donors and Their Siblings, Ann Intern Med, 1986,105,1- 
8: J. S. Najaran et al., 1992 ibid; P. M. Ter Wee et al., Pair Tested Renal Reserve Filtration Capacity in 
Kidney Recipients and Their Donors, JASN, 1994,4,1798-1808; I. J. Miller et al., Impact of Renal 
Donation, Long Tenn Clinical and Biochemical Follow-Up of Living Donors in a Single Centre, Am J 
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Despite differing findings the evidence increasingly points to the absence of significant 
long term risks. Some reports show LDT does not have serious clinical effects on the 
53 54 donor after 20 years and even 25 years or more. NaJariads recent study involving 
follow-up from 21-29 years (average 23) concludes that, "renal transplant donors are not 
at increased risk for development of renal failure" and that other risks are low. 
" most 
importantly Kasiske et al., have conducted a substantial review of 48 studies with 3124 
patients and 1703 controls using multiple linear regression to combine studies and adjust 
for differences in the duration of follow-up, the reason for reduced renal mass, the type 
56 of controls, age and gender. The authors pointed out that differences in the results of 
previous studies may have been due to, 
"differences in the amount of renal mass removed, age at the time of renal mass 
reduction, unsuspected renal damage to the remaining kidney, or other factors. In 
addition the relatively small numbers of patients in most studies and the use of different 
controls have made the interpretation of results difficult. "57 
Med, 1985,79,201-208; P-L. Liu et al., Renal Function in Unilateral Nephrectomy Subjects, J. Vrol 
1992,147,337-9; C. Bustza et al., Pregnancy After Donor Nephrectomy, Transplantation 1985,40, 
651-654. T. Talseth et al., Long Term Blood Pressure and Renal Function in Kidney Donors, Kidney Int, 
1986,29,1072-1076 reported a moderate increase in blood pressure in Norwegian donors and 15% were 
hypertensive. However the report concluded that donor nephrectomy represents no long term health risk. 
For a fuller review of findings of studies in this area see B. L. Kasiske et al., Long-Term Effects of Reduced 
Renal Mass in Humans, Kidney Int, 1995,48,814-819. 
52 E. g. R. B. Colvin et al., Lab Invest, 1982,46,275-281; R. M. Hakim. et al., ibid; V. Lent et al., 
Nephropathy in Remnant Kidneys: Pathological Proteinuria After Unilateral Nephrectomy, J Vrol, 1994, 
152,312-6. However the presence of risk factors may not correlate with decreased renal function, for 
instance increases in hypertension tend only to match those occurring in the general population and 
increases in protenuria tend not to result in glornerulosclerosis at least in the medium term. For a fuller 
review of studies on long term consequences ee B. L. Kasiske et al., Long-Term Effects of Reduced Renal 
Mass in Humans, Kidney Int, 1995,48,814-819. 
53 Such as Vincenti et al., Transplantation, 1983,36,626; R. M. Hakim. et al., Kidney Int, 1984,25, 
930; J. A. Velosaetal., TransProc, 1985,17,100. 
54 E. g. W. J. Bayetal., Prognosis After Donor Nephrectomy: AnUpdate, IntJArtOrg, 1987,10,9-13 
also J. S. Najarianetal., 20 Years or More of Follow-up of Living Kidney Donors, TheLancet, 1992, 
340,807-810. 
55j. S Najarianetal., 20 Years or More of Follow-up of Living Kidney Donors, TheLancetl992,340, 
807-810 at 809. 
56 B. L. Kasiskeetal., Long-Tenn Effects of Reduced Renal Mass in Humans, KidneyInt, 1995,48,814- 
819. 
57 lbid at p814. 
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To address this they carried out a meta-analysis; testing if reduction in renal mass leads 
to progressive changes in any of proteinuria, hypertension and/or renal function in 
humans. The conclusion was that the reductions in renal mass did not have any of these 
consequences. Some increases of proteinuria were detected following uninephrectomy 
but these did not progress during the period of follow-up while increases in blood 
pressure were sufficiently low not to cause an increased incidence in hypertension. The 
considerable weight of this study in combination with other recent results is probably 
enough to assert that mid to long-term risks of nephrectomy are minimal or non-existent. 
There are no donor studies on 30-40 year risks. Some animal experiments point toward 
the possibility of significant very long term risks . 
18 However, D. M. Narkun-Burgess et 
al., 59 comparing 62 US soldiers who lost one kidney during the Second World War and 
were followed up for 45 years after uninephrectomy with 620 controls found they showed 
no increases in mortality, prevalence of hypertension and renal dysfunction which could 
be related to the previous loss of a kidney. However, this study may contain inherent 
bias in so far as the soldiers are likely to have been a more healthy sub-group than the 
control sample and more data is needed to firmly assess very long term risks in donation. 
3.4.2.2. Detriment With Non-Renal Organ LDT. 
Liver LDT. 
Experience of liver LDT is very limited, both in terms of the numbers of such 
transplants and the fact that the procedure only started to be utilised in the late 1980's. 60 
58"Reliable long term and large scale studies of medical records are lacking .... This is a serious 
deficiency 
because animal experiments have demonstrated that adverse outcomes resulted after nephrectomy in rats 
after 40% of normal life span, which would point to adverse outcomes in humans after approximately 30 
years" (F. Th. De Charro et al., Donor Recruitment in Europe, in De Charro et al. (ed), Systems of Donor 
Recruitment, Kluwer, 1992 at 10). See also A. Chanutin et al., Experimental Renal Insufficiency 
Produced By Partial Nephrectomy, Arch Intern Med, 1982,49,767-787 and T. H. Hostetter et al., 
Hyperfiltration in Remnant Nephrons: A Potentially Adverse Response to Renal Ablation, Am JPhysiol, 
1981,241, F85-F93. 
"Forty-five Year Follow-up After Uniphrectomy, Kidney Int, 1993,43,1110-1115. 
60S Raia et al., Lancet, 1989,26,497. 
41 
Obviously there is no donor data relating to long term risks. There is experience of 
livers being reduced in people with problematical liver conditions and this suggests that 
risk to a liver donor should be low. 61 Some early studies suggested comparable risks to 
those kidney donation 62 and some recent series have reported no serious complications 
from donation. 63 However, R. W. Busuttil pointed out higher risks were consistent with 
the complexity of the segment removal procedure 64 and found early complications to 
include incidental splenectomy, bile leak, subphrenic collection and wound infection. 65 
LDT Lung Lobe. 
Living donor lung lobe donation carries the risk of lobectorny. 66 This has been 
estimated as 1.1% for patients under 60 who undergo lobectomy because of lung cancer 67 
but is likely to be less than 1% for a donor coming into the procedure with good health 
(as opposed to being a smoker and/or having other problems). Long term risks from 
lobectomy are unknown -a possible impact would be reduced pulmonary function. 
There is a question of whether this level of risk and uncertainty is acceptable at all, if it is 
the justification must surely be high. Shaw et al., have suggested the justification 
would be to select patients for whom a cadaveric organ is unlikely to become available, 
are likely to deteriorate but are sufficiently healthy and agree to participate in 
rehabilitation programmes and refrain from smoking. 68 
6 'P83 ibid. 
62 E. g. P. A. Singer et al., New EngI JMed, 1990,321,620. 
63M Baberal et al., experience of 15 donors at Baskent University Hospital, Turkey (Living Donor 
Transplantation: Single Centre Experience, Trans Proc, 1996,28(l), 65-7). 
64Living Related Liver Donation: CON, Trans Proc, 1991,23(l), 43-5. 
651bid. 
66 L. R. Shawetal., TheLancet, 1991,338,678-681. 
67 F-J. Ginsbergetal., Modem Thirty Day Operative Mortality for Surgical Resections in Lung Cancer, J 
ThoracCardiovasculSurg, 1983,86,654-58. 
0L. R. Shaw et al., TheLancet, 1991,338,678-68lat679. 
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Other Organ LDT. 
Living donor heart and living donor cornea donation are ordinarily only incidental to a 
therapeutically necessary removal (i. e. the donor as a patient - domino transplant). This 
is not quite the same as living donation in the true, ordinary sense and presents issues 
which are better discussed elsewhere. 69 Outside of therapeutically necessary removal 
both forms of donation unacceptable levels of detriment. The practice of trade in 
corneas, which is common in some countries including India, is ethically indefensible - 
leading as it does to an overall health detriment o the donor-recipient pair. 70 
LDT pancreatic vessel length donation presents risks of splenectomy and treatment for 
infection and loss of endocrine and exocrine function. The risks appear to be more 
serious than liver segment, lung lobe and kidney, donation and may not be within an 
acceptable level. 71 The actual detriment and risks in small bowel segment donation, 
on the other hand, appear to be limited and acceptable. 72 
3.4.2.3. Detriment and Voluntary Informed Consent. 
If a clinician is utilising a living donor the fact that the donor is taking risks should make 
the clinicians communication about these risks and the process of donation of the utmost 
importance. The neutrality of the environment for decision-making and the 
informedness and voluntariness of the decision made by the prospective donor are critical 
to justifying donation as a bona-fide expression of autonomous decision-making. The 
question is whether living donation can ever conducted in this environment in practice. 
This is a critical issue examined in the following 4 chapters particularly chapter 6. For 
69Because they are more akin to general issues involving patients than to those involving donors. 701t involves an exchange of site from one person to another when the optimum optical solution would 
simply have been to keep things as they were. 71D. E. R. Sutherland et al., Medical Risks and Benefit of Pancreas Transplants From Living Related 
Donors in Land and Dossetor, Organ Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, Springer Verlag, 92-101. 
72 E. Deltz, Medical Risk and Benefit in Small-Bowel Segment Donors in Land and Dossetor (eds. ), Organ Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, SpringerVerlag, 110-116. 
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now it can only be stated that a carefully organised system of securing donor consent may 
be able to prevent most problems. 
3.4.2.4. Benefits to the Donor in Organ LDT. 
The assertion that donating an organ is often psychologically beneficial is supported by 
questionnaire and interview studies conducted with living donors. Fellner and 
Marshall's 12 donor study found that the donation had a consistently positive long lasting 
impact on the donor's life. 73 R. G. Simmons, S. D. Klein and R. L. Simmons conducted a 
one year follow-up study of living donors and concluded that donation was typically an 
exceedingly positive experience for the donors. 74 This result was confirmed in a 5-9 
years post-transplant study by Simmons and Anderson which found donors had higher 
self-esteem, positive changes in depressive affect and increased family closeness. 75 
Eisendrath's study also concluded that donation tends to have a positive impact on the 
lives of donors. 76 Bunzendahl et al., found a neutral evaluation by 83 donors of their 
general quality of life after donation, but with positive improvements in self-esteem for 
the majority of donors. 77 Westlie et al's quality of life study of 494 Norwegian donors 
(up to 19 years post-donation) found that they scored better than controls on 13 out of 19 
quality of life indicators (6 out of 10 on psychological aspects). 78 
73C. H. Fellner, J. R. Marshall, Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm. Med. Assoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 and 
Kidney Donors Revisited, Am JPsychiatry, 1977,134,575-576. 
74 R. G. Simmons, S. D. Klein, R. L. Simmons, The Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of 
Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 1977. 
75R. G. Simmons, C. R. Anderson, Social-Psychological Problems in Living Donor Transplantation, in 
J. L. Touraine et al., (ed), Transplantation and Clinical Immunology XVI, Elsevier Science Publishers, 
1983,47-57. 
76 R. M. Eisendrath, Psychologic Considerations in the Selection of Kidney Transplant Donors, Surg Gynec 
Obstet, 1969,129,243-248. See also, The Role of Grief and Fear in The Death of Kidney Transplant Patients, AmJPsychiatry, 1969,126,381. 
77 Retrospective Evaluation of Psychosocial Factors in Former Living Related Kidney Donors in Organ 
Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, (ed. Land and Dossetor, Springer Verlag, 1991 at 
p57). Similarly improvements in self esteem had been found in Sadler et al's study (in The Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 1977, p502). 7'Quality of life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
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The above studies paint a positive picture of donation, but there can be problems. 
R. G. Simmons et al. 's study had also reported that the benefits might "have been less 
evident if the questionnaire were administered in a situation unrelated to donation. " They 
added that "(d)espite this benign picture for the majority of donors, at all points in time 
there appeared to be a small group of donors who were extremely ambivalent or regretful 
of their decision (5% - 8%), '79 Westlie et al's. study of Norwegian donors revealed 94% 
of donors expressing that they would probably or definitely donate again with a low 
percentage (1.4%) saying they definitely would not. 80 
The findings of psychological / psychiatric trauma in donation are quite considerable. 
Morris et al. evaluated the quality of life of 12 donors 9- 23 months after donation. The 
main questionnaire focused on both the donors relationship with the recipient and the 
81 experience of donation. A general health questionnaire was also used. In 4 out of 12 
donors significant psychiatric morbidity was found. Hirvas et al., conducted a study of 
68 donors 6 months and then 6 years after donation. 82 The donors were interviewed by a 
psychiatrist and a Rorschach test was performed. 24 donors experienced mild trauma 
while a further 12 had experienced moderate to severe trauma. 
There has been specific analysis of depression in some studies. In a 1966 study, Kemph 
found unconscious resentment by donors to recipients and moderate depression in all the 
donors studied. 83 Kemph's view that donor's giving 'something for nothing' could 
predispose them to post-operative depression was supported by W. Cramond et al. in this 
early period. 84 However, later studies have not found incidence of depression higher 
79The Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 
1977 at 431-3. 
80L. Westlie et al., Quality of life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1993,8,1146- 
1150. 
"Morris P, St George B et al., Psychosocial Complications in Living Related Kidney Donors: An 
Australian Experience, Trans Proc, 1987,19,2840-2844. 
82 Hirvas J, Enckelll M et al., Psychological and Social Problems Encountered in Active Treatment of 
Chronic Uraemia, ActaMedScand, 1976,200,17-20. 
83 See J. P. Kemph, Renal Failure, Artificial Kidney and Kidney Transplant, Am iPsychiatry, 1966,122, 
12704. 
84 See W. Cramond et al., Psychological Screening of Potential Donors in a Renal Hornotransplantation 
Programme, Brit J ofPsychiatry, 1967,113,1213-1221. 
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than in the general population. Indeed, in 1985, Simmons and Anderson analysed the 
combined effect of large scale donor studies (N=1460,1501,2460) and their controls 
finding that they had similar pre-donation measures of depressive effect but that the 
donors had considerably 'better' (less depressed) measures both 1 year and 5-9 years after 
donation. 86 In addition, Simmons and Bernstein have found depression to be rare in 
adolescent kidney donors. 87 
It must also be concluded at this stage that there is no positive correlation between 
donation and depression. However, studies do indicate some relationship between a 
person's experience of donation/attitude towards it and the success of the graft outcome 
in the recipient. Simmons and Karnstra-Hennen studied 147 living related donors 
between 1970-1973 who received survey interviews pre-transplant. 88 At the time the 
article was written 47 of the donors had corresponding recipients who had 'lost' the 
donated kidney. The authors were able to interview 30 of these donors . 
89 84% of 141 
donors interviewed post-transplant would have done the same again had the clock been 
turned back. However, the response appeared to be related to graft outcome. 17% of 
donors whose recipients grafts had failed indicated feelings of regret whereas only 3% of 
the other donors did so. 90 Other studies have confirmed the connection between 
increased levels of regret post-donation and graft failure. The 94% of donors who 
would probably or definitely donate again in Westlie's study was compared to 89.2% in 
the sub-group of donors whose recipients had died, with higher numbers in the second 
cohort definitely not wanting to donate again (1.4% as against 4.3%). However Westlie 
et al's study also indicated that the sub group of donors whose recipients grafts had failed 
85 E. g. C. H. Fellner and J. R. Marshall, Twelve Kidney Donors, JAM4,1968,206,2703. Simmons and 
Karnstra-Hennen below. See also Simmons and Anderson above indicating that donors scored lower on 
depressive effect than did members of their family who could have volunteered to donate but did not do so. 
86 60% and 49% of donors respectively at these two times having better results than the controls. 
97 Bernstein and Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney Donor: TheRighttoGive, AmJPsychiat, 1974,131, 
1338. 
88Simmons and Karnstra-Hennen, The Living-Related Kidney Donor: Psychological Reactions When the 
KidneyFails, Dialysis and Transplantation, 8(6), June1979. 
8916 corresponding recipients were dead, 6 on dialysis and 6 had new functioning grafts. "Problems for donors in the survey as a whole were focused around a wide range of issues. 
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still scored as highly as the control group on quality of life factors. 91 Bunzendahl et al's 
study of 83 donors in Hannover, Germany found that 89.7% of donors with successful 
recipient grafting would donate again if the clock was turned back as against 84% for 
those without successful recipient graft survival. 92 
In all but exceptional cases (most of which could be screened out before donation) 
donation appear not to be an act of psychopathology unless one takes the view that 
transplantation as a whole is maleficent (and hence psycho-pathological to be involved 
in). Incidences of psychological and psychiatric morbidity can also be offset against the 
enrichment that can occur from donation. One danger, examined further in chapter 6 is 
that the act of service is used by the prospective donor as a screen with which to hide 
ambiguous feelings and motivation for donation - outright or circumstantial pressures 
may encourage a donor to deny his/her true feelings about donation, particularly if they 
are against he act of donation. The results of studies suggesting that donation can have 
a positive impact (on self-esteem etc. ) may be distorted through the donors lens of not 
wanting to experience cognitive dissonance in relation to the act of donation. 
Nethertheless it is difficult to dispute that the act of donation has positive psychological 
benefits in many cases and is in some cases imply a noble act designed to benefit another 
- perhaps, as Simmons suggests, 
"the skepticism with which altruistic acts are regarded in the literature should be re- 
examined. 03 
Clearly, also, some account must be taken of the fact that not donating could under 
certain circumstances cause psychological detriment - both through negative feeling about 
having missed an opportunity to be of service to another and, more potently, in 
91L. Westlie et al., Quality of life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1993,8,1146- 
1150. 
92 Retrospective Evaluation of Psychosocial Factors in Former Living Related Kidney Donors in Organ 
Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, (ed. Land and Dossetor, Springer Verlag, 1991 at 
p57). 
93 Gift of Life, Wiley and Sons, 1977 at 445. 
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occasional cases where the act of donation by the prospective donor is essential to 
preserve the well-being of a person whom the prospective donor has a critical relationship 
to. 
3.4.3. General Impact of Donation 
3.4.3.1. The Impact of Increasing LDT on Cadaveric Supply. 
Strong cadaveric procurement has sometimes led to lower LDT rates. 94 However the 
USA has fairly good cadaveric procurement but still has a significant rate of living 
donation (see graph 1). Some countries having average / lower cadaveric procurement 
still only have a low LDT rate. 95 The real question, however is whether use of LDT 
can adversely impact on cadaveric procurement. Although problems in cadaveric 
procurement are an incentive for the development of a strong living donor programme 96 
LDT is unlikely to influence the rate of cadaveric donation 97 except in cases where an 
established LDT programme acts as a disincentive to facing resistance to development of 
a cadaver programme. 98 This is a problem of organisational motivation to reduce 
waiting lists, not an intrinsic consequence of using LDT. 99 
94 Belgium, Austria, Spain, Portugal. 
95Canada, Australia, UK 
96 E. g. Norway (see Graph 5), Turkey, Greeceetc. 
97 However a minority of other transplant professionals think otherwise. See for instance H. Kreis, Trans 
Proc, 1987,27,1510-1514. Kreis quotes a study of Bart et al., Transplantation, 1981,31,379. 
This study discovered that potentially US kidney procurement could reach 110 p. m. p. Kreis suggests that 
living donation is easier for hospitals and may be relied upon instead of an attempt to maintain and increase 
a cadaveric programme (pI513 ibid). 
9'Kreis (Trans Proc, 1987,27,1510-1514), argues that LDT does generally act as a disincentive. He 
notes that in 1982 and before the number of cadaveric transplants increased slowly whilst living donation 
was below 5% then in 1983 when a deliberate centre policy to expand living donation was adopted for the 
first time since 1969 cadaveric transplants reduced. 
991n other words if physicians are becoming less motivated to maintain and expand cadaveric when living 
donation increases, the problem is not an intrinsic one but lies in the motivational attitudes toward 
transplanting people within a short time. Sometimes a dernotivating factor can be the fact that the financial 
rewards in countries with private dialysis facilities are great. On this and broader questions of motivation 
see a comparison and analysis of Norwegian and French practices (with particular regard to LDT), Hilde 
Lorentzen and Florence Paterson, The Use of Living Donors For Kidney Transplants: Second Order and 
Third Order Decision Making, copy available from OSC, FNSP CNRS, 49 Rue de I: Universite 75007 
Paris. 
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3.4.3.2. Impact of LDT on the Trade in Human Organs. 
Kreis points out that commercial trading in living donor organs is inescapable in 
countries promoting living donation. 100 He concludes from this that the need for organs 
should be met from cadaveric donors. 101 However prevention of commerce is not an 
absolute goal; 102 there have been cases of trafficking in cadaveric donation and this has 
not been taken as a reason to stop transplantation altogether. Decisions need to be taken 
through a balancing of ethical and other imperatives. In practice this would probably 
mean regulatory control of classes of donation (e. g. non-closely genetic) more likely to be 
subject to 'commercial abuses' as well prohibition on conducting organ transplant 
activities for profit. This area is investigated further in chapter 8. 
3.4.4. Conclusions. 
The decision of how far to use LDT to address the organ shortfall is largely a matter of 
weighing detriment and benefit for the donor and recipient. Subject to being able to 
develop an approach that mostly ensures informed and voluntary consent, the three meta 
conclusions that can be drawn in this area are: 
Firstly, given reasonably low risks to the donor, evaluating the ethics of a particular 
LDT involves comparing the prospective benefits to the recipient with prospective 
risks to both the recipient and donor. The decision to use LDT is largely based on a 
sufficiently favourable comparison combined with its use representing the optimum 
remedium for treatment. 
Secondly, psychological benefit cannot justify a procedure in itself but where LDT is 
the right choice for the recipienfs position it may be taken into account as a factor to 
be balanced against detriment to the donor and used as an ethical justification, 
100Trans Proc, 1987,27,1510-1514 at 1513. 
'O'Ibid at 1513. 
1021t is assumed for the purposes of this discussion that commerce needs preventing - for an analysis of 
ethical issues in this area see chapter 8.3. 
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alongside autonomy, for donations that have, prospectively, limited detriment. 
Nethertheless because primum non nocere is intrinsically breached by LDT to some 
degree 103 it would remain a professional right for a centre or clinician to refuse to 
undertake LDT in general or in particular circumstances on ethical grounds. 104 
Thirdly, an assessment in individual cases is mainly determined by variables of pre- 
existing health condition of the donor and recipient, the type of procedure being 
undertaken and the quality of the organ being donated (including the level of match). 
The majority of kidney LDT's have low risks / consequences and high anticipated benefits 
and can thus be justified as a better alternative than dialysis where acceptable methods of 
cadaveric procurement cannot fully meet demand. Liver LDT is used only where no 
suitable cadaver donors are available for the recipient. 105 Some evidence suggests that 
liver LDT graft survival is not as good as with its cadaveric counterpart. 106 Arguably this 
means liver LDT should continue to be used very selectively, for instance only where 
there is strong or chronic need, as is often the case with paediatric potential recipients. 
This selectivity might be broadened by the fact that the consequences of not receiving a 
liver transplant can ultimately be death for a liver patient whereas a kidney patient will 
usually simply have to endure continued dialysis. 
Living lung donation has a much lower success rate 107 than kidney donation as well as 
greater risks which makes it a much more difficult procedure to justify generally but 
again it could be utilised in cases of strong need. Living pancreas donation is almost 
impossible to justify in general because of higher risks than kidney donation, combined 
with a significant technical failure rate and the fact that no shortage of cadaver organs are 
103 F. D. Moore, Three Ethical Revolutions: Ancient Assumptions Remodelled Under Pressure of 
Transplantation! Trans Prop, 1988,20(l) supp 1,1061-1067. 104 Much as a clinician can refuse to undertake an abortion. 
105M. Haberal et al., Living Related Liver Transplantation in an Adult and A Child. In Organ Replacement 
Therapy: Ethics, Justice, Commerce ed W. Land and J. Dossetor, Springer Verlag, 1991,83 -9 1. 106 R. W. Busutill, Living Related Liver Donation: CON, Trans Proc, 1991,23,43-45. 
107 L. R. Shaw et al., The Lancet, 1991,338,678-681. Graft survival rates are quoted at 65% for one year 
and 53% at 3 years. 
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available. Probably the only situation in which it could seriously be considered is where 
cadaveric donation cannot easily be used, for instance with highly sensitised diabetics. 
3.5. Conclusions. 
The extent to which reliance is placed on LDT varies widely between countries. Some 
differences are due to geography'08 or differing supply needs. 109 However, differing 
usage is seemingly also significantly due to differing understandings and perspectives on 
LDT ethics, particularly amongst practitioners (see chapter 10). At the one extreme a 
number of surgeons prefer LDT organs to cadaveric organs"O and, at the other extreme, 
a significant proportion of clinicians regard LDT as unethical. "' Attitudes of clinicians 
are a key to determining practice and even the regulatory framework for LDT. Currently 
criteria for living donor usage varies widely between countries, regions, centres and 
different clinicians and are often not clearly established at all. Indeed the overall picture 
is "ad hoc and unsystematic. "' 12 It is essential that the direction of procurement policy 
is not superimposed on centres and countries but, equally, extensive LDT use must be 
placed firmly on the agenda and subjected to a clear analysis of the ethical and legal pre- 
conditions for usage and the respective rights and responsibilities of participants and 
practitioners. 
'081n. Norway geographical / transportation issues make dialysis more difficult. 109As is the case with Eire where by the use of cadaver alone the waiting list is kept to a small level. 110A. Spital et al. in their study of US transplant centres found 36% of surgeons with this view 
(Transplantation 1993,48 at 243-248). 
"'Editorial, Lancet, 1982, ii, 696. In this study of 148 European Transplant Centres 22% of surveyed 
doctors thought LDT was ethically unacceptable. 
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Chapter 4 Legality of LDT and Basic Legal Preconditions for 
Conductint! it. 
4.1. Introduction 
There are basic legal pre-conditons for conducting any type of medical procedure. For 
instance, common law will always require that a procedure is acceptable on grounds of 
public policy. As with several serious medical procedures, LDT is often subject to 
legislative pre-conditions on it's use which supplant and/or supplement general principles 
of law. Legislative stipulations in this area are partly designed to provide a framework 
for acceptable use of LDT by practitioners - such a framework being important, in 
particular, to protect prospective donors (prospective donors are generally considered to 
be in a vulnerable situation through being 'placed' in the position of being potential 
rescuers in a procedure not designed for their benefit). Basic preconditons for 
conducting LDT can be divided into 4 areas: 
1. conditions as to the rationale for choosing living donation; 
2. conditions as to the minimum acceptable prospective benefit-detriment ratio; 
3. limits on allowable prospective (definite and potential) donor detriment; and 
4. conditions as to the procedures that must be followed. 
Of course before examining these issues in turn it is important to consider the legality of 
LDT. 
4.2. The Le2ality of LDT. 
In most countries the legality of LDT in general is assured through legislation. At least 
before such legislation became commonplace there were questions as to whether LDT 
was legal because it involves mutilation without any direct therapeutic benefit for the 
donor. The issue of limits to the detriment that a person can legally endure was 
examined in English law in the case of Rv Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. This case laid 
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down the clear principle that limits exist. However, what has subsequently become 
clear, is that limits are not so much absolute as relative to the context and activity taking 
place. The key issue for judges has been whether or not enduring the detriment is, in 
the circumstances, in the public interest. As Lord Lane CJ said when giving the 
judgement in A-G's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) (1981) 2 All ER 1057, 
"... Ordinarily, then, if the victim consents, the assailant is not guilty ... The question 
is: 
at what point does public interest require the court to hold otherwise? ... The answer to 
this question, in our judgement, is that it is not in the public interest that people should 
try to cause or should cause each other bodily harm for no good reason. "' 
However, whether the judges have taken a consistent approach to this issue is debatable. 
On the one hand, some activities that can be viewed as causing siginificant pointless or at 
least unnecessary self-harm have been declared legal, the most obvious example being 
boxing. ' Other acts tending to cause less harm can be declared outside the legal limits of 
what can be consented to - hence in Rv Brown (Anthony) [199312 All ER 75, [1994] 2 
WLR 556 the House of Lords declared certain acts of sexual sado-masochism to be 
outside of the boundaries of law. ' What is clear is that reasonable surgical interference 
has long been assumed to be legal. 4 Recently in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993) 1 
All ER 821 Lord Mustill explicitly stated that, 
"bodily invasions in the course of proper medical treatment stand completely outside the 
criminal law. "5 
The problem is that the normal justiciation for surgical interference, that it is in the 
patients best interests, cannot easily apply to LDT. In practice physically non- 
1[1981] 2 ALL ER 1057. 
2 Although not where done with bare knuckles R yConey [ 1882] 8 QBD 534. 
3 For a critique of this judgement see E Edwards, 'No Defence for a Sado-Masochistic Libido, ' NLJ, 1993, 
143,552. 
'See e. g. A-G's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) (1981) 2 All ER 1057. 
511993] 1 All ER 821 at 889. 
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therapeutic procedures have been declared illegal or legal depending on the public interest 
in the circumstances. Hence, while it is normally legal to perform a sex change 
operation (Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33 per Ormrod j6) it is 
illegal to engage to engage in the mutilation of female genitalia. 7A key is whether the 
overall intention of the procedure can be regarded as beneficial or "reasonable. " a 
Genital mutilation may be regarded as something that women are often unduly 
influenced, 'brainwashed' or coerced into and is specifically designed to reduce sexual 
pleasure. It could be regarded as oppressive and not worthy of public support. A sex 
change on the other hand is someone's individual choice about their sexual identity. 
Normally it is a free decision made without coercion or undue influence. It causes 
physical harm but this is accepted as incidental to it's main purpose. Even if some 
people challenge the rationality of the procedure there is no basis for claiming it is 
actively against the public interest. Living organ donation goes beyond an ordinary 
physiologically non-therapeutic procedure because (unlike, for instance, a sex change 
operation) its purpose is normally not any kind of benefit to the person undergoing it but 
solely the benefit of another. The reason why judges, in cases where donation of an 
organ or tissues is examined, have assumed that LDT can be legal9 is presumably that it 
has a reasonable and beneficial purpose rather than an oppressive one and can therefore 
be in the public interest. , The donor in effect is an 'approved rescuer. ' Rescuers have 
traditionally been given legal protection and praise rather than there actions being 
declared unlawful or illegal. 10 The key to the the prospective donor being allowed to 
6[l 970] 2 All ER 33 at 43. 
7 The Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 under which physically non-therapeutic procedures involving mutilation of the clitoris, labia etc. are illegal, being clearly in this instance against the public interest. Mutilation would probably have been illegal at common law also. 8A view expressed by Lord Lane in Attomey-General's Reference [No. 6 of 1980](1981] 2 All E. R. 1057 CA as confirmed in Brown on this point. 
9See chapters 5-7 for cases where LDT is discussed obiter or is the matter at hand. Skegg has said, "if 
called upon to deal with a case in which a kidney had been removed from a consenting adult, for 
transplantation into someone in need of it, the courts may confidently be expected to take the view that the 
operation did not amount to the offence of battery " (Law, Ethics and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law, 
Clarendon Press 1988 at 36). 
1OSee for instance IlMmes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA) duty of care owed to the rescuer by person being rescued where rescue might reasonably have been foreseen. ý Lidean KBritish Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650, [1963] 2 All ER 860 (CA) duty of care owed to a statiomnaster escuing his small son 
who had been trespassing on the lines. Street states that the rescue cases in England, "are marked by an 
emphatic desire by thejudiciary toreward! desirable conduct and encourage in this limited sphere'Good 
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engage in the rescue act is generally that what (s)he is doing has a level of benefit to 
another without an excessive or overriding level of detriment to him/herself although, as 
examined in chapter 7, matters are not so simple as this where the donor is a minor or 
incapacitate adult. 
An interesting final point is Michielson's questioning of the legality of LDT on the basis 
that problems in assessing risks make informed consent to organ LDT impossible. " This 
view must be rejected because the reality of almost any medical decision, indeed any 
decision in general, is that it will carry an element of uncertainty in terms of knowledge 
of risks and consequences. This uncertainty is not held to invalidate consent legally" 
and ethically it will normally be acceptable just to convey any significant areas of 
uncertainty. 
4.3. Legal Preconditions as to the Basic Rationale for Choosing LDT. 
Transplantation is considered the 'ultimum remedium! to be used where there are no other 
reasonable alternatives and is generally only allowed for therapeutic, not purely 
scientific, purposes. 13 This approach is philosophically underpinned by the principle of 
primum non nocere (first do no harm). Despite its side effects modem allopathic 
medical treatment is generally accepted as capable of respecting this principle where the 
procedure is, all things considered, in the best interests of the patient. However, living 
donors can gain only vicarious benefit from donation along with some direct physical 
detriment. Nys concludes that if primurn non nocere is to be taken seriously, 
Samaritanship" (Street On Torts, Eighth Edition edited by Margaret Brazier, Butterworths, 1988 at 176). 
This quote could just as easily be applied by judges to LDT. 
"P. Michielson, Medical Risk and Benefit in Renal Donors: The Use of Living Donation Reconsidered, in 
W. Land and J-Dossetor (eds. ), Organ Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, 1990, 
Springer-Verlag, 32-39. 
12 The Voluntarism. and Informedness of Living Donors in Price and Akveld (eds. ), Living Organ Donation 
in The Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,98-115 at 99. 
13 Excepting transplantation between animals. 
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"it follows .. that organs that may be removed from living donors will always be limited. 
Organs that are not only not regenerative but are also vital such as heart and liver cannot 
be removed. " 14 
It would also follow from the primurn non nocere principle that preconditions should 
rightly exist for preferring living donation to other options. 15 General legal principles 
are unlikely to give direct attention to this issue and neither does the Council of Europe's 
Resolution (78)29. However, the WHO Guiding Principles on transplantation state that 
organs should preferably come from the bodies of deceased persons 16 and, as illustrated 
below, transplant legislation typically has preconditions for favouring LDT - partly to 
ensure that there is an adequate rationale for conducting it. 
4.3.1. Rationale for Transplantation Generally as the optimum Remedium or 
Last Resort. 
Some laws require transplant to be the optimum solution under the circumstances or even 
a last resort. This is really only a requirement that reflects the physicians Hippocratic to 
act in the patients best interests and not engage in a harmful procedure unless absolutely 
necessary. Regimes with this requirement include: Belarus (draft), 
17 Belgium, 18 
20 22 Finland, 19 GDR, Russian Federation2l and Ecuador where the patient must be 
140f course this should not preclude removal of these organs for therapeutic purposes and living donation as 
a merely incidental fact to this (e. g. domino heart procedure). See Nys, Desirable Characteristics of 
Living Donation Transplant Legislation in Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal 
Perspective, (Ed D. Price and H. Akveld), EUROTOLD, 1996,116-125. 
15 E. g. CDT or dialysis. 
16 Guiding Principle I- see chapter 7 for more detailed comment on these principles. 17 States that the transplantation of organs and tissues, "may be effected only if other medical procedures 
would not enable the patient's life to be safeguarded or his health to be restored... (and) shall be carried out 
on the basis of medical indications, in accordance with the general rules applicable to surgical procedures. " Section 4 of the Draft Law of the Republic of Belarus on the Donation and Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues - copies available from WHO or the EUROTOLD project. "Law No. 32 of 13 June 1986 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs at section 6. 19Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 On the Removal of Human Organs and Tissues for Medical Purposes at 
section 2. 
20ThiS states, "it shall be a prerequisite for organ transplantation that there are no or only limited prospects 
of successful results being achieved through the application of other medical procedures and methods for 
the preservation of life or the restoration or improvement of the health of the patient" (law operating in the 
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suffering from a disease for which the transplant is the only means of prolonging or 
improving his life; 23 Algeri 4 and Romania25 where the transplant must be the sole 
means of preserving the life or physical integrity of the recipient. 
Dialysis might be perceived as capable of improving health or at least preserving physical 
integrity, in which case most of these provisions would restrict transplant to exceptional 
cases. There was not much foresight in the drafting of these provisions! However, 
common sense may prevail to allow LDT to be conducted where it was the means to 
preserve / improve existing quality of life in terms of the long-term prognosis. Russian 
Federation law is well framed by ignoring health preservation and stating that 
transplantation may only be carried out where other medical techniques cannot guarantee 
the saving of the life of the patient or the restoration of health. 26 
4.3.2. Legislative Preference for CDT and the Explicit Legislative 
Requirement that LDT is the Optimum Remedium. 
Some jurisdictions have a regulatory bias towards CDT. Swedish law states that the use 
of living donors should be limited as much as possible 27 Colombian law requires that 
the living organ donation to be for a therapeutically indispensable transplantation28 
5 new Landers of Germany that used to be East Germany. Ordinance of 4th July 1975 On The 
Performance of Organ Transplantation section 1(3)). 
21Law of 22 December 1992 of the Russian Federation on the Transplantation of Human Organs and/or 
Tissues at section 1. 
22 Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code at section 2. 23Ecuador also has the de minimus requirement that the patient have sufficient health to sustain surgery and 
post operative treatment. 
24Law No. 85-05 of 16 February 1985 On Health Protection and Promotion at section 166. 25 Law of 1996 (available from EUROTOLD). 
26 Law of 22 December 1992 of the Russian Federation On the Transplantation of Human Organs and/or Tissues at section 1. 
27 Explanatory Memorandum to the new Act of 8 June 1995 On Transplantation etc. - see Linda Nielson, Living Organ Donors: Legal Perspectives From Western Europe in D. Price and H. Akveld (ed. ), Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,58-71. This 
represents a slight change in approach given that Sweden'sold law allowed very unfettered clinical 
judgement by simply requiring that the transplant is to treat a disease or physical injury in another person (The Transplantation Law (No. 190) of 15 May 1975 at section 1). "Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 19 89 at section 24. 
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implying that cadaveric donation would be given prior consideration over LDT, with the 
latter only able to be used if really necessary. Slovenian law29 requires living donation 
to be the best therapeutic solution for the recipient and cadaveric is to be preferred where 
there is reasonable availability. In contrast to these straightforward provisions, Belgian 
and Mexican regulation is fraught with ambiguity in this area. 
In Belgium the law states that, 
"if the removal of organs or tissues from living persons may affect the donor, or if such 
organs are non-regenerable, it may only be performed if the recipient's life is in danger 
and if the transplantation of organs or tissues from a deceased person could not produce 
an equally satisfactory reSUItOO 
Herman Nys, a Belgian legal academic, assumes "life in danger" to mean anywhere 
where renal failure has occurred .31 This broad interpretation avoids the 
farcical situation 
of only allowing LDT where there is immediate danger to life. 32 Another aspect of 
Belgian law is that LDT is only permitted insofar as the use of a cadaveric organ does not 
offer prospects of an "equally satisfactory result. 03 This stipulation is, in effect saying 
that becuase LDT causes the donor some detriment it must be justified as being a better 
option than CDT in the circumstances. Mexican law goes even further, stating that 
LDT may only occur when organs or tissues from cadavers cannot be used. 34 
29Article 2 ibid. 
30Law No. 32 of 13 June 1986 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs at section 6. 
1 INys comments that if the transplantation were not to preserve life and was for a futile transplantation it 
would breach Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights which emphasises the duty of the 
state to preserve life (Desirable Characteristics of Living Donor Transplant Laws in D. Price and H. Akveld 
(ed. ), Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996, 
114-124). 
32ThiS would exclude the majority of patients who are surviving reasonably on dialysis and shackle LDT 
from being used at an optimal time when the patient is most healthy (i. e. pre-dialysis or early dialysis basis). 
33 Article 6 of 1983 law. This position is recommended by B. Schoeller, Vorchslag Fur Eine Gestzliche 
Regelung der Organspende Vorn Lebender Spender (proposal for an LDT law for Germany), Peter Lange 
1993 at 78. 
"The General Law on Health 26 December 1983 at section 322. hiexican Llaw also requires the recipient 
to be suffering from an ailment which can be effectively treated by means of the transplant and is not 
suffering from other diseases which could foreseeable j copardise the success of the transplant (Federal 
Regulation of 16 August 1976 On the Use of Human Organs, Tissues and Cadavers at section 35). 
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Nys has noted interpretational problems in the Belgian provision, 
"Should this requirement be understood 'in abstracto', which means that transplantation 
with a cadaveric does not offer, as a rule, similar results as transplantation with a living 
donated organ, or'in concreto', which means that if no cadaveric organ is available in a 
given case the condition is fulfilled. But what is the meaning of 'not available'? Inthe 
region? The country? Europe? Worldwide? 05 
Hopefully common sense would prevail in interpreting the provision as requiring the 
clinician to make a reasonable assessment of whether or not LDT is better than cadaveric 
in the light of the individual case circumstances. Main factors to weigh would be: the 
level of match of the proposed LDT; the level of urgency of the need of the recipient; 
and likely cadaveric waiting time for the recipient. For instance, if the expected waiting 
time was 3 years and the proposed living donor was a good match an LDT would 
probably be justified as better. If expected waiting time was less than a year probably 
only exceptional recipient need and / or a perfect match would justify LDT as more 
satisfactory (a similar situation and policy to this exists in Eire at present). 
The requirement in Mexican law that LDT can only be used when CDT 'cannot'be used 
is sornwhat bizarre and unreasonable as it stands. Even if cannot is taken as referring to 
a cadaveric organ not being obtainable within a reasonable period of time the provision is 
restrictive and in need of amendment. Perhaps a new provision could say that LDT is 
permissible where a reasonable cadaveric organ is unlikely to be found within a 
reasonable time period. 
Ambiguity and uncertainty of the Belgian and Mexican variety may produce a 
disinclination arnonst professionals to use LDT; indeed, for example, the attitudes 
questionnaire results presented in chapter 10 indicate that some Belgian transplant 
35Desirable Characteristics of LDT Legislation - ibid. 
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professionals wrongly think LDT is illegal. The underlying principle of requiring LDT 
to be superior to cadaveric donation is valid - in so far as it protects healthy volunteers 
from the extreme utilitarianism of being used as 'waiting list reducers' when a cadaveric 
donation would have been as successful. On the other hand whether people want to be 
used in this way could be viewed as their business; they simply need to be clearly told 
and left to decide whether or not they want to engage in an act of such'social solidarity. 
36 
Other provisions require LDT's to be the best available choice in the circumstances which 
would include being superior to the cadaveric option. For instance, Argentina's law 
states that LDT is to be used where, "other means have been exhausted or are 
insufficient, or if they do not constitute an appropriate therapeutic solution for a 
particular patient. 07 Peruvian laW38 requires LDT to be the best therapeutic solution for 
the recipient. The authorisation process for LDT in the Canadian model law considers 
whether it is the treatment of choice. 39 
4.3.3. Justification for Transplantation in Terms of Anticipated Results. 
When is it justified to conduct transplantation? This is usually left for clinicians to 
decide. Polish law is an example of legislation reinforcing clinical discretion. It 
requires the doctor performing the transplantation to determine the justification and 
expediency of harvesting cells, tissues and organs from a particular donor. 
36 A Norwegian donor gifted partly for this explicit reason (see chapter 9). 37 Law No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 On the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials at section 
2 (taken from IDHL, 1994,45(l), 35-36 ). Additionally where living donation is specifically proposed 
it must, "offer the likelihood of success with regard to preserving the life or improving the health of the 
recipient" (section 14). The old law stated that LDT's should be considered "as standard procedures rather 
than experimental ones, which may be performed when all other available non-artificial means and 
resources have been exhausted and there is no alternative therapeutic means of restoring the patienVs health" 
(Law No. 21541 of 21 March 1977 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical 
Materials at section 2). The need to use non-artificial means and resources first may refer to nutritional 
therapy and other potentially more holistic treatments. 
38Law No. 23415 of I June 1985 at section 7(a) repealed by Supreme Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 
1988 at section 14 (IDHL, 1994,45(l) at 36-37). 
39Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 5(3) and section 7((6). 
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Transplantation to a specified recipient is determined on the basis of actual medical 
knowledge. 40 
Other legislative provision in this area tends to be de minimus in it's level of stringency 
and tends to refer to transplantation as a whole. The former GDR law (in force in the 5 
new Landers of Unified Germany) states that transplantation must only be conducted in 
situations where it, "may be assumed with a high degree of probability that 
transplantation of the organ will save the life or restore or improve the health of a 
patient. tv41 Bolivian law allows for transplantation to maintain, restore and prolong 
human life; 42 a clinician would not normally do it on any other basis anyway. 
Paraguqy's law requires that the transplant demonstrably prolongs or improves the 
recipients health. 43 Kuwaiti law simply requires the transplantation to be in order to 
protect or prolong life. 44 The only clinical restriction in France, 45 Panama, 46 
ruguay, 47 Tunisia, 48 VenezuelP and India" is that the removal is for therapeutic 
purposes. Iraq's law requires simply that the donation is for therapeutic purposes or 
where necessary to maintain life. 51 
40Law of October 26,1995 Regulating the Removal and Transplantation of Human Cells, Tissues and 
Organs at Article 9(l) point 3. Translated copy of the law held at EUROTOLD courtesy of the Polish 
PECO participants. 
4 'Ordinance of 4th July 1975 (operative in the 5 new Landers of unified Germany that used to be East 
Germany) at section 6. 
42 Regulations On the Use of Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 1. 
43 Law No. 826180 of 15 December 1980 Promulgating the Health Code at section 278. 
44 Decree Law No. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation at section 1. 
45 Law No. 94-54 of 29 July 1994 On the Donation and Use of Elements and Products of the Human Body, 
Medically Assisted Procreation, and Prenatal Diagnosis (Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, 
Lois et Decrets, 30 July 1994,175, pp 11060-11068, Division 2, Article L. 671-3. See IDHL, 1994, 
45(4), 473482. at p474. 
46 Law No. 10 of II July 1983 Regulating the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Parts and Laying 
Down Other Provisions at section 1. Section 12 says that organs may be donated in order to preserve or 
restore the patients health. 
47 Decree No 660/991 of 4 December 1991 at section 1. Updating Regulations No. 86/977, made for the 
implementation of Law No. 14005, for the purpose of determining the technical supervision of the National 
Organ and Tissue Bank (IDHL, 1994,45(l) at 38). 
48Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs at section 2 49Law of 19 November 1992, No. 4497 at section 3 (implicit) (IDHL, 1995,46(3) at 329-330. 5'Act No. 42 of 1994 section 3 (IDHL, 1995,46(l) at 34-37). Therapeutic purposes are defined in 
section I as "systematic treatment of any disease or the measures to improve health according to any 
fVicular method or modality. " 
Decree No. 698 of 27 August 1986 of the Revolutionary Command Council at section 1. 
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4.3.5. Justification in'Terms of Biological Compatibility Between Living 
Donor and Recipient. 
Often, centre policy will require a certain level of biological compatibility between donor 
and recipient to conduct LDT. In bone marrow transplantation full compatibility is a 
basic clinical necessity but where organs are concerned the stipulation of certain levels of 
compatibility is aimed simply at improving the quality of transplant. In this light 
requirements can be seen as an indirect method for helping to ensure that LDT is 
sufficiently justified. At the same time such requirements are not flexible to the 
circumstances of justification in an individual case and do not of themselves ensure that 
an LDT is an optimum remedium. 
Legislative regimes with compatibility requirements include Greek law which states that, 
"there must be histocompatibility between the donor and the recipient. 02 Full 
histocompatibility is required for bone marrow transplantation but it is unclear what level 
of compatibility is required for other organs. Greece's significant LDT use suggests this 
provision merely means there must be some level of histocompatibility (i. e. not 
mismatch). Ecuador's law is probably the same in requiring positive histocompatibility 
results. 53 More liberally, Cypriot law requires donor-recipient immunological 
compatibility between donor and recipient or at least toleration of the biological materials 
by the recipient according to scientific criteria. 54 Similarly, Mexican law simply 
requires organ compatibility to be present between donor and recipient and that the 
recipient can tolerate the transplant. Since clinically mismatched LDT is the only form 
of LDT inferior to cadaveric donation 55 the histocompatibility requirements act to ensure 
LDT is justified as the best clinical option. 56 
52 Law No. 13 83 of 2 August 1983 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Tissues and Organs at 
section 5(b). 
53 Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code at section 2. 
54 Law No. 97 of 1987 On the Removal and Transplantation of Biological Materials of Human Origin at 
section 7. 
55See Chapter 3.4.1. 
56 Thus effectively producing a correspondence between such laws and Belgian law. 
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4.3.6. Other Reauirements. 
Although most jurisdictions leave regulation as to required donor health to clinical 
guidelines some legislatively limit donations on this basis, usually to protect the donor 
but sometimes to protect the recipient as in the case of Costa Rican law which states that 
so called 'high risle persons can not be donors. 57 
A number of legilsative regimes require authorisation of LDT by a body or persons 
independent of the clinicians caring for the recipient (see chapter 6). The requirement 
for such authorisation has several functions including ensuring voluntariness and an 
adequate clinical justification for LDT. 
4.3.7. Conclusion. 
Most legislative requirements in this area are very basic but in some cases laws favour 
cadaveric donation or otherwise significantly restrict LDT. Even a non-restrictive law is 
ultimately no guarantee of choice for the potential living donor - there is no right to 
donate and as such the donor will be somewhat beholden to clinical judgement at the 
local transplant centre or to finding an alternative centre which will undertake the 
procedure. Some issues are almost universally left as a matter for individual centres and 
/ or national guidelines; e. g. criteria on who is acceptable for transplantation on clinical 
criteria. Legislative preconditions that may be considered useful are: the requirement 
that LDT is the optimum remedium in the circumstances of the individual case; and the 
requirement that LDT is undertaken for therapeutic purposes. Other legislative controls 
are basically superfluous - although health and safety stipulations (e. g. donor health) may 
be necessary in some circumstances to obtain a consistent national or international 
approach, ensure high standards and allay public concerns. 
57 These are defined as; (a) homosexual or bisexual men; (b) female Prostitutes; (c) promiscuous men; (d) 
drug injecting drug dependent persons; (e) persons receiving blood or blood products; and (f) women who 
have had sexual relations with men belonging to groups (a), (c), (d) and (e). This also applies to anyone 
with HIV but any person belonging to one of the above groups may be a donor if they are found to not be 
HIV positive (see Decree No. 17533-S of 8 May 1987 at section 1-4). 
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4.4. Limiting Parameters to Definite and Potential Donor Detriment in 
LDT. 
4.4.1. Introduction., 
The Council of Europe's Draft Bioethics Convention stresses that parties to 
transplantation should protect the dignity and identity of all human beings, and guarantee 
everyone respect for their integrity. 58 This philosophy has been one of the factors 
behind legal limitations on the level of prospective detriment for living donors which 
include parameters restricting the acceptable level of definite harmful consequences 
stemming from a procedure and restriction of levels of permissible risk involved in 
undergoing a procedure. They can also be placed in the context of anticipated benefits 
as is the case within the Council of Europe Resolution (78) 2959 provision which states 
that where the removal of substances presents a foreseeable substantial risk to the life or 
health of the donor a removal may be permitted exceptionally where it is justified by the 
motivations of the donor, the family relationship with the recipieneo and the medical 
requirements of the case. The Draft Convention on Bioethics is more explicit on this 
point in stating that, "no organ shall be collected if the risk for the donor is 
disproportionate to the benefit expected for the recipient. , 61 The Council of Europe is 
currently developing a new Protocol on organ transplantation but this is unlikely to 
comment further on the question of detriment. 
"Article I of the Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Bioethics Convention and Explanatory Report. 
Dir/Jur (94)2 directorate of Legal Affairs, Strasbourg, July 1994. Note that this draft was developed into a 
'Convention on Human Right and Biomedicine, ' adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 November 
1996 (Dir/Jur (96) 14) which has recently been published. 
"Adopted by the Committee of the Council of Europe, II May 1978. 
60Article 5. Case law relating to capacity and LDT has emphasised the question of close relationship and it 
would just as likely be a factor here - since the public interest is likely to be determined not just by what 
risks are being taken but by the likely value of taking them. 
6 'For ftuther discussion of the Convention see C. Byk, Living Organ Donation: European Perspectives in 
D. Price and H. Akveld, Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, 
EUROTOLD, 1996,49-57. 
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Limits to detriment are explicitly laid out within most transplant legislation. There are a 
few exceptions, such as France, 62 whilst some jurisdictions only partially regulate on 
this point - for instance Hong Kong's Ordinance and UK law both of which regulate 
limits for certain forms of donation requiring special authorisation (i. e. respectively 
donations not defined as between genetic relatives or spouses of 3 or more years standing 
and those not defined as between genetic relatives 63) . General law 
has principles which 
often restrict the detriment a person may endure - including detriment in medical 
procedures, although there have been no cases of LDT. General law provides not just a 
useful comparison with but in some cases a clarification of the meaning of provisions 
within transplant legislation. 
Inevitably, limits to detriment raise tensions between the self-determination rights of 
donors and concerns that procedures can be justified as minimal in their level of 
maleficence. These concerns stem not just from a perception of the interests of the 
donor (as perceived by others and in terms of the danger of undue influence) but also the 
rights of organisers of transplantation and the public to have an efficient, publicly well 
regarded, system operating within reasonable ethical criteria. 
4.4.2. Legislative Limits to Detriment. 
There are a large number of jurisdictions regulating limits to the levels of definite and 
possible consequences a prospective donor may endure. Some provisions require 
medical professionals to certify that risks are below a certain level. For instance, 
Bolivian law states that at least two physicians must certify that removal of the organ will 
64 
not seriously damage the donor's health or chances of survival . Under Russian 
62 Old French laws and the recent 1994 law have no provision on this point (IDHL, 1994,45(4), 473482 - 
The law was also presented in it's draft form as the Bill On Use of Human Parts and Assisted Procreation, 
Bull. Med. Eth. /March 1993). 
63 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 To Prohibit Commercial Dealings in Human Organs Intended For 
Transplanting, to Restrict the Transplanting of Organs Between Persons Who Are Not Genetically Related, 
to Regulate the Importing of Human Organs Intended for Transplanting and For Supplementary Purposes 
Connected With These Matters (The Human Organ Transplants Ordinance) section 5(4)c(ii). 
'Regulations On the Use of Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 3(b). 
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Federation law a living donor may only donate organs or tissue where, according to the 
findings of a committee of medical specialists, his health will suffer no significant 
damage. 65 In Greek law there must not, in the opinion of the responsible physicians in 
the treatment unit where the removal is to be performed, be "any manifest serious risk to 
the life or health of the donor. iM Poland, 67 Hong Kone 8 and Canada (model law) 
9 
also have provisions in this area. 
4.4.2.1. Legislation Allowing LDT's That Do Not Jeopardise the Donors Life. 
Romani '70 Algeria, 
71 and TurkeZ 2 have provisions allowing donation where it does not 
jeopardise the donors life. In interpretation of these and other provisions referring to 
life, de minimus jeopardy to life would have to be excluded since all organ donation 
involves a fractional risk of death. Similarly, laws referring to a reasonably foreseeable 
risk of death 73 must be interpreted as not referring to reasonably forseeable de minimus 
risk of death. 
65Law of 22 December 1992 at section 1. 
66Law No. 13 83 of 2 August 1983 at section 5(c). 
67 Requires that a medical check-up prior to donation ascertains that the risk does not surpass the permissible 
anticipated limits for such medical operations and does not seriously in an adverse manner the health 
condition of a donor. Law of 26 October 1995 at Article 9(l) point 4. 
68Proposed distant genetically related and emotionally related living donations (apart from spouses of 3 
years standing) must seek validation from the Board set up under the law. The Board will simply note the 
risk involved in the procedure at issue as one of the factors bearing on it's determination. Ordinance No. 
16 of 1995 To Prohibit Commercial Dealings in Human Organs Intended For Transplanting, to Restrict the 
Transplanting of Organs Between Persons Who Are Not Genetically Related, to Regulate the Importing of 
Human Organs Intended for Transplanting and For Supplementary Purposes Connected With These Matters 
(The Human Organ Transplants Ordinance) section 5(4)c(ii). 
61IMposes no restrictions for regenerative material but non-regenerative material must be transplanted only 
in after an independent assessment which will take into account whether the removal will create a 
substantial health or other risk to the donor. The Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 
7(6). 
"Presently Article 4(l) of the 1996 Law regarding The Harvesting and The Transplantation of Human 
Tissues and Organs. Formerly in the Law of July 1978 at section 132 
"States that the removal of organs or tissues must not endanger the life of the donor (Law No. 85-05 of 16 
February 1985 On Health Protection and Promotion at section 162). 
72 Law No. 223 8 of 29 May 1979 On the Removal, Storage, Transfer and Grafting of Organs and Tissues at 
section 8. 
73 Such as Finland (Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 at section 3). 
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Another problem is that jurisdictions which are limited to excluding donations that 
Jeopardise life or present a forseeable risk of death on the face of it are allowing some 
ethically unacceptable form of donation - such as donation of one or two comea. Of 
course, in practice such donations would be outside the limits of acceptable detriment 
under general principles of law (unless donation was incidental to a removal which was 
therapeutically necessary for the donor). 74 
4.4.2.2. Legislation Allowing LDT's that Do Not Present a Serious Risk to Donor 
Health. 
Many laws in this area give rise to legal uncertainty and require considerable 
interpretation. Spain s law requires that, 
, 
"the organ concerned must be one whose 
removal is compatible with the donor's survival and does not seriously diminish his 
functional capacities. 05 The word "functional" would seem to imply physical 
functioning but also the ability to work, maintain relationships, etc. Commenting on 
these restrictions Casabona states that, 
"single vital organs may not be removed nor may single remaining organs from 
pairs ... Limbs are also excluded as are any parts of the body the removal of which would 
involve diminished bodily functions. The removal of paired or double organs is 
permissible when the remaining organ can act as a functional substitute. The same is 
true of regenerable tissue (blood, medulla, bones, cartilage, etc. ). It is therefore 
necessary to carry out a full medical examination of the donor so as to determine whether 
or not his / her current health would result in his / her being seriously affected by the 
removal of the organ. If the donor's physical and mental health is good enough for the 
removal to go ahead, a medical practitioner other than those who will perform the 
operation must make a statement to that effect. 06 
743 cornea and 26 hearts were live donated in 1991 in the UK on this basis (UKTSSA 1991 Annual Report). 
75 Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 at section 2(b). The law also states the obvious that the 
donor must be "(i)n a state of health compatible with the removal procedure. " section 2(a) ibid. 76 Casabona, The Living Donor in Spanish Law, EUROTOLD materials. 
106 
Under general Spanish law intrusions on bodily integrity are illegal but this transplant law 
implicitly makes living donation an exception to this law. 77 A reform of the general law 
in 1983 explicitly recognises living donation as an exception. 78 
Norwgys law states that, "(t)he operation may be performed only if, no direct danger to 
the donor's life or health results therefrom"79 This would make living kidney donation 
legal but leave the legal status of living liver donation uncertain. Denmark's law states 
that, "the intervention may only be performed if, taking into account it's nature and the 
state of health of the person giving consent, it may be undertaken without any immediate 
danger to that person. , 80 This provision would need broad interpretation so as to 
exclude de minimus quantities of immediate danger present in all donations, while 
Norwgy's provision would need to exclude de minimus quantities of direct danger. 
The fon-ner GDR law (in force in the 5 new Landers of Unified Germany)81 requires that 
no damage to the donor's health must be anticipated; 82 unless this law is interpreted 
broadly LDT will be excluded because some damage is inevitable and there is a small risk 
of major damage. Paragum's I also needs to incorporate de minimus as a 
qualification to the provision that the donation must not adversely affect the donor's 
ability to live. 83 Slovakia! s law prohibits donations which it is anticipated will seriously 
jeopardise the donor's state of health. 84 Some of the newer, more risky and damaging 
forms of living donation might be excluded under this provision - in particular pancreas 
living donation. Cypriot law states that there must be no serious and manifest risk to the 
life or health of the donor, other than that resulting from the removal itself. 85 Clearly 
"Casabona, The Living Donor in Spanish Law. 
78 Ibid. 
79Law No. 6 of 1973 On Transplantation, Hospital Autopsies, Donations of Bodies etc. at section 1. 
"Section 13(4) Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 On the Examination of Cadavers, Autopsies and 
Transplantation etc. 
"Applying in the 5 Landers of Germany that were formerly East Germany. 
"Section 6 of The Ordinance of 4 July 1975. All living donation necessarily involves some damage! 
83 Law No. 836180 of 15 December 1980 Promulgating the Health Code. 
84 Law of 24 August 1994 at section 46(2). 
"Section 7 of Law No. 97 of 1987. 
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all forms of LDT have serious and manifest risks to donor health - it is only that the more 
serious risks are very unlikely to actualise, except in more marginal cases and forms of 
organ LDT. 
Fortunately, a few pieces of legislation have relatively simple provision in this area. 
Portugal's law is clearly framed, stating that donations shall not be permitted if, "there is 
a strong probability of serious and permanent impairment of the physical integrity and 
health of the donor. " 86 
87 88 9 Other jurisdictions regulating on this point include Finland. Lebanon, Slovenia 8 
Russian Federation, 90 Hung 91 Argentin . 
92 
4.4.2.4. Laws Placing Restrictions by Reference to Particular Types of Organs. 
A significant number of laws, mostly outside western Europe indirectly place a degree of 
restriction on donor detriment via restricting the range of organs that are donatable. 
86 Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues at 
section 6(4). Under ordinary circumstances LDT kidney donation would be legally acceptable in Portugal 
because the risk of serious and permanent impairment of the physical integrity and health of the donor is 
minimal. The outer limits of consent could potentially be transgressed if there was some special risk due 
to the condition of the donor or a different form of organ being transplanted. 
87 The law states that, "(t)he intervention shall not entail a serious risk to, or harm the health of, the 
donor ... the transplant 
(must) not involve any reasonably foreseeable risk of death or total permanent 
incapacity of the donor" (Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 at section 3). 
"Tissues or organs cant be removed from a person whose, "state of health precludes such removal or if 
there is a risk or serious danger to the health of the donor. " Decree No. 109 of 16 September 1983 On the 
Removal of Human Tissues and Organs for Therapeutic and Scientific Purposes at section I- 
89Has the very basic requirement that the donation must be a reasonable risk for the donor and recipient and 
have a strong possibility of success. 1996 law at Article 2. 
"According to team of medical specialists donor's health must suffer no significant damage (Law of 22 
December 1992 at section 1). 
"Three physicians from the medical establishment not involved in the removal and transplantation 
procedures must determine that the donor will not suffer irremediable injury (ordinance No. 18 of 4 
November 1972 at section 1(3)). 
92 LDT is only considered if it would not seriously harm the health of the donor. Law No. 24193 of 24 
March 1993 On The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials at section 14. The old 
(repealed) law states that only one of two paired organs may be removed and only anatomical materials 
whose removal does not entail any reasonably foreseeable risk that the donor will die or be completely or 
permanently disabled (Law No. 21541 of 21 March 1977 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs 
and Anatomical Materials at section 12). 
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Provisions in this area are sometimes de minimus in the sense that the restriction applies 
to organs that if donated would result in severe damage or death to the donor. For 
instance, Tunisian law prohibits only the removal of the entirety of a vital organ of a 
living person, 93 Sylian Arab Republic law has a similar provision while Russian 
Federation law merely restricts donation to, "(d) paired organ, a part of an organ, or a 
tissue whose absence does not entail any irreversible damage to health may be removed 
from a living donor. 04 
Some laws have clearly become outmoded by the fast pace of medical science. 
Colombian 95 and Hungarian lawS96 only permit permit donation of organs where they are 
one of a pair organs. Both laws were developed before LDT's of parts of single organs 
such as liver and lung were occurring - the laws effectively prohibit such donation. 
Romania has a novel provision stating that the donor cannot donate vital organs or 
reproductive organs contrary to human nature -a provision which bans artificial 
reproductive technologies. 97 Harvesting of unique organs such as heart, liver, pancreas 
etc. can only be performed from brain-dead persons; this apparently precludes a clinically 
indicated domino heart procedure. 98 These prerequisites are general to all transplants 
with no added requirements for a LDT. 
Other jurisdictions with regulation on this point include Peru, 99 Argentin 100 Belarus 
draft 1 101 Bolivia, 102 Ecuador, 103 Kuwait' 04 and Panama. 105 
93 Vital organ in this context meaning one whose withdrawal would inevitably entail the death of the person 
from whom it was removed. The law states that the organ must not be one that is essential to life even if 
the donor has given consent (Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 at section 4). 
94 Law of 22 December 1992 at section 12. 
95 Law No. 73 of 20 December 1988 at section 3(a). ýo--Iombian provision adds that "the donation of one 
of the paired organs shall only be permitted if ifs removal does not entail serious prejudice or mutilation for 
the living donor and iVs purpose is a transplantation that is indispensable from the therapeutic standpoint" 
(Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 1989 at section 24). "A)t the time of organ removal, the organ donor must 
not be suffering from any disease liable to be aggravated by the withdrawal of the donated organ and if the 
donor is a woman, she must not be pregnant" (ibid at section 35f). 
96 Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 at section 1(3). 
97Article 8(2) ibid. 
"Article 9(3) ibid. 
"Supreme Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 1988 at section 14 - see IDHL, 1994,45(l), 36-7 at p37. 
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4.4.2.5. Regenerative Non-Regenerative Distinctions and Donor Detriment. 
As a variation of the above, a few legislative regimes restrict donation of non- 
regenerative body materials (i. e. organs with the exception of liver segment) which 
indirectly places some limits to the degree of donor detriment. The most potent example 
is Slovenian law under which tissues must, as a rule, be reviving to be donated. 106 
Liver segment and single kidney donation are acceptable for the sake of transplantation 
into a person who is "genetically or family linked" to the donor if it is not possible to get 
a cadaver within a reasonable time and use of LDT "assures much better possibilities of 
medical treatment"107 and ethical committee approval is also given. 108 Through this 
approach, Slovenian law prohibits several viable forms of organ LDT (including lung, 
domino-heart, small bowel, pancreas and comea). 109 Other regimes with legislative 
provision on this issue include Peru' 10 and Bolivia! 11 
100Law creates regulations which determine the list of organs which are acceptable for living donation (Law 
No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 On The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials at section 15). 
Special provisions are provided for bone marrow. 
10'Allows donation of, "a paired organ, part of an organ, or a tissue whose absence does not entail 
irreversible damage to health may be withdrawn from a living donor for transplantation purposes" (section 
6). This section also contains provisions relating to the safety of recipients. 
102AIlows donation of organs that are double or multiple, so that removal of one of them will not seriously 
damage the donor's health, and organs and tissues that by their nature are capable or regeneration or are 
replaceable. Risks must be certified as within certain limits (Regulations On the Use of Organs and 
Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 2 and 3(b)). 
103 Provides that the transplant must be of a duplicate organ, or involves anatomical materials or tissues 
from organs whose removal does not involve any reasonable foreseeable risk of death or total or permanent 
incapacity of the donor and that the donor has a favourable medical opinion from a physician concerning his 
state of health and from a psychologist concerning the probable consequences of the transplant for his 
personality. Transplantation is prohibited if it involves a threat to the life of the donor or of a significant 
deterioration of his health (Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code at section 2). 
104 States that an organ cant be removed even with consent; "if the removal is liable to bring about the death 
of the donor or prevent him carrying out his activities (Decree-Law No. 55 of 20 December at section 3). 
"5Prohibits donations when, "it may reasonably be presumed that such removal may entail the death or 
permanent and total invalidity of the donor. " Law No. 10 of II July 1983 at section 6. 106 1996 law Article 8. 
1071t is unclear what the ambit of family and genetic links is under the law. 
10'Article 8 ibid. 
'09unless the stipulation that as a rule body material must be reviving is not just allowing liver segment and 
kidney to be exceptions but also other organ in exceptional circumstances 
"OProvides that living donation can only be carried out with regenerable or restorable tissues or with paired 
organs such that the donor's life is not endangered. Supreme Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 1988 at 
section 14 - see IDHL, 1994,45(l), 36-7 at p37. 
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4.4.2.6. Conclusions. 
There are widely varying legislative approaches to limiting detriment that the donor can 
endure. The differences are more about the failure of jurisdictions to harmonize 
according to rational principles that any legitimate expression of societal difference. 
Provisions are also often vague in certain areas, in particular specification of what levels 
of consequences and risks of donation are acceptable is often so inexact as to be 
worthless. Practitioners are used to assessing questions of risk in medical procedures 
but living donation is exceptional in that it is a 'rescuing volunteer' rather than a patient 
at issue. Clear legislative provision, rather than restricting practitioners, would actually 
serve to encourage them to undertake living donation where appropriate in the knowledge 
that they are operating within a clear and legitimating framework. 
Risks and consequences can be of all types and degrees. What really matters is that the 
overall package of detriment is within reasonable limits. To avoid professional 
uncertainty leading to professional inaction an authority set-up by legislation could be 
referred to by practitioners in more marginal cases. Legislation needs to include limits 
to donor detriment in terms of level (e. g. minimal) of definite consequences of donation 
and level of possibility (e. g. minimal) that more serious harms will materialise. 
Legislation can specify what organs are permissibly donated; however, it must be borne 
in mind that medical advancements can make provisions outdated. In light of this it 
seems better to address this issue in a more flexible manner (e. g. delegated to an authority 
set-up by the legislation itself). A final point may be made that some jurisdictions limit 
the level of detriment that a minor or adult incompetent may endure by limiting the 
donatable range of body materials. The details of such an approach are considered in 
chapter 7. 
"'Allows donation of organs and tissues that by their nature are capable or regeneration or are replaceable 
in addition to organs that are double or multiple, so that removal of one of them will not seriously damage 
the donor's health. Risks of all LDT must be certified as within certain limits. Regulations on the Use of 
Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 2 and 3(b). 
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4.4.3. Limits to Detriment Under General Principles of Law: A Case Stud 
of English law. 
The cases most relevant to the question of limits to detriment in organ donation is the 
Canadian one of Urbanski v Patel [1978] 84 DLR 3d 650, which would probably be 
followed in all common law countries. In Urbanski it was stated, obiter dicta, that a 
person can only donate one of a pair of vital organs. At first glance it would seem 
bizarre that anyone would want to do more than this of their own volition (i. e. without 
coercion or undue influence). However, one of the donors I interviewed subsequently 
offered to donate a second kidney. 112 This offer was the subject of a television 
documentary entitled 'The Decision: Whose Kidney Is It Anyway? " 13 The potential 
donor was the father of two son's who had a kidney disease and had already given an 
organ to one of them and wanted to give away his second to his other son. The main 
element of his reasoning was that he was old and retired and could live on dialysis for a 
while his son needed a transplant very much and it may enable him to live a fruitful life. 
This potential donation was being seriously discussed by a London hospital. This 
indicates that a person can have a rational reason for wanting to donate an organ which is 
essential to good health. However legally they would almost certainly be shackled from 
doing so; besides the Urbanski case their is the well established principle in common and 
civil law countries that a person cannot consent to being killed, self mutilated or 
seriously injured. ' 14 These principles would probably apply in any jurisdiction where 
there is no legislative provision for the question of limits to detriment. An example 
would be the UK, where the English case of Rv Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 suggested 
that a purported consent to a procedure causing death, mutilation or serious injury would 
be null and void with the surgeon committing the criminal offences of intentionally 
causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do S0115 and maim. "' Clearly, the whole 
removal of an essential organ (e. g. cornea, an only kidney, heart) would be unlawful 
112 English interviews with living donors and recipients are discussed in chapter 8. 
113 Tuesday 20 February 1996 at 9pm on Channel 4. 
114 D. Gieson, International Medical Malpractice Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988,609. 
"'Under section 18 of The Offences Against The Person Act 1861 
116See Rv Wright [ 1603] 1 Co. Inst. 127. 
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(unless incidental to a therapeutic removal). ' 17 Additionally, more novel forms of 
living donation carrying uncertain and potentially higher risks / more serious harms and 
in those situations where the prospective donor has a precondition leading risks to be 
considerably higher. ' 18 
The question arises: would judges go further and restrict detriment proportionate to 
benefits? At this point the ethical confict between autonomy and beneficience is 
amplified. Preventing donation where it does not have a good benefit to detriment ratio 
could be highly paternalistic. The prospective competent donor must be viewed as 
legitimately possessing the right to take into account what factors to take into account and 
how to assess these, including the likely benefits to the prospective recipient. 
Consequently Skegg has suggested that, 
"a court is unlikely to inquire closely into whether there are good reasons for a particular 
intervention. There is no danger of a court attempting to decide whether there are good 
reasons for removing a kidney from a living donor, instead of keeping the patient on 
dialysis in the hope that a suitable cadaver kidney would become available. "119 
Nethertheless, while the competent donor has every right to make his or own assessment, 
the organisers and regulators of transplantation have their own legitimate right to prevent 
those LDT's which are clearly against public interest. The public has a right for ifs 
resources to be used efficiently and ethically, transplant organisers have a right to decline 
to engage in procedures they regard as unethical or inefficient and both organisers and 
public have a legitimate interest in protecting the reputation of transplantation as 
something carried out under responsible conditions. Clearly, while the law must allow 
participants some leeway in determining what is a beneficient procedure it must not allow 
so much leeway as to denigrate the responsible practice of transplantation. This matter 
117See K. Norrie, Human Tissue Transplants: Legal Liability in Different Jurisdictions, LCL. Q., 1985, 
42,442 at 447 who suggests that cornea donation simply for the benefit of the recipient is unlawful. "'The position appears similar to that developed in many of the earlier discussed statutory regimes. 119Law, Ethics and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law, Clarendon Press, 1988. 
113 
is really a role for legislation, although common law inevitably does take into account 
anticipated benefits when determining what activities are too detrimental to be legal (see 
4.3). 
Carl Elliots leading article, Doing Harm: Living Organ Donors, Clinical Research and 
The Tenth Man, 120 confirms the ethics of this approach to risk taking. On the one hand 
it could be argued that the donor has a right to take high risks but on the other we are 
faced with Elliot's question: "What would we think of a person who would take 
advantage of a donor's willingness to take life-threatening risks? " 121 
Elliot poses the further point that when someone chooses to risk themselves they also risk 
harming others. 122 He rightly suggests that these effects should be taken into account. 123 
Elliot also suggests a common sense principle that "any system of practices in which 
people are likely to be harmed should be set up in ways that minimize this possibility. " 
This includes not having incentives to engage in practices like organ donation 
encouraging the risk of donating, "for example it would be better to have a system of 
living organ transplantation in which nobody is able to make a financial profit from the 
procedure. " 124 
4.4.4: Conclusions on limits to detriment. 
Statutory provisions usually require justifications for taking the risks and enduring the 
consequences of living donation. Firstly, the justification is often seen in terms of the 
clinical conditions present. This could for example be that living donor transplant is 
the best available clinical option, or that the recipient is in danger of losing life. 
Secondly, LDT is sometimes seen as necessitating a special relationship between the 
120 JMedEth, 1995,21,91-96. 
12'DoingHarin: Living Organ Donors, Clinical Research and The Tenth Man, JMedEth, 1995,21,91- 
96 at 94. 
122 Ibid at p96. 
123 Ibid at p96. 
124 Ibid. 
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donor and recipient as a justification for risk taking. Medical practitioners are usually 
responsible for ensuring justifications are met; failure to meet them may constitute a 
statutory offence. 125 The role of common law is more limited in placing limits to 
detriment without being likely to enquire in a more detailed way as to the justifications 
for particular donations. Jurisdictions based on common law principles for the area of 
detriment are likely to offer more leeway to practitioners. From the practitioner 
perspective this isn't necessarily advantageous if it leaves more responsibility to the 
individual transplant centre or practitioner to assess on a case by case basis, and through 
centre policy, which transplants reflect a fair detriment to beneflt ratio. This is very 
much an area that might be best suited to the use of national codes of practice which can 
be adapted more easily than legislation to reflect changing transplantation practice and 
technology. Alternatively/additionally an authority set up under law could be given 
responsibility for authorisation of LDT's in certain situations. 
4.5. Procedural Requirements Relating to the Formation of a Legallv 
Valid Consent. 
A general rule of medical law is that medical treatments and procedures can be 
undertaken without procedural formalities. However, within many jurisdictions, living 
organ donation provides an exception to the rule through transplant legislation requiring 
certain procedural formalities to be observed. Most legislative regimes prescribe 
procedural requirements in the the formation of a valid consent for the donor and in some 
cases for the recipient. 126 Some statutory regimes only partially deal with questions of 
procedure in consent. For instance UK law requires procedural requirements to be met 
125 Such failure tends to be statutorily defined as invalidating the consent. Of course questions of 
justification can be a part of general principles of law and failure to satisfy requirements can invalidate 
consent here. 
126 The legislation of Cuba (Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 at section 80) and that of Ecuador (Law No. 
64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code) do not regulate on points of substance and procedure in 
consent. Nor do the legislative regimes of Austria and Malaysia simply because they are limited in ambit 
to cadaveric donation. Several regimes are limited in the ambit of organs they cover or other ways. See, 
for example, the legislation of Italy (various), Columbia (Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 1989), Vietnam 
(Law of 1989 On the Protection of Public Health at section 30), Kuwait (Decree Law No. 55 of 20 
December 1987 On Organ Transplantation). 
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for the authorisation of non-genetically related donation only. 127 A similar approach is 
taken in the laws of Hong Kong128 and India. 129 Argentinean law130 and the Canadian 
model law131 appear to impose no procedural requirements. The special position of the 
donor and the recipient arguably justifies special legislative attention. Donors are 
volunteers enduring risks and harmful consequences132 and some forms of donation are 
experimental, with uncertain risks and benefits. These factors intimate the need for 
procedural protection as does the real possibility of commercial organ dealings and / or 
'foul play. ' Recipients have, as already examined, a peculiar interdependence with the 
donor making accepting a living persons organ unlike any other kind of treatment and 
worth particular procedural protection. 
4.5.1: Written Formalities. 
The statutory provisions of the following countries require that donor consent to LDT be 
given in writing as detailed in Figure 1. 
127 See HOTA 1989 section 2(3) - discussed at section 4 
128 Ordinance No 16 of 1995. 
129Act No. 42 of 1994, IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38. 
VoLaw No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 repealing Law No. 21541 of 21 March 1977 On the Removal and 
Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials which stated at section II that the decisions of the 
donor and recipient would be made according to regulations. 
13 'Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990. 
132 Unless donation is merely incidental to a medically necessary removal. 
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Figure 1: Jurisdictions Statutorily Requiring Consent to be in Writing. 
Algeria 133 Australian state laws of Northern Territojy, 
134 Queensland, 135 South Australia, 136 Tasmania 
137 
and _Westem 
Australia, 138 Belgium. 139 Costa Rica 140 Finland 141 the 5 former GDR Landers of German , 
142 
Lebanon 143 mexico, 144 ýanaMaa 145 146 S- 147 148 14 Poland, pain. Slovenia. Slovakia, 9 Denmark 
150 Sweden, 151 
Norwgy, 152 Greece. 153 CY12rUS154 (usually), 155 Romania 156 Bulgaria 157 Poland, 158 Russian Federation, 
159 
South Africa, 160 Sri Lanka, 161 SyIian rab Republic, 162 The Philippines, 163 The Netherlan 
164 Turkey, 165 
_Venezuela, 
166 Zimbabwe 167 Hungajy which requires that the donor make a declaration signifying his consent 
to the removal in a written document drawn up by a notary and kept in the clinical file of the donor 
16' and 
Portugal which requires consent to be given in the presence of a physician (who is not a member of the 
transplant team) designated by the clinical director of the establishment in which the removal takes place. 
169 
133 No 85-05 of 16 February 1985 On Health Protection and Promotion at section 162. 
134No. 121 of 1979 The Human Tissue Transplant Act at section 8. 
13'The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 10. 
136 The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 section 9(l). 
137 The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 7. 
138Act No. 116 of 1982 To Make Provision for and in Relation to the Removal of Human Tissues for 
Transplantation, for Post-Mortem Examinations, for the Repeal of the Tissue Grafting and Processing Act 
etc... at section 8. 
139Law of 13 June 1986 On The Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs section 8(2). See 
additional procedural requirements under the Crown Order of 30 October 1986 regulating the method of 
expressing Consent to the Removal of Organs and Tissues From Living Persons. 
140Law No. 5560 of 20 August 1974 On Human Transplants at section 15. 
14'Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 On the Removal of Human Organs and Tissues for Medical Purposes at 
section 2. 
142 GDR law is still in force in the five landers of unified Germany that were formerly East Germany. 
143 Decree No. 109 of 16 September 1983 On the Removal of Human Tissues and Organs for Therapeutic 
Purposes at section 1(3). The recipient must also have given written consent - section 3. 144 Federal Regulations of 16 August 1976 On the Use of Human Organs, Tissues and Cadavers at section 
24. 
145 Law No. 10 of II July 19 83 Regulating the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Parts and Laying 
Down Other Provisions at section 21. 
146AXtiCle 9(l) at point 7 of The Law of October 26,1995, Regulating The Removal and Transplantation of 
Human Cells, Tissues and Organs. 
147 Law No. 30 of 27 October 1979 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs at section 4(c) 
14'The Law of the Transplantation of Human Body Parts For The Sake of Medical Treatment 1996 at 
ArticlelO. The recipient must also express consent in written form (Article 6). 
149Law No. 277 of 24 August 1994 at section 46(l). 
"OSection 13(l) of Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 On the Examination of Cadavers, Autopsies and 
Transplantation, etc. 
"'The Transplantation Law (No. 190) of 15 May 1975 at section 4. 
152 Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 On Transplantation, Hospital Autopsies, Donations of Bodies etc. at 
section 1. 
153 Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Tissues and Organs at 
section 5(d). 
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4.5.2. Additional Procedural Requirements. 
4.5.2.1. Information Giving 
In practice the donor may receive information from a variety of sources but several 
legislative regimes identify a person responsible for information giving. "' Usually the 
legislation does not apply to recipients. Sometimes information must be given by the 
person expected to undertake the removal (e. g. under the legislative regimes of Greece, 171 
T key, 172 Hungary, 173 Belgium 174 and Panama 175). This aids proficient information 
'5'Section 4 of Law No. 97 of 1987 On the Removal and Transplantation of Biological Materials of Human 
Origin at section 7(2). 
155AIternatively consent can be given orally in the presence of witnesses with a declaration being recorded 
in a dedicated register) see ibid at section 7(2). 
`6Article 4(l) of the Law Regarding The Harvesting and The Transplantation of Human Tissues and 
organs 1996 replacing an identical requirement in the Law of July 1978 on Satequardy of the Health of the 
Population at section 132. 
117Removal of Human Organs for Therapeutic Purposes. Ordinance No. 15 of the Minister of Public 
Health On the Transplantation of Human Organs at section 2 (April 1976 No. 35). 
"'Law of October 26,1995 Regulating The Removal and Transplantation of Human Cells, Tissues and 
organs at Article 9(l) point 7. 
159Law of 22 December 1992 of the Russian Federation on the Transplantation of Human Organs and / or 
Tissues. 
160Act No. 65 of 1983 at section IS. 
16'The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act No. 48 of 1987 at section 7(l). 
162 Law No. 31 of 23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs from the Human Body at 
section 2(3). 
163 Presidential Decree No. 856 of 23 December 1975 Promulgating the Code on Sanitation at section 96(a). 
164 Hans Akveld (Dutch EUROTOLD participant) response to the EUROTOLD legal questionnaire. 
165Law No. 223 8 of 29 May 1979 On the Removal, Storage, Transfer and Grafting of Organs and Tissues. 
166 Law No. 4497 of 19 November 1992 On The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials in 
Human Beings at section 12. 
16'Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976 at section 12(a). 
168 Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 of The Minister of Health for the implementation of the 
Provisions of Law No. Il of 1972 on Health Relating to the Removal and Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues at section 2 although this can be an oral declaration in the presence of a notary retained in the 
clinical file of the donor. 
169Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues at 
section 8(2). 
1"The laws of several jurisdictions impose no requirements on this point e. g. Argentina, ODR, Slovakia 
alovenia, Bulgari , Russian Federation, Cyprus. 17 'Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983 at section 5-6. 
172 Law No. 2238 of 29 May 1979 at section 7. 
"'Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 at section 2(2). 
174Law of 13 June 1986 at section 9. 
175 Law No. 10 of II July 1983 at section 6. 
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giving but, theoretically at least, could compromise the neutrality of disclosure (e. g. 
encourage bias in favour of transplantation). 
unconsciously motivated undue influence. 
There is also potential for deliberate or 
The same problems could arise within 
another group of legislative regime s (including Denmark, 176 France, 177 Portugal, 178 
Norway, 179 Romania 180 and Tunisial8l) which delegate information giving responsibility 
to persons who may be associated with the recipient and / or transplant procedure such as 
'a physician. ' 182 
The problems of bias and undue influence etc., can be addressed procedurally by applying 
a form of the 'separation principle; ' creating a process / system for informing and caring 
for the donor that is separate and independent to that utilised for the recipient. The 
Spanish, 183 Polish, 184 Hong Kong 185 and Sri Lankan 186 legislative regimes invoke 
separation to the extent of ensuring the donor's information giver is independent of the 
team conducting the removal. On the other hand, under these regimes the information 
giver could still be a nephrologist or nurse who is caring for the recipient. Finnish 187 
176 Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 at section 13(3) simply states that it must be a physician who informs. 
177 The physician in charge of the hospital department in which the organ is to be removed (or another 
physician to whom he has delegated the task employed by the same hospital) is responsible. Decree No. 
78-501 of 31 March 1978 at section 1. The recent law adds nothing on this point. 
178SiMply says 'the physiciarf is responsible - it is unclear form the surrounding text whether this may be any 
physician or has to be the physician responsible for the removal procedure (Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at 
section 7). 
17'Norwegian law simply requires it to be a physician with information on the nature of the operation and 
it's possible consequences (Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 at section 1). 
18ORomania's old law the chief physician was required to inform the donor. The new law simply requires it 
to be 'the doctors' and presumably refers to those doctors who are involved in undertaking the proposed 
nephrectomy (Article 4(2) of 1996 law). 
"'This law requires the chief physician of the hospital department in which the organ is to be removed to 
give information (Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 at section 7). 
"'See Denmarks law footnote 177. 
183 Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 at section 3. 
184 Law of 26 October 1995 at Article 9(l) point 5. 
"'This law imposes a requirement of authorisation that the potential donor and recipient have had the 
procedure, iVs risk and the fact that consent may be withdrawn at any time explained to them by a medical 
practitioner, not being the practitioner who is to remove the organ. This requirement onlý applies for 
potential donations which are not by a spouse of 3 years standing or a close genetic relative. Ordinance 
No. 16 of 1995 The Human Organ Transplant Ordinance at section 5(4)c. 
186 This law requires a medical consultant, other than a medical consultant attached to the transplant team, 
to give information (The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at sections 7 and 8). 
187 Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 at section 3 states that the information giver must be a physician who is 
not caring for the recipient. 
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and Swedish 188 legislative regimes address this problem by requiring that the donor's 
information giver should be separate from the person who is caring for the recipient. 
How far laws should go to uphold the 'separation! principle is a difficult question. A 
theme developed further in chapter 6 is that the voluntariness of a donors consent is 
critical, especially given that the essential justification for donation is that the donor is a 
volunteer. Another theme developed in chapter 6 is that there is solid empirical 
evidence and psychological theorising to suggest that at least a significant minority of 
donations are subject to pressure and undue influence. Taking these matters into 
account, it may be important that legislative regimes uphold the principle of separation at 
least in the shape of the donor's information giver being independent of the care of the 
recipient. 
4.5.2.2. Written Consent Before Specified Persons or Authorities. 
Several countries require consent to be evidenced before specific person(s). There are 3 
distinct approaches: 
Firstly the routine matter of consent before a medical authority (such as a physician 
indepndent of the transplant eam) expressly required under some laws (e. g. GDR, 189 
Portugal'90 and Polish law'91). 
e Secondly consent before a legal authority (e. g. Greece, 
192 Spain'93 and France 
194). 
18'Tbe responsibility is with the chief physician or the assistant chief physician at the hospital (not being the 
physician in charge of the care of the recipient patient). Law No. 190 of 15 May 1975 at section 5 read in 
conjunction with section 3. 
'89This law, applying in the 5 new Landers of unified Germany that were formerly East Germany, states 
that the donor's consent shall be given to the competent local medical officer in the presence of a 
representative of the medical team carrying out the removal procedure. A report on the details of the 
information provided and the donor's declaration of consent shall be drawn up and signed by the local 
medical officer, the representative of the medical team, and the donor. 
190The law stipulates that consent must be given in the presence of a physician designated by the clinical 
director of the establishment in which the removal takes place, not being a physician involved as a member 
of the transplantation team (Law of 1993 at section 8(2)). 
19'This law merely requires that the written consent be given in front of'the doctor'- which presumably 
refers to the doctor undertaking the removal procedure (Law of 26 October 1995 at Article 9(l) point 7). 192ThiS law which states that the declaration of willingness to donate must be made in notarial form or on a 
form on which the police authority has confirmed the authenticity of the signature of the potential donor or 
orally, the declaration being recorded in a special register kept by the treatment establishment where the 
120 
197 Thirdly the use of additional witnesses (e. g. in Turkey, 195 Venezuela, 196 Algeri , 
Costa Rica, 198 The Philippines'" and Mexico"). The class of person that can be a 
witness is not usually expressly restricted although in some cases it must be a 
notary. 201 
Using extra witnesses and, particularly, requiring consent before a judicial authority 
have the advantage of helping to ward against impropriety such as coercion. However, 
requiring consent before a legal authority can be criticised as bureaucratic and 
discouraging of LDT unless it is necessary within a particular jurisdiction where 
commerical trade in organs and/or coercion is not uncommon. In consent giving, as 
with information giving, there is a debate between using the separation principle, which 
helps to ensure no falsification or other 'foul play' and having consent given to a member 
of the transplant team, which is practically simpler. Statutory approaches tend to 
emphasise the separation principle. 202 
removal procedure is to be performed, in the presence of two witnesses who must both sign the declaration 
together with the donor (Law No. 13 83 of 2 August 1983 at section 5). 
193 This law requires that the written consent of the donor be given in the presence of the magistrate 
responsible for public records in the locality concerned. The consent document must additionally be 
signed by the other persons present (Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 for the Implementation of 
Law No. 30 of 27 October 1979 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs section 4(4)). 
194 The French Decree of 1978 stipulated that the donor's consent in writing must also be signed by a witness 
whom (s)he has chosen, and if the organ to be removed is non-regenerable, the consent must be given in 
court (Decree No. 78-501 of 31 March 1978 for the Implementation of the Law of 22 Dec 1976 On the 
Removal of Organs at section 2) however this has been repealed by the 1994 law (No. 94-654 On the 
Donation and Use of Elements and Products of the Human Body, Medically Assisted Procreation, and 
Prenatal Diagnosis at Article L-671-3 (IDHL, 1994,45(4), 473482 at 474). This law states that the 
donor must express consent before the Presiding Judge of the tribunal de grande instance (or the judge 
designated by him) but does not say that this has to be in written form. 
"'Law which requires minor and legally incompetent donors only to draw up a written document giving 
consent to the removal and sign it in the presence of at least two witnesses or give an oral undertaking in the 
presence of at least two witnesses and then sign a declaration which is then countersigned by a physician 
(Law of 1979 at section 6). 
196 Law No. 4497 of 19 November 1992 On The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials in 
Human Beings at section 12. 
197 Section 162 of Law No. 85-05 of 16 February 1985. 
19'Law No. 5560 of 20 August 1974 On Human Transplants at section 15. 
'99Decree No. 856 of 23 December 1975 at section 96(e). 
20OFederal Regulations of 16 August 1976 at section 24. 
201E. g. Bolivia (Regulation On the Use of Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 3) and UruguU 
(Decree No. 660/991 of 4 December 1991 at section 4). 
202 A possible exception being Loland (Law of 26 October 1995). 
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4.5.2.3. Time Lapse Between Agreement and Removal. 
The few jurisdictions that legally specify a time lapse between donor agreement and 
organ removal usually require 24 hours (e. g. Spain203 and Australian state laws of 
Northern Territoly, 204 South Australia, 20 Tasmania, 206 Western Australia: 207 and 
Queenslan(f). This legally ensures that the potential donor has a chance to reflect and 
change his / her mind if donating does not reflect his / her true will. Although most 
jurisdictions have no explicit time lapse requirement it is common transplant practice for 
significant time delay between donor agreement and removal of the organ. This is done 
partly as a practical byproduct of needing to work-up the potential recipient for the 
transplant. 
4.5.2.4. Other Requirements 
Occasionally legislation contains form and procedures for the purpose of confirming 
written consent. For example, Romanian law states that the written consent must be 
given in the form of Annex Number I attached to the Act. This involves the donor 
signing to say (s)he was informed of the risks, asked for and received no payment and 
consented without pressure, etc. 209 The role of most additional requirements is to 
protect the prospective donor's right of self-determination. 210 
203 At least 24 hours must elapse between the signing of the consent document before the local magistrate 
and the removal of the organ. Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 for the Implementation of Law 
No. 30 of 27 October 1979 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs section 4(4). 
204 No. 121 of 1979 at section 9. 
`5The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 at section 10. 
206 The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 8(l). 
207 Section 9(l) of Act No. 116 of 1982. 
208The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 11. 
209Article 4(l) of the Law of 1996 replacing the provision in Law of July 1978 at section 132. 
2 10This is not always so, however. For instance Belgium's additional requirements relate partly to 
obtaining the consent of others in certain circumstances and hence can actually be viewed as a restriction on 
the rights of the donor. Belgium! s law requires that the written consent be evidenced and signed by a 
witness who is over the age of majority. In addition to the consent of the donor, consent must also be 
obtained from the donor's spouse (if married) where (s)he is residing with the donor. Additionally where 
the donor is aged under 21 years consent must be obtained from the person(s) whose consent to the 
marriage of a minor is required under the Civil Code. Where the removal may be performed on a person 
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4.5.3. Conclusions on Procedural Requirements. 
The presence of written and other formalities for obtaining donor consent reflect the 
serious, volunteering and non-directly beneficial nature of donation. 211 Procedural 
requirements have a role in ensuring voluntariness and in impressing on donors the 
gravity of the undertaking. 'Procedural requirement packages' vary considerably accross 
legislative regimes world-wide, although there is an almost universal requirement for 
written consent. Legislative variations are not a cause for concern in their own right. 
However, the paramount importance of voluntariness warrants a more 'accross the 
legislative board' consideration of the methods by which the voluntariness of donation 
can be protected through procedural requirements. There is a danger of 'procedural 
overkill' if requirements are made too onerous; for instance requirements that a 
magistrate witness consent might conceivably put some donors off. At the same time 
other requirements that would protect donors could be made standard practice such as 
time lapse between agreement and removal, independence of the donors information 
giver from the recipient team and the evidencing of the donors written consent by 
independent witnesses - perhaps even the signing of a statement to say that the donation 
accorded to his/her true will. 
under 18 (see above), either the consent of the spouse or the person(s) required to consent to the marriage 
of the minor is required. Law No. 32 of June 1986 at section 6-7. 
21 'One ethical argument, however, is that these factors are irrelevant and what matters is the clear 
protection of people's right to self-determination in all medical procedures. This might lead to procedural 
requirements being seen as ethically required for all medical procedures or at least more serious ones. 
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Chapter 5: Disclosure and Informed Decision-Making in Organ 
Donation and Reception. 
5.1. Introduction. 
When a competent person is making a medical decision the role of the practitioner is 
to convey the different options, a view of their possible and definite consequences 
and recommendation of which course of action to take. The extent of the 
practitioners duty to disclose has been the subject of considerable debate but has not 
yet been examined comprehensively in the specific context of the living organ donor 
and recipient. 
Disclosure pits the rights of the decision-maker against those of medical practitioners. 
A decision-maker uses information as a tool to enhance the practical value of 
autonomy; understanding the significant facts and possibilities and their place in the 
decision-making process makes it more likely that one will make a decision according 
to one's true will. Whilst the practitioners efforts to disclose and ensure 
understanding of disclosure will influence how a decision is made, whether or not 
such a decision accords with the true will of the decision-maker is ultimately also 
about how (s)he uses information in reaching a decision. In this light, most models 
of rational decision-making have emphasised a deliberative process involving 
multiple steps, including: 
9 canvassing a wide range of alternative courses of action; 
o surveying the full range of objectives to be fulfilled; 
* carefully weighing whatever is known about the costs and risks of negative 
and positive consequences flowing from each alternative; 
e intensively searching new information relevant to further evaluation of the 
altematives; 
e correct assimilation and taking into account any new information or expert 
judgement to which the individual is exposed; 
e re-examination of the consequences of all alternatives before making a final 
choice; 
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9 the making of detailed provisions for the implementation or execution of the 
chosen course of action, with special attention to contingency plans that might 
be required if various known risks were to materialise. ' 
This model is a useful best practice guide for people making serious decisions. 
Whilst even very serious decisions such as living organ donation and reception can be 
based on a person's true will when taken quickly or without rationalised awareness of 
all these factors even awareness of some or most can help avoid misconceptions or 
incorrect evaluations (such as over-expectations of benefits and/or underestimation's 
of detriment) that could result in a donor or recipient making a decision that did not 
reflect their true will. 
Practitioners cannot be expected to be responsible for ensuring the normative ideal of 
comprehensively informed decision-making is met. For instance, it would be 
unreasonable to expect disclosure of every single known detail about the prospective 
ramifications of a procedure and it's alternatives. On the other hand if a practitioner 
is withholding particular information in order to influence a patient to take a Particular 
course of action the question of 'who's decision is it anyway? ' is raised. Can a 
practitioner in the interests of his/her conception of beneficence (or avoiding 
maleficence) limit the patients right to know and hence interfere with the patient's 
autonomy? What level of responsibility is it reasonable to impose on a practitioner 
to make checks on patient understanding of information? This question is central to 
the debate because, for instance, if a patient doesn't understand the core factors about 
a procedure and it's alternatives (e. g. main detrimental and beneficial definite and 
possible consequences) the autonomy of decision-making is undermined. 
A practitioners level of responsibilities must also relate to the context including the 
seriousness, complexity and prospective detriment and benefits of a procedure and 
it's alternatives and the individual characteristics of a decision-maker. Giesoný 
categorises three types of medical procedure; therapeutic treatment, therapeutic 
experiments and research experiments stating that an amplification of disclosure 
responsibilities takes place through categories 1-3. The unique position of living 
organ donors and recipients is illustrated by the application of these 3 categories to 
LDT. 
1I. Janis and L. Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and 
Commitment, The Free Press, 1977 at II 
2CiviI Liability of Physicians For New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A Comparative 
Examination, Med Law Review, 1995 (Spring), 3,22-52 at 25. 
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II 
For the prospective donor organ LDT effectively represents afourth category of non- 
therapeutic procedure with a therapeutic purpose that can be subdivided as 'standard' 
and 'experimental. ' The donor has to consider much the same issues as the recipient 
but in many ways is in a more vulnerable position as a potential 'saviour' or 'rescuer' 
rather than a person undergoing a procedure for direct benefit. In tort law rescuers 
have traditionally gained very strong legal protection. 3 In terms of degree a donor is 
undergoing a procedure worthy of a similar level of practitioner responsibility to 
disclose as research experiments, at least if the procedure is experimental or is not 
insignificant in it's level of prospective detriment. 
For the recipient most forms of LDT will be therapeutic treatment, whereby (s)he is 
treated by normal and approved (or orthodox) procedures. However, recipient 
treatment by new methods and techniques for primarily (though not exclusively) 
therapeutic purposes would be a therapeutic experiment (also known as therapeutic 
research or 'innovative therapy A) . LDT reception will normally not be a research 
experiment in respect of the fact that it is done for more than purely scientific 
purposes. No doubt some recipients will not give ethical issues relating to LDT 
more than a glancing reflection but they can be seen to have a right to deep and wide- 
ranging information and to understand that information as a necessary foundation for 
weighing and balancing-up the fundamental aspects of the choice at hand. Several 
issues heighten the demand for disclosure including: the placement of the donor 
(potentially a family member) injeopardy; questions of the donors motivation; issues 
of receiving an 'alien' body part; subtle issues of family dynamics and power and of 
course the general fact that it is a major treatment decision. 
The issue, not hitherto significantly considered in LDT literature, is that donor and 
recipient have a special interdependence which amplifies the needfor disclosure to 
both of them in general. The interdependence of donor and recipient also 
specifically makes it important that both be given information on the definite and 
possible consequences and ramifications for the other, as well as his/her self, and the 
alternative options. Interdependence generates these requirements because a person 
cannot make a rational decision about whether to donate or receive without being 
informed of, and sufficiently understanding, the prospective impact on the other as 
well as his/herself. In addition, having a lower standard of disclosure to the 
recipient could be considered to impact negatively on the morality of decision making 
3 Medical Law: Text With Materials, Butterworths, 1994,1138. 
4Zimmer v Ringrose [1981] 28 A. R. 69, (1981), [1981] 4 W. W. R. 75 (C. A. ). 
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as seen in the context of the second and third of Schwartz's three necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a moral decision: 
an awareness of the consequences of one's decision (meaning a recipient would 
have to fully aware of all significant aspects of living donation and it's alternatives 
as they affect both him/her and the donor); and 
an ascription of personal responsibility to the self rather than a denial of the 
responsibility for the consequences (meaning that to help ensure morality of 
decision-making the recipient should be given disclosure as above, like it or not). 5 
For the purposes of this chapter practitioner responsibilities to donors and recipients 
are divided into two categories: 
Firstly, the substance of information communicated including the types of 
infon-nation to be communicated and the depth of information communicated; and 
Secondly, effective communication of information and checks to ensure it has been 
understood. 
5.2. Disclosure and Donor and Recipient Informed Understanding in 
Practice. 
Studies of practice in medicine have raised concerns about the extent to which 
practitioners disclose and ensure understanding. Tom Beauchamp, in reviewing the 
literature (which he terms describes as a part of 'informed consent') has summarised 
the concems, 
"If informed consent means only telling things to an attentive patient, and not asking 
anything (such as questions or permission) of the patient, how are we to interpret 
claims by physicians that they regularly "obtain consents" from patients before 
medical procedures? The answer is that such claims are entirely unreliable unless we 
know the actual procedures involved in some detail. Matters may be even worse that 
they appear: perhaps all physicians understand by informed consent is that the 
patients signature was obtained, or perhaps they only mean that some kind of 
disclosure was made. This interpretation fits better with the results of studies of 
informed consent that proved more negative. Some studies failed to find any 
sizeable evidence of informed consent in clinical medicine; other studies found little 
IS. Schwartz, Elicitation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behaviour, JPers & Soc Psych, 
1970,15(4), 283-293. The first of the three conditions is a sense of moral obligation to make the 
decision. 
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evidence that the consents obtained are meaningful exercises of informed choice by 
patients (Lidz and Meisel 1982 6 333-340; Faden and Beauchamp 1986,98-1 00). 
0 
Beauchamp mentions one notable study8 in which US physicians were asked, "what 
does the term informed consent mean to you? " Only 26% of physicians indicated 
that informed consent had anything to do with patients' giving permission, 
consenting, or agreeing to treatment; only 9% indicated that it involved patients' 
making a choice or stating a preference about his or her treatment, and recognition by 
the patient of what is taking place. It appears that most physicians surveyed only 
understood the informational aspect of informed consent. 
Barnard has linked disclosure problems to the allopathic approach to medicine9 His 
recommended solution is a "a more genuinely person-centred approach to illness and 
"informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care. ' in Presidents Commission'Making Health Care 
Decisions, ' WashingtonD. C., Government Printing OJJ1ce, 1982. 
7A History and Theory of Informed Consent, Oxford University Press, 1986. Some of the foremost 
cases in the United States have also adopted the position that informed consent is merely about 
information giving to the patient thus the U. S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v Danforth 426 US 52,67 1976 stated that, "One might well wonder ... what'informed 
consent' of a patient is... we are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of information to the 
patient as to just what would be done and as to it's consequences. " 
sReviewed by T. Beauchamp in A History and Theory of Informed Consent, Oxford University Press, 
1986. 
9Barriard suggest that the allopathic model, "assumes a direct (even though frequently masked) 
correspondence between a person' s subjective distress and underlying physiochemical bodily changes. 
From this perspective, the task of medical treatment is to translate the patient's subjective language of 
distress into the corresponding physical pathology, thus opening the way for appropriate intervention to 
return the physiochernical properties of the body to their premorbid state. In this account "illness" 
begins with the disruption in the physiochernical status of the body and ends when that status is returned 
to normal. The "meaning" of illness resides in the physiciarfs categories for interpreting subjective 
distress in terms of underlying physiochernical conditions. These categories, when imposed on the 
patient's experience, lead to treatment recommendations which it is then the patienfs responsibility to 
follow. " (The Personal Meaning of Illness in Client-Centred Dimensions of Medicine and Health Care, 
Client-Centred Therapy, (ed) J. Shlien, 337-351 at 337). For more information on the client / person 
centred approach see Appendix 4. Barnard Adds that, "Many have argued that the biomedical 
model, when uncritically applied, carries several implications that detract from optimal medical care. 
First, the patients own explanations and attributions concerning his or her illness are secondary in 
importance to the physician's, if they are even elicited or acknowledged at all. Indeed, the physician 
must substitute his or her explanations for the patient's as quickly as possible to ensure rational therapy. 
Second, the significance of the patient's symptoms is determined by the physician according to the 
inherent seriousness of the condition and the requirements of treatment. The biomedical model directs 
the physician's attention to the problem of accurate diagnosis and therapy, and not to personal or 
cultural meanings or associations that the patients may attach to their distress. Third, because illness 
consists in disturbed physiochernical processes, social and cultural factors are irrelevant in identifying 
and treating bodily disorders. There is no room in the strict biomedical model for the cultural 
patterning of illness, in which bodily complaints may express or represent culturally appropriate forms 
of coping with personal or social stress. Fourth, patients are assumed to consult the physician for the 
treatment of bodily complaints. In the absence of identifiable organic disease, the patients' requests 
and agendas in the consulting room are considered illegitimate, and the physician does not feel 
compelled to address them. Fifth, since presumably it is the physician and not the patient who 
understands the biomedical model and must apply it to solve the patient' s problem, expertise, power 
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it's medical treatment"10 involving a model of negotiation (see Figure 2). However, 
there must be doubt as to how far changes can occur without altering the whole 
paradigm of medicine; " conventional medicine functions primarily according to the 
idea that medical professionals can 'solve' medical problems in the same way as a 
mechanic might fix a malfunctioning car 12 and this manifests in the doctor typically 
assuming (and / or being treated as having) all or most of the authority in the 
relationship with the patienfs role being to be uninvolved with the treatment and 
undemanding. 13 
Figure 2: Barnard's Negotiation Model for Medical Practice 
"the client-centred hypothesis that perspWs themselves possess decisive healing resources. In the 
medical context, patients possess a positive potential for growth and health. Medical interventions 
and knowledge, in this perspective, are only one among many determinants of personal health. A 
major role of the physician is to assist the patient to reclaim or renew his or her own strengths and 
tendencies toward growth. In certain circumstances this may entail the application of technical modes 
of healing. In all cases, however, it will require the effort of helping the patient to clarify personal 
needs and goals, and to select, with the help of the physician, plans and actions consistent with and 
supportive of personal values. " 14 
Given the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above, the hypothesis must be 
that excellent disclosure standards in LDT are unlikely. While some LDT studies 
have focused on the endpoint of informedness of donor consent, 15 the only empirical 
evidence directly relevant to this hypothesis is a study of 494 Norwegian donors by 
Westlie et aL, 16 and the multi-jurisdictional survey of donors and recipients 
conducted for this research in conjunction with EUROTOLD. 17 
and authority in the doctor patient relationship are inherently and appropriately unequal. The 
physician diagnoses and recommends; the patient answers questions accurately and follows advice 
(Ibid at p338-339). 
101bid at 337. 
"Sociologically, the development of dialysis and transplantation (and hence LDT) can themselves be 
viewed as part of a wider problem of relatively unquestioning reliance on a model of medicine which by 
ifs very nature is not attuned to patient rights. If alternative, holistic, methods of treatment of serious 
forms of organ disease were ftirther examined and shown to be more efficacious the protection of 
patient rights might be enhanced - indeed holistic approaches have long emphasised facilitation of client 
/ patient autonomy and tend to be relatively free of the intractable problems relating to doctor-patient 
communication in conventional medical practice. The homeopathic approach, for instance, is based 
on a facilitative practitioner attitude (See H. Graham, Introduction to Humanistic Psychology, Open 
University Press, 1989). 
"Mclean, A Patient Right To Know, Dartmouth Publishing, 1989 at Chl. 
13 Ibid at p4. 
14 Barriard ibid at 350-35 1. 
"See chapter 7. 
16 L. Westlie, P. Fauchald et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial 




Westlie et al. 's study included an examination of 3 key disclosure issues: who 
provided information; the quantity of information provided; and the quality of 
information provided. The main providers of information about the process were 
nephrologists at the recipient's hospital and doctors and nurses at the national 
hospital; other sources, such as previous donor's, were relied on to a much lesser 
extent. A further question, asking whom the donor would seek information on 
kidney donation and transplantation from when it was wanted, revealed a heavy 
informational reliance on nephrologists at the recipienfs hospital (90.3%). 
This pattern of informational reliance on one person could be problematical in terms 
of getting the full range of information and perspectives on transplantation. Where 
dialysis is privately run18 self-interest'9 could be a distorting factor in information 
disclosure by nephrologists. 
In terms of quantity of information, most donors felt they had received enough 
information but some were unsure or felt they had insufficient information on a 
number of subjects (see Figure 3). In particular, this was the case for longer term 
information about post-operative recovery. 
Figure 3: Norwegian donor perceptions on, whether they received enough 
ý information (Westlie et al. 's Study). 
I 
I Received enough information on: 
I how you were selected as a donor? 
I what surgery would be like? 




yes 70.6% both yes&no 20.3% 
what post surgery hospitalisation would be like? yes 51.7% both yes&no 26.5% 1 
what your recovery at home would be like? yes 45.3% both yes&no 23.5% 
I chances of success for recipient were? yes 71.8% both yes&no 18.8% no 9.4% 
In terms of quality of information provided, a high percentage of donors were not 
fully enthusiastic: 35.9% said quality was 'acceptable' and 11.8% said it was not very 
helpful, 1.9% saying it was not helpful at all. 
Lars Westlie, in Fredrikstad, Norway where I was able to discuss the study with him at some length 
and was given the comprehensive materials detailing methods and results which have now been 
sunimarised in the above article. 
17 See chapter 9. 
18E. g. Gerinany 
191n other words financial profitability from keeping people on dialysis. 
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In Westlie's study perceptions of disclosure could be summarised as ranging from 
poor to very good - it could best be described on the whole as average in terms of 
quality and quite good in terms of quantity. Further research is needed to establish 
firm conclusions but it may be tentatively theorised that disclosure to donors is better 
than to patients in general. A similar conclusion can tentatively be drawn from the 
donor and recipient interviews conducted for this research in conjunction with 
EUROTOLD (chapter 9.3.2); these interviews revealing illuminative subjective 
experiences of disclosure in LDT and indicate that practice is still far from ideal. 
The other aspect relating to disclosure and informed understanding is how decisions 
are made in practice. There is a tendency for prospective donors and recipients to 
become acquainted with the significant factors involved in organ LDT over a period 
of time - it is fortunate in this respect that donors, at least, are not usually asked to 
make a decision about donation until a number of (reasonably time consuming) tests 
have been gone through. However, incremental consideration of the issues involved 
will not necessarily mean a readiness to immediately decide what one truly wants to 
do when asked. In this context empirical evidence about the way donors make 
decisions is disturbing. Fellner and Marshall have stated that, 
"when a person is faced with a decision between two alternatives his behaviour is 
expected to be oriented toward making an objective and impartial evaluation of the 
merits of the alternatives. This usually takes the form of information seeking which 
probably continues until sufficient confidence is acquired that the preference will not 
be upset and reversed by subsequent information. At this level of confidence the 
rational person then will make a decision (pre-decision process). 
Contrary to this expectation, we found that our donors made an immediate major 
decision, before even inquiring into the possible consequences for themselves, or 
seeking reassurance as to the eventual benefits for the recipient. "" 
Corroborating this conclusion, the studies of Simmons et al. in The Gift of Life2' 
found that 88% of donors first considered onating as soon as they found out about 
20Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm MedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 at 2706. 21GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977at431-3. 
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the need, 78% knew right away that they would definitely do it" and 61% followed a 
non-deliberative model of decision-making" with only 5% postponing decisions 
indefinitely or to the last minute. " In addition the donor and recipient questionnaires 
conducted for this research in conjunction with EUROTOLD indicate immediate 
decision-making by donors to be the norm. " 
Fellner and Marshall's conclusion that informed consent in living donation is a rn " 
is supported not just by the speed of decision-making but also by empirical studies 
suggesting that donation is in some cases unconsciously motivated rather than based 
on a rational assessment of all the relevant factors. Whilst donors tend to be highly 
motivated, "' and unconscious aspects should not be overestimated" problems are very 
clearly present an in their light it has been stated that the physicians responsibility to 
safeguard the rights and responsibilities of the donor is of vital importance. "
5.3. Law Relating to Disclosure and Informed Understanding in 
Organ LDT. 
5.3.1. General Issues. 
International guidelines have taken contrasting approaches to the issue of donor 
disclosure. The Third Conference of European Health Ministers in Paris (16-17 
November 1987) emphasises a range of specific categories of information that must 
be disclosed without commenting on the depth of disclosure or it's function, 
22 lbid at 242. 
23 lbid at 244.25% had a period of deliberation with a conscious choice. 24 R. G. Simmons et al., Gift of Life, Transaction Books, 1987. 
25 Chapter 9. 
26C Xellner and J. Marshall, Kidney Donors - The Myth of Informed Consent, Am JPSYch, 1970,126, 
1245-1251. 
27j Shanteau and J. Skowronski, The Decision to Donate Organs in J. Shanteau et al., Organ Donation 
and Transplantation: Psychological and Behavioural Factors, Am Psych Ass, 1991,59-67. Simmons 
et al., Gift of Life, Wiley and Sons, 1977. 
28Simmons et al., Gift of Life, Wiley andSons, 1977. 
29 lbid at 2707. 
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"the donor should be given appropriate information before the removal about it's 
possible consequences, in particular the medical, social and psychological effects, 
as well as about the implications of the donation for the recipient. 00 
On the other hand the World Health Organisation's Guiding Principles on 
Transplantation emphasise disclosure simply in the context of knowing and evaluating 
the significance of giving consent - with Guiding Principle 3 stating that, 
"the donor should be.. sufficiently informed to be able to understand and weigh the 
risks, benefits and consequences of consent. 01 
Such guidelines, along with most pieces of transplant legislation 32 do not consider the 
matter of professional responsibilities to disclose information to recipients. Where 
the recipient is considered it is typically in a less comprehensive manner than 
consideration of the donor. However, interestingly regulation of disclosure to 
donors can also be limited e. g. to particular classes of donor; 33 UK law, only 
regulates disclosure in relation to donors not legislatively classed as genetically related 
to the recipien t34 while Hong Kong3s law only regulates disclosure where the donor is 
not legislatively classed as genetically related to the recipient and not the recipient's 
spouse of 3 or more years standing. 36 Their are also a few jurisdictions where 
transplant law does not examine disclosure in LDT at all including; Cuba, 37 
Ecuado, 38 Kuwait,, 39 Sylian Arab-Republic4o Uruc! 
.U 
41 Vietnam, 42 ZimbabWe43 
30Adopted as para 11. of The Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (79) of The Committee of 
Ministers to the Member States. Reprinted in the World Health Organization' s Book, 'Legislative 
Responses To Organ Transplantation, ' Martinus Nyhoff, 1994, Appendix 1. 
31 WHO Guiding Principles 199 1, adopted by the World Health Assembly in resolution WHA44.25. 
Reprinted in 'Legislative Responses To Organ Transplantation, ' Martinus NYhoff, 1994 at Appendix I 
See also Human Organ Transplantation: A Report on Developments Under the Auspices of WHO 
(1987-1991) WHO 1991. 
32 Exceptions are Belgium, Finland, Poland, 5pain and Turkey plus those discussed in the following 
sections. 
33 Disclosure requirements can also be limited by the relevant legislation only covering certain organs - 
e. g. Italian legislation only covers kidneys. 
34 See HOTA 1989 section 2(3) - discussed at section 4 35 Ordinance No 16 of 1995. 
36 Indian law also imposes disclosure requirements only for certain classes of donor (see Act No. 42 of 
1994, IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38. 
37 Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 at section 80. 
38Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code. 
39Decree Law No. 55 of 20 December 1989. 
40Law No. 31 of 23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs from the Human Body 
at section 2(3). Peru may be a Rifther exception but the full text of its recent law has yet to be 
published in English (for a limited text see IDHL, 1994,45(l), 36-37). 
4 'Decree No. 660/991 of 4 December 1991 at section 4. 




plus a few regimes (e. g. Austria and Malaysia) that are simply limited in ambit to 
cadaveric donation. 
Roughly parallel with the development of transplant legislation, there has been a 
wide-ranging development of general law relating to disclosure in medical treatment 
in many common and civil law jurisdictions; 44 such law being capable of application 
to living organ donation and reception. The contrast between general Principles and 
regulation in transplant legislation is interesting. Whilst the latter tends to promote 
certainty and professional awareness on some disclosure matters it is a long way from 
being comprehensive. For instance, only a minority of transplant laws specify 
disclosure requirements for the recipient and most lack fail to indicate what depth of 
information must be given. 
Transplant laws in BelgiUM45 and many Australian 
46 
states, supplant some of the 
original role of general principles of law (the failure to meet legislative disclosure 
requirements precludes the giving of a valid consent to donation which is actually 
defined in terms of professional responsibilities laid out in the legiSlation47). 
However, in most cases legislation is merely a supplement to general principles. 
48 49 50 For instance, in Algeria, Norw , Costa Rica, satisfaction of 
legislative 
disclosure requirements simply acts as a gateway that must be passed through if valid 
consent, as defined by general principles, is to be given. In U. K. law, liability can 
flow from both under principles of negligence / battery and under the provisions of 
HOTA 1989.51 In this type of situation the failure to meet a legislative requirement 
has no special bearing on the legal validity of consent to donation. Indeed, common 
law principles will probably be used to define consent under the Act; regulation 
3(2)b of The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI No. 
2480) refers to ULTRA needing to be satisfied that the donor has understood and 
4'Anatomical Donations and Post Mortern Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976 at section 12(a). "See D. Gieson, International Medical Malpractice Law, JCB. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) andMartinus 
Nyhoff, 1988, paras 486-514,550-669,1132,1164-1177,1181-200 1. 
45Law of June 13 1986 at section 8. 
46 For example see Northern Territory Act No 121 of 1979 at section 10 and Queensland, The 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-84 at section 10. See also Legislative Responses to Organ 
Transplantation at 13-13 1. 
4'However, a claim in negligence for insufficient disclosure may still be open in this situation. 48Law No. 85-05 of 1985 at section 162. 
49Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 at section I 
5OLaw No. 5560 of 20 August 1974 at section 15. 
"Some other examples of this include Bolivia (section II March 1982 law), Colombi (Decree No. 
1172 of 6 June 1989 at section 35e), Cyprus (Law No. 97 of 1987 at section 7), Lebanon (Decree No. 
109 of 1983), Mexico (Federal Regulations of 16 August 1976 at section 3 IV), Kuwait (Decree Law 
No. 55 of 20 December 1987 at section 4), Panam (Law No. 10 of II July 1983 at section 6), 
Russian Federation (Law of 22 December 1992 at section 6) and ae-nmark (Law No. 402 of 13 June 
1990 at section 13(3)). 
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consented in order to grant authorisation i. e. the term 'understanding' 
is not defining 
consent, which is nowhere defined within the legislative regime. While the 
Act 
considers the matter of disclosure and understanding in LDT's defined as 
'non- 
genetically related, ' it appears that regardless of whether a doctor had proceeded with 
or without ULTRA authorisation for a 'non-genetically related donation' (s)he could 
theoretically be liable in negligence or battery for disclosure (and, incidentally, 
technical) failures. Occasionally transplant legislation merely acts to confirm general 
principles - e. g. laws in UrugUgy, 52 Peru, 
53 Zimbabwe, 54 Vietnam '55 and the 
SyIian 
Arab Republic 56 merely state that the express consent of the donor is required in LDT. 
5.3.1.1. The Tort of Batterv 
The first problem with general principles of law has been that they rarely promote 
high standards of disclosure. In the case of common law, this is due to relying on 
the tort of negligence to define disclosure requirements. It having being held that a 
practitioners failures (even if gross 57) to explain risks and benefits will not make 
58 consent unreal, use of the tort/crime of battery is confined to situations like agreeing 
to one procedure and a different one being performed59 or the practitioner being aware 
that the patient did not understand the nature of the procedure intended6o or acting in 
bad faiOl rather than being the outcome of a failure to provide and communicate 
information sufficiently to support an autonomous independent decision. 
62 
52 Decree No. 660/991 of 4 December 1991 at section 4. 
53 Supreme Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 1988 at section 15 repealing Law No. 23415 of I June 
1982. 
54 Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976 at section 12(a). 
55Law of 30 June 1989 On the Protection of Public Health at section 30 subsections 1 and 3 
respectively. 
56 Law No. 31 of 23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of organs from the Human 
Body at section 2(3). 
57 Hills y Potter [1983] 3 All ER716 HirstJ 3 All ER716. "The plaintiffs undoubted consent to the 
operation which was in fact performed negates any possibility of liability under this head. " Confirmed 
by the Court of Appeal (and by Lord Scarman in the House of Lords) in Sidaw Vy Board of Governors 
of the Bethlem Royal Hosl2ital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 per Sir John Donaldson 
and Lord Justice Dunn. This position has also been reached in Canada (see Reibl v Hughes [1980] 
114 D. L. R. (3d) 646 Supreme Ct of Canada) although cases like Koehler y Cook [1975] D. L. R. (3d) 
766 and Zimmer v Rinurrose [1978] 89 D. L. R. (3d) 646) have criticised this approach. 
"Chatterson v Gerson [1981] Q. B. 432 at 442G. 
591bid and Cull v Rpyal Surrey County Hospital and Butler, Br. Med. J., 1932,1,1195. Or consent 
given to a particular surgeon and another surgeon performed the operation (provided that the consent 
and authorisation was legitimately confined to one such surgeon - which today, outside of private 
medicine, is unlikely). 
6OChatterson y Gerson [1981] QB 432. 
61Or where a person touches without consent in a case where only a specific other persons touching is 
consented to in a case where the identity of the person affects what is being done. 
62An example of the limits of the current approach would be where a doctor recommending a drug to a 
patient provides no information as to the fact it may have side effects, with the result that the patient 
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However, by way of exception, failure to meet required disclosure standards will 
found an action in battery where a procedure is experimental and non-therapeutic as 
established in the Canadian case of Halushka v University of Sakatchewan [1965] 53 
DLR (2d) 436. This exception, is justified on the basis that the ethical principles 
governing experimental research make confining recovery to negligence unacceptable 
in experimental research/non-therapeutic situations. 63 What apparently discounts the 
recipient from using the battery head is the fact that organ donation is always 
therapeutic (at least if done within principles of ethics, and sometimes law). 
However, donors undergoing forms of donation that are experimental should be 
treated under the head of battery on the basis that the procedure is not justified in itself 
as for the therapeutic benefit of the donor even if in some cases the donor might gain 
more benefit than detriment out of it (as indeed might somebody partaking in medical 
research not designed to benefit them). 
While Zimmer v Ringrose [1981] 28 A. R. 69, (1981), [1981] 4 W. W. R. 75 (C. A) 
concluded that use of the battery analysis in disclosure cases is limited to the non- 
therapeutic experiment context, there must be hoped that it could be more widely 
applied in the unique situation of LDT. Gieson has suggested that, 
"as regards the donor, extensive and detailed information must be required since no 
therapeutic treatment of him is intended and thus he will not therapeutically benefit 
from the oper ion. 91,64 
Under a framework of common law, the need for disclosure of detailed and extensive 
information necessitates sole reliance on the battery analysis, simply because, under 
the tort of negligence a practitioner could escape unsanctioned for non-disclosure 
simply on the basis that the donor would still have gone ahead with the procedure had 
the legally required level of disclosure taken place (see below). As already reasoned, 
the recipients unique interdependence with the donor also warrants that (s)he receives 
extensive and detailed information, again requiring sole reliance on the tort of battery. 
Despite it's rationality this approach is likely to generate some unease, particularly in 
may end up assenting and forming a legally valid consent to a treatment without making an informed 
autonomous decision and so arguably not consenting in the fundamental ethical sense of the word. "Gieson, Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment: A Comparative Examination, 
MedLaw Review, 1995 (Spring), 3,22-52 at 33. 
"International Medical Malpractice Law, J C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) & Martinus Nyhoff, 1988,609. 
136 
those jurisdictions which are used to restricting disclosure requirements in the 
interests of restricting the scope of liability of medical practitioners. 65 
5.3.1.2. The Tort of Negligence 
The intrinsic problem with using negligence to define disclosure requirements, both 
in general and in LDT, is that even if the relevant standard is breached the onus is on 
the patient to prove causation i. e. that on the balance of probabilities that (s)he would 
not have undergone the procedure if the relevant disclosure standard had been met. 
66 
This basically means that inadequate disclosure, even failure to disclose very 
significant risks can go without legal sanction simply because a patient/recipient/ 
donor cannot prove (s)he would have made a different decision if the disclosure 
standard had been met. 
Even with use of a subjective test, 67 most patients will find it difficult to find the 
evidence to show that if (s)he had received proper disclosure a different decision 
would have been made. In practice whatever a patient may subjectively suggest 
(s)he would have done a judge is likely to apply his own standard of rationality to the 
65For instance, several judgements have indicated that English disclosure requirements under the tort of 
negligence are motivated by a desire to restrict liability (on grounds of policy rather than principle). 
Lord Denning in Hatcher v Black [1954] Times 2 July conjures up visions of MacBeth in suggesting 
that expanding liability would result in the doctor or surgeon, "instead of getting on with his work.. 
forever looking over his shoulder to see if someone was coming up with a dagger. " Lord Scarman in 
Sidawgy alluded to, "the danger of defensive medicine developing in this country[1985] I All ER 643 
a sentiment echoed by Lord Justice Mustill in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authorfty [1987] QB 730, 
[1986] 3 All ER 801 (CA) who stated that "the risks which actions for professional negligence bring for 
the public as a whole, in the shape of an instinct on the part of the professional man to play for safety, 
are serious and are now well recognised. Of course one can argue on grounds of principle that failing 
to disclose is itself a form of defensive medicine ("Failure to challenge the practice of medical 
practitioners even in the routine situation has led, or may lead, to general societal unwillingness to 
challenge other aspects of medicine. " McLean, A Patients Right to Know, Dartmouth Publishing, 
1989,102) and that requiring higher standards would simply encourage a more enlightened approach 
to doctor-patient interaction (one that in itself might reap benefits in the healing process - see Barriards 
comments about a person centred approach in section 5.2). 
66 A duty will normally exist to patients (see Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 
Committee [1969] 1 QB 428 [1968] 1 All ER 1068 (QBD) and generally see M. Brazier (ed) Medicine, 
Patients and the Law, Penguin, 1992 (2nd Ed), 117-118). While the donor is not a patient a duty 
would normally exist to him or her also. 
67 in Reibl v Hughes [1980] 114 DLR (3d) 1 (Can Sup Ct) an objective test was used for causation - i. e. 
based on whether or not a reasonable patient would have gone ahead with a procedure. This is clearly 
absurd because causation is a matter based on the facts of what would have happened not an abstracted 
notion of reasonableness. The objective test in Reibl has not surprisingly been rejected in favour of a 
subjective approach in several jurisdictions including English (ýIhh_qtutersonv Gerson [1981] QB 432 per 
Bristow J obiter) and New South Wales [1989] 17 NSWLR 553 
(NSW CA) 
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situation in the absence of very strong evidence of what the patient would have 
done. 68 
Added to this intrinsic problem of proving causation, Eire 69 and, in general, the US70 
have followed English law in restrictively defining the standard of disclosure that is 
required by the practitioner to meet his or her duty of care under the head of 
negligence. The key case is SidqKay v Board of Governors, Bethlem Royal 
Hospital [1985] AC 871 where the majority in the House of Lords confirmed that in 
English law the duty of care is met where a doctor acts in accordance with a school of 
thought accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion. 71 Whilst a 
number of caseS72 have interpreted Sidaway as denying the possibility of judicial 
scrutiny of reasonableness where there is expert evidence available, 73 it is clear that a 
practice defined as reasonable by a competent body of medical opinion could still be 
negligent in exceptional circumstances. 74 However, the level of duty remains not 
68This is classically illustrated in the recent case of P2ynter v Hillingdon (High Court, 23 April 1997, 
unreported) where despite the clear evidence that parents considering treatment for their child were 
very much against an allopathic approach - agreeing to it with extreme reluctance (perhaps even 
coercion), Sir Maurice Drake viewed matters very much in terms of he himselfconsidering the 
allopathic treatment proposed to be in the best interests of the child and deriving from this a conclusion 
that the parents would have consented to such treatment on the child's behalf even if the relevant non- 
disclosed informations concerning risks had been disclosed. One can see the danger here that in effect 
disclosure negligence will in most instances be limited to cases where the patients best interests are 
gone against according to the court and hence (s)he finds no problem in persuading the court that (s)he 
would have made a different decision had the relevant disclosures taken place. 
69Dunner v National Materni1y Hospital [1988] IR 91 
70 See Mason & McCall-Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, Butterworths, 1991,245. 
7'Declaration in Bolam y Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 115 followed and 
approved in both cases of treatment (see Whitehouse y Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 - particularly per 
Lord Edmund Davies at 258 (HL)) and in cases of diagnosis (see Mmmard y West Midlands Regional 
Health Authgrfty [ 19 84] 1 WLR 634 - particularly per Lord Scarman at 63 8). The approach in 
Sidaway has been confirmed as good law several times subsequently including by the Court of Appeal 
in Huahes v Waltham Forest HA [1991] 2 Med LR 155. 
72 Including Gold y Haringey Health Authori [1987] 2 All ER 888(albeit in the context of alternative 
treatments rather than risks of treatment), Palmer y Eadie (18 May 1987, unreported), CA and Bi-Y-th- 
v Bloomsbuoý HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151 CA. 
73 The Court of Appeal in Joyce v Merton Sutton and Handsworth Health Authod! Y 27 BMLR 124-157 
(applying Bolam) held that only limited weight will be given to the defence of practitioners that they 
had followed their normal practice if there are witnesses and documentary evidence showing that 
p! oper practice was not followed and no other expert medical evidence in favour of the defence. 
14 Court of Appeal in Bolitho v City Hackney HA [1993] 13 BMLR III (stating that there is a'very 
onerous weight' on the plaintiff to show conventional practice is unreasonable). This approach is 
supported by a close analysis of Lord Bridge's judgement in Sidaway, "even in a case where, as here, 
no expert in the relevant field condemns the non-disclosure as being in conflict with accepted and 
responsible medical practice, I am of the opinion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to 
the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on 
the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it" (Sidaway [1985] 
AC 871, [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 663). This approach was subsequently applied in Smith y, Tunbridge 
Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334 (QBD) where Morland J, faced by medical evidence that it would not 
have been common practice to have disclosed a particular risk but, held that, "although some surgeons 
may still not have been warning patients similar in situation to the plaintiff of the risk .... that omission 
138 
defined by equal reference to expert opinion from both sides 75 but through an 
overwhelming deference to expert evidence of a group of practitioners selected on 
behalf of the defence, belonging to a profession not noted for it's high disclosure 
standards from whence the very alleged abuses of patient rights came. 76 
A problem generally, and in the specific context of LDT is that adopting this so- 
called 'professional based standard 77 is bound to impact on the way the profession 
behaves 78 including fostering the unquestioning acceptance of the authority of 
medicine which to some extent already exists. 79 Not surprisingly this approach has 
was neither reasonable nor responsible" (p339). He clearly viewed this as "applying the Bolam Test 
as elucidated inSidaway. 11 (p339). The House of Lords have now ruled in Bolitho ([1997] All ER4, 
771 HL. ) that where there are two bodies of opposing opinion the one brought forward for the defence 
can be rejected (even if competent) if it is not logically supportable (P779). Hucks v Cole 
(1968)(1993) 4 Med LR 393 was applied to conclude that medical opinion could be rejected where it 
did not stand up at all to logical analysis. Lord Brown-Wilkinson, giving the judgment, stressed that 
this would seldom occur. Commenting on the decision the All ER Annual Review 1997 concludes at 
p314 that, "Bolitho represents an adaptation of Bolam rather than a radical break .... It will be used 
sparingly by the courts. " 
75 As would be the case in most non-medical areas of negligence. 
76As McLean states English law places an "almost overwhelming weight placed on medical judgement 
and the deference shown to orthodox medicine and its therapies (Sheila McLean, A Patients Right to 
Know, Dartmouth Publishing, 1989,103). 
77 In Sidaw4Y Lord Diplock gave unequivocal approval to the Bolarn test and suggested it was the 
doctor's function to weigh and evaluate options, not the patients, "all these are matters which the 
doctor will have to take into consideration in determining, in the exercise of his professional skill and 
judgement, that it is in the patients best interests that he should take the risk involved and undergo the 
treatment recommended by the doctor. " SidawU [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 656. Avoiding negligence 
was simply showing that a responsible body of medical opinion would have taken the course taken by 
the defendant. He rejected the view that the determining factor should be the patienVs level of 
informedness. Informed consent appears to have been used loosely here rather than in it's technical 
sense as a legal doctrine. For discussion of the doctrine of informed consent see Mason & 
McCall-Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, Butterworths, 1991, p242-252. As Dunn LJ stated in the 
Court of Appeal in Sidawgy "the doctrine of informed consent forms no part of English law" 
(Sidawgy [1985] 1 All ER at 517 (CA)). Lords Bridge and Keith adopted the Bolarn test while 
contradictorily asserting the paramount nature of patient autonomy ([1985] 1 All ER 643). Lord 
Templeman emphasised that the patient did not need to be told of all the risks; "the doctor ... must 
decide what information should be given to the patient and in what terms that information should be 
couched" [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 666. This point would suggest that any doctrine of therapeutic 
privilege would be merely superfluous -a viewpoint noted by Kennedy and Grubb, Medical Law: Text 
with Materials, Butterworths, 1994,211. Kennedy and Grubb discuss the case of Blyth v 
Bloomsbu1y Health Authgri! y [1993] 4 Med LR 151 (CA) in relation to the issue of a doctor's duty to 
answer questions that are directly asked by a patient (Medical Law: Text With Materials, 
Butterworths, 1994,205-211. The opportunity to create more stringent requirements for disclosure, 
communication and understanding than for the exercise of technical skills was missed in all 4 majority 
judgements [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 657. This confirms the approach in Hatcher y Black (1954) 
Times, 2 July (QBD) and Bolam. 
7'Klass has suggested it is one reason for the huge (in his view excessive) prescription of drugs in the 
United Kingdom (See A. Klass, There's Gold in Them Thar Pills, Penguin, 1975. 
71, 'The idea of questioning, not to speak of refusing a doctor's order is difficult for patients to 
contemplate, if not out of habit then out of other concerns. For example, patients often feel 
compelled to surrender their right to ask questions out of fear of offending their doctors and out of guilt 
about imposing on their own time. " Katz, The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient, 1986, p. x. 
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received criticism by academics 80 and the judiciary, 81 not least because it limits the 
role of patient autonomy, 
"where doctors are allowed to limit disclosure on the basis of their clinical judgement 
the patienfs capacity to make decisions based upon his own value commitments and 
weighting of the various risks is undermined. , 82 
Fortunately, a number of jurisdictions including Canada, 83 some Australian states, 
84 
New Zealand '85 South Africa 
86 and a number of leading civil law jurisdictions such as 
Switzerland, Austria and GennMy 7 have rejected use of a 'professional based 
standard' in favour of one based on the disclosure needs of the 'reasonable patient' in 
the actual patient's situation. Underlying this approach, according to the Australian 
High Court in Rogers v Whittaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79, is, 
"... the principle that, while evidence of acceptable medical practice is a useful guide 
for the courts, it is for the courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of 
BoSee for instance M. Brazier, Patient Autonomy and Consent o Treatment: The Role of the Law? 
LS., 1987,7,169; D. Gieson and J. Hayes, The Patients Right to Know -A Comparative Analysis, 
AngloAmLawRev, 1992,21,101; D. Gieson, Vindicating the Patient's Rights: AComparative 
Perspective, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, 1993,9,273-309. 
8'See Bollen J in the Supreme Court of Australia decision of FvR r19831 SASR 189 and the 
Australian case of Rogers v Whittaker [1992] 175 C. L. R. 479. Seethe ýupreme Court of Ireland in 
the case of Dunner v National Maternity Hospital [1988] IR 91. Sidaway has been applied to assume 
that the patient already has knowledge of certain things (Thake v Maurice [1986] Q. B. 644). 
82 Per Lord Scarman in his minority judgement in Sidaway [1985] 1 All ER 643 (at 654) where he also 
stated that, "it would be a strange conclusion if courts should be led to conclude that our law, which 
undoubtedly recognises the right of the patient to decide whether he will accept or reject the treatment 
proposed, should permit the doctors to determine whether and in what circumstances a duty arises, 
requiring the doctor to warn his patient of the risks inherent in the treatment which he proposes" 
(Sidaway[1985]IAIIER643at649). His Lordship's approach drew heavily on such an informed 
consent approach used in CanterbuKy v Spence [1972] 464 F 2d 772, US App DC; cert denied 409 US 
1064 and differentiated between technical and non-technical aspects of medicine to assert that the 
doctors duty to inforni stems from the patient's rights 11985] 1 All ER 643 at 654. However, in the 
final analysis the judgement was very qualified by a defence of 'therapeutic privilege. ' 93 lbid at 245. 
84 See for instance the New South Wales Court of Appeal Decision of Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital 
[1990] 2 Med LR 103 and the decision of the Australian High Court in Rolze sy Whittaker [1993] 4 
Med LR 79. 
15 See particularly the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Smith v Auckland Hospital Board 
[ 1964] NZLR 24 1. 
86 See particularly Castell y De Greef (1994) Case No. A 976/92 (Supreme Court of South Africa, Cape 
of Good Hope Provincial Division, per Ackermarm J. ) (not yet reported). 
87 These are cited by Gieson! s comparative analysis of world-wide provision in this area of law (see 
D. Gieson, From Paternalism to Self Determination to Shared Decision-Making, Acta Juridica, 1988, 
107; D. Gieson and J. Hayes, The Patients Right to Know ,A Comparative Analysis, Anglo American LawReview, 1988,2,101; D. Gieson, Vindicating the Patients Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, 1993,9,273-309; D. Gieson, CivilLiability 
of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A Comparative Examination, Med 
LawReview, 1995(Spring), 3,22-52). 
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care after giving weight to "the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to 
make his own decisions about his life ..... 
88 
5.3.2. Depth and Rane of Disclosure in LDT 
5.3.2.1. General Points. 
As already stated, 89 in order to avoid the perils of proving causation LDT must be 
considered under the head of battery. However, whatever test is used the range and 
depth of disclosure to donors is likely to be exceptionally high. Whilst Lloyd LJ in 
Gold v Haringey Health Authgfit elt that making a legal y [1987] 2 All ER 8890 f 
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic procedures would go against the 
whole thrust of the House of Lords decision in Sidaway, the fact ihat donation is a 
non-therapeutic procedure will surely influence disclosure requirements. It would to 
be difficult to justify treating the recipient in anything but the same fashion here 
because his/her unique interdependence with the donor necessitates making a choice 
based on all significant information irrespective of whether (s)he and/or the medical 
practitioner want information disclosed. 
The nature of disclosure in organ LDT will, however, vary according to a number of 
factors including: 
1. the test for disclosure being applied (i. e. based on the reasonable patient or a more 
professional based standard); 
2. any enhanced factors in the specific situation such as due to limited hospital 
expertise or equipment or due to a particular make-up of one of the participants 
(e. g. a donor having the onset diabetes or high blood pressure); 
3. the specific organ being donated; and 
"At 82 citing King CJ in FvR (1983) 33 SASR 189. 
89See 5.3.1.1. 
"Giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Watkins and Stephen Brown LJJ agreed) reversing the 
view of the trial court. 
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4. the extent to which the procedure is experimental i. e. yet to be proven as the 
optimum treatment and/or unpredictable in prospective detriment/ benefit levels. 
91 
Professional Disclosure Test. 
Whilst a competent body of medical opinion brought forward by the defence will 
normally determine disclosure requirements under a professional based test certain 
factors would surely have to be disclosed in living organ donation irrespective of such 
opinion. Skegg has stated that, 
"if a doctor involved in renal transplantation failed to disclose the risks of 
nephrectomy to a potential living donor, before obtaining his consent to the removal 
of one of his kidneys a judge would be virtually certain to hold that the doctor was in 
breach of his duty of care to the donor, even if (which is not the case) the doctor 
could adduce evidence that his conduct was in accord with a common and 
professionally approved practice"92 
This approach could be applied equally to the recipient. It must also be the case that 
a practitioner, as well as being required to disclose any significant risks to the donor 
and recipient, would be required to disclose any significant benefits. Expectations 
of the range of disclosure beyond medical risks and benefits must be limited because 
as Lord Scarman noted, a doctor may only be partially, if at all, aware of the 'non- 
medically oriented' factors that bear on the patient's decision, "for example, his 
family, business or social responsibilities.,, 93 Nethertheless, these non-medically 
oriented factors are particularly relevant to LDT for both the donor and recipient (for 
instance the potential economic consequences of donation, potential family stress 
etc. ) a reasonable practitioner would make some effort at disclosure of some of the 
factors beyond the purely medical while not meeting, for example, the standards of a 
"in this context FvR [1983] 33 S. A. S. R. 437 (F. C. ) evaluated disclosure as influenced by the degree 
of speculativeness and haphazardness in the procedure whilst Gieson has stated that the degree of 
novelty will be influential (Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and 
Experimentation: A Comparative Review, Med Law Review, 1995 (Spring), 3,22-52 at 35). 
92Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine, Oxford University Press, 1984,85. 
93 Sidaway [198511 All ER 643. 
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social worker, family therapist or financial advisor. However, whether it would be 
a legal duty to make some effort in this area is debatable given that a competent body 
of medical opinion could probably be brought forward to support non-disclosure of 
such information's as common practice. 
Although the nature of the professional based reasonableness test makes it impossible 
to accurately prophesise what must be disclosed in a given situation such as LDT, 
there are useful obiter-dicta 'hints' or 'guidelines' which can be applied. In English 
law part of the problem is that these 'hints' are quite variant in nature. Lord Bridge 
in Sidaway said certain risks would have to be disclosed irrespective of medical 
opinion. 94 He suggested that substantial risks of grave adverse consequences (such 
as 10% chance of a stroke) must be disclosed. 95 Under this test the donor and 
recipient might be able to expect infon-nation about such things as: 
* risks for the recipient of rejection, the possibility of very serious cumulative side 
effects from drugs and the possibility of sexual dysfunction (such as impotence) 
plus any other serious risks applying in reception of a specific type of organ (e. g. 
lung lobe). 
risks for the donor of any substantial risks of grave adverse consequences such as 
the risk of donor splenectomy in liver segment donation risk of donor splenectomy 
and loss of endocrine and exocrine function in pancreatic vessel length donation. 96 
Lord Templeman felt that 'special' dangers particular to the operation would have to 
be disclosed. 97 Given his Lordship's medically deferential speech? 8 such special 
dangers would probably have to be significant to be disclosed - perhaps, in the case of 
LDT disclosure of such things as: 
9 risk to the recipient of rejection, drug side effects, effects on family life and impact 
on sexual function etc.; 
94[l 985] 1 All ER 643 at 663. 
931bid. 
96 See chapter 3.4. for ftuther discussion of risks in particular forms of LDT. 
97 Ibid. 
"Kennedy and Grubb, Medical Law: Text With Materials, Butterworths, 1994 at p 190. 
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risks to the donor of restricted physical capacity for a short period after removal, 
possibility of septicaernia at the woundsite etc.; and 
significant other risks to the donor and/or recipient particular to the type of organ 
or tissue being removed and particularities on the participants (e. g. poor health 
condition). 
Lord Templeman felt that general dangers inherent in an operation did not have to be 
disclosed. 99 This is perhaps too restrictive a view in the context of LDT, one might, 
for instance, think it reasonable to require a practitioner to disclose the normal risk of 
death due to not coming out of the anaesthetic to the recipient and donor. Equally, it 
can be argued that Lord Bridge's view that substantial risks of grave adverse 
consequences (such as 10% chance of a stroke) must be disclosed is too restrictive in 
the LDT context; one might think that reasonable disclosure to the donor and 
recipient would include disclosure of those donation risks that were not substantial but 
significant and related to adverse consequences that were not grave but simply 
significant (e. g. risk of septicaernia to the donor's woundsite, which is usually less 
than a 5% risk, ought to be disclosed to donor and recipient, risk of donor serious 
injury and/or death in the more novel risky forms of living organ donation - i. e. lung 
lobe and pancreas vessel length donation - see 3.4.2.2. ). 
Reasonable Patient Test. 
A jurisdiction using a reasonable patient base test (e. g. New Zealand, South Africa) 
would probably require a higher standard of disclosure to a living organ donor and 
recipient. For instance, donors and recipients can reasonably be expected to require: 
* treatment as an interdependent pair for the purposes of disclosure; 
* disclosure of non-medical factors; 
disclosure of the risk of death or serious injury from organ donation in a wider 
range of cases than under the professional based standard (e. g. not just lung lobe 
'9[1985] 1 All ER 643. 
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and pancreas vessel length donation but probably also even liver segment and 
kidney donation); and 
greater disclosure with regards to the prospective risks and consequences for the 
recipient. 
This would be the case irrespective of the fact that one or more competent bodies of 
medical opinion would probably not be inclined (at least in a standard living kidney 
donation) to take all, or even necessarily any, of these factors into account (unless 
legally obliged to) in determining disclosure. 
Therapeutic Privilege, 
The notion of therapeutic privilege is particularly in line with the idea that it is for the 
medical practitioner to determine what disclosure is reasonable in the circumstances 
(professional based test). However, even the notion that disclosure is based on the 
requirements of the reasonable patient might result in non-disclosure being accepted 
on therapeutic grounds, such as where relevant information would "harm an 
unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient. "100 
While concealment offends the principle of self-determination and can actually 
compromise the independence of decision-making, it is basically accepted in 
circumstances where the non-disclosure at issue is considered beneficent. However, 
Skegg has pointed out that non-disclosure is less acceptable in non-therapeutic 
procedures. In the context of the professional-based disclosure test he concludes that 
even if there was an established practice of non-disclosure in non-therapeutic cases 
(which there is not), 
"it is highly unlikely that judges would accept that evidence of such a practice 
conclusively established that a doctor was not in breach of the duty he owed to the 
patient" 101 
10ORogers v Whittaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79 at 83. 
'O'Skegg, Law Ethics and Medicine, oxford University press, 1984,84. 
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Concealment in the area of living donation is hard to justify at all because donation is 
not even undertaken for the benefit of the donor it must be the product of the donor 
reaching an autonomous decision after being informed of all the significant factors 
involved it cannot be justified at all. 102 Edmund Davies LJ has even extra judicially 
stated that disclosure must take place where the donor does not wish it, 
"however eager the donor is to play out his self sacrificial role, the surgeon is under a 
legal duty to make clear to him the risks involved. He may not want the truth, but in 
this case the truth must be forced upon him"103 
Non-use of therapeutic privilege should also be extended to the recipient who being 
interdependent with the donor requires disclosure in all the significant areas in order 
to make a moral decision. 
Experimental Procedures 
Whilst the law relating to experimental procedures is not highly evolved, there are 
some general points that can be taken into account. 
Firstly, whilst the law is not designed to discourage the use of experimental 
techniques or practices'04 a new experimental method must reasonably seem to be 
more likely to bring about the recovery of the patient than the old one. 105 In LDT 
this appears to mean that a new form of living organ donation must be a better 
option than it's cadaveric counterpart in terms of prospective benefits and 
detriments. However, in reality the prospective waiting time for a CDT must also 
102 This is why it is difficult to accept the use of incompetent donors at all, unless through psychological 
benefit (or the avoidance of psychological harm) that outweighs the detriment of extraction the 
procedure can be shown to be, in all probability in the incompetents best interests - see chapter 7 for a 
further discussion of this area. 
103 The Patients Right to Know the Truth, Proc Roy Soc Med, 1973,533 at 535. 
104(Didwgy v Brown [1984] 1 N. S. W. L. R 100 "every innovation has to be performed for a first time. 
That something has not been done before is not proof that it ought not be done. " per Hurtley J-A. 
105 Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A Comparative 
Examination, MedLaw Review, 1995 (Spring), 3,22-52 at 29-30. The burden of proving a choice 
was the best practice lies with the defendant in many jurisdictions - see, for example, Anderson v 
Chasney and Sisters of St Joseph [1949] 57 Man R 343; Crits v ilyyester f 19561 O. R. 132 (Ont C. A. 
per Schroeder J-A. at 148); G. Memeteau, Le Droit Medical, Litec, 1985,307-308 
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be factored into the equation - in some situations CDT may be superior to LDT 
in 
terms of an abstract comparison of the two but LDT may still be justified by 
reference to the fact that of a long expected waiting time or exceptional need to 
conduct a transplantation in the particular circumstances. 
" Secondly, disclosure levels will also be affected by the extent of experimentality of 
a procedure. Some forms of living organ donation may be new but historically 
conducted on a medically indicated basis (e. g. donation of a lung lobe) the 
knowledge and experience of them in this context being taken into account in 
assessing their degree of experimentality. 
" Thirdly, while disclosure should be high in the experimental situation, leeway 
should also be given for the considerable variances in approach that might exist 
(e. g. transplant practitioner have very variant attitudes towards transplant scenarios 
in general and in experimental situations. 106 
" Fourthly, in an experimental situation there ought to be an explanation of the 
possibility of unknown risks actualising (in both reception and donation in the case 
of LDT. 107 Interestingly this requirement is embodied in Colombia's transplant 
law which states that the donor and recipient must have been warned in advance of 
the impossibility of knowing with certainty all the risks that the procedure may 
entail, on account of the possibility of unforeseen situations. 108 
5.3.2.2. Ranize and Denth of Disclosure to the Recinient 
There is little discussion of the depth of disclosure to recipients under transplant 
legislation although Indian law requires the medical practitioner to explain all possible 
effects, complications and hazards; all presumably meaning all that are beyond the 
de minimus level. The range of disclosure can be limited to apparently more medical 
aspects, as is the case in Indian and Bolivian law. 109 Some laws are vague about the 
required level of disclosure, for instance, Argentinean law states that the recipient 
106 This point is brought out in the discussion of professional attitudes toward living donor 
transplantation in chapter 10. 
107Gieson, Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A 
Comparative Examination, MedLaw Review, 1995 (Spring), 3,22-52 at 35. Several authorities are 
presented for this view. 
'OsDecree No. 1173 of 6 June 1989 at section 35. 
109Decree No. 55,1987, sections 9 and 10). 
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must be informed of the likely risks and benefits of the procedure. 110 Theoretically 
the term 'benefif could include social, psychological and other benefits. Similarly, 
Panamaýs law requires that physicians who undertake a transplant inform the recipient 
of the consequences of the procedure as well as the risks. III It may be that 
information about consequences could extend beyond the purely medical aspects. 
Greek law is almost identical on this point in placing a duty on physicians responsible 
for the removal to provide the recipient with information relating to the possible 
consequences of the removal and transplant. 112 Some laws, e. g. Russian 
Federation 113 and Vietnam, 114 simply require the recipient to have given consent. 
There are also some novel provisions in terms of the range of information that must be 
disclosed. Bolivian law is unusual in specifically stating that the recipient must be 
informed as to whether the organ came form a living person or a dead one. 
Importantly the recipient is also able to get information on the clinical value of the 
donation with the regulation stating that, "the recipient is also to be informed 
regarding the results of tissue compatibility tests between the organs or tissues of the 
donor and of the recipient as well as the potential immunological risks and reactions" 
(This information is to be provided in writing). 
5.3.2.3. Ran2e and Depth of Disclosure to Donors. 
Most transplant legislation fails to explicitly state the depth of information that must 
be disclosed to the donor. A typical example is French law which states that the 
donor must be "informed in advance of the risks to which he is exposed and the 
possible consequences of removal. "115 One is left to interpret the depth of 
information that must be communicated; a practitioner cannot disclose all the risks 
and possible consequences so this provision may be construed as excluding de 
minimus risks or involving disclosure only of risks that are significant. 
1 10Transplantation Law No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 at section 13. 
"'Law No. 10 of II July 1983 Regulating the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Parts and 
Laying Down Other Provisions at section 6. 
112 Section 5-6 of Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983. 
113 Law of 22 December 1992 at section 6. 
114 Law of 30 June 1989 On the Protection of Public Health at section 30(l) and 30(3) 115 Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 at Article L. 671-3. 
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Transplant laws also have considerable variations as to the range of information they 
require to be communicated to the donor. The implication within the French law is 
that disclosure is limited to more medical risks and aspects of the procedure and it's 
consequences - an approach which is seen in many more jurisdictions including 
117 1 j, 120 Algeria, 116 Belarus,, Bolivian law, 118 Bulgaria, "' Canada (model aw 
Cyprus, 121 Hungaly, 122 Kuwait, 123 Mexico, 124 Northern Territga, 125 Poland,, 126 
Queensland,, 127 Slovakia, 128 Slovenia, 129 Sri Lanka, 130 Sweden, 131 Tasmania 132 and 
Western Australia. 133 
116 This law states that the physician must inform the donor of any medical risks which the removal may 
entail for the consent to be valid (Law No. 85-05 of 16 February 1985 at section 162). 
117 See Article 3 of the Draft Law of the Republic of Belarus On the Donation and Transplantation of 
Human Organs and Tissues, 1995. There are also transplant provisions within general law. 
"'Provides for the donor to be given information concerning the health risks of the procedure (section 
10 of Regulations on the Use of Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982). 
119The 1996 law demands that the donor has been given a clear explanation of the risks involved in the 
removal prior to giving consent. 
120Requires that the donor understands the nature and consequences of transplanting tissue from his or 
her body during his or her life (section 5(l) this applies to over 16 year olds. For provision relating to 
under 16's see chapter on capacity). 
12'The donor must be duly informed of the medical consequences of removal (section 7(3) of Law No. 
97 of 1987). 
122 The physician performing the removal procedure is responsible for informing the donor in a thorough 
and detailed manner of the necessity for the operation, the risks it entails, and the sequelae which might 
occur subsequently (section 2(1) of Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972). 
123 Requires that the donor be given information in writing of the effects to his health that may result 
from the removal of a specific organ (Decree No. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation 
at section 4). 
124 Provides that the donor must have been fully informed of the risks to himself of the operation and the 
consequences to himself of the removal of the organ, and the degree of probability of a successful 
transplant (Federal Regulations of 16 August 1976 On the Use of Human Organs, Tissues and 
Cadavers at section 29). It is somewhat uncertain whether or not this provision extends beyond more 
medical consequences / possible effects of removal. 
125Law requires that the physician explain the nature and effect of the removal from the body of the 
tissue specified in the consent (Act No. 121 of 1979 the Human Tissue Transplant Act at section 10(b)). 
126 The donor must "be informed in detail about the intervention, the risk connected with it and any 
possible typical consequences for his health condition" (Law of October 26,1995 at Article 9(l) point 
5). 
127 This law simply requires that the donor is prepared to donate in the light of medical advice furnished 
him (The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 10(c)). 
128Tbe living donor must be "fully informed of the risks entailed for his health" (Law of 24 August 
1994 at section 46(3). 
129The donor must have formed a consent that reflects his / her true will and based on an "appropriate 
explanation about the nature, purpose and course of the operation, probability of its success and usual 
risks" (The Law of The Transplantation of Human Body Parts For the Sake of Medical Treatment 1996 
at Article 10). 
130Requires that the nature and effect of donation be explained prior to consent being given (The 
Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at section 8(3)). 
13 'Law No. 831 of 8 June 1995 at section 10 states that the donor is to be informed of the nature of 
intervention and the risks entailed (IDHL, 1996,47(l), 28-30 at 29). 
132 The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 9(b) - requires that the physician explain the nature and effect 
of the removal from the body of the tissue specified in the consent 133 Act No. 116 of 1982 at section 8(l)(c). Provision as above. 
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Of course when a regulation specifies disclosure of consequences it could expand 
beyond medical factors to include social, familial and other consequences. Even 
when the regulation merely specifies disclosure of 'medical aspects' the term medical 
may well include psychological - psychological risks are very much within the normal 
ambit of disclosure - it could be added that psychological benefits are as well 
in the 
case of living donation. Some jurisdictions have recognised the unique position of 
the donor by explicitly requiring a range of factors to be disclosed; such as physical, 
psychological, mental, family, medical and social consequences. The Third 
Conference of European Health Ministers in Paris (16-17 November 1987) speaks of 
the donor being given "appropriate information before the removal about ifs possible 
consequences, in particular the medical, social and psychological effects, as well as 
about the implications of the donation for the recipient. , 134 Spanish law states that 
the living donor must have been informed about the foreseeable physical, mental and 
psychological consequences of donation and the possible effects of the donation on 
the donor's personal, family and professional life as well as the benefits which it is 
hoped the recipient will derive from the transplant. 135 Romania, 136 Belgium, 
137 
Turkey, 138 Tunisia 139 and Colombia 140 have similar provisions. Turkgy has a unique 
addition in also requiring the donor's spouse to also be informed. 141 The recent 
Netherlands law states that disclosure must include information on, "the nature and 
134 Adopted as para 11. of The Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (79) of The Committee of 
Ministers to the Member States. Reprinted in the World Health Organization! s Book, 'Legislative 
Responses To Organ Transplantation, ' Martinus Nyhoff, 1994, Appendix 1. 
135This information should be provided by the physician who is to carry out the removal procedure 
according to 1979 law (No. 30 of 1979 at section 4) but the 1980 Crown Decree (No. 426 of 22 
February 1980 at section 3) supersedes and apparently overrules this in stating that a physician other 
than the one responsible for the removal shall provide this information and check the donors 
competence. 
136 This law states that the donor can only give consent after being "fully informed by the doctors about 
the possible physical, psychical, family and professional risks and consequences following the act of 
harvesting" (Law of 1996 at Article 4(2)). 
137 The physician who is to carry out the removal must provide clear and complete information to the 
donor and any person whose consent is required on the physical, mental, family, and social effects of 
the removal procedure (Law No. 32 of 1986 at section 9). 
138Turkish law requires physicians to, "inform the donor of the possible risks entailed by the removal 
procedure and its medical, psychological, family and social consequences. " The donor must be 
informed of the benefits to the recipient (Law No. 2238 of 29 May 1979 at section 7(a)). 
139The law requires the donor to be informed of the possible consequences of his decision by the chief 
physician of the hospital department in which the organ is to be removed. The information is to 
include all the foreseeable physical and mental consequences of organ removal, and the possible 
repercussions of removal on the donor's personal family and professional life and all the results that the 
recipient can anticipate as a result of the transplantation (Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 at section 
7). 
'This law requires that the donor be given, "prior information on the consequences of his decision to 
the extent they are foreseeable from the somatic, mental and psychological standpoint, and on the 
possible repercussions that the donation may have for his personal, family and professional life, as 
well as on the anticipated benefits of the transplantation for the recipient" (Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 
1989 at section 35). 
14'Law No. 2238 of 29 May 1979 at section 7. 
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object of the removal, and also the foreseeable risks for his health and the conditions 
affecting his life. "142 The Netherlands transplant law is unique in expressly stating 
that the donor must be given information on the provisions of the law itself 
concerning the reimbursement of expenses. 143 It also has a very modem and 
thoughtful feature of requiring different formats for the presentation of information; 
information must be presented "orally and in writing and, where appropriate, with 
the aid of audivisual means. " This approach will particularly aid persons with 
certain types of disability (e. g. reading, hearing difficulties). 
Several jurisdictions do not set out a list of consequences and possible effects the 
donor must be informed of, but are nethertheless broadly framed. For instance, in 
Finland, a physician, not being the physician who is caring for the recipient, shall 
explain to the donor what is entailed by the procedure and its effects for the donor 
himself and for the recipient. 144 
5.3.3. The Requirement for Donor and Recipient Informed Understandina 
of Disclosure. 
Competent donors and recipients would be able to bring an action using the tort of 
battery on grounds that the consent was unreal if it were given without understanding 
of the basic nature of the procedure and it's purpose. However, in terms of 
independent autonomous decision making understanding of all the significant aspects 
of LDT is important. A reasonable donor or recipient might expect a practitioner to 
make reasonable attempts (e. g. through informal interviewing) to ensure that (s)he 
understands the central risks, benefits and other significant aspects of the procedure. 
A reasonable attempt would include making reasonable efforts to ensure the approach 
to communicating the significant aspects is one which is acceptable for the particular 
donor and recipient (e. g. taking into account general intellectual capabilities, 
language, disabilities and special learning needs). Under a professional standard a 
142 Ibid. 
143 Law of 1996, section 3(2). 
144A statement must be included in the application to the National Board of Health that this information 
has been given to the donor (Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 at section 2- see also Ordinance No. 724 of 
23 August 1985 On the Removal of Human Organs and Tissues for Medical Purposes). Under GDR 
law the donor must, prior to giving consent to the removal, have been informed of the possible 
consequences of and risks associated with the removal and of all available aftcr-care facilities. Under 
Greek I the physicians responsible for any removal or transplantation procedure have a duty to 
provide the potential donor with information relating to the possible consequences of the removal and 
transplant, and the responsible physicians at the transplantation unit must verify that these conditions 
have been met as regards the giving of voluntary consent, correct form etc. (section 5-6 of Law 
No. 1383 of 2 August 1983). 
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competent body of medical opinion could be brought forward that would only make 
minimal attempts to ensure the above standards of communication. The amplified 
need for understanding in LDT might mean that a court would reject such a competent 
body of medical opinion in favour of an approach ensuring more substantial quality in 
communication. The way around the uncertainty of how general principles would be 
applied in this area is, of course, for legislation or regulations to specify exactly what 
factors must be disclosed to the donor and recipient and how far the practitioner must 
go in ensuring such information is understood. Legislation could also address the 
problem that donors and recipients might not understand all the relevant factors, 
despite the practitioners best attempts, by requiring psychological evaluation of 
donors and recipients. Donors and recipients could be required to write (or 
otherwise evidence) a short statement on the reasons why they want to go ahead with 
an LDT. From this statement a more objective judgment could be formed about the 
appropriate way forward; from rejecting the transplantation, to offering further 
clarification/information or making further checks to going ahead as is. 
5.3.3.1. The Recipient. 
Portugal 145 and Hong Kong (for donations which are not between genetic relatives or 
spouses of 3 or more years standing 146 ) are the only provisions which require actual 
understanding by the recipient of information communicated. 
5.3.3.2. The Donor. 
Interestingly The Council of Europe in it's recent Draft Protocol on OrRan 
Transplantation states that LDT may only be conducted where donor consent is 
informed. "' Although it does not define what informed means, such a requirement 
would probably generate a duty on the practitioner to ensure the donor understands the 
significant aspects of the process of LDT. 
8 European laws (Denmark, 148 Sweden, 149 Norw 150 Portugal '151 The Netherlands 
law, 152 Russian Federation, ' 53 Slovenia 154 and the UK under the Human Organ 
145Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at sections 7 and 8(l). 
146 Section 5(4)c of Ordinance No. 16 of 1995. 
147 Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI) (97)5, Article 7. 
14'Section 13(3) of Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 On the Examination of Cadavers, Autopsies and Transplantation. 
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Transplants Act 1989 for transplants defined under the Act as between person who are 
155 156 157 
not genetically related ) and 3 non-European laws (Hong Kong" Lebanon, and 
South Australia' 58) impose some requirement on the practitioner to ensure donor 
understanding. Exactly what must be disclosed and what must be understood varies. 
Most jurisdictions appear to limit practitioner to ensuring donor understanding of 
clinical, perhaps including psychological, aspects of donation. For instance, 
Australian law merely requires the practitioner to ensure the donor has understood, in 
the light of medical evidence furnished him, "the nature and effect of the removal and 
the nature of the transplantation" 159 and Danish law, merely requires the physician to 
ensure donor understanding of disclosure of the nature of the procedure, its 
consequences, and the risks. 160 It is of course possible, but by no means certain, 
that non-clinical (e. g. social, economic) as well as clinical consequences would need 
disclosure. Portugal's law is very specific and potentially quite protective of the 
donor in requiring donor consent to be informed, 161 with the physician having to 
infonn the donor, 
149This law declares that the decision whether the removal shall take place shall be made by the chief 
physician or the assistant chief physician at the hospital (not being the physician in charge of the care of 
the recipient patient) who must also inform the donor of the nature of the operation and the risks 
inherent in it. The physician to whom the consent is given must satisfy himself that the donor has 
understood the significance of the information given (section 3 and 5 of The Transplantation Law (No. 
190) of 15 May 1975). 
"OThis law requires that before giving his consent the donor must have been provided by a physician 
with information on the nature of the operation and its possible consequences. This physician has an 
obligation to ensure that the donor has understood the information provided to him and its significance 
(section I of Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973). 
15 'Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 7 and section 8(l). 
152 Law of 24 May 1996 (see IDHL, 1996,47(4), 469-475) coming into force in January or February 
1998 requires the person removing the organ shall ensure that the donor has given consent with full 
knowledge of the consequences (section 3(2)). 
153 The donor must have been warned of any complications that could affect his health and must have 
given informed consent. 
154 Requires that the donation be an expression of the donoes free will a- Article 10 of 1996 Law. 155 These must be authorised by ULTRA who must be satisfied amongst other thing that the donor was 
given an explanation by a registered medical practitioner of the nature of the medical procedure for, 
and the risk involved in, the removal of the organ in question and understands the nature of the medical 
procedure and it's risks, as explained by the practitioner, and consents to the removal in question. 
UK and Hong Kon law are similar in respect of their limited field of application (i. e. do not apply to 
genetically related donors which are the most common by far). 
156 The committee authorising donations which are not between genetic relatives or spouses of 3 or more 
years standing must be satisfied that that the donor understands the nature and consequences of the 
removal (section 5(4)c of Ordinance No. 16 of 1995). 
157 The physician must inform the donor of the consequences and risks of the intervention and satisfy 
himself that the donor has properly understood (Decree No. 109 of 16 September 1983 On the Removal 
of Human Tissues and Organs for Therapeutic and Scientific Purposes at section 1(2)). 158Section 9(2) of the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983). 
159Section 9(2) of the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983). 
160 Section 13(3) of Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 On the Examination of Cadavers, Autopsies and 
Transplantation. 
16'Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 8(l). 
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"in an honest, appropriate, and comprehensible manner of the possible risks, the 
consequences of donation and treatment, and any untoward effects, as well as the 
precautions to be observed subsequently. ""' 
Slovenian law simply requires that the donation be based on the appropriate 
information -a provision that would probably mean that the practitioners, 
before 
going ahead with removal, would have to ensure that the decision itself is based on 
understanding of the significant factors. 
With respect to disclosure pre-requisites, UK transplant legislation only regulates the 
position of donors that are defined as non-genetically related to the recipient under the 
HOTA. 163 This regulation occurs in the The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelate 
Persons) Regulations. 164 Regulation 3(2)b requires that the donor consents, 
Regulation 3(2)e adding that the donor and recipient must both have been interviewed 
by a person who appears to the ULTRA to have been suitably qualified to conduct 
such interviews. This person then reports to the Authority that certain conditions are 
satisfied and refers to any difficulties of communication experienced and how these 
difficulties were overcome. 
165 One of factors ULTRA must be satisfied OfI66 is that 
a registered medical practitioner has given the donor an explanation of the nature of 
the medical procedure for, and the risk involved in, the removal of the organ in 
question. 167 Additionally the authority must be satisfied that the donor understands 
the nature of the medical procedure and the risks as explained by the registered 
medical practitioner, and consents to the removal of the organ in question. 
168 
Presumably if ULTRA allowed or disallowed a donation its decision could be subject 
to an action for judicial review for incorrect application of the regulations. However, 
section 2(3) of HOTA only requires that the Authority is subjectively satisfied that the 
requirements under the regulations have been met. Proving that the Authority was 
not satisfied would require very strong objective evidence that the Authority couldn't 
162 Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 7. 
163 Including distant relatives, spouses and persons who are only related emotionally (section 2 of 
HOTA - discussed further in chapter 6C(i)b). 1641989 (SI No. 2480 passed by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 2(3) of HOTA. 
165The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI No. 2480). Regulation 
3(2)e. 
'"Regulation 3(1)c ibid. An exception is donations that are subsidiary to medical treatment (e. g. 
therapeutically necessary heart or cornea removal). 
167 Regulation 3(2)a ibid. 
168 Regulation 3(2)b ibid. 
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have been satisfied. Interestingly Italian law mitigates against the requirement for 
informed understanding, and perhaps reflects different cultural priorities, in requiring 
donation to occur spontaneously!! "' 
5.4. Conclusions. 
Tom Beauchamp has surnmarised the problems with professional based disclosure 
standards in the context of the US, 
"We have a strong tendency in the United States to look to legal and regulatory 
approaches to informed consent for the relevant standards, but it has become 
progressively clear that the focus of statutory law, case law and regulatory guideline 
has been on disclosure and that this focus is misguided. Problems about the quality 
and adequacy of consent probably cannot be resolved unless conventional disclosure 
requirements are abandoned and a shift occurs toward quality of understanding in the 
subject, patient and representative. From this perspective, the central problems 
about informed consent are issues of communication rather than the abstract and 
disembodied issues about proper legal standards of disclosure that have so long 
070 dominated the subject literature. 
The central philosophy behind this limited approach to disclosure is the notion that 
medicine is generally beneficent and practitioners require protection from a floodgate 
of litigation. The problem with this reasoning is that even if it were accepted that 
allopathic medicine is generally beneficentl7l iability for insufficent disclosure and 
communication can clearly benefit medicine by providing an impetus for practitioners 
to fully respect and support patients to make informed, autonomous decisions. The 
need for prospective organ donors and recipients to make such decisions is 
particularly high and demands special attention. Extensive liability is only likely to 
generate defensive medicine in cases of technical competence. 
Currently their are variant legal standards of disclosure both within and between 
general principles of law and transplant legislation. Approaches range from those 
emphasising the professional based test or disclosure limited to medical aspects of the 
procedure to those emphasising the actual needs of the reasonable patient, extensive 
169Law No. 458 of 26 June 1967 applying only to kidney donation. 
170A Patients Right to Know, at chapter 7. 
17 'A contrasting view is that conventional medicine generally is inadequate and a holistic approach 
more appropriate for human growth -a point briefly raised at the end of the PhD introduction. 
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disclosure and understanding of what is disclosed. 
There is no rational basis for maintaining differences in disclosure and 
communication requirements between jurisdictions; the need for donor and recipient 
to receive a high level of disclosure and understand the significance of information 
disclosed is a matter of universal principle not cultural relativity. In the case of 
organ LDT the way forward is clear; international co-operation to achieve 
comprehensive harmonised standards et out under transplant legislation. Whilst it 
may not be possible for transplant legislation to lay out each thing that must be 
disclosed within each form of organ donation, it could clearly state the general 
principles and allow for statutory guidance to practitioners to lay out specific 
disclosures that would need to occur to meet the required standards. 
In terms of it's general approach, transplant legislation should emphasise the need for 
practitioner to make reasonable attempts to ensure donor and recipient understanding 
of a wide breadth and depth of information and make this information available in a 
variety of formats. In terms of breadth there must be an emphasis on reasonable 
disclosure of relevant non-clinical factors including disclosure of the fact that 
economic factors (like potential loss of earnings and expenses related to taking time 
off work to donate) can be of serious material bearing to decision-making for the 
donor and potentially the recipient. Economic factors 172 could come within 
disclosure of social consequences and/or 'consequences for family / professional life' 
but given that this is not certain they warrant inclusion as a separate category of 
information that should be disclosed. 
172 See chapter 8 for ftirther detail. 
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Chapter 6 Voluntariness in LDT. 
6.1. Introduction 
Whilst law has traditionally not inquired as to the motivation or rationality of decisions 
made by competent persons it has been prepared to intervene in some cases where a 
decision is not made in accordance with it's makers true will through external influences. 
This question of voluntariness is particularly critical in LDT; the whole purpose of which 
is compromised by 'false' decision-making by the prospective donor or recipient. At the 
same time it is possible to hypothesise that the prospective donor, as a potential 
4saviour, ' is particularly vulnerable to external pressures and influences ranging from the 
gentle to the outright coercive. Consequently, it is not surprising that transplant 
legislation usually gives special attention to the direct question of voluntariness in living 
donation. Additionally voluntariness is covered indirectly where permissible forms of 
donation in terms of donor-recipient relationship and limitations, related to institutional 
or other status, on who can be a donor or on what basis are specified. General 
principles of law relating to voluntariness retain an important role, not just for the 
recipient but for 'fleshing out' the meaning of voluntariness. 
6.2. Voluntariness and LDT in Practice 
While little data exists on recipient motivations for accepting LDT, a considerable 
amount examines donor motivation in gifting. A minority of people who having 
decided to donate have ambivalent motivation. In one study Simmons et al., found that 
12% of donors would be relieved if they were not able to donate and a further 1% would 
be very relieved-' This 13% of donors aware that they were acting out the desire to 
donate may be the 'tip of an iceberg' of donors who consciously or unconsciously do not 
want to donate or have denied or rationalised away ambivalence. 2 Fellner and Marshall 
I Gift of Life ibid at 149-197 particularly 154-155. 
221% of donors who, pre-transplant, agreed a little with the statement "I sometimes feel unsure about 
donating. " A further 5% agreed with this statement a lot (ibid 149-197 particularly 154-155). A larger 
percentage of donors in this study did admit to fears surrounding donation. 20% of donors agreed a lot 
that surgery frightens them and a further 31% agreed a little. One third of donors were concerned about 
157 
have pointed to some cases where immediate decision-making was the unconscious 
product of donors wanting to avoid inner conflict in making the decision' and cases 
where prospective donors passively let the selection process decide for them4 - this 
being 
reflected in one study by 5% of donors never making a conscious choice about whether to 
donate or not but simply taking a succession of steps locking them into the process of 
donation. 5 We have also seen in chapter 3.4.2.4. that a minority of between 3-8% of 
donors regret their decision post donation. Where a 'false' decision is made, as is no 
doubt the case in some of the above instances, it could be due to unconscious issues 
within the donor. These could include the compulsive need to donate to avoid intense 
guilt or self-criticism (which 46% of the public anticipated that they would feel if they 
were asked to donate but refused6) or gain absolution (one study found that a quarter of 
donors agreed with the statement that donation was one way to 'make up for the wrongs 
we may have done to others in our liveS17). Some people, having decided whether or 
not to donate, use unconscious mechanisms to reify their decision and insulate 
themselves from information that might challenge it. 8 Unresolved unconscious issues 
can lead to 'false' decisions both on their own and by the addition of external pressure to 
decide one way or another. The difficulty come in deciding when the law should step in 
to 'protect' prospective donors and what mechanisms, if any, can reliably be used to 
scrutinise and determine motivations before donation takes place 
their future with only one kidney and between 10 and 20% of donors were concerned about the length of 
their recovery period, the timing of the operation, the financial sacrifice involved and conflicts between 
their obligation to their immediate family and to the recipient. The level of stress in ambivalent donors 
was "extreme" according to the authors. 
3Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm MedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 at 2706. 
4Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm MedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 at 2706. 
5R. G. Simmons et al., (Minnesota study) Gift of Life, Transaction Books, 1987 at 245. 
6Written questionnaire completed by 116 adults in a Midwestern US City concerning attitudes to donation - 
findings presented in C. H. Fellner and S. H. Schwartz, Altruism in Disrepute: Medical Versus Public 
Attitudes Toward The Living Organ Donor, The New Eng J Med, 1971 (March 18), 5 82-5 85 at 5 84. 
729% of donors in the Minnesota study of 114 donors agreed that they'had done something major in their 
life that their fwnily did not approve of. ' 20% reported that there was a period in their life when they and 
the recipient did not get along well. lbid at p 162. 
8Kidney Donors, in J. Macauley and L. Berkowitz (eds. ), Altruism and Helping Behaviour, Academic 
press, 1970,279. 
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The situational context within which donation takes place cna of itself generate pressure. 
Firstly, the very fact of the prospective donor being asked to donate, or informed of the 
possibility, is bome out of a hope that this person will want to donate and this invites the 
prospective donor to at least consider the matter seriously when in some cases (s)he may 
have felt more comfortable avoiding it. Some prospective donors feel that the situation 
in itself leaves them with no choice but to offer. it could be suggested that 
philosophically a decision is involuntary where the prospective donor has been asked to 
donate - for example, the donor in interview 13 of the Norwegian interviews9 basically 
explained that he had to donate because it was his duty. However, this extreme position 
would rightly not be adopted in law. Ethically a proactive as well as a reactive approach 
to prospective donors seems acceptablelO provided there is an overarching context of an 
attempt to facilitate true will donor (and indeed recipient) decision-making and ensure 
motivation is acceptable. 
Reducing, balancing or removing structural and attitudinal biases in favour of 
transplantation during the process is by no means easy. It has been pointed out that the 
very manner, "in which the donor is informed of the need for a related donor may make it 
difficult for him to resist volunteering. "' I There are also many aspects of the LDT 
situation that lend themselves to pressures being placed on people to donate. 12 General 
psychological literature suggests that the induced action-taking normally involved in 
being tested as a potential donor may produce compliance. 13 The more preliminary 
9See chapter 9.3.3. 
1OWestlie et al. 's study found 43.9% of donors had been asked by the family physician to donate and 40.6% 
had donated without being asked, while 10.3% had been asked by the family physician and 3.8% by a 
family member (L. Westlie, P. Fauchald et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial 
Transplant, 1993,8,1146-1150 and conversation with the main author of this study, Dr Lars Westlie, in 
Fredrikstad, Norway). The BTS 1995 Working Party Report found roughly equal use of a proactive and 
reactive approach to prospective living donors by transplant centres in the UK - see chapter 9.3. for further 
discussion. 
IlSimmonsetal., GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977,159. 
12Saks, Social Psychological Contributions to a Legislative Sub Committee on organ and Tissue 
Transplants, American Psychologist, 1978 (July), 680-690. 
13E. g. the induced actions of going for a blood test, checking for compatibility etc. sets the potential donor 
on a path from which it is a short step to compliance with eventual donation (see J. L. Freedman and 
S. C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot in The Door Technique, i ofPersonality and Soc 
Psych, 1966,4,195-202. 
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behaviours induced (e. g. blood sample, tissue sample etc. ) the greater the probability that 
the person will perform the target behaviour. 14 Schwartz's study of potential bone 
marrow donors found evidence that action taking was induced. 15 He noted how the 
'Foot in the Door' technique could be successfully used in gaining the consent of donors; 
commitment (and difficulty of withdrawal) being increased through a series of small acts 
of compliance, such as taking blood tests etc. 16 Another psychological feature relevant 
to the LDT situation is that unanimity of viewpoint creates pressure to conform. In LDT 
hospital contact and information giving to the donor typically involves experts all 
essentially advocating transplantation17 and the family will probably also be in favour of 
transplantation. Modelling18 and social comparison19 act as reinforcements when 
prospective donors and their families are invited to speak with past donors and their 
families. The prospective donor is being asked to make a big sacrifice but the need to 
pass tests helps to redefine the situation as one where the donor is lucky to have the 
opportunity to donate. Tests add credibility to the views of the physicians, helping to 
obfuscate any ambivalence the potential donor is experiencing. 20 As we have see in the 
last chapter, prospective donors tend to rely heavily on medical professionals for 
infonnation and advice sources in general. This reliance can be increased after the 
initial steps as noted in the Minnesota study of Simmons et al., which found that, 
"after the blood test most donors directed their information seeking toward the transplant 
physicians rather than towards an outside source. 1121 
14A. Bandura, Principles of Behaviour Modification, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1969. 
15S. H. Schwartz, Elicitation of Moral obligation and Self sacrificing Behaviour: An Experimental Study of 
Volunteering to Bea Bone Marrow Donor. J ofPersonality and Soc Psych, 1970,15,283-293. 
160icitation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behaviour: An Experimental Study of Volunteering 
to Be a Bone Marrow Donor, JPers & Soc Psych, 1970,15(4), 283-293. The foot in the door 
technique is a traditional sales technique. 
1717or this effect of expert power generally see J. R. P. French and B. Raven, The Bases of Social power (In 
D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds. ), Group Dynamics, Harper and Row, 1968). For this impact of 
unanimity on decision making in general see S. E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon The Modification 
and Distortion of Judgements (In H. Guetzkow (Ed) Groups, Leadership and Men, Carnegie Press, 195 1). 
18Bandura, Principles of Behaviour Modification ibid. 
19L. Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Progress, Human Relations, 1954,2,117-140. 
20D. J. Bem, Self Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, 
Psychological Review, 1974,81,506-520. 
21GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977at257. 
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The significance of this is that it can influence the prospective donor towards whatever 
outcome practitioners desire; as one donor commented the further he went into the 
process the more difficult it became to withdraw because of the building expectations of 
others around hiM. 22 
Recipients can also be influenced by many of the above factors - for instance the 'Foot in 
the Door Technique' would be relevant to prospective recipients where they have not 
already made up there mind whether or not to accept LDT as would modelling23 and 
social compariSon24 where undecided prospective recipients are invited to speak with past 
recipients to encourage reception. Of course modelling and social comparison could 
work in the reverse direction were the prospective recipient within the context of a 
dialysis unit where dialysis was viewed as a preferred approach - e. g. because of an 
economic disincentive of the dialysis centre to refer patients for transplantation. The 
process of information giving will also exert an influence on whether the prospective 
recipient chooses LDT or not - for instance the way risks are evaluated and expressed by 
medical practitioners. 
Beyond situational pressures there can be more unconscious or deliberate manipulation of 
the donor. In the context of US practice Saks has worryingly suggested that, 
"some features of the process used by physicians to obtain informed consent from patients 
bear a troubling resemblance to the procedures used by police to obtain confessions from 
suspects: demand characteristics of the situation, perceptual and judgmental distortions, 
social relations distortions, and semantic and verbal distortions. 1125 
22Gift of Life at p260. 
23Bandura, Principles of Behaviour Modification ibid. 
24L. Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Progress, Human Relations, 1954,2,117-140. 
25Social Psychological Contributions to a Legislative Subcommittee on Organ and Tissue Transplants ibid 
at 685. 
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A significant minority of donations involve direct pressure being applied on the donor 
according to studies so far. Simmons et aL noted overt pressure in 11% of caseS26 while 
Westlie et aL's study of Quality of Life in Norwegian donorS27 indicates that 15.7% of 
donors experienced pressure in the process, 9.3% of this being to donate and 6.4% not to 
donate. The sources of this pressure were friends, family and medical personnel. As 
only 4.9% of donors experienced family conflict over the donation it may be that pressure 
was exerted as much, or more so, by friends and medical personnel as the family itself. 
Direct pressure in it's mildest form would be 'persuasion`28 other forms include subtle29 
and overt manipulation, coercion and the use or threat of results adverse to the decision- 
maker. Levels of pressures are difficult to quantify because of their very nature as 
somewhat hidden. This hiddenness inevitably also makes them difficult to remove; 
Simmons et al. have suggested that more subtle pressures appear inevitable. 30 Levels of 
pressure identified within the donor and recipient questionnaires conducted for this Phd, 
were extremely low (see 9.3.3.5 - page 296) and more commonly not to donate than 
donate. However, this study did not use any sophisticated methods to evalaute the true 
extent of pressure. There is a need in future European studies for a family systems 
based analysis of pressure in relation to donation with the tracking and uncovering of 
medical and family actions and motivations before, during and after the act of donation. 
One unique aspect of the EUROTOLD donor-recipient questionnaires was the 
presentation of data relating to pressure on recipients. A small number of recipients in 
the study stated that they experienced pressure this typically being to not receive. In 
26GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977,158. Most of the donors who were openly pressured were 
ambivalent about donation-see next section. 
27Nephrol Dial Trans, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
28See Re T. 
29For ftuther discussion of this area see also W. Gaylin, On the Borders of Persuasion: A Psychoanalytic 
Look at Coercion, Psychiatry, 1974,37(Feb), 1-9; T. Talseth et. al., Long-Term Blood Pressure and 
Renal Function in Kidney Donors, Kidney International, 1986,29,1072-1076; R. Cialdini et. al., Low 
Ball Procedure For Producing Compliance: Commitment then Cost, Journal ofPersonality and Social 
Psychology, 1978,36(5), 463-476; R. D. Foss, Blood Donation and the Foot-In-The-Door Technique: A 
LimitingCase, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1979,37(4), 580-590; S. Schwartz, 
Elicitation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behaviour, Journal ofPersonality and Social 
Psychology, 1970,15(4), 283-293; J. Freedmanet. al., Compliance Without Pressure, Journalof 
Personality and Social Psychology, 7(2), 117-124. 
30GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977,431-3. 
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addition the study illustrates a number of ways that external influences can bear down on 
a recipient's decision - including the fact of who does and does not come forward as a 
potential donor, the basis for which is not always transparent. 31 As part of a family 
systems approach recipient motivation is worthy of further examination - the importance 
of the recipient making a choice that truly reflects his or her will should not be 
underestimated. One feature that may be frequently occurring is an assumption of the 
part of practitioners that dialysis and transplantation are the only viable options in the 
case of serious organ disease. This might result in pressure on patients to choose to 
merely await a transplantation (including perhaps a living donation) when they would 
prefer to explore naturopathic options for treatment. 
Besides outright evidence that it exists an attempt to guage the frequency and degree of 
pressure must also look at associated factors such as family conflict. Westlie et al's. 
study indicated that 95.1% of donors said the donation had not led to any conflicts in 
relation to their family - the remainder saying it had led to 'some' conflict (3.7%) or 
'severe' conflict (1.2%), this mainly being with a spouse. R. G. Simmons et aL, pointed 
to increased family cohesiveness consequent upon donation, although there was family 
conflict in 25% of cases as a consequence of the donor search. The authors suggest that 
these were families who were more likely to have had a history of significant family 
confliCt. 32 
Another factor that could lend itself to pressure is donor-recipient dependency, but this 
has rarely been examined. Westlie et aL's study found 68.3% of donors wer e able to 
categorically state there was no dependency between them and the donor. 33 Some of the 
remaining cases may have involved some dependency, which may have resulted in some 
decisions being partly based on donors feeling pressure inside of themselves to donate or 
from the recipient. However, dependency could have started post-donation in some 
instances. 
31 See chapter 9.3.3. 
321bid at 435. 
33Nephrol Dial Trans, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
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6.3. Law and Voluntariness in LDT. 
6.3.1. General Issues. 
The main role of law of voluntariness in medical practice is to prevent medical treatment 
on a competent person that is not being voluntarily undertaken. This approach applies in 
all but the most exceptional situations. 34 In McFall v Shimp [ 1978] 10 Pa D&C (3 d) 90 
(Ct Comm PI, Pa) the plaintiff, who had a rare bone marrow disease, brought an action 
seeking a direction that his adult cousin, the only suitable donor of bone marrow in the 
family, be required to submit to procedures for the extraction of bone marrow for 
transplantation i to the plaintiff despite his unwillingness to do so. Justice Flaherty, in 
denying the plaintiffs claim, stated that, 
"(Oor our law to compel the defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change 
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat 
the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limits, and 
one could not imagine where the line would be drawn. " 
Medical professionals also have duties under general principles off law to ensure 
voluntariness. The knowingness of involuntariness would leave a practitioner open to 
being sued and/or criminally sanctioned for battery; and carelessness as to voluntariness 
resulting in damage would leave the practitioner open to being sued under the head of 
negligence - the minimum standards depending on the jurisdiction and the individual 
circumstances of the case. 35 Best practice with respect to donors would include 
proactive efforts by practitioners to ensure that: Giving is voluntary; the 'climate' for 
decision-making is as neutral as reasonably possible; and a process/system of moving 
toward decision making which affords the prospective donor good opportunities to 
34See e. g. Re S [1992] 4 All ER 671 where the High Court decided a woman should undergo acaesarian 
section despite her objection, to prevent the death of her unborn child. 
35Standards which are discussed inchapter 5. 
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choose not to donate (e. g. by providing the donor with a way out without'losing face'36) is 
devised. Practitioners would probably owe donor's a higher legal standard of care than 
the average recipient because the donor is more vulnerable to exploitation and is not 
undergoing the procedure for therapeutic benefit. 
More contentious issues are raised by the setting aside of decisions held, in the presence 
of external pressure, to be against he true will of the decision-maker. Such a setting- 
aside occurred in the landmark English law case of Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
treatmenijt[1992] 4 All ER 649. Re T was a case where a mother who was a JehovaWs 
witness had, according to trial judge, influencing her daughter, who was not a Jehovah's 
Witness, to refuse a blood transfusion. The daughter was a patient who was admitted to 
hospital 34 weeks pregnant. Her condition worsened such that she was taken into 
intensive care. The Court of Appeal granted a declaration stating that in the 
circumstances it would not be unlawful for the hospital to administer a blood transfusion 
on the basis that the patient did not make a valid refusal to consent to this. Lord 
Donaldson MR stated that, 
"it is wholly acceptable that the patient should have been persuaded by others of the 
merits of such a decision and have decided accordingly. It matters not how strong the 
persuasion was so long as it did not overbear the independence of the patienfs decision. 
The real question in each such case is 'Does the patient really mean what he says or is he 
merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and 
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide 
for himselff In other words 'Is it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality? "137 
Lord Donaldson MR went on to say that two aspects can be of crucial importance in 
considering the effect of outside influences: Firstly the strength of will of the patient and 
361n Norway the Oslo centre avoids the donors losing face by simply telling the relatives that the medical 
conditions are not met. 
37[1992] 4 All ER 649. 
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secondly the relationship of the 'persuader' to the patient. Butler Sloss LJ, concurring 
that undue influence had been brought to bear, suggested that, 
"the degree of pressure to turn persuasion or appeals to affection into undue influence 
may... be very little. 1138 
Stoughton LJ also concurred, although he made it very clear that in his view the decision 
was still voluntary, in the sense that it wasift brought about by compulsion; however, it 
was invalid by reason of undue influence. 39 
Whilst one may debate the justifications of using voluntariness instead of undue 
influence, or vice versa: 40 the key point of logic is expressed in Lord Donaldson's view 
that what matters is not how strong any persuasion is but whether that persuasion acted in 
such a way as to overbear the independence of the decision. What is controversial is 
that the decision was based on circumstantial evidence that the patient's true will was 
overborne by her mother; with no certainty that without the alleged external influence of 
her mother the patient would have decided against a blood transfusion (through internal 
confusion or genuine values). One might conclude that on the balance of probabilities 
there was pressure and she would have decided differently but should balance of 
probabilities be sufficient in such cases? Is there not a clear danger that judges will be 
more inclined to overturn those decisions by competent persons that fall outside their 
conception of what is rational with the attendant danger of infringement of the autonomy 
to think differently and, in the opposite direction, that decisions that fit the judicial 
conception of what is rationale will be inadequately scrutinised. This is almost the 
intrinsic and unavoidable problem of the area of undue influence as a whole. Expectedly, 
Re T has not escaped the accusation that it is based on paternalistic considerations rather 
than protection of autonomy. As Kennedy and Grubb bluntly put it, 
381bid. 
391bid. 
40Traditionally undue influence is a doctrine used within a contractual context with voluntariness being 
more pertinent in the context of tort. 
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"perhaps the court adopted the undue influence approach out of it's desire that the patient 
should not die. "41 
Another possible example of notions of rationality, rather than simply questions of 
autonomy, being a factor in determining whether or not undue influence has occurred is 
the case of PoMter v Hillingdon Health Authorily (23 April 1997 Unreported). In this 
case, the parents of a potential recipient of a cadaveric organ were clearly rejecting the 
allopathic model of treatment of organ disease. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
acceptance of the transplantation was the result of pressure, which one can imagine could 
take place in such a situation. The judge rejected the possibility of this without ever 
really examining it in detail possibly precisely because of a reluctance to pay proper 
attention to the significance of different concepts of best interests that are in opposition to 
medical model concepts of rationality. This type of situation could repeat itself in living 
organ donation - there might be a tendency amongst practitioners and even judges to 
overlook pressure on the donor and/or the recipient to go ahead with LDT. A 
consequence of Re T might be that a prospective recipients decision not to receive is 
overturned due to the determination that the decision has been reached because of 
external pressure. What would be almost inconceivable, however, is a prospective 
donor's decision not to donate being overturned because it was based on undue influence. 
This would set to dangerous a precedent, would damage the reputation of transplantation, 
would subject a person to a physically non-therapeutic procedure against their expressed 
will and would also be excluded under most jurisdictions simply because most transplant 
legislation requires express donor consent (e. g. Bolivi 42 Peru43 and Cuba44) or at least 
written consent. 45 
41Medical Law: Text with Materials, Butterworths, 1994 at 238. 
42Requires that the donor express consent without any reservations. Regulations On the Use of Organs 
and Tissues March 1982 at section 3(a). 
43 States that the donor's consent and the recipients acceptance must be free, conscious and express. 
Supreme Decree No. 0 14-8 8-SA of 19 May 19 88 at section 15. 
44Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 at section 80. 
45Nearly all laws do - see chapter 4.5. 
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The evidence in these cases clearly needs careful examination and weighing by 
practitioners and, where cases come to court, judges. The dangers of utility and 
paternalism overriding autonomy should result in a strong reluctance to overturn the 
decision of a competent, most particularly so where evidence is circumstantial. People 
do have a general right to make decisions that are widely considered stupid or irrational 
and a high burden of proof that external pressure resulted in them making a decision they 
would not have otherwise made should be satisfied before their decision is overturned.. 
6.3.2. General Provisions Relating to Voluntariness in Transplant 
Legislation. 
Transplant laws typically have voluntariness requirements integral to the process of 
giving consent i. e. failure to meet them results in the consent being invalid, occasionally 
failure to meet requirements is a criminal offence. 46 Sometimes provisions merely 
reiterate what would be required under general principles of law (e. g. Algeria, 47 
Bulgaria, 48 CypruS, 49 Denmark, 50 Ecuador, 51 Kuwait, 52 Norwgy, 53 Panama, 54 
Slovaki 55 South Africa, 56 South Australia'57 Vietnam'58 Western Australia59 and 
Zimbabwe60 merely emphasise the need for consent within which the need for 
voluntariness is implicit). The laws of Finland6l and Irag62 simply require that consent 
be given on a voluntary basis. 
46Law of 22 December 1993. 
47Law No. 85-05 of 16 February 1985. 
480rdinance No. 15 of 30 April 1976. 
49Law No. 97 of 1987. 
50Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990. 
51 Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming the Health Code. 
52Decree-Law No. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation. 
53Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973. 
54Law No. 10 of II July 19 83. 
55Law of 24 August 1994. 
56Human Tissue Act, No. 65 of 1983. 
57The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 
58Law of 30 June 1989 On the Protection of Public Health at section 30. 
59Act No. 116 of 1982 To Make Provision For and in Relation to the Removal of Human Tissues for 
Transplantation, For Post-Mortem Examinations etc... 
60Anatomical Donations and Post-Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976. 
61Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 at section 3. 
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In some jurisdictions general principles of law are needed to fill in the gaps left in 
transplant law. For instance, the model law of Canada (for non-regenerative tiSSUe)63 
and the law of Venezuela64 emphasise that consent to donation must be given without 
coercion - leaving the issue of whether donation in the face of coercion to donate or not 
donate would be acceptable if it still accorded with the decision-makers true will. The 
law of Argentin is clearer in simply emphasising that the decision must be of the donor's 
free will while simultaneously prohibiting coercion and inducement. 65 Slovenia66 and 
Sweden 7 similarly stress that the donation must accord with donor's will. A variation of 
this approach is found in the Council of Europe's Resolution 78(29) Article 368 and its 
Draft Protocol on Organ Transplantation69 which simply state that consent must be freely 
Transplant laws of a number of jurisdictions (including those France 70 Greece 71 
Northern TerritoEy of Australia, 72 Poland, 73 Portugal, 74 Paragu 75 Sri Lanka, 76 
Lebanon, 77 Sylian Arab RepubliC. 78 Queensland. 79 The Netherlands 80 Tasmania, 81 and 
62Excepting the instance of persons who are killed by the state whose organs may be used regardless. 
Resolution No. 776 of 9 June 1981 of the Revolutionary Command Council Promulgating Law No. 60 of 
1981 On Kidney Transplant Operations at section I(a) and I(b) respectively. This practice of using the 
organs of executed persons is also adopted in China and is of course more relevant to cadaveric donation. 
63Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 7(6). 
64Law of 19 November 1992 On the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials in Human Beings 
at section 12. 
65Law No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 On Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials. 
66Requires that the donation be an expression of the donor's free will - Article 10 of 1996 Law. 67States that the donation must not occur against the donors will. Law No. 190 of 15 May 1975 at section 
4. This is the old law - translated copy of the new law is not yet available. 
680n Harmonisation of Member States to Removal Grafting and Transplantation of Human Substances 
69Steering Committe on Bioethics (CDBI) (97)5, Article 7. 
70Law No. 76-1181 of 22 December 1976 at section 1. No comment is made on this point in the 1994 
French law. 
71 Requires that the willingness to donate must be a freely declared one. LawNo. 1383 of2 August 1983 
On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Tissues and Organs at section 5. 
72AIlows for certification by a medical practitioner that the consent was freely given which alongside other 
criteria constitute sufficient authority for the removal of the organ or tissue which, presumably in attempt to 
avoid pressure, can not be undertaken by the certifying practitioner. Law No. 121 of 1979 at section 
I 0(iii). 
73Law of 26 October 1995, Article 9(l) at point 7. 
74Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 8(l). 
75Law No. 836180 of 15 December 1980 at section 276. 
76The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at sections 7 and 8. 
77Decree No. 109 of 16 September 1983 at section 1(3). 
78Law No. 31 of 23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human organs From the Body at 
section 2(3). 
79The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 12(b)(iii). 
80Law of 24 May 1996 section 3. 
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TuniSi 82) also state this while in Belgium donation must occur freely and knowingly, 83 
in Romania freely and in a deliberate manner84 and in Colombia freely and voluntarily" 
with the intention of the donor overriding any contrary opinion of his relatives or any 
other person. 86 Cuban law states donation must be, "a free and expressly voluntary act 
of the donor or of his representative, performed for humanitarian reasons. "87 Turkish 
law, like Cuban law, includes a provision by which physicians are required to refuse any 
organ not given out of humane aspirations. Physicians are also required to refuse organs 
from persons unable to take their own decision for mental or psychological reasons; 
interpreted broadly this could include persons coerced or pressurised into donation. " 
Mexican law requires the donor to give his consent freely, without moral coercion, 
unambiguously and voluntarily! 89 The Council of Europe in ifs recent Draft Protocol 
on Organ Transplantation has latched onto this use of a variety of words in its statement 
that LDT may only be conducted where consent if informed, free, express and specific. 90 
It is surprising that the notion of 'true will being overborne' is not directly used within 
transplant legislation, particularly given that undue influence is specifically referred to 
within WHO Guiding Principle 3 (which states consent by the donor "should be free of 
any undue influence and pressure"91). Perhaps true will decision making is implicit in 
the idea of donation being free. The mention of pressure has often been more of a 
hindrance than a help; quite unrealistically (given pressures invariably exist) jurisdictions 
like Spain (the donation must be made freely, consciously and free of external pressure92) 
and Hung (the removal must be consented to freely and in the absence of any 
8 IThe Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 9(c)(iii). 
82Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 at section 2. 
83Law of 13 June 1986 at section 8(l). 
84Law of 1996 at Article 4(l). 
85Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 1989 at section 32(c). 
861, aw No. 73 of 20 December 1988 at section 3. 
87Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 at section 80. 
881, aw No. 223 8 of 29 May 1979 at section 7. 
89Federal Regulations of 16 August 1976 at section 24 and 26. 
90Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI) (97)5, Article 7. 
91 Guiding Principle 3. 
92Law No. 30 of 27 October 1979 at section 4(c). 
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pressure93) have required that agreement to donate is made in the absence of external 
pressure. It would surely be equally efficacious and more realistic just to exclude 
donations which evidence suggests are the product of inducement or coercion. Thelaws 
of the Russian Federation, 94 Belarus(draft), 95 Canada (model) for non-regenerative 
tissue)96 and VenezuelA97 appear to do this but much will depend on interpretation in 
practice as to whether they are really excluding donations where there has been any 
coercion or simply those where evidence suggests the coercion has overborne the 
decision-makers true will. A clear example of the former approach would be Hong 
Kong whilst UK law is an example of the latter. 
Hong Kong's Ordinance states that the Board authorising organ LDT's not legislatively 
defined as between genetic relative or spouses of 3 or more years standing98 must be 
satisfied that donor consent was given without coercion or the offer of inducement99 is 
overly restrictive. English law has similarly addressed coercion with specific types of 
donor - those not between persons defined as genetically related under the Act as part of 
regulation 3 of The Human Organ Transplants (Qnrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 [SI 
No 2480] passed pursuant to HOTA 1989. The conditions include ULTRA being 
satisfied that removal was not obtained by coercion or the offer of an inducement 
(Regulation 3(2)c). 100 Regulation 3(2)e adds the requirement that the donor and 
recipient must have been interviewed by a person who appears to the Authority to have 
been suitably qualified to conduct such interviews and who has reported to the Authority 
on the conditions contained in regulations 3(2)a - 3(2)d and included in his report an 
930rdinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 at section 2(2) see also section 10(4). 
94Law of 22 December 1992 at section 3. 
95Section 8. 
96Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 7(6). 
97Law of 19 November 1992 On the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials in Human Beings 
at section 12. 
980rdinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 5(4)d. 
991bid at section 5(4)e. There must also be no payment or intention of payment that would contravene the 
Ordinance and an interviewing procedure is carried out with the prospective donor and recipient to check 
that these requirements and other ones relating to disclosure, as discussed in chapter 5, have been met 
(section 5(5) and 5(6)). 
IOOULTRA's satisfaction of these, and indeed any other factors, could be subject to judicial review. No 
such case has been brought but clearly proving that ULTRA was not satisfied would be very difficult. 
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account of any difficulties of communication with the donor or recipient and an 
explanation of how those difficulties were overcome. By virtue of regulation 3(1)c the 
requirements in regulation 3(2) do not apply "where the primary purpose of removal of an 
organ from a donor is the medical treatment of that donor. "101 The reference to coercion 
in regulation 3(2)c is mainly directed at preventing manipulation in the context of the 
organ market. However, it would also apply in other situations such as overwhelming 
family pressure to donate. 102 Interestingly regulation 3(2)c refers to consent being 
obtained by coercion (or the offer of an inducement). Hence, coercion / offer of 
inducement only has significance where it is the cause of donation i. e. but for it the 
prospective donor would not, on the balance of probabilities have donated. 103 This 
approach matches common law principles of voluntariness and undue influence104except 
in so far that 'offer of an inducement' is added within the legislative regime. In 
prospective LDT's involving persons who are defined as genetically related, ULTRA 
will not sanction donation caused by an offer of inducement. There is no clear principle 
that an LDT between genetically related persons caused by an offer of inducement 
(financial or otherwise) would necessarily be unlawful, although (given HOTA's main 
purpose is to ensure donation is gift motivated'05) it would most likely be so on public 
policy grounds. This approach would not affect offers of an inducement which did not 
cause donation - for instance offers that were simply turned down. On the other hand, 
under the legislative regime, donation by a person not defined as genetically related to 
the prospective recipient would not be authorised where there had been an offer to pay 
travel expenses and other reasonable costs if this offer caused the donation! This may 
seem a bizarre result but on closer reflection it reflects the intention of the legislative 
regime that any prospective donor should be primarily motivated by non-financial factors. 
It is conceivable that someone might donate primarily out of a desire to travel to a place 
10IThis would mean that donation as part of domino heart transplants, for instance, would not be subject to 
the extra requirements of regulation 3(2), although still subject to the other provisions of the law (as to not 
obtaining removal by coercion etc. ). 
102SeeM. Evans, 'Organ Donation Should Not be Restricted to Relatives, ' JMedEthics, 1989,15,17. 
103No test for causality is given under the HOTA or the pursuant regulations. The 'But For' test, being 
the main test used in negligence cases would normally be relied on. 
104See Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatmenl)[1992] 4 All ER 649 at 6C(ii)b. 
105See e. g. section I(a) which makes it an offence to sell organs. 
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free of charge and have expenses paid for. 106 Whether, a donation in this situation 
would be unlawful in common law (on grounds of public policy) is not entirely certain 
since there is no great 'evil' to be prevented. 
6.3.3. The Withdrawal of Consent to Donation in LDT. 
The ability to withdraw consent at any time is integral to the self-determining rights of 
potential donors and is a general principle of law. Many jurisdictions specifically 
uphold this principle within transplant law including Algeri 107 Bolivia, 108 Canada, 1109 
Columbia, 110 France III Hong KonRI12 Hunizaty. 113 Kuwait, 114 Mexico. 115 Panama 116 
Portugal, 117 Romania, 118 Slovenia, 119 Slovakia. 120 Spain, 121 Tunisia. 122 the Australian 
states of Northern Territo ý123 -Queensland. 
124 South Australia, 125 Tasmania, 126 and 
Western Australia, 127 and, implicitly, Poland. 128 UK law, for donations not between 
10613specially, for instance, if this was a way to come from a far off country to stay/live in the UK. 
107Law No. 85-05 of 16 February 1985 at section 162. 
108Regulations On the Use of Human Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982 at section 12. 
109The Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 9(2). 
1 IOUniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 at section 9(2). 
111 Section 2 of Decree No. 78-501 of 31 March 1978 For the Implementation of the Law of 22 December 
1976 On the Removal of Organs. See also Article 671-3 of the 1994 law which states that, "consent may 
be withdrawn without formality and at any time. " (IDHL, 1994,45(4), 473-482 at p475). 
1120rdinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 5(4)d for donations which are not between spouses of 3 or more 
years standing or close genetic relatives. 
1130rdinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 at section 2(3) stating that, "at any time prior to removal of the 
organ, the donor may, unconditionally withdraw his consent, in any manner whatsoever. " 
114Decree-Law No. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation at section 4. 
1151'ederal Regulations of 16 August 1976 at section 26. 
11 6Law No. 10 of II July 19 83 at section 19. 
117Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 8(6). 
118Law of July 1978 at section 132 now contained in Article 4(3) of 1996 Law. 
119Article 10 of 1996 Law. 
120Law of 24 August 1994 at section 46(l). 
12 1 Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 at section 4. Additionally this section states that 24 hours 
must elapse between the signature of the document and the removal of the organ. See Casabona, The 
Living Donor in Spanish Law - manuscript held at EUROTOLD. 
122Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 at section 9. 
123No. 121 of 1979 at section 16. 
124The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-19 84 at section 2 1. 
125The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 at section 16. 
126The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 22. 
127Act No. 116 of 1982 at section 14. 
128The law requires that the potential donor be informed of the consequences of withdrawal of consent 
during the last phase of preparation of the recipient for the transplant procedure. This is perfectly 
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persons defined as genetically related under HOTA, requires that ULTRA be satisfied 
that the proposed donor understands his / her entitlement to withdraw consent and has not 
done So. 129 Medical practitioners submit proposed genetically unrelated donations 
before ULTRA who must be satisfied that the donor understands his / her right to 
withdraw consent at any time. 130 Failure on the part of the practitioner to ensure the 
donor understands this right constitutes a statutory offence. Of course such a failure 
would result in liability at common law anyway, but what the existence of this legislative 
regime adds is the reality of independent scrutiny of this and other issues with all 
genetically unrelated LDT's. Hong Kong's Ordinance states that the Board authorising 
organ LDT's not legislatively defined as between genetic relative or spouses of 3 or more 
years standingl3l be satisfied that after giving consent there was no subsequent 
withdrawal of consent132 
6.3.4. Independent Authorisation of LDT's. 
Some transplant laws include provision for independent authorisation of LDT, partly to 
ensure the voluntariness of donation. There are variations in who is assigned the 
authorising role and in their level of independence from the recipient team. Finnish law 
requires the approval of the National Board of Health; 133 Slovakia! s law a special 
advisory committee opinion; 134 Hungarian law three physicians not involved in the 
reasonable if done in a neutral way but it could be done in a manner which pressurises the potential donor to 
carry on despite no longer really wanting to donate. In this situation the donation could be prevented by 
the fact that it can be said that consent has no longer been freely given. Law of 26 October 1995 at Article 
g(l) at point 8 read in conjunction with point 7. 
129Human Organ Transplant Regulations 3(2)d. 
1301bid. 
13 1 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 5 (4)d. 
1321bid. 
133Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985 On the Removal of Human Organs and Tissues for Medical Purposes at 
sections 2 and 3 respectively. 
134"It being the task of this committee to examine the legitimate chances of success of the removal and 
transplantation of an organ, as well as the extent to which the benefit for the recipient is likely to outweigh 
any detriment to the donor. Removal may not be performed if it is anticipated that this will seriously 
jeopardise the donor's state of health. " Law of No. 277 of 24 August 1994 at section 46(2). See IDHL, 
1995,46(2), 151-157 at 155. 
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removal and transplantation procedures; 135 and S31jan Arab Republic law a commission 
of three medical specialists other than the physicians carrying out the removal 
procedure. 136 As already discussed, UK, HonR Konp, and Indian law also require 
independent authorisation of LDT's involving certain types of donor-recipient 
relationship. Some laws require authorisation by an independent body for minor or 
adult incompetent donation. 137 
6.3.5. Voluntariness and Restrictions on Donor's Due to Their Status. 
In some cases, law restricts donation by persons in terms of their status - most often 
where this involves capacity to donate138 but in some instances in order to help ensure 
voluntariness/freedom from undue influence in donation. Such provisions are typically 
aimed at people with institutional status. 
Jurisdictions prohibiting prisoners from being living donors include Slovakia, 139 
Panama140 and Paragu . 141 These restrictions are put in place partly to protect prisoners 
from being exploited in their vulnerable position. However, it seems overly restrictive 
not to allow prisoners to donate to family as allowed under Mexican law (spouse, 
concubine or relative)142 and Bolivian law (immediate blood relatives or relatives by 
marriage"). 143 Bolivian law is to be commended on being based on the de facto 
135Transplant must be justified in the view of these physicians. Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 of 
the Minister of Health for the Implementation of the Provisions of Law No. II of 1972 On Health Relating 
to the Removal and Transplantation of Organs and Tissues at section 1(2). 136The requirement is only that they find the operation to be necessary for the recipient. Law No. 31 of 
23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs from the Human Body at section 2(5). 
The Canadian Model law requires that an independent assessment be carried out in cases where non- 
regenerative tissue is being donated. 
137See chapter 7. 
138See chapter 7. 
139Law of 24 August 1994 at section 46(l), IDHL, 1995,46(2), 151-157 at 155 states that, "removal may 
not be performed if the donor is serving a prison sentence. ". 
140Law No. 10 of II July 1983 at section 22 prohibits donation by persons subject to restrictions on their 
legal rights such as prisoners and other persons deprived of their liberty. 
141Law No. 836180 of 15 December 1980 Promulgating the Health Code at section 279 prohibits 
'detainees' from being donors. 
142Decree of 25 April 1987 Revising and Amending the General law on Health at section 328. 143Regulations of March 1982 at section 5. 
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voluntariness of prisoners and other persons of restricted liberty. 144 This approach is 
also taken in common law. The Michigan Circuit Court in the US case of Kaimowitz v 
Michigan Department of Mental Health 42 USLW 2063 [1973] (Mich Cir Ct) 
emphasised that pressure can easily be overbearing in a mental hospital context which 
starts off as inherently unequal. This was a case where on the facts the patient was held 
not to have given voluntary consent to psychosurgery. The English Court of Appeal 
referred to Kaimowitz in the case of Freeman y Home Office (No 2) [1984] QB 524. 
Freeman was a case involving a prisoner where on the facts the consent was held to be 
valid but it was accepted an institutional setting could make apparent consent invalid. 145 
The Courts are obviously prepared to scrutinise decisions within institutional contexts 
very carefully and will no doubt be particularly guarded where the proposed procedure is 
serious and invasive, as it was in Kaimowitz, and more so if, as in living donation, 
there is no therapeutic necessity for the procedure to be undergone and a higher than 
normal risk of inducements (for instance the possibility of early release for a prisoner) 
becoming the basis of decision-making. Under the UK legislative regime ULTRA 
would not authorise a donation by a prisoner to a person (s)he was not defined as 
genetically related to if early release had been offered as an inducement and was acting as 
the cause for the decision to donate. The need to establish that the donation was 
voluntary would lead to a close examination of motivations of possible altruism and/or 
family solidarity. 
6.3.6. Voluntariness and Restrictions on Donor-Recipient Relationship. 
Article 4 of the Council of Europe Resolutign 78 J'L91 states that removal of substances 
which cannot regenerate must be confined to transplantation between genetically related 
persons barring exceptional cases where there are good chances of success. WHO 
144"persons under special disciplinary condition or otherwise detained in closed institutions may donate 
organs and tissues only of their own freewill... " Regulations of March 1982 at section S. 
145Nethertheless on the facts of the case Kennedy and Grubb have suggested that, "it could be said that the 
court dismissed the argument that the 'institutional setting! deprived him of his free will too readily. " 
Medical Law: Text With Materials, Ibid at 241. 
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Guiding Principles take a similar approach stating that in general donors should be 
genetically related to the recipients although exceptions may be made in the case of 
transplantation of bone marrow and other regenerative tissue. 146 
Some jurisdictions simply limit LDT's from living donors to recipients with whom they 
have an existing relationship, whether genetic, familial or emotional. Other 
jurisdictions subject donations involving certain types of donor-recipient relationship to 
more stringent qualifying criteria and/or a process of authorisation. The general 
approach is that the more distant a potential donor is emotionally and genetically the more 
likely the law is to prohibit or place extra restrictions on it; the goal being to reduced 
likelyhood of both involuntary and commercially motivated donation (which are often 
viewed as more likely the more distant the relationship of the prospective donor-recipient 
pair). Costa Rican law limits donors to giving to relatives, 
"up to the fourth degree of consanguinity or up to the third degree of affinity, or of his 
spouse" 147 
Portuguese law restricts living donation of non-regenerative substances to relatives of the 
donor up to the third degree. 148 The law of the Russian Federation is ambiguous but 
appears to restrict donation from living donors to persons with whom there is a genetic 
relationship, apart from cases of bone marrow donation. 149 French law generally 
restricts donation of organs as a whole to the nuclear family unit, except in the case of 
bone marrow transplantation. 150 However, it allows donation between spouses in 
emergency cases. 151 Italian law restricts living kidney donation to the nuclear family 
unit (including half-brothers and sisters). 152 In Slovenia donation of non-reviving body 
146Guiding Principle 3. 
147Law No. 5560 of 20 August 1974 On Human Transplants at section 15. 
148Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 at section 6(2). 
149Law of 22 December 1992 at section 11. 
15OArticle 671-3 ibid. 
15 1 Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994. 
152Law No. 458 of 26 June 1967 Concerning the Transplantation of Kidneys From Living Donors. 
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materials appears to be limited to liver segment and kidney for transplantation into 
genetic or familial relatives. 153 
Some jurisdictions subject LDT's involving certain donor-recipient relationships to more 
stringent qualifying criteria. The recent Venezuelan law generally restricts LDT to first 
degree blood relatives but allows the National Executive to determine that a wider range 
is acceptable. 154 The new Swedish law restricts LDT to situations where "the donor is 
related to the potential recipient or if he is particularly close to him for some other 
reason" and other persons only in "special cases. "155 Without explicitly requiring the 
donor's decision to be voluntary some jurisdictions concern themselves with freedom 
from pressure in decision-making. Russian Federation law156 and Belarus draft law157 
thoughtfully attempt to exclude pressured donations by excluding donations by a person 
who is dependant on the recipient'58 as well as donations that have been coerced. 
Some jurisdictions rely primarily on an authorising body to determine and/or apply 
restrictions on specific classes of donor-recipient relationship. The general approach 
seems to be to restrict and more closely scrutinise donation by persons who do not have a 
close blood or at least legal tie with the recipient. The main purpose of such an 
approach is usually to prevent commercially motivated donations and thereby protect the 
reputation of transplantation. Trade is more likely to happen outside the genetic relative 
context. However a clear subsidiary purpose of such provisions is to ensure 
voluntariness - the concern being that manipulation and coercion can occur outside the 
genetic relative context. Coercion and manipulation can, of course, also occur within 
the genetic relative context -a point that has not gained much recent attention but has 
been documented in the psychological literature for decades. Close family ties can be 
153Law of 1995 at Article 8. 
154Law of 19th November 1992 On the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials in Human 
Beings, at section II (IDHL 1995,46(3) at 329-330). 
155Law No. 831 of 8 June 1995 at section 7. 
156Law of 22 December 1992 at section 3. 
157Section 8. 
15813ither because of their functions or in any other manner. 
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more coercive in a subtle and manipulative way than more distant ties which offer more 
potential to produce more purely altruistic donations. 
Hong Kong's Ordinance allows donation only by close genetic relatives, 159 spouses of 3 
years standing160 and those given special authorisation to donate by a board set up under 
the lawl6l (this board can only take referrals from the responsible clinicians, not potential 
donors and recipients themselves162). Among the criteria imposed for donations 
requiring approval are that a registered medical practitioner, who is not the person 
removing the organ must explain to the donor and recipient about the procedure, the risk 
involved and the entitlement to withdraw consent at any time and this information must 
be understood. 163 The donor must have given consent without coercion, offer of 
inducement or subsequent withdrawal of consent. 164 An interviewing procedure is also 
carried out with the potential donor and recipient principally to check that requirements 
have been met. 165 
UK has a provision similar to Hong Kong, again partly aimed at ensuring voluntariness. 
Under section 2(1)a HOTA 1989 it is an offence for a surgeon to remove an organ from a 
person who is not genetically related to the intended recipient. Section 2(1)b also 
prohibits the transplantation of an organ into a recipient who is not genetically related to 
the donor. The definition of genetic relative excludes people who are distant blood 
relatives as well as spouses and other persons who are emotionally related-166 Section 
1590rdinance No. 16 of 1995 To Prohibit Commercial Dealings in Human Organs Intended For 
Transplanting, to Restrict the Transplanting of Organs Between Persons Who Are Not Genetically Related, 
to Regulate the Importing of Human Organs Intended for Transplanting and For Supplementary Purposes 
Connected With These Matters. The Human Organ Transplants Ordinance at section 5 (1). Section 5(2) 
defines those who have sufficient genetic relationship the nuclear family unit plus uncles, aunts and first 
cousins. These relatives can be full or half blood. 
160Section 5 (1) ibid. 
161Section 5 ibid. 
162Section 5(4)a ibid. 
163Section 5(4)c ibid. 
164Section 5(4)d ibid. There must have been no payment or intention to pay that would be prohibited under 
the Ordinance (section 5(4)e). 
165Section 5(5) and section 5(6). 
166Genetically related donors are classified under the act as the following relatives of the recipient: (a) his 
natural parents and children, (b) his brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood, (c) the brothers and 
sisters of the whole or half blood of either of his natural parents, and the natural children of his brothers and 
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2(3) of the Act allows the Secretary of State to pass regulations providing that the 
prohibition on LDT between non-genetically related persons167 shall not apply where: 
,, (a) such authority as is specified in or constituted by the regulations is satisfied- 
(i) that no payment has been or is to be made in contravention of section 1 above; 168 and 
(ii) that such other conditions as are specified in the regulations are satisfied; and 
(b) such other requirements as may be specified in the regulations are complied with. " 
The Human Organ Transplants (Qnrelated Persons) Relaulations, 169 passed pursuant to 
section 2(3) of HOTA set up ULTRA as the body to scrutinise non-genetically related 
donation. Proposed LDT's between distant blood relatives and emotionally relatives 
such as spouses can be brought before ULTRA and permitted providing certain 
conditions are fulfilled. 170 
General Medical Council Guidance on the application of the Act is that doctors have a 
duty to establish beyond doubt the presence of consanguinity or a close and enduring 
relationship between the donor and the recipient. 171 The key behind the scrutiny of 
donations that are not close genetic related was Parliaments concern to ensure that all 
donations are altruistic. 172 However, donation between grandparents and grandchildren 
is perhaps unwittingly subject to ULTRA authorisation (through not being within the 
sisters of the whole or half blood or of the brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood of either of his 
naturalparents. The PhD uses the phrase 'close genetic relationships' to describe these categories. Other 
categories are 'distant genetic relatives, ' emotionally related donors and strangers. The scientific tests for 
establishing genetic relationship under the Act are undergoing revision through having proved to be 
practically unworkable. 
167As defined in above reference. 
168i. e. in contravention of section I of HOTA which regulates commercial dealings in human organs. 
169S. I. 1989 No 2480. 
170These conditions relate primarily to disclosure, capacity, voluntariness and commerce in donation and 
are discussed in the corresponding chapters of the PhD. 
171The Guidance adds that doctors, "should consider seeking advice from professional bodies, including 
national and international transplantation societies, on the tests needed to establish consanguinity and on 
the circumstances in which unrelated live donor transplants may be considered. " General Medical Council 
Guidance for Doctors on Transplantation of Organs From Live Donors, General Medical Council 
Supplement News Review, December 1992 at point 7. 
172HC Deb, 6th July 1989. 
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legal ambit of 'genetic relative' donation under the Act173); it Cannot have been seriously 
considered that such donation were any more susceptible to commercial motivation or 
pressure than those involving the direct nuclear family unit. 174 'Gifts' between genetic 
relatives can sometimes constitute payment under the Act and hence be an offence but 
were probably less of a concern in passing the Act than fully-blown trade. 
Indian law allows donations from persons outside the nuclear family unit with the prior 
consent of the Authorisation Committee where the donation is based on donor affection 
or attachment to the recipient or any other special reasons. 175 It is not unusual for 
requirements on the relationship the donor must have with the recipient to operate 
informally at the centre level in countries without the use of specific legislative 
provisions. For instance, in Germany it was common practice only to allow intra- 
nuclear familial genetically related living donations although now a more adventurous 
approach is being taken in some centres, particularly with the use of spouses. 176 
Prohibiting donations where the donor and recipient have an existing relationship seems 
overly restrictive. However, subjecting certain forms of donation to the prior approval 
of an authorising committee is an acceptable step - not only to ensure adequate checking 
of such matters as voluntariness from a body which will build up expertise in this area but 
also to encourage practitioners to use such forms of LDT by giving them the confidence 
that the ethics of such donations will be given an ethical seal of approval from an expert 
body (in turn providing them with a means to deflect any criticism of practice). 
173See Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Text With Materials, Butterworths, 1994 (2nd edition), 1092 174The additional point can be made that donations within the family can be the consequence of pressure, 
guilt and other motivations - i. e. they are not necessarily altruistic; this discussion about the merits of 
restricting different classes of donation is continued in chapter 7. 
1757he terms and conditions of operation of which is determined by Central Government. An Act (No. 42 
Of 1994) To provide For the Regulation of Removal, Storage and Transplantation of Human Organs for 
Therapeutic Purposes and for Matters Connected Therewith Or Incidental Thereto (The Transplantation of 
Human Organs Act 1994 at section 9 ((IDHL, 1995,46(l) at 34-37). 
176Centres taking a more adventurous approach include Munich and Freiburg. 
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6.4. Conclusions. 
Most external pressures are not readily perceivable and quantifiable in their impact on the 
decision-maker. Nethertheless, law can to a certain extent protect against external 
pressures overbearing the will of decision-makers; a proviso being that decisions should 
only be overturned where a high standard of proof is satisfied. 
Whilst the demand for revised legislation of voluntariness in LDT is not very high it 
could bring to bear greater certainty in this area - particularly if detailed guidance for 
interpreting voluntariness were included in order to supplant the need to rely on general 
principles for interpretation. The development of regulation could include examining 
voluntariness in the context of the recipient and more systematic consideration of 
different classes of donor - including adoption of an authorising committee approach to 
approving certain torms of LDT such as that used in Hong Kong. In addition, this 
issue can be addressed within a code of practice which addresses practical methods of 
meeting regulatory requirements and minimising all forms of pressure. 
Further research is needed in this area is needed - particularly to explore the dimensions 
of recipient decision-making and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different processes that exist from centre to centre in approaching prospective donors. 
Clearly practitioners have an important role, not just in following the minimum legal 
standard but developing best practice in protecting donors as far as possible from both 
their own impulsiveness and unconscious motivations and pressures from external 
sources such as family members and practitioners themselves. The development of 
centre protocols could be a key feature here. 
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Chapter 7 Minor and Adult Capacity and Consent to LDT. 
Chap 7.1. Introduction. 
Use of incompetent adults as living organ donors is extremely rare and use of minors is 
relatively rare, ' although attitudes surveys amongst transplant professionals in the US, 
Great Britain and now (through EUROTOLD) Europe as a whole indicate increased 
scope for use. 2 However, LDT by these classes of donor is of special legal and ethical 
significance. Conflicts between paternalism and autonomy and between deontological 
theory and consequentialism arise when people lose the right to self determination in a 
medical decision through being classified as incapable of consenting to that decision 
based on their mental condition, insufficient mental development or maturity or even 
simply because of minority or having a mental condition/lack of development (i. e. 
without any finding of incapacity). These conflicts are amplified in living organ 
donation as it is not a treatment, 3 will cause some detriment and is primarily designed 
for the benefit of another. Can donation by an incapacitate be justified as in his/her best 
interests rather than simply of utilitarian value? If the answer is yes, there is the 
question of what conditions use should be subject to. Should donation by competent 
minors and by adults with mental disability/illness impairing their judgement but still 
competent be subject to special restrictions or treated in the same fashion as organ 
donation by a 'normal' adult. Should decisions in cases not involving a 'normal' adult 
be subject to judicial involvement or oversight or left in the hands of the prospective 
donor, his/her family and transplant practitioners? 
'In 1992 J. K. Mason eLcgal Aspects of Organ Transplantation, ' in C Dyer (ed) Doctors, Patients and the 
Law, 1992) reported that in Europe in the preceding 10 years 5 minors had been used in Eurotransplant, 
one each in UK and Eire and none in Scandanavia or France. Considerably more minors become cadaver 
donors. In the UK in 1992 11% of cadaveric kidney donors were under the age of 16 - overhalf of these 
were under II (UKTSSA Annual Report 1992 - see also JAlexander et al, The Use of Marginal Donors for 
Organ Transplantation: The Older and Younger Donors, Trans Proc, 1991,23(l) at 905). Paediatric 
liver cadaveric donation also frequently occurs. Living donor minors are used more frequently in the USA 
- Spital's 1987 survey of US Transplant Centrcs found 13% of responding centres had performed at least 
one non-twin minor transplant within the preceding 5 years (Unconventional Living Kidney Donors: 
Attitudes and Use Among Transplant Centers, Transplantation, 1989,48(2), 243-248). The use, as 
living organ donors, of person's incapacitate to donate by reason of mental illness or disability is almost 
unheard of in Europe although there have been several instances in the US - some of them the subject of 
high profile cases - see 7.4.3. 2 These surveys are discussed fin-ther in chapter 10. 
3 See Re W (A M inor) Med ical Treatment [ 1992] 3 WLR 75 8 at 767F. 
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A framework for addressing these issues flexibly is provided under general principles of 
law. In some cases transplant law has reduced the flexibility by, for instance, 
excluding certain donors, in other cases it has merely confirmed general principles e. g. 
by asserting the need for consent. 
One of the critical factors in the legal position is whether or not the donor has reached 
majority, as this brings with it a presumptive right of self-determination over the decision 
of whether or not to donate. Under the general law most jurisdictions will define a 
minor as passing into majority at age 16 or 18 for the purposes of medical treatment. 
Those transplant laws specifying an age of majority in the context of living organ 
donation, may do so simply to confirm the position within that jurisdiction for medical 
treatment in general or to define a different, usually higher, age - such as 21. English 
law -is somewhat unusual in arriving almost accidentally at a lower age of majority in 
medical decision-making generally than for living organ donation specifically. The 
general position of English law, under section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, is 
that capacity is rebuttally presumed to exist with 16 and 17 year olds. However, in the 
context of organ LDT, Section 8 is only applicable to reception and not donation because 
it only refers to medical 'treatment. A This means, as affirmed in Re W (A Minor) 
Medical Treatment [1992] 3 WLR 758,5 that the rebuttable presumption of capacity for 
young people donating an organ or tissue applies from the age of 18 not the age of 16 
under English law. 6 
Of course, unless legislation states the contrary, persons under 18 can be de facto 
capacitate to donate an organ but this does not necessarily confer on them a presumptive 
right of self-determination. This brings us on to the second factor on which a legal 
position can hinge - the definition of capacity. Not surprisingly, their are differences in 
approach between minors and adults 7 although commonalities are that minors and adults 
4 Subsection 2 states that in section 8 "surgical dental or medical treatment includes any procedure 
undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis and this section applies to any procedure (including in particular 
the administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that treatment. " 
The emphasis is on treatment which organ donation is not. 5 At767F. 
6 lbid - Le the presumption of capacity reverts back to the age of 18 in accordance with general principles of 
law relating to the age of majority. 
7M Gunn, The Meaning of Capacity, AfedLaw Review, 1994,2(l) at 8. 
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can both be deemed legally capable of making some decisions and not others and capacity 
can vary over time. 8 
The House of Lords case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authorily 
(1985) 3 All ER 4029 established that a minor has capacity where (s)he has sufficient 
understanding and maturity to consent to the particular procedure in question-10 Despite 
organ donation not being a treatment, the Gillick principle' 1 applies to it according to Re 
W. 12 'Sufficient' maturity has not been fully defined; 13 which is somewhat inevitable 
because it will depend on the procedure in question and will often be influenced, though 
not determined, by increasing age. Clearly it would be harder, for instance, for a 
minor to be sufficiently mature to make a decision about living organ donation than to 
make one about blood donation and the younger the minor the less likely (s)he would be 
sufficiently mature to make a decision about either. 
While an adult starts with a presumption of capacity to make all medical and other 
decisions 14 this presumption can be rebutted. Legal principles for determining whether 
sHowever, in the case of an adult at least, a person with fluctuating capacity will not be deemed capacitate 
even if (s)he has expressed a clear decision during a period of lucid capacity. In Re R [1992] Fam. II this 
scenario formed the basis of a decision relating to a 15 year old girl being forcibly administered anti- 
psychotic drugs when her ability to consent was deemed fluctuating. 
9See Bainham, The Judge and The Competent Minor, LQR; 1992,108,194.. This case concerned the 
hypothetical capacity of a 14 year old girl to take the contraceptive pill (Hypothetically because essentially 
her mother was bringing the case not out of genuine fear that her daughter would take the contraceptive pill 
but to establish certain points of law on the matter and with regard to a department of health circular relating 
to girls under 16 being prescribed the contraception). The House of Lords decided that she had capacity to 
consent to taking the contraceptive pill. The decision allows for flexibility in the treatment of the capacity 
of minors. Thus in principle a decision to donate an organ by a person under the age of 16 could be legal, 
provided the young person at issue 
'OSee Lord Scarmansjudgment in Gillick [1985] 3 All ER402. Lord Scarrn&s flexible approach has 
been adopted in a number of other countries see for example the Court of Appeal decision in Alberta, 
Canada in Cv Wrent [ 19 87] 35 DLR (4th) 419 (Alta CA). 
"Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authori1y (1985) 3 All ER402 (HL). SeeBainham, 
The Judge and The Competent Minor, LQR, 1992,108,194. For the legal genesis of this approach see 
Lord Scarmans judgment in Gillick [1985] 3 All ER 402. Lord Scarman's flexible approach has been 
adopted in a number of other countries see for example the Court of Appeal decision in Alberta, Canada in 
CvWren [1987135 DLR(4th) 419 (Alta CA) 
123 WLR758 at 767 and772 atpara C perLord Donaldson. A number of legal academic articles have 
also taken this position. See e. g. Price and Garwood-Gowers, Transplantation From Minors, 
Contemporary Issues in Law, 1996, l(l), 1-27, Mason and McCall-Smith (Law and Medical Ethics, 
Butterworths, 1991,373) and M. Brazier (Medicine, Patients and The Law, Penguin, 1992 (2nd ed), 
421 
13M Gunn, The Meaning of Capacity, Afed Law Review, 1994,2(l) at 8. 
14 See for instance the law of Scotland on this matter discussed in D. M. Walker, Principles of Scottish 
Private Law, Clarendon Press, 1982 (3rd edn), Vol 1. 
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an adult has capacity are complex and unsettled. 15 A general point is that the finding of 
incapacity to make a decision is usually related to factors like mental illness or disability 
or to temporary factors such as shock, severe fatigue, pain or drugs being used in his 
treatment. 
7.2. Minors and LDT. 
The legal position of living organ donor transplantation by minors was first considered 40 
years ago by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Masden v Harrison. 16 Since 
then it was been considered in English and US cases and within most transplant laws. In 
many jurisdictions the legal position is derived from a combination of analysing 
transplant legislation and general principles. For instance, under HOTA, non- 
genetically related living organ donation is illegal in the UK unless it gains the prior 
authorisation of ULTRA. Amongst other things ULTRA must be satisfied that the 
donor is competent. 17 However, non-genetically related minor living donation is still 
subject to common law principles of liability in the same way as its genetically related 
counterpart. 
7.2.1. Living Organ Donation by Incompetent Minors. 
Many transplant laws are framed in such a way as not to exclude the possibility of living 
organ donation by incompetent minors. Such donors also have the potential for 
acceptance under general principles of law and have indeed become living organ and 
tissue donors in the US although only tissue and blood donors in the UK. 
7.2.1.1. Conditions For Donation by Incompetent Minors Under Transplant 
Le0slation.. 
Jurisdictions with transplant legislation allowing the normal range of organs to be 
aWi 20 South donated by incompetent minors include: Argentina, " Cuba, 19 Mal 9- 
151n regard to adults the recent Law Commission Report on Mentally Incapacitated Adults stated that "(i)t is 
widely recognised that, in this area, the law as it now stands is unsystematic and full of glaring gaps. It does 
not rest on clear or modem foundations of principle. " HMSO, LawCommNo. 231,1995atpl- 
16 Eq. No 68651 (Mass, June 12,1957). Confirmed in the same year by Huskgy v Harrison Eq. No. 68666 
(Mass., Aug. 30 1957) and Foster v Harrison Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20,1957). 
17 Section 2(3)a. 
"Section 14 ibid. Section 18 specifies a list of people who are able to consent in order of priority topped 
by a spouse. 
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Africa, 21 Sweden22 and S3ýdan Arab Republic (where between twin brothers only). 
23 In 
several other jurisdictions incompetent minors appear to be able to donate liver segment 
by virtue of the fact this it is regenerable or replacable body material (Ajjýalimn laws 
Y'24 Bel iUm 25 Finland 26 Po 127 Sloven. 
30 
a 29 Sri Lanka, 
29 Zimbabwe generall - Qr gm 
tuga. 1 
Argentin 31 South AfriC 2 Cuba, 33 Ma1aWi34 and the Sydan Arab RepubliC35). This 
was clearly not an intended result (because liver segment donation carries more 
prospective detriment than some forms of donation of non-regenerative material - e. g. 
19Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 section 8 1. 
20Scction II The Anatomy Act 1990. 
2'Section 18 (b)(ii). 
22Law No. 831 of 8 June 1995 (IDHL, 1996,47(l)). 
231f the donor is under 21 the parent(s) must consent. Law No. 31 of 23 Aug 1972 On the Removal and 
Transplantation of Organs from the Human Body (Recueildes lois et de la Legislation Financiere de la 
Republique. 4rabe Syrienne, Sept 1972, p2-4). 
'Queensland The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 12(b) by implication; South 
AustraliaThe Transplantation and Anatomy Act (1983) section 12(a); Western Australia The Human 
Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (No. 116 of 1982) at section 13(l); Tasmania The Human Tissue Act 
1985 at section 7(a); and Tasmania However in the NorthemTerritoEy The Human Tissue Transplant Act 
1979 (No. 121 of 1979) at section 9 excludes donation by those under 18 and New South Wales The 
Human Tissue Act 1983, s 10 forbids it by omission from specified permissions. In Canada this position 
is recommended for provinces under the model law, Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 section 
5(1) and 6(l). The age of majority is 16. If there is reason to believe the minor may not "understand the 
nature and consequences of transplanting tissue" an independent assessment must be carried out. This 
assessment will take into account a number of factors and then a choice will be made (section 8). The 
decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Human Tissue Donation Act 1992 for 
Prince Edward Island (Canada) has a similar provision (section 7(l)) although no independent assessment 
scheme is applied. If a minor does not understand the procedure (s)he will be limited to the donation of 
bone marrow with parental/guardian consent required (section 7(2) 
25Law of 1986 (sections 5-7). 
26Law Number 355 of 26 April 1985. Persons under the age of 18 may donate non-renewable tissue with 
the consent in writing of their guardian or trustee and the approval of the National Board of Health and 
provided the donor does not object. The donoes opinion of the intervention shall be established insofar as 
is possible having regard to his age and level of development. An expert in child psychology or 
paediatrics must submit a report to the National Board of Health to accompany the application for approval 
which must be submitted to the Board before the living donation in question can proceed. 
27Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993 OnThe Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues section 
6(3) and section 8(3). 
281bid. 
"Parents must consent if the donor is under the age of 21 or one of them if the other is incapacitate or 0 
otherwise the guardian. The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at sections 7 and 8. 
30Parents /Guardian must give the consent if the donor is under the age of 18. Anatomical Donations and 
Post Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976 at section 12 particularly subsection (b). 
3 'Section 14 ibid. Section 18 specifies a list of people who are able to consent in order of priority topped 
by a spouse. 
32 Section 18 (bXii). 
33Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 section 8 1. 
34 Section II The Anatomy Act 1990. 
35 Law No. 31 of 23 Aug 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs from the Human Body 
(Recueildes lois et de la Legislation Financiere de la Repblique Arabe Syrienne, Sept 1972,24). 
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donation of a single kidney) but there is a way round it which is to specify that removal 
must normally carry a minimal level of detriment - this would result, for instance in bone 
marrow donation being allowed and liver segment donation not being allowed. The only 
law that comes close to taking this approach is the Netherlands which amongst other 
conditions specifies that for living minors under 12 the removal of non-regenerable 
material must not have lasting effects on the donors health. 36 
The anomalous, more liberal treatment of living liver segment is also witnessed in the 
Council of Europe's 1978 Resolution 37 under which by virtue of being regenerative, it 
can be donated by an incapacitate exceptionally and provided their is no objection from 
the minor and his legal representative consents to it. 38 Contrastingly, non-regenerative 
material is restricted to special cases where a donor has the capacity for understanding, 
has consented to donation along with his legal representative and has authorisation of the 
appropriate authority. 39 In defence of the resolution it must be stated that it would have 
been drafted before lawyers would have conceived of the possibility of liver segment 
donation. The current re-examination of the Resolution will probably address the 
problem by avoiding the use of the term regenerative in this context. 
In English law donation of an organ by a minor not within the ambit of 'genetic relative' 
as defined under HOTA and associated regulations regarding the use of non-genetically 
related donors is limited to donors who ULTRA is satisfied understand, 
"the nature of the medical procedure and the risks, as explained by the registered general 
medical practitioner, and consents to the removal of the organ in question. , 40 
Since all non-genetically related donations will go through ULTRAý' it is almost 
inconceivable that an incompetent genetically unrelated minors will ever donate an organ 
36UW of 24 May 1996 at section 5(l) - see IDHL, 1996,47(4) at 470. 37 Resolution (78)29 on Harmonization of Legislations of Member States to Removal, Grafting and 
Transplantation of Human Substances. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of The Council of Europe 
on II May 1978. 
"Article 6(l). 
39Article 6(2). 
40The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI No 2480) at regulation 3(l) b. 
41A doctor could theoretically do such a donation without ULTRA approval but practically is unlikely to do 
so since it would be an offence under the Act. Common law principles of liability would also be relevant if 
such a situation arose. 
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in the UK unless ULTRA makes an error of judgement. 42 The Act does not prevent 
incompetent minors from giving organs to genetic relatives, 43 perhaps partly because 
donation on behalf of a close genetic relative is easier to justify as in the direct 
psychological interest of the incapacitate. 44 
Use of living organ donation by incompetent minors is normally subject to conditions 
beyond consent by the person with legal authority to consent on behalf of the minor. 45 
Many transplant laws have a whole range of requirements. For instance, in Finland 
persons under the age of 18 may donate non-renewable tissue with the consent in writing 
of their guardian or trustee and the approval of the National Board of Health and provided 
the donor does not object. The donor's opinion of the intervention shall be established 
insofar as is possible having regard to his age and level of development. Minor rejection 
of the procedure as a total bar. An expert in child psychology or paediatrics must submit 
a report to the National Board of Health to accompany the application for approval which 
must be submitted to the Board before the living donation in question can proceed. 46 
Some of the features in Finland's law which are common in transplant legislation include: 
e the need for approval / non-refusal by the donor4' thereby protecting him or her from 
the spectre of forced donation; 
9 the need for approval by a special designated person or body; 48 and 
42 Such an error would be difficult to gain a successful judicial review of because ULTRA has only to be 
subjectively satisfied that consent has been given - there is no requirement for ULTRA's judgment to be 
reasonable or even that it has reasonable grounds to be satisfied - see discussion in chapter 4 on this point. 43 HOTA 1989 section 2(3). 
440f course this does discriminate against people who may be close but not genetically related e. g. an 
adopted brother or sister. 
45 This requirement is explicitly stated in some legislation e. g. Sweden's law (Law No. 83 1 of 8 June 1995 at 
section 8) expressly requires parental / guardian support of the proposed donation and Finland's law 
requires consent in writing of their guardian or trustee (Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985). 
46 Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985. 
47ýuýeSe law (section 8(4) of 1993) states that where the minor is "capable of understanding and able to 
express their wishes" the donation is "subject to their agreement. " Slovenian law (Article II of 1996) 
states that if a minor is 15 years old or more and capacitate his / her consent is required and that in any case 
where any donor "explicitly contradicts" donation it is not allowed. Under Oueensland law child 
agreement is required where the child is capable of understanding the nature effect of the removal of the 
tissue and the nature of the transplantation - this will refer only to competent minors if understanding the 
nature and effect of the removal is equatable with being competent to donate. Similar provisions exist in 
South 
_Australia 
(section 13) and Western Australia (section 13(2)). 
48FinIand persons under the age of 18 may donate non-renewable tissue with the and the approval of the 
National Board of Health. An expert in child psychology or paediatrics must submit a report to the 
National Board of Health to accompany the application for approval which must be submitted to the Board 
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the need for special justification (e. g. by restricting the level of permissible risk / harm 
to the donor and requiring a certain level of prospective benefits for the recipient). 
49 
occasionally there are restrictions, over and above those applying to competent adults, 
on who the material may be given to. 50 
7.2.1.2. Conditions For Living Organ Donation bv Incompetnet Minors Under 
General Principles of Law. 
The kPproach Within Which Conditions Are Framed 
Baron has detected 3 different judicial approaches to authorising minor organ donation: 
51 
e necessitating infonned consent; 
" reviewing the parents' weighing of the relative costs and benefits of the 
operation to both children; 52 and 
" the best interest test. 53 
Clearly the first approach would exclude organ donation by incompetent minors. In 
practice, while the presence of informed consent by a minor has been taken to be a strong 
before the living donation in question can proceed (Law No. 355 of 26 April 1985). Sweden'slaw(Law 
No. 83 1 of 8 June 1995 at section 8) states that the intervention must be authorised by the National Board of 
Health and Welfare and support of the physician empowered to decide on the removal and parental / 
guardian support. Belgium's law of 1986 (sections 5-7) requires that consents are obtained as follows: - 1. 
the consent of the donor if he is at least 15 years of age. 2. The consent of the spouse of the donor where the 
spouse is residing with him (in cases where the donor is under 18 but married). 3. The consent of the 
person(s) whose consent to the marriage of the minor is required (e. g. parents, guardian. ). Slovenian law 
(Article 11 of 1996) requires prior ethical committee approval for the minor donation. 
`Sweden's Law of 1995 requires the situation to be one where the recipient is unable to get compatible 
material from another person and there must be special grounds for removal (Law No. 83 1 of 8 June 1995 at 
section 8), Belgium's law of 1986 (sections 5-7) states that the transplant must be on behalf of a sibling 
Slovenian law (Article II of 1996) requires prior ethical committee approval for the minor donation and 
consent by the donoes legal representative or nearest relative. Under Queensland law there must be likely 
death of a member of the nuclear family without donation by the minor and the risk must be minimal 
(section 12c and d). 
"This is more commonly stipulated solely in relation to tissues/regenerative material but Sweden's law, for 
instance, (section 8 ibid) limits donation of organs by minors to crelatives., 
5 'Live organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor Donors in Massachusetts, Boston U Law Review 1975, 
55,159atpl69. 
52Nathan v Farinelli Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass., July 3,1974). 
53 First used in 1957 Massachusetts decisions like Foster v Harrison, . Eq. No. 68674 (Mas., Aug. 30,1957) 
and Huskey v Harrison, Eq. No. 68666 (Mass., Aug. 30,1957). 
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legitimating factor it is not true to say that its absence has prevented organ donation by a 
minor. The two main tests that have been historically used for determining what 
medical treatment is acceptable on behalf of an incompetent minor are 'substituted 
judgement' and 'best interests. ' The doctrine of substituted judgement involves decision- 
making on behalf of an incompetent minor or adult being made by reference to what the 
'patient' would have done had they had capacity to decide. The doctrine appears to have 
little legal standing today in English law in the treatment of minors. 54 In the US the 
doctrine was often thought to have been the basis for allowing donation by a mentally 
'disabled' adult in the case of Strunk v Strunk discussed later in this chapter. However, 
Little y Little (Tex Civ 1979), 576 SW 2d 493 at 498 concluded that, 
"it is clear in transplant cases that courts, whether they use the term 'substituted 
judgement' or not, will consider the benefits to the donor as a basis for permitting an 
incompetent to donate an organ. Although in Strunk the Kentucky Court discussed the 
substituted judgement doctrine in some detail, the conclusion of the majority there was 
based on the benefits that the incompetent donor would derive, rather than on the theory 
that the incompetent would have consented to the transplant if he were competent. We 
adopt this approach. " 
The substituted judgement doctrine has subsequently been rejected in a minor organ 
transplantation case In Re Guardianship of Pescinski (1975) 67 Wis 2d 4 226 NW 2d 180. 
Clearly, what the incompetent would have done if competent is just one factor in the 
overall determination of best interests. It has been stated in the Massachusetts 
jurisdiction, where most of the US decisions relating to organ donation by incompetent 
donors have been made, that, 
"the justices have not clearly articulated the legal theory upon which their decrees have 
been based"55 
54 In Re J (a minor) ( wardship: medical treatment ) (199 1) Farn 33 substituted judgment was applied to a 
neonate but generally the doctrine has lost favour and is only one of several factors that may be taken into 
account within the overarching context of the minor's best interests. This approach is also the Law 
Commission's recommended one for adults. 
55Live Organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor Donors in Massachusetts, Boston U Law Review 1975, 
55,159atpl69. 
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However, it is clear, as Justice Calvo states in Curran v Bosze, 56 that there is only one 
test in the case of a minor who is unable to give informed consent (and this generally 
applies in the US), 
"notwithstanding the language used by the courts in reaching their determination that a 
transplant may or may not occur, the standard by which the determination was made was 
whether the transplant would be in the best interest of the child or incompetent person. " 
In English law there has been a brief dalliance with the notion that a procedure might be 
justified where it was not against the child's best interests (per Lord Reid in SyS [19701 
3 All ER 107 (HL) in the case of a simple blood procedure) 57 but this approach has never 
gained currency in subsequent cases including the bone marrow donation case of Re I 
on principle it is also a controversial approach that invades childrens rights and 
autonomy on the basis of medically (and possibly judicially) conceived notions of utility. 
Conditions For Accepting Living Organ Donation By Incompetent Minors Under the Best 
Interests Test. 
The strict answer is that the best interests test has only one condition; showing that the 
proposed decision is in the best interests of the incompetent. However, donation by 
incompetent minors has traditionally been authorised in US cases where a combination 
(or all) of the following are present: 
" contended 'extraordinary benefits' to the recipient from the proposed transplant; 
" the minimal risks to the donor; 
" the consent of the parents and 
" the agreement of the minor donor (not necessarily mature agreement e. g. in Hart v 
58 Brown donation between 7 year old identical twins was found acceptable. 
There has also been attempts in individual US cases to elucidate the conditions that 
should be met for a donation to be declared in the best interests of the incompetent minor. 
In Curran v Bosze 59 the proposed testing of three and a half year old twins for possible 
56(1990) 566 NE 2d 1319 (Illinois Sup Ct). 
57[l 970] 3 All ER 107 at I 10. 
5829 Conn. Supp. 368,289 A. 2d 3 86 (Super Ct 1972). 
11(1990) 566 NE 2d 1319 (Illinois Sup Ct). 
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bone marrow donation to a half sibling who they had only met on two occasions. The 
court refused to grant a petition for testing and thus the petition that they be used as organ 
donors if compatible was also ruled out. Mr Justice Calvo's suggested 3 criteria must be 
staisfied to declare an organ donation as in an incompetent minor's best interests: 60 
1. the parent or guardian who consents on behalf of the child must be informed of the 
risks and benefits inherent in the procedure; 
2. There must be emotional support available from the person or persons who take care 
of the child; and 
3. there must be an existing close relationship between the donor and the recipient. The 
reason behind this was the need for psychological benefit to be present not just in the 
form of altruism but in terms of the possible consequences for the particular donor 
given the particular relationship. 
The second criteria was not met in the immediate case, because the day to day carer of 
the twins was not in support of the procedure. Nor was the third, because the twins did 
not know their half sibling to any significant degree. 
English law only has Re y6l -a bone marrow donation by an incompetent adult - to offer 
guidance. The commentary on ReY suggested that even in bone marrow cases the 
courts will look for evidence of a close relationship which will be damaged if the donee- 
patient dies and added that it was unlikely the court would contemplate even a minimally 
risky procedure with a child if the child's age prevented him her forming such a 
relationship with the donee-patient. 62 However, there was not a fundamental and vital 
connection between the incompetent and prospective recipient in the case itself which in 
the end was probably partly sanctioned on grounds of utility to the recipient combined 
with the low detriment in bone marrow donation. 
Limitations of the Best Interests-Test in the Field of Living Orjzan Donation by 
Incompetent Minors. 
Under best interests, although substituted judgement is relevant, the minor's known 
values and views are not decisive and can be overridden. Use of the test can thus impose 
60(1990) 566 NE 2d 1319 (Illinois Sup Ct). 
61 Re Y commentary [1996] Med L Rev 205-207. 
62 Re y commentary [1996] Med L Rev 205-207 at 206. g__ 
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a decision upon a minor', as was the case in Re W itselL However, the test does at least 
somewhat protect against extreme utilitarianism by the fact that benefit to another cannot 
be used directly as a justification for medical intervention. 
In living donation, since the minor can accrue no physical benefit from donation, 
intervention under the best interests test should at least be founded on a minimum of 
physical detriment being outweighed by psychological benefit or freedom from 
psychological detriment. Studies on the psychological impact of donation to minors 
indicate a very positive picture of benefit. Bernstein and Simmons have concluded that 
older minor donors tend to gain significant psychological benefits such as increased self 
esteem (more so than the average adult). 63 Simmons et al., have emphasised positive 
attitudes amongst teenage donors and that problems with this group are no more common 
than with adult donors. 64 Lewis suggests that even younger donors may gain similar 
benefits though he recognises that this is somewhat uncertain. 65 
'Psychological benefit' is sometimes used to suggest the risk is well worth the potential 
donor taking in return for the likelihood of a well recipient, a point especially stressed 
where the recipient is likely to have long life with the new organ. 66 Some commentators 
have gone further and even argued that even when it is adults who refuse to let a young 
person be a donor that young potential donor may subsequently feel a personal 
responsibility for the refusal. 67 
However, there are serious problems in taking psychological factors into account in 
incapacitate minor organ donation. Using psychological assessments to justify donation 
by an incompetent is speculative in individual cases. As a matter of evidence should 
"Bernstein & Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney Donor: The Right To Give, Am. JPsychiat, 1974,13 1, 
1338,1340. 
'One of the major ethical controversies has involved the use of teenage donors. The question is whether 
such young people are capable of informed consent. At the University of Minnesota 18 donors from age 
16-21 were used and evaluated. There was no more evidence of blatant family pressure in this group than 
in the other age groups, and there was only one donor who showed long-term ambivalence about the 
donation. In general the adolescent kidney donors indicated highly positive attitudes toward the donation 
and improvement in the self-picture afterward. Gift of Life at 431-3 
65Lewis, Kidney Donation by a7 Year Old Identical Twin Child: Psychological, Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, J Am. Acad. ChildPsychiat, 1974,13,221 at 228-232. 
66 Madsen v Harrison, Mass Sul2reme Judicial Court. Equity No. 6865 1, June 12,1957. See also Lewis 
ibid. 
67ThiS was the view expressed by Shalom Schwartz, Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, Dec 13,1974 in a telephone conversation with Charles C Baron (See Baron, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants From Minor Donors in Massachusetts, Boston ULaw Review, 1975,55,159 
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there be a minimum degree of certainty of psychological benefit to warrant the 
intervention in order to avoid decisions being too heavily founded on recipient benefit? 
Certainly US decisions involving minors under 8 68 appear to be a 'utilitarian infringement 
of rights' given there is little concrete evidence with which to determine whether the 
particular minor at hand will benefit psychologically. 69 
The fact that Simmons et al., found that 43% of family relatives of potential recipients 
did not go ahead and have the initial blood test, 70 and in general about 30% of adults 
have objections to transplantation, is evidence that psychological benefit in incompetent 
minor donation is uncertain. 'Negative' responses could include feeling wrongfully 
invaded as well as simply disagreeing with the idea of donation. Such negative 
responses must be taken seriously - indeed they can preclude or reduce psychological 
benefit in a given case. 71 
7.2.1.3. Conclusion 
Without the security of the minor's consent, donations can always be covertly based on 
considerations of recipient benefit - it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the US 
decisions sanctioning use of exceptionally young minors have been so based. 72 The 
seriousness of donation and the scope for intra-familial conflicts of motivation give rise to 
pressures that may subtly, situationally or more overtly 'manufacture' a child's assent to 
donation which then becomes a justification for intervention. 73 
68E. g. Hart v Brown 289 2 Ad 386 (1972) and also donation of skin to an identical 3 year old brother upheld 
by a Washington Court (see P. Herron and I. Marion, Homografting in The Treatment of Sever Bums, 
PaciftMedandSurg, 1967,75,4. 
69For criticisms see HollenbergNK, Altruism and Coercion: Should Children Serve as Kidney Donors, N 
EnglJMed, 1977; 296: 390. See also W. J. Curran WJ, Kidney Transplantation in Identical Twin Minors: 
Justice is done in Conneticut. NEnglJMed, 1972,287,26. For an article taking a more favourable 
approach to donation by young minors see Lewis, Kidney Donation by a7 Year Old Identical Twin Child: 
psychological, Legal and Ethical Considerations, J Am. Acad. Child Psychiat, 1974,13,221 at 228-232. 
Where specific evidence is present that the minor will not benefit US courts have recognised this (see e. g. 
Camitta v Fager, Eq. No. 73-171 (Mass., Sept 5,1973) where the prospective donor's guardian ad litem 
contended that the minor donor's mental state characterised as a combination of mild retardation and 
schizophrenia precluded realisation of any psychological benefits. 
70Gift 
ofLife, WileyandSons, 1977at431-3. 
71This area of motivations is discussed further in chapter 6. 
72 E. g. Hart v Brown 289 2 Ad 386 (1972) and also donation of skin to an identical 3 year old brother upheld 
by a Washington Court (see P. Herron and I. Marion, Homografting in The Treatment of Sever Bums, 
paciftMedandSurg, 1967,75,4. SeeHollenbergNK, Altruism and Coercion: ShouldChildren 
Serve as Kidney Donors, NEnglJMed, 1977; 296: 390. 
73 including family conflicts. The feeling of guilt and / or family disapproval that can be the feared and / or 
actual consequence of not donating can be one factor in assuring assent. In one study an adult offspring 
195 
Substituted judgement provides some protection through the decision being based on 
fpatients' known values and feelings. ' Robertson has advocated the general application 
of substituted judgement to cases of organ donation by incompetents for a number of 
reasons including the notion that it attempts to continue regarding the incompetent 
person, 
"as an individual with free choice and moral dignity, and not as someone whose 
preferences no longer mattered.,, " 
However, McLean has pointed out that where a person has always lacked capacity, 
"what he or she would do if competent is simply a matter of speculation. 05 
The test could be limited to situations in which something is genuinely known about how 
the minor may have decided. For example, where the minor is only temporarily 
incompetent and previously expressed his / her views (as in Pescinski76 and in Re W77) or 
permanently incapacitated and has done so. If best interests is to be used in organ 
donation it ought to be confined to situations where use of substituted judgement is 
sophistic. In general allowing organ donation by an incompetent minor should really be 
something out of the ordinary, perhaps necessitating: 
the minor exhibiting some kind of meaningful agreement to the proposed donation78 
and 
donor ran away the day before the operation after agreeing to donate, suggesting he was not so happy about 
the idea but had felt pressure to donate (R. G. Simmons et at., Donors and Non Donors: The Role of the 
Family and The Physician in Kidney Transplantation in Land and Dossetor (eds). Organ Replacement 
Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, Springer Verlag, 1991 at p 10 8). Assent may be influenced by 
the fact that donation is sometimes seen as an aid to being seen as more mature rather than childish (For 6 
out of 26 adolescent donors in the Minnesota study of 114 donors - see R. G. Simmons et a]., Gift of Life, 
Wiley andSons, 1977,177). In some cultural sub groups (e. g. some Asian cultures) vulnerability to 
compulsive assent may arise through norms of family reciprocation applying to offspring. 71 Organ Donation by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgement Doctrine, Columbia LR, 1976,76,48. 
75McLean, A Patients Right to Know, Dartmouth Publishing, 1989 at p68. 
76 While he was not classified as incompetent before this he may have been, however. 
77 Where consent to treatment on behalf of an anorexic minor was at issue. See Kennedy and Grubb 
Medical Law, Text with Materials, Butterworths, 1994 at p289. For an example of where substituted 
judgment was used see Re Lucille Boyd [1979] 403 A 2d 744 (Dc Cir) where the pre-incompetency 
religious beliefs of the incompetent person suggested that she would have refused treatment. USuggested as a rule of thumb even for bone marrow donation in the Re Y commentary, Med L Rev 205- 
207 at 207 - the case and commentary is discussed further in section 7.4. 
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the prospective recipient is in clinically urgent need of an organ and there is no 
prospect of a reasonable cadaver option turning-up within a time frame that will avoid 
significant jeopardy or actual harm to the prospective recipient; or 
the recipients survival or health being exceptionally linked to a need for a living 
donation or a very high quality organ match that only the incapacitate can provide 79 
and 
the prospective recipient being an integral part of the incompetents existence in such a 
way that the incompetent has a tangible direct interest in helping the prospective 
recipient maintain / regain health. 
Apro eminjusti ing incompetent minor organ donation today is that there will usually 
be a reasonable alternative -for instance, in kidney donation, waiting for acadaveric 
organ will often represent a reasonable alternative. 
7.2.2. Competent Minors and Living Organ Donation. 
7.2.2.1. When Does Minor Competence to Donate an Organ Exist? 
In examining general principles of law judges have expressed some pessimistic views 
about whether a minor could be competent to donate organs. For instance, Lord 
Donaldson in Re W went as far as to doubt whether a minor (an under 18 in this instance) 
would ever be Gillick competent to be a living organ donor8o a view echoed recently in 
the case commentary of Re Y (Adult Incompetent: Legalily of Non-TheraDeutic 
Procedure) [1996] Med L Rev 204-205, 
"given the need to weigh the benefit of the procedure against the risks of doing it, it is 
not likely that a court would contemplate donation of non-regenerative tissue such as a 
,, 81 kidney (by a minor). 
790f the Irish cohort of donor-recipient pairs interviewed (see chapter 8) one pair had been 13 year old twin 
sisters at the time of donation. David Price and I spoke retrospectively with the President of the Irish High 
Court about this donation and he expressed no objections. The donor agreed to the procedure but it was 
uncertain whether she was able to give My informed consent, however the organ had an expected graft 
survival of 37 years - approximately 4 times the average cadaveric graft survival. The donor and recipient 
were also very close. Even so this donation would not have met the exceptional criteria noted above because there was no exceptional need. 
10[1992]3WLR758at767F. He felt that persons under the age of 18 could quite possibly be competent 
to donate blood. 
81[ 19961 Med L Rev 205-207 at 206. 
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There are, of course, different decision-making processes in children to those adopted by 
adults. Piaget suggests that younger children are in a preoperational cognitive stage of 
development 82 a point expanded on by Kohlberg in his cognitive developmental theory. 83 
However, evidence regarding younger children should not be taken to mean that all 
minors are likely to be too immature to donate. In reviewing psychological studies of 
minor decision-making David Price and 184 concluded that, 
"studies of intellectual development suggest that from 7-8 years the child is capable of 
certain logical reasoning processes applied to concrete objects or events in the immediate 
present. From 11-15 years the ability to reason hypothetically is also formed. " 
This paper noted that hypothetical reasoning is an intrinsic aspect of the organ donation 
decision-making process. Is hypothetical reasoning sufficient however? Clearly a 
minor might have hypothetical reasoning but not have sufficient maturity and 
understanding to reasonably apply that to their own situation. Theoretically a minor 
between ages II and 15 could be competent to donate an organ but this is likely to be 
very rare. However, in a world where teenagers make many important decisions, 
including marriage, it does seem unduly pessimistic to suggest that persons under 18 are 
unlikely to ever have capacity to donate an organ; several US decision including Masden 
v Harrison 85 (14 year old) and Rappeport v Stott86 (17 year old) have held otherwise. 
Surely teenagers in England and Wales are not any more immature than those in the US? 
7.2.2.2. The Competent Minors Liberty to Donate. 
Is Competence of Itself Sufficient for a Minor's Choice to be Determinative? 
Whilst teenagers are in a vulnerable zone between childhood and adulthood 87 it is 
difficult to justify limiting their autonomy by imposing conditions on their donating over 
82j Piaget and B-Inhelder, The Psychology of A Child, Basic Books, 1969. 
83 L. Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-developmental Approach to Socialization. In 
UI A. Goslin (Ed) Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Rand cNa ly, 1969. 84 See D. Price and A-Garwood-Gowers, Transplantation From Minors Are Children Other People's 
Medicine, Contemporary Issues in Law, 1995,1(1), 1-25. 
"Eq. No 68651 (Mass, June 12,1957). Confirmed in the same year by Huskey y Harrison Eq. No. 68666 
(Mass., Aug. 30 1957) and Foster v Harri-son Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20,1957). 
, 01.14o. L 74-57 (Mass, Aug 2 8,1974). 
97 See Rappeport v Stott Civil No. 1.74-57 (Mass, Aug 28,1974). 
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and above those applying to adults in cases where they are competent. However, within 
88 
some transplant laws, including Algeria, the law governing the new 
Landers of 
_S12ain '89 
Greece, 90 Hong K 91 India. 92 Lebanon, 93 Panama 94 Mexico, 95 
96 
German 
and Tunisia, 97 the use of minors as living organ donors has been excluded altogether. 
While such exclusion generates certainty it is at the cost of missing the opportunity to 
utilise capacitate minors some of whom may be just as mature and acceptable as donors 
as an average adult. 
WHO Guiding Principle 5 excludes use of organ donors expressly. 
98 It states that 
exceptions "may be made under national law in the case of regenerative tissue. "99 Some 
transplant legislation regimes allow donation of tissues onlyloo (e. g. The Netherlands, 
101 
8'Law No. 85-05 of 16 Feb 1985 On Health Protection and Promotion (Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, 1985 (17 Feb), 8,122-140. ) section 163. 
"Section 7(2) applicable to the 4 Landers of Unified Germany that used to form East Germany. 
"Section 5 of Law Number 1383 of 2nd August 1983. Though note that under this law bone marrow may 
be exceptionally removed from a minor provided that she and the recipient are siblings they are fully 
histocompatible and consent has been obtained from the person legally responsible for her. 
910rdinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 5(4)b excludes minor under 16 from donating and only allows those 
16-18 to donate if they are married. This provision may be though to unfairly discriminate against single 
and cohabiting 16-17 year olds. 
92 The Transplantation of Human Organs Act 1994 at section 2(f). See Organ Donation Consanguinity Vs 
Universality An Analysis of Indian Law at p4. Manuscript to be published in Transplantation Proceedings, 
December 1996 and can be obtained from EUROTOLD. Organs can be removed from deceased minors 
with parental consent (section 3(7)). 
93 Decree No. 109 of 16 September 1983 On the Removal of Human Tissues and Organs For Therapeutic 
and Scientific Purposes section l(l). 
94 Law No. 10 of II th July 19 83 Regulating The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Parts and laying 
Down Other Provisions at s22. See also section 3 of the Draft Law of The Republic of Belarus On The 
Donation and Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues. Argentina excluded minors under section 13 
of Law No. 21541 of 21 March 1977 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical 
Materials (Buenos Aires, Ministry of Social Welfare, 1977,15pp). However this law has been repealed 
and replaced by a 1993 law the full text of which does not appear in the international Digest of Health 
Legislation. 
"Federal Regulation of 16 Aug 1976 on use of human organs tissues and cadavers, (Salud Publica de 
Mexico, 1977,19,59-68) section 24. 
96 Section 2 of the Crown Decree of 1980. 
97 Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 On The Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs at section 2. 
98"No organ should be removed from the body of a living minor for the purpose of transplantation. " See 
Human Organ Transplantation: A Report Under the Auspices of WHO (1987-1991) World Health 
Organisation, Geneva 1991/ 
991bid. 
'00Consent in such cases will be given on behalf of the minor - although in some instances the minor's view 
on the donation will be relevant and refusal or objection respected e. g. in laws of _Fra_nce, 
The Netherlands 
(Section 8(4) of the law. Hans Akveld in personal communication with the EUROTOLD project. ), 
Belzium and Portual (section 8(4) of 1993 law). 
10'The Netherlands Law of 24 May 1996. Non-regenerable body material can be donated (body material is 
all called organs under this law). Section 5(l) states that, "the removal of an organ from from a living 
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, 
iUM, 102 Slovenia, 103 Portugal, 104 Sri Lanka'05 and Zimbabwe'06 and for specific Belp 
tissues onl Romania. 107 Poland, 108 France, 109 Russian Federation'lo and Greece"'). y 
US cases have the appearance of being somewhat contradictory as to the conditions 
necessary to allow living organ donation by competent minors. In Masden v Harrison 112 
it was stated that a 14 year old minor accepted for donation had given informed and 
voluntary consent but not made clear if this was sufficient justification in itself for 
donation. In Ral2penort v Stott 113 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a 
minor's donation of bone marrow on the express ground that the 17 year old donor was, 
minor 12 or more years of age may be performed only if the organ concerned is regenerable, if the removal 
will not have lasting effects on the donor's health, and only for the purposes of transplantation into a blood 
relative, up to and including the second degree of relationship, who is in danger of losing his life, where 
such danger may not be readily as averted in any other way. Removal may not be performed until the 
minor has given his consent and consent has been obtained from the parents exercising parental authority or 
the guardian, as well as from the judge of the children's court. " Section 5(2) deals with minor under 12 
years of age and those 12 years of age or older and who is not capable of making a reasonable assessment of 
their interests in the matter of donation it makes the same stipulations as the above section but adds that the 
donor must attatch "considerable importance to averting the danger of death threatening the blood relative 
concerned. " 
102 Law of 1986 sections 5-7. 
103 Law of 1996 Article 11. 
10'Law of 1993 at section 8(4). 
05The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at sections 7 and 8. 
06Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 of 1976 at section 12 particularly 
subsection (b). 
107 To a sibling only - ibid at Article 5(l). Article 5(2) requires authorisation to be given by those with 
legal custody in the presence of the president of the court or of a magistrate authorised by him. Article 
5(4) adds that minor refusal to donate is a bar to harvesting. 
10'To an ascendant, descendant or sibling. Their must be a direct danger of loss of life to the recipient or 
possibility to avoid such danger in a manner other than the transplant. The transplant must not cause any 
foreseeable deterioration of the proficiency of the donor's organism and the legal representative and 
custodial court appropriate to the donor's place of residence must give consent. The permission of minors 
over the age of 13 is also required. See Articles 9(2), 9(3) and 9(4) of the Law of 26 October 1995. 
1090nly on behalf of a sibling where consent has been given by each person exercising parental authority or 
the minor's legal representative expressed before the Presiding Judge of the tribunal de grande instance or 
the judge designated by him. "Authorisation must also be granted by a committee of experts who must 
ensure that the minor has been informed of the intended removal, so that he may express his wishes if he is 
capable of doing so. Removal shall not be carried out if the minor reftises. " Article L 671-4 and 671-5 
of Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 On The Donation and Use of Elements and Products of the Human 
Body, Medically Assisted Procreation, and Prenatal Diagnosis. The composition of the committee of 
experts is laid down in Article L. 671-6 (See IDHL, 1994,45(l), 473482 at 475). "'Regulation 3 of 1992 law. 
"'Section 5 of Law No. 1383 of 2nd August 1983. Removal of bone marrow must be exceptional where 
the potential minor donor and recipient are siblings, are fully histocompatible and consent has been 
obtained from the person legally responsible for her. 
112Eq. No 68651 (Mass, June 12,1957). Confirmed in the same year by Ifuskey v Harrison Eq. No. 68666 
(Mass., Aug. 30 1957) and Foster v Harrison Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20,1957). 
113 Civil No. 1.74-57 (Mass, Aug 28,1974). 
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"capable of consenting to the proposed procedure. " This approach has been repeated 
with a sibling kidney donation in another jurisdiction. 
114 However, in this latter case 
the judges could also point to clear psychological benefit to the donor. Indeed, it may 
be speculated in general, that to legally donate an organ a competent minor must 
evidence benefit (even if only required to evidence actual best interests if incompetent) 
through factors like a close pre-existing relationship with the prospective recipient. This 
restriction is likely to be founded on the grounds of the seriousness of the procedure, the 
fact that it is not designed for the therapeutic benefit of the minor and the connected point 
that there are potential conflicts of interest. 
The danger of veto of a competent minor's choice is much more real than the danger of 
forced donation. Re W has reaffirmed the Gillick concept that parents have no right of 
veto if a doctor chooses to accept a capacitate minors choice. 115 However, there is no 
obligation on the doctor to accept the wishes of the minor rather than those of the parents 
even if he considers the former's approach more rational. Doctors might be reluctant to 
ever proceed without Parental consent - through both conservatism and the shadows of 
doubt about the possibility of minor competency to donate that Re W have cast over the 
arena of LDT. Interestingly the US case of Bonner v Moran 126 F. 2d 121 (1941)1 16 
goes as far as to suggest that parental consent would generally be required. 117 
The Competent Minor's Rig-ht not to Donate 
Inroads into the autonomy of the competent minor are very strong in English law with 
regard to medical treatment as a whole. Re W118 (confirmed in le R has established 
that a competent minor can have his/her self-determination infringed without legal 
recourse providing the medical practitioner obtains a consent from someone who is in a 
position to legally consent on that minor's behalf (usually a parent/legal guardian)-119 
Obtaining such a consent, according to Lord Donaldsods idiosyncratic judgement, acts 
as an insulating 'flak j ackef against legal liability even where going against the view of a 
114 In the Alabama jurisdiction from a 17 year old donor to a 16 year old recipient - see G. Smitherson, The 
Legal Dilemna of Minor Sibling Kidney Donation, The Alabama Journal ofMedical Sciences, 1982, 
19(3), 309. 
115[1992] 3 WLR 758 at 767 F. 
116The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
117 The case concerned a possible skin graft from the minor to his severely burned cousin. This case 
involved a minor without capacity but the principle stated in a manner general to minors. 
118Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 758 (CA). 
1191bid. 
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Gillick competent minor (even if the minor is 16 or 17) . 
120 This approach runs counter 
to Hoggett's dictum that, "the capacity to consent must logically include the capacity to 
dissent" 12 1 and not surprisingly it has been stated that in English law, ".. as far as 
teenagers are concerned there is no longer any real meaning to consent" 
122 
Kennedy and Grubb suggest that -ReW and 
Re R are "provocative; " 123 neglecting the 
most fundamental value in section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act - that of respecting 
autonomy. 124 They note the disturbing possibility that the decisions might allow a 
doctor to be immunised from liability when performing a sterilisation or abortion on a 
young competent women without her consent. 125 Similarly disturbing and far more 
consequentialist is the theoretical possibility that organ and tissue removals with 
potentially serious consequences might be performed on unconsenting competent minors. 
Since LDT is only intended to be a voluntary gifting act the spectre of forcing someone to 
donate should, and probably would, be ruled out at the earliest opportunity. 
Fortunately, Re W and Re R in general, and the assessment in some cases before 
Masden v Harrison that the consent of parents alone might be sufficient are all 
contentious, rejectable legal approaches, that are out of step with a modem approach in 
which the rights of older minors are treated seriously (most particularly of all in the 
context of living organ donation). Lord Donaldson's views conflict with the view of 
120Lord Donaldson stated that medical ethics would require a doctor to seek parental consent where a 
Gillick competent minor had consented to donation but he did not consider this to be a legal duty (Ee-W 
[ 1992] 3 WLR 75 8 at 767). 
12'Hoggett. B., Parents, Children and Medical Treatment: The Legal Issues, in P. Byrne (ed. ), Rights and 
Wrongs in Medicine, Kings Fund (OUP), 1986,158. 
122jo Bridgman, Old Enough to Know Best?, Journal ofLegal Studies, 1993,13(l), 69. 
123 Medical Law Text with Materials, Butterworths, 1994,393. 
124 Medical Law, Butterworths, 1994,393. Section 8(l) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 appears to 
treat 16 and 17 year olds as adults for the purposes of medical treatment: "(1) The consent of a minor who 
has attained the age of 16 years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of 
consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age 
and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be 
necessary to obtain any consent for it from parent or guardian. " However in Re W section 8 was construed 
as 'not conferring' an absolute right of sovereignty in medical decision making to 16 and 17 year olds by 
virtue of subsection 3 stating that, "(n)othing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any 
consent which would have been effective if this section had not been enacted. " This was construed as 
insulating physicians from liability even where they were going against the wishes of a competent 16 or 17 
year old minor provided that the consent of someone with legal authority to consent had been given. 
Clearly to gain prima-facie protection of the right to self-determination in medical treatment a person must 
be 18 years old. This decision appears to go against the spirit of Gillick which emphasised that the 
authority of adults progressively diminishes as the minor grows in maturity and understanding[ 1985] 3 All 
ER 402 - see Lord Scarman's speech particularly. 125'Medical Law Text with Materials, ' Butterworths, 1994,393. 
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Lord Scarman in Gillick and the policy of the Children Act 1989 under which a child who 
has sufficient understanding has a right to make an informed refusal to submit to a 
medical or psychiatric assessment or examination. 126 
Although, in their aim to protect doctors from liability, some of the recent decisions 
concerning minor decision making (including Re W and Re LI) have extended state 
control over children and the family127 it would be difficult to sustain donation as 
psychologically in the best interests of a minor opposed to it or even a minor who, 
although not opposing, had not given some active and meaningful agreement. This 
view is supported in Re W where Lord Donaldson implied that living donation cannot 
benefit a minor128 while Lord Justice Balcombe more forthrightly ruled out the possibility 
of donation by an unconsenting competent minor. The case commentary in Re Y has 
even hypothesised that the court would, as a rule of thumb, look for agreement in bone 
marrow donation by an incompetent donor. 129 US minor donations have specifically 
been justified on the estimation that prospective psychological gains / avoidance of 
psychological harm brought about by donation outweigh prospective physical detriment 
An English court might be influenced by this approach but only where the minor had no 
view or was in favour of donation; it would be hard to prove that a donor would 
psychologically benefit from a clinically unnecessary procedure (s)he is opposed to! 
7.2.2.3. Jurisdictions OnIv Allowing Competent Minors to Become Living Organ 
Donors. 
The transplant legislation of a number of jurisdictions including Poland, 130 Slovakia, 131 
Cyprus, 132 Turke 
'133 
HungM, 134 Romania, 135 Ecuador, 136 Kuwait 137 and Bulgaria 138 
126 See sections 43(8), 44(7) and Schedule 3, paras 4(4) and 5(5). 
127 See Bainham, The Judge and the Competent Minor, LQR, 1992,108,194. 
128 Re W (A Minor) Medical Treatment [1992] 3 WLR 758 at 767F. 
129Re Y commentary, Med L Rev 205-207 at 207 - the case and commentary is discussed further in section 
7.4. 
130Law of 26 October 1995 Regulating The Removal and Transplantation of Human Cells, Tissues and 
Organs at Article 9(l). See Transplantation From Living Donors Vv%o are Unable to Give Consent For 
Organ Harvesting, Marek Safjan, Dorota Safjan. Manuscript to be published in Transplantation 
Proceedings, Dec 1996. Copies of this and the Law available from EUROTOLD. 
13 'Section 46(l) of Law No. 277 of 24 August 1994. 
132 Law No. 97 of 1987 On The Removal and Transplantation of Biological Materials of Human Origin at 
section 7(3). 
133 States that, "the removal of an organ or tissue from a person under 18 years of age... shall be permissible 
in cases where the person has drawn up and signed a document in the presence of at least 2 witnesses and in 
the absence of any pressure of any kind, or where the person has given an oral undertaking in the presence 
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restrict living organ donation to capacitate minors. 139 Some jurisdictions indirectly 
arrive at the same result e. g. the requirement in Norwgy 140 and Denmark141 thatthe minor 
consents to the removal is almost equivalent to the requirement for capacity because 
consent under these jurisdictions means understanding the risks, consequences etc. 
142 
Donations not classed as between genetic relatives under HOTA can only be conducted if 
the donor "understands the nature of the medical procedure and the risks, as explained by 
the registered general medical practitioner, and consents to the removal of the organ in 
question. , 143 In effect 'non-genetic-relative' donation is almost limited to donors who 
are competent. Nonyay144 and Denmark145 require special reasons for donation; 
presumably justifications like closeness of donor-recipient relationship, quality of match, 
unusual need and lack of reasonable alternatives. No 2 
146 Denmark147 and 
of at least two witnesses and has signed a declaration which is then countersigned by a physician. " Donors 
under the age of 18 (as well as adults) are prohibited from donating if they are deemed "unable to take their 
own decision for mental of psychological reasons. " This appears to be equivalent to a requirement for 
capacity. Section 6 of LawNo. 2238 of 29 May 1979. 
134 Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 of the Minister for Health for the Implementation of Law No. 11 
on Health Relating to the Removal and Transplantation of Organs and Tissues states in section 51(2) that 
the physician performing the transplantation is responsible for informing the patient "or, if he is a minor, 
his relative of the necessity of the operation, the risks it entails.. and that the written declaration of the 
relative indicating that he consented of his own free will and in the absence of any pressure, must be kept 
in the clinical file of the patient. " However, the Ordinance Law No. 6 of 1987, amending the 1972 law, 
states in section 7(2) that, "in the case of transplantation of bone marrow, removal may also be carried out 
on the body of a minor, with the consent of his legal representative. In the case of the withdrawal of tissue 
from the body of a minor of limited competence, the donor's consent shall also be required. " This section 
appears to refer to tissue but not organ donation by capacitate minor donors. 
135Article 4(l) of the 1996 Law Regarding The Harvesting and The Transplantation of Human Tissues and 
Organs. Regulation 133. Also note that s129 even prohibits the donation of blood by minors. 
136 Law No. 64 of 26th May 1987 section 24. 
137 Decree-LawNo. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation section 2. Althoughone 
conceivable interpretation is that this section only applies to cadaveric even if it did in the statute it is hard 
to see living donation being interpreted less stringently in practice than cadaveric. 
1380rdinance No 15 of The Minister of Public Health On the Transplantation of Human Organs, 30th April 
1976 No. 35. Bulgaria! s law is currently under review. 
139See also Peruvian law which simply states that "the donor shall have given his express consent" which 
probably means a competent consent (Law No. 23415 of I June 1982 at section 7(b)) and Vietnam law - 
although in the case of the minor recipient relatives or guardians may consent which might mean they could 
also consent for the donor. Law of 30 June 1989 On The Protection of Public Health (section 30(2)). 140Law No. 6 of 19 Feb 1973. 
14'Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 at section 13(2). 
142 See chapter 5.3. Norway's law (1973) states that the minor donor must have understood the information 
concerning the nature of the operation and its consequences which was provided to him by a physician. 143 The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI No 2480) at regulation 3(l) b. 144 Requires special grounds to exist (Law No. 6 of 19 Feb 1973). 
145Requires that there are special reasons for performing the intervention on a person under the age of 18 
(Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 at section 13(2)). 
146 Requires the agreement of the minor's guardian and the person exercising parental authority and 
responsible for the care of the minor (Law No. 6 of 19 Feb 1973). 
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Bulgaria 148 impose the requirement of parental consent; making parental veto possible. 
Nonyays law149 requires the approval / authorisation of a National Health Board. 
7.2.3. Court Involvement. 
The seriousness of minor organ donation and the conflicting interests involved'50 make 
the involvement of the courts, or a quasi-legal body, essential. This approach has 
typically been accepted in the US. 151 The approach of cases in the UK is more divided. 
Lord Donaldson in Re W seems to imply that court involvement would not be mandatory 
for organ donation at least where the doctor reasonably believes the minor is Gillick 
competent or obtains the consent of someone legally able to consent on behalf of the 
minor. 152 The furthest he went was to say that, 
"a doctor may well be advised to apply to the court for guidance, as recommended by 
Lord Templeman in a different context in Re B (a minor)(wardship: sterilisation) [1988] 
A. C. 199,205-6. " 153 
147 Requires that the approval of the person exercising parental authority has been obtained (Law No. 402 of 
13 June 1990 at section 13(2)). 
148 Law of 1996. 
149Requires the agreement of the directorate of Health Services (Law No. 6 of 19 Feb 1973). 
15OThe Law Commission also took the view that, "(r)eference to ajudicial forum can ensure that decisions 
are made properly, and are seen to be made properly, and protect those providing the treatment from 
criticism or future liability. In addition there may be a category of decisions which are so serious that the 
involvement of ajudicial body is always required. " (Law Commission's Consultation Paper on Mentally 
Incapacitated Adults and Decision Making: Medical Research and Treatment, No. 129 at 4.1. ) If this is 
to apply to adults their is also a clear basis for it to apply to minors. 
15 'Hart v Brown 29 Conn. Supp. 368,289 A-2d 386 (Super. Ct 1972); Howard v Fulton-DeKalb Memorial 
Hosp. Auth., Civil No. B-90430 (Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga., Nov. 29,1973); Children's Memorial 
Hosp. v. Lewis, No. 73CH6936 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Nov. 21,1973); In re Richardson 284 So. 2d 
185 (La. App. 1973); In re Bostrom , Eq. No. 493 85 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Md., June 7,1974); In 
re Bachman., _Fid. 
No. 20828 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax County, Va., Aug. 9,1974); Lausier v Pescinski. No. 668 
(Wis., Mar. 4,1975). Washington is an exception - the Attorney General's Office appears to have 
determined that the written consent of the legal guardian is sufficient consent for a minor or other legal 
incompetent. 
152[ 1 992] 3 WLR 758 at 767. He stated that, "Organ transplants are quite different and, as a matter of 
law, doctors would have to secure the consent of someone with the rights to consent on behalf of a donor 
under the age of 18 or, if they relied on the consent of the minor himself, or herself, be satisfied that the 
minor was Gillick competent in the context of so serious a procedure which could not benefit the minor. " 
Reversed around this statement means that however desirable court involvement might be with regard to 
minor donors it is not legally necessary as the doctors will be insulated from liability if they follow 
Donaldson's instructions. 
153[ 1 992] 3 WLR 75 8 at 767G. 
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Mr Justice Connell in Re Y merely suggested court involvement was appropriate in adult 
incompetent bone marrow cases. 154 David Price and I have suggested that Donaldson's 
approach to minors in Re W may not be good law. 155 Indeed, Lord Justice Nolan in Re 
W contradicts Donaldson's approach. He considered Court involvement to be 
mandatory in the context of a potential abortion procedure and added, 
"I would say the same of a case in which a child of any age consented to donate an 
organ. " 156 
This is consistent with the approach recommended by the Law Commission' 57 for adult 
incompetent bone marrow and organ donation. 158 
7.2.4. Conclusions Regarding Minors and LDT. 
The legislative approach to organ donation by minors has so far had an overriding 
emphasis on restricting minors to areas where the potential risks of donation are low, 
with the unwitting exception of often allowing liver segment donation. In a few 
154[1996] Med L Rev 204-205 at 205. 
155 Price and Garwood-Gowers, Transplantation From Minors: Are Children Other People's Medicine, 
Contemporary Issues in Law, 1996, l(l), 1-27 at 17. 
156 Re W[ 1992] 3 WLR 75 8 at 782C. 
157 Law Com No. 231 at p85. 
15'Tissue donation can be distinguished given that is usually involves lesser detriment to a donor but ought 
(unless de minimus detriment at issue) to necessitate court involvement simply because of the conflicting 
interests involved, the fragile status of the prospective donor and the difficulties of assessing best interests 
where a non-therapeutic procedure is involved. In contraceptive sterilisation cases involving adult 
incapacity, views have varied amongst judges from seeing court involvement as mandatory (Lord 
Templeman in Re B (a minor) (wardship: sterilization) [19881 AC 199, Lord Griffiths in Re F (mental 
patient. sterifisation) [1990] 2 ACI and the majority in the Australian case of Department of Health v JWB, 
& SMB (1992) 66 ALJR 360 (Aust High Ct)) to merely seeing it as desirable (Lords Brandon and Goff in 
Re F [1990] 2 AQ. The net effect of a series of recent lower court decisions by Sir Stephen-Brown P (Ege 
E (a minor) (medical treatment)[ 1991] 7 BMLR 117 (Fam Div) and FyF [1991] 7 BMLR 135 (Fam Div) 
and Re SQ (a minor) (1991) 6 BMLR 95 (Fam Div)) appears to be that the court will only necessarily 
involve itself in matters which are non-therapeutic. This would almost certainly include organ donation as 
well as the more obvious example of contraceptive sterilisation. In Re F [1990] 2 A. C. 1, Lord Bridge in 
the House of Lords (ibid at 52), along with Neill LJ (ibid at 33) and Lord Donaldson MR (ibid at 19) in the 
Court of Appeal, mentioned that an operation to allow inter vivos organ donation by an incapacitated adult 
required similar safeguards to contraceptive sterilisation - i. e. court involvement. Arguably, sterilisation 
is a much more serious procedure than organ donation - the former has an intrinsic and fundamental 
(restrictive? ) influence on the way a person lives their life, the latter would only do so if it 'went wrong. ' 
Nethertheless, there is good sense in requiring court involvement for adult organ donation as well as 
sterilisation especially given the need to safeguard against utilitarianism. 
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instances the justifications (such as close donor-recipient relationship'159 direct interest of 
the donor in saving the recipienfs life 160 and need of the recipient 161 ) must be higher than 
average as well. Minors clearly have restricted freedom in the donation of organs but 
this fact also means they are legally insulated from the possibility of risky / harmful 
procedures (particularly important given concerns about pressure and unconscious 
motivation discussed in the last chapter) and the reputation of the medical enterprise is 
protected. However, the failure of many transplant laws to make a distinction between 
capacity and majority denies autonomy and is difficult to ethically justify simply via 
paternalism. 
Although common law is generally framed to restrict medical liability and maximise 
clinical discretion rather than protect autonomy of competent or incompetent patients, 
minor living organ donors are in something of an exceptional position. This exceptional 
position has meant that the wishes of competent and incompetent minors are often seen to 
be taken account of; especially in the context of not mandating a minor to donate an 
organ but also in valuing a minors viewpoint about the prospective living donation when 
assessing whether or not their is sufficient justification for a donation to go ahead. 
Globally speaking, however, both transplant legislation and general principles of law in 
this area are some distance from methodolically considering the role of minors in the 
living organ donation decision-making process. This role should involve competent 
minors being treated on a par with competent adults. 162 The age of majority, and hence 
the presumption of capacity to donate an organ, should apply from the age of 16,17 or 18 
159E. g. Belgium's law of 1986 (regulation 7) states that the recipient must be a sibling, as do Er-ench (law of 
1994 Article L. 6714 and 671-5), Greek (law of 1983 section 5-6) and Romanian laws (Article 5(l) of 
1996. Poland's law of 1995 (Article 9(l)-9(4)) allows incapacitate minor donors to donate only to a linear 
relative or sibling. Slovenian law of 1996 (Article 9) allows such persons to donate to the direct family 
unity only 5-6), The Netherlands law of 1996 states that donors of 12-18 years must be donating to a first 
or second degree relative. 
160E. g. The Netherlands 1996 for regenerative tissues states that if the donor is less than 12 he/she must 
have her own interest in saving the recipients life (plus additional requirements applying to donors over 12 
years).. 
161E. g. The Netherlands law 1996 states that where the donor is 12-18 the recipient must be in danger of 
losing his / her life for the donation to be permitted. This applies to regenerative tissue - not regenerative 
cannot be donated by a minor in The Netherlands. 
162 Price and Garwood-Gowers in Transplantation From Minors: Are Children Other People's Medicine 
noted the grounds suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in ifs Report on the Procurement 
and Transfer of Human Tissues and Organs (Working Paper 66,1992) for prohibiting all forms of 
donation by minors but each of these was countered in the paper which concluded that "there are really no 
compelling arguments against allowing (competent) minors to donate even (paired) non-regenerable organs 
in certain circumstances. " 
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- in line with the age at which young people are considered adult for the purposes of 
making most serious decisions. The position could be subject to social and cultural 
variations but it may be thought that in all cases majority in organ donation should be no 
more than 18 years of age. 
Incompetent minors should only being sanctioned as organ donors where they explicitly 
agree and have sufficient understanding and maturity for this agreement to be a 
meaningful choice. In this context the acceptance of very young minors must be 
regarded as dubious. Living organ donors as young as 7 have been accepted in the US; 
it must be concluded that a person of this age would normally only have sufficient 
maturity and understanding to make a meaningful choice about very simple and low level 
risks of donation, such as donation of blood. The presence of hypothetical reasoning 
(normally appearing between the ages of 11-15) ought to be treated as a minimum 
condition for organ donation by a minor. A mere assent, or absence of refusal, should 
be treated as insufficient on the basis that it does not adequately protect minor autonomy. 
Several other requirements should be added in the context of an organ donation by an 
incompetent minor, including: 
consent to donation of someone qualified to consent on the incompetents behalf (e. g. a 
parent - this is a matter of saying that a person who is not fully competent needs 
another person to help protect their interest); 
the donation must be very likely to be psychologically beneficial. This should be 
evidenced by a significant relationship between the minor and prospective recipient 
whereby the minor will be likely to gain significant psychological value from donation 
and/or avoid the likelihood of significant detriment from not donating. The mere fact 
that donation is in general psychologically beneficial should be regarded as a 
speculative and insufficient basis for justifying donation; and 
Prospective benefit must outweigh prospective detriment - i. e. the donation must be in 
the best interests of the incompetent. Organ donation is a serious and invasive 
procedure not designed for the benefit of the minor so benefit ought to clearly and 
significantly outweigh detriment (this requirement is perhaps more important than in 
the case of tissue donation). In addition, detriment should be limited; it might be 
considered that kidney donation is the only acceptable form of organ donation by a 
minor. 
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The best approach would be to use a legal forum, set up by legislation, to examine all 
prospective donations according to the above principles. 163 The presence of such a 
forum would help to allay the concerns of those who believe that only competent minors 
should be allowed to become living organ donors. 164 Such a forum could use expert 
psychological evidence and where appropriate use a social worker to interview a child .1 
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Statutory regulations could lay down guidelines for the forum from time to time - such as 
guidance about different forms of donation, to be altered in the light of advances in 
transplantation practice. 
7.3. Non-Minority Based Capacity and LDT. 
Historically adult incompetents have been vulnerable to the vagaries of extreme 
utilitarianism, including the application of eugenics ideas in the US. Even today adult 
incompetents are vulnerable to the covert or unconscious judicial application of 'social 
interests' disguised as an assessment of best interests. Theoretically this will particularly 
be a danger in living organ donation, given it is not a procedure designed for the benefit 
of the incompetent. Justifying adult incompetent donation can be particularly difficult 
where the incompetent has reduced (or even nil) ability to accrue psychological benefits 
in terms of self-esteem etc. from donation. In such cases donation would have to be 
shown to be of overall benefit to the incompetent via helping him/her avoid a degree of 
psychological hann outweighing the physical detriment of donation. Making an 
assessment of psychological benefit compared to physical harm is, as we have seen, 
often difficult - not least because there is a degree of speculation involved when 
examining the likely psychological impact of LDT upon the donor. 
Despite the difficulties of justifying living organ donation by an adult incompetent, or for 
that matter an older minor with a mental condition, it has been sanctioned in a number of 
the major US cases. 166 Under English law bone marrow donation by an incompetent 
163 Price and Garwood-Gowers, Transplantation From Minors: Are Children Other People's Medicine, 
Contemporary Issues in Law, 1996, l(l), 1-27 at 18. 
164For instance, D. Daube has suggested that a minors consent would be a minimum ('Transplantation: 
Acceptability of Procedures and the Required Legal Sanctions, ' in Ethics In Medical Progress, 
G. Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor (eds. ), Little Brown, 1966,188-20 1. 
165 L. Delaney has suggested that a social worker could be used (see Law and the Altruistic Child in 
Medicine, in D. Lockton (ed), Children and the Law, Cavendish, 1993,39 at 42). 166 See e. g. Strunk v Strunk 445 S. W. 2d 145 (ky. 1969), Little v Little (Tex Civ 1979) 576 SW 2d 493, In 
Re Guardianship of Pescinski (1975) 67 Wis 2d 4,226 NW 2d 180 and In Re Richardson (La App 1973), 
284 So 2d 185. Some cases involve older minors and some adults. 
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adult was sanctioned in Re Y. In addition some transplant laws allow for donation of 
organs by an incompetent adult and in a few instances are so radical as to not require any 
special conditions for it other than the obvious requirement that someone with legal 
authority to consent must consent of the incompetents behalf. At the other end of the 
spectrum there are transplant laws which exclude the possibility of living organ donation 
by incompetent adults and even in some cases are framed in such a way as to potentially 
act as a 'drag net' preventing donation by some competent adults. 
7.3.1. Defining Capacity in Relation to Adults with a Mental Disabilitv 
Illness / Condition. 
There are several overall approaches in English common law to defining adult-related 
capacity. Bristow J in Chatterson v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257 stated that the patient 
was required to understand the nature of the procedure and iVs consequences in broad 
terms in order to give a legally valid consent. 167 In Re F [1990] 2 AC I the test was 
ability to understand the nature or purpose of an operation or treatment. 168 This 
approach is usually referred to as the functional or cognitive approach. In Re C1 69 
Thorpe J focused on the test developed by Dr Eastman as an expert witness in the case. 
Eastman analysed the decision-making process into 3 stages: (1) comprehending and 
retaining information; (2) believing it and (3) weighing it in balance to arrive at a choice. 
This approach could simply be interpreted as a more detailed explication of the 
'understanding in broad terms' required in Chatterson v Gerson. 170 A definitive test in 
this area is elusive; hence the recommendation of the Law Commission, in it's recent 
Command Paper on adult medical decision making and capacity, of; 
".. a single piece of legislation to make new provision for people who, lack mental 
capacity; and to confer new functions on local authorities in relation to people in need of 
care or protection. " 171 
167[l 98 1]I All ER 257 at 265 see also - 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All E. R. 649. 
168[ 1 990] 2 AC I at 55 per Lord Brandon. 
169NLj 1993,143,1642. 
1700f indirect legal effect, but general interest here is the Mental Health Act Code of Practice (which came 
into force on November Ist 1993). The Code applies to both detained and informal patients and provides 
that an individual in order to have capacity must be able to: Understand what medical treatment is and that 
somebody has said that he needs it and why the treatment is being proposed; understand in broad terms the 
nature of the treatment; understand it's principle benefits and risks; understand what will be the 
consequences of not receiving the proposed treatment and possess the capacity to make a choice. 
17'Law Com No 23 1, HMSO, 1995,29. 
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The Commission recommended that legislation relating to adult incapacity should apply 
to people aged 16 and over, 172 with a presumption against lack of capacity 173 and a 
person being defined as without capacity at the material time if he or she is 
,, (I) unable by reason of mental disability to make a decision on the matter in question, 
or 
(2) unable to communicate adecision on that matter because he or she is unconscious 
or for any other reason. "174 
It added that in terms of the retention of information, 
46.. a person should be regarded as unable to make a decision by reason of mental disability 
if the disability is such that, at the time when the decision needs to be made, he or she is 
unable to understand or retain the information relevant to the decision, including 
information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or 
another or failing to make the decision. "175 
with the requirement for understanding and retaining information being viewed as met 
where a person is, 
".. able to understand an explanation of that information in broad terms and simple 
language. "176 
Concerned that a person should not only be able to retain and understand information but 
utilise it in the decision-making process, the Commission recommended that, 
C(I-a person should be regarded as unable to make a decision by reason of mental disability 
if the disability is such that, at the time when the decision needs to be made, he or she is 
unable to make a decision based on the information relevant to the decision, including 
information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or 
,, 177 another or failing to make the decision. 
'7'Page 30 ibid. 
"Page 32 ibid. 
174Draft Bill, clause 2(l)) at page 37 ibid. 
175Draft Bill, clause 2(2)(a). 
176 Draft Bill, clause 2(3) at page 39 ibid. 
'77Draft Bill, clause 2(2)(b ) at page 39 ibid. The Commission also produced a thoughtful 
recommendation on the communication of decisions; ".. a person should not be regarded as unable to 
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Perhaps one of the dangers here would be that a judge or clinician could use deduction to 
say that because of the 'imprudent' way a person has decided they couldn't reasonably be 
viewed as having made a decision based on the relevant information. Such an approach 
would obliterate any practical role for autonomy which must include the right to make 
decisions which others regard as irrational or bizarre. Hence, the Commission framed a 
recommendation stating that a person, 
".. should not be regarded as unable to make a decision by reason of mental disability 
merely because he or she make a decision which would not be made by a person of 
ordinary prudence. "178 (emphasis added). 
The problem with this provision is the use of the word 'merely' which would suggest that 
a person's choice could be relied upon heavily (provided not completely) to conclude (or 
deduce? ) that they do not have capacity. The danger here is still one of the imposition of 
a fairly homogenous set or narrow band of values upon people making decisions. In 
practice it may even make people with unusual medical viewpoints more vulnerable to 
being 'found' incapacitate to make a decision simply because of the unconventionality of 
their view. Consequently the recommendation may not guard enough against 
unnecessary breaches of a person's right to bodily control. In most situations this would 
not have ramifications for a living donor who would be regarded as making a 'prudent' or 
at least 'normal' decision whether or not (s)he chose to donate. However, it could have 
ramifications if the donor was wanting to donate an organ with very high risks (such as a 
Leicester donor discussed in chapter 9 who wanted to donate his second kidney). It 
could also have ramifications for a prospective recipient, who may for instance wish to 
follow an unconventional course of rejecting transplant and dialysis altogether to use 
naturopathic, holistic treatment. 
However, in general, the Commissions approach can be welcomed as one that if adopted 
would bring a degree of certainty to English law in this area although inevitably there will 
always be some difficulties in applying provisions in the field of complex and rapidly 
evolving medical technologies of which LDT is a part. 
communicate his or her decision unless al practicable steps to enable him or her to do so have been taken 
without success. " (Draft Bill, clause 2(5)). 
17'Draft Bill, clause 2(4). Evidence to the Commission overwhelmingly supported the inclusion of an 
express recommendation guarding against capacity beingjudged by the choice made itself (page 39-40 
ibid). 
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7.3.3. Jurisdictions Allowing the Donation of Organs and Tissues by 
Incompetent Adults. 
As well as being possible under general legal principles, some transplant laws 
specifically state that an adult incompetent may become a donor. Not surprisingly, such 
donation is always subject to special conditions. 
7.3.3.1. Conditions on Living- Organ Donation by Incompetent Adults Under 
TransplantLegislation. 
The Council of Europe's Resolution (78)29 179 restricts donation to regenerative 
materials 180 and this must only be in exceptional cases and where the incompetent does 
not object 18 1 and consent has been given by the legal representative. 182 Theoretically, 
allowing donation of regenerative materials results in the possibility of incompetent adult, 
living liver segment donation, although it is difficult to see their ever being sufficiently 
exceptional circumstances to justify this. 
183 84 85 h In Huniza 3, Colombia' and Malawi' the condition is merely consent by te donor's 
legal representative but other transplant laws with provision in this area are stricter. For 
instance, Swedish law 186 states that transplant operations may be performed on persons 
who are incapable of giving consent due to a mental disorder if the donor is related to the 
potential recipient, if it is not possible to obtain medically compatible biological material 
from another person, if it is not against the donor's wishes, if consent is given by the 
guardian or legal representative and if the National Board of Health and Welfare 
authorises it - for this to happen there must be special justifications and the support of the 
physician empowered to decide on the removal. Swedish law does not state what 
special reasons constitute - possible factors might include a close relationship between 
donor and recipient and/or the likelihood of tangible harm to the incompetent should the 
1790n Harmonization of Legislation of Member States to Removal, Grafting and Transplantation of Human 
Substances. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on II May 1978. "'Article 6(2). 
"'Article 6(l). 
182A, rtiCle 2. 
""'the legal representative (curator), in the case of a patient who is mentally incompetent or is of 
diminished responsibility" (Law No. 18 of 4 November 1972 at section 13). 
184 Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 1989 at section 30. 
'85Anatomy Act No. 14 of 1990 at section II (b). 
186 Law No. 831 of 8 June 1995 at section 8 QDHL, 1996,47(l), 28-30 at 29). 
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recipient die. The Canadian Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 requires an 
independent assessment to be made where such an incapacitate donation is proposed but 
clearly envisages the possibility. 
The status of mentally ill/disabled incapacitate donation is uncertain in Finland; a 
psychiatrist gives an account of the mental condition of the donor and his suitability as a 
donor. It would appear that 'unsuitable' donors are excluded! 87 Since 'unsuitable' is 
defined by a psychiatrist it's ambit is uncertain. It may in practice mean that anyone 
incapacitate to donate would be excluded. Effectively English law prevents non- 
genetically related incompetent adult organ donation and leaves the legality of organ 
donation by genetically related incompetents to be determined under general principles! 88 
7.3.3.2. Conditions on Living Organ Donation by Incompetent Adults Under 
General Principles of Law. 
The Approach Within Which Conditions are Framed 
The 'best interests' test and the substituted judgement doctrine' 89 have been the subject of 
much comment in cases involving consideration of living donation by incompetent adults. 
English law has rejected the substituted judgement doctrine in Re Y (Adult Incompetent: 
Legalily of Non-Therapeutic Procedure [1996] Med L Rev, 204-205 where Mr Justice 
Connell in the High Court of Justice, Family Division used the best interests test in 
determining the legality of an adult incompetent donating bone marrow to her sister. 190 
As regards US cases involving living organ donation by adult incompetents, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals considered substituted judgement in Strunk v Strunk 445 SW 
2d 145 (Ky 1969)191 but as stated in Little v Little (Tex Civ 1979), 576 SW 2d 493, 
Strunk was not based on substituted judgement, 
1870rdinance No. 724 of 23 August 1985 On The Removal of Human Organs and Tissues for Medical 
Purposes at section 2). 
'"As seen in the section on minors Under HOTA, non-genetically related organ donation by an 
incompetent person is unlikely to ever be authorised. 
'89Used as far back as 1816 with an adult incompetent in Ex parte Whitebread 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch 1816). 
`0Page204. The US bone marrow case of Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N. E. 2d 1319 (III. Sup. Ct) was used 
as authority. 
'9'The New York case of In The Matter of Willougbby, A Lunatic II Paige 257 (N. Y. 1844) provided 
authority that the substituted judgement doctrine applied in the US. For further discussion of the doctrine 
see Annot, 24 A. L. R. 3d 863 (1969). 
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"It is clear in transplant cases that courts, whether they use the term 'substituted 
judgement' or not, will consider the benefits to the donor as a basis for permitting an 
incompetent to donate an organ. Although in Strunk the Kentucky Court discussed the 
substituted judgement doctrine in some detail, the conclusion of the majority there was 
based on the benefits that the incompetent donor would derive, rather than on the theory 
that the incompetent would have consented to the transplant if he were competent. We 
adopt this approach. " 192 
The probable legal position is that substituted judgement is one of the factors for the 
doctor to take into account, "in forming a clinical judgement as to what is in the best 
interests of the patient. " (per Lord Donaldson MR in Re T (adult: refusal of treatmenD 
[1992] 4 All ER 649(CA)). The weight of opinion'93 and common sense goes against 
Lord Goff s view in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 that substituted 
judgement formed no part of English law in relation to incompetent adults. 
The use of the best interests test has not been without criticism. Judge Samuel Steinfield 
giving the dissenting opinion in Strunk took the view that consent was the sole 
justification for donation. 194 He placed weight upon concerns that the issue raised 
thoughts of experimentation on human subjects reminiscent of 25 years ago, 
"an arently because of my indelible recollection of a government which to the shame of UP 
it's citizens embarked upon a programme of genocide and experimentation with human 
bodies I have been more troubled in reaching a decision in this case than in any other. " 195 
The merit of this lone view is that preventing incompetent persons from donating protects 
them from utilitarian abuse. Allowing such donation opens the door to ignoring - or not 
thoroughly exploring the wishes, values and involvement of the incompetent in the 
decision -a situation which happened in Strunk v Strunk itself with the whole emphasis 
192LLIttle 576 SW 2d at 498. 
193 The approach in Airedale is criticised by Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law, Text with Materials, 
Butterworths, 1994,289. The authors doubt whether Lord Goff in Bland was sound in his reliance on Re 
F (mental patient: sterilisation)[1990] 2AC I (HL) as authority for substituted judgment not applying in 
English law. Lord Mustill also criticised substituted judgment in Bland but his comments were more 
relevant to the specific case of a non-sentient patient. Re J (a minorl (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 
All ER 930 makes it clear that the individual circumstances of the particular person at issue need to be taken 
into account in deciding what's in the her/his best interest. 
1941oThe ability to fully understand and consent is a pre-requisite to the donation of a part of the human 
body" (445 S. W. 2d 145 (Ky. 1969) at 150). 
195 445 S. W. 2d 145 (Ky 1969) at p149. 
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being on a paternalistic evaluation by the psychiatrist of the level of the incompetents 
capabilities (e. g. through I. Q. and other tests) without a real attempt being made to try 
and facilitate the incompetent's expression of his true feelings about donation. 196 
Conditions for Accepting Living Organ Donation by Adult Incompetent's Under the Best 
Interests Test. 
In terms of the general position for incompetent adults, there is considerable uncertainty 
as to the exact meaning of the best interests test in English law. The House of Lords 
recently considered the question in the sterilisation case of Re F [1990] 2 A. C. 1. Lord 
Brandon took the view that a treatment would be in the patients best interests where it 
was carried out to save his life or ensure improvement / prevent deterioration in his 
physical or mental health. 197 Some academics suggested that Lord Brandon was 
confining best interests to medical factors. 198 Whether or not this was the case it is now 
clear that assessment of best interests can involve "more than a purely medical 
opinion. "199 Indeed Lord Keith, in Airedale NHS Trust y Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, 
took the view that the sterilisation of the patient in Re F had been determined to be in her 
best interests "because her life would be fuller and more agreeable" through it. 200 It is 
notable that if Re F were confining the 'best interests' test to medical factors bone 
marrow donation would never have been sanctioned in Re Y because donation would not 
be medically necessary. Indeed adult incompetent donation of tissues and organs as a 
whole would be unlawful. 201 
So what are the relevant factors in determining best interests? Lord Donaldson's in the 
Court of Appeal in Re F suggested that doctors exercising a choice on behalf of a patient 
should apply the same principles as those which would be applied by a 'reasonable' adult 
196 At p74-75 of the Transcript the psychiatric testimony states that Jerry understood that, "the operation 
would hurt and that he might have to be in hospital for two weeks. " and at p76 continues I believe he does 
understand that the giving of a kidney is a helpful act because of his brother's ill health. " Jerry is not 
understanding the process and it's consequence or even actually assenting to something he doesWt 
understand. 
197 lbid at 55. 
198A. Grubb and D. Pearl, Sterilisation - Courts and Doctors as Decision Makers, CLJ, 1989,380,382; 
D. Morgan, JS. W. L., 1990,204, p206. 
119je F ibid at 78 per Lord Goff. 
20OAiredale NFIS Trust y Bland [1993] 2 W. L. R. 316 at 361 and [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 860. 
21'Indeed Kennedy and Grubb in arguing that Re F is confined to medical factors have suggested that, 
"removal of tissue from an incompetent adult for transplantation would be unlawful" (Medical Law: Text 
With Materials, Butterworths, 1994,1087). 
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considering his own medical treatment. 202 The result of applying this to organ donation 
is speculative; some adults choose to donate but a significant minority of presumably 
reasonable adults do not. The particularities of being an incapacitate donor would surely 
warrant the use of a more definite and stringent test than this. The Law Commission's 
findings in this area are to be welcomed as a well reasoned set of principles that could 
provide a degree of certainty in the living donation context. In recommending use of the 
best interests concept the Commission stated that in deciding what is in a person's best 
interest regard should be had to: 
"(1) the ascertainable past and present wishes and feelings of the person concerned, and 
the factors that person would consider if able to do so; 
(2) the need to permit and encourage the person to participate or to improve his or her 
ability to participate, as fully as possible in anything done for and any decision affecting 
him or her; 
(3) the views of other people whom it is appropriate and practicable to consult about the 
person's wishes and feelings and what would be in his or her best interests; 
(4) whether the purpose for which any action or decision is required can be as effectively 
achieved in a manner less restrictive of the person's freedom of action (Draft Bill, clause 
3(2)). q1203 
This main features of this approach are a notion of substituted judgement in point 1, an 
emphasis on participation in decision making in point 2, an emphasis on drawing widely 
on relevant sources of evidence in point 3 and, in point 4, an emphasis on taking the 
option least restrictive for the incompetent. In terms of living donation these principles 
might translate into taking the prospective donors known views and wishes during any 
period where (s)he was competent into account, an emphasis on the incompetents current 
views and wishes, drawing evidence from the incompetents family and other sources and 
finally using the least restrictive option might translate into not using the incompetent as a 
donor where there is a feasible alternative. 
202p 990] 2 A. C. 1,18. 
203 Law Comm No 231 at 44-45. 
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More direct illumination of the relevant factors in determining best interests in living 
donation cases is found in the bone marrow case of Re Y. The three main principles 
developed in this case are that: 
donation must benefit the incompetent, to a degree outweighing detriment; 
benefit from the procedure to the prospective recipient is only relevant in so far 
as it serves the best interests of the incompetent; and 
benefit goes beyond the purely medical to include "emotional, psychological 
and social benefit. 3ý204 This could include the benefit derived from altruistic 
gifting. 
In Re Y itself, the benefit was contended to be derived from the fact that if the 
incompetent did not donate his sister would die placing extra burden on her family and in 
particular her mother who was already ill and would have to face the death and look after 
the plaintiffs daughter. The relevance of this in terms of the incompetent was mainly 
that she was close to her family and would be harmed by the fact that with the burden of a 
death they would cease or dramatically reduce visits to her (she was institutionalised). 205 
The harm done would outweigh the small disadvantages of bone marrow donation. 206 
Additionally she would benefit from the donation through the gratitude of her family. 207 
The evidence of benefit has rightly been described in the case commentary as 
"not-particularly strong"208 The justifications may have been enough for bone marrow 
donation but should clearly be viewed as insufficient for organ donation - indeed Mr 
Justice Connell himself reigned in the significance of the criteria applied in Re Y by 
stating that the decision should not be considered, 
66a useful precedent in cases where the surgery involved is more intrusive. "209 
However, the three principles in Re Y can be seen as a useful complement to the 
aforementioned Law Commission approach. 
204 Re Y[ 1996] Med L Rev 204-207 at 205. 
205 lbid at 205. 
206 lbid 
207 Commentary note - ibid at 206. 20'Ibid. 
2091bid. 
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In the US, the conditions for authorising a living organ donation by an incompetent 
adult have been examined more extensively. Strunk v Strunk was the first case 
involving an incompetent adult to hinge on whether a living organ donation could be 
established as in the best interests of the incompetent. The Court of Appeals held, by a 
4-3 decision, that it had the power to permit a kidney to be removed from a person 
deemed an incompetent ward of State upon the petition of his committee 210 for the 
purpose of being transplanted into his brother, who was 'dying' of a kidney disease on the 
basis that the donation was in the incompetents best interests. Some of the dissenting 
minority felt that evidence in the case was insufficient to "conclusively demonstrate" a 
"significant benefit" to the incompetent, but that if the evidence ever did rise to that 
"pinnacle" the transplant should be allowed . 
21 1 The dissenters were also concerned by 
the testimony that a cadaver kidney could be used. The basis for the majority view was 
not clearly articulated but the central factors were: 
Firstly, psychological value 212 for the incompetent based on closeness of relationship 
with his brother, the prospective recipient, including evidence that the latter 
represented the former's main link outside of institutionalisation and that the continued 
close relationship was important to the rehabilitation and treatment of the 
incompetent; 213 and 
Secondly, although clinical necessity for the donation was not established it was clear 
that the incompetent was the only viable living donor214 and that this option was 
clinically vastly superior in this case to an average cadaver. 215 
2 1OWhich in this case was his mother. 
211 In the first instance decision the Franklin County Court stated that, "it would be psychologically 
beneficial and in the interests of the incompetent to donate the kidney. " It authorised the Committee to 
consent on behalf of the donor. The Guardian ad Litern for Jerry had argued that the removal of Jerry's 
kidney would violate his right to be secure in his person, his right to due process, and his right to due 
protection under the law. The Committee turned these arguments on their head by saying that since the 
donation would be beneficial to Jerry it would be a violation of his constitutional rights not to go ahead. 
The Court accepted the latter view. The guardian ad litern appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court (where 
the decision was affirmed) and then to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 
212ThiS was urged by the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Health which was custodian for the 
incompetent (see p 113 transcript). 
213 Transcript of the case entitled 'In the matter of Jerry Strunk, an incompetent, Aug 19,1969 at note 41 
p13-14. The transcript is on file with Franklin County Court. See also Joe C Savage, Kentucky Law 
Journal, 1970,58,132. 
214 Medical testimony stated that other relatives had been tested and none of them were well enough matched 
to be living donors (see page 44 of the transcript). 
2159o% chance of graft survival after 2 years due to 'top quality match' between the brothers as distinct to 
40% with a cadaver. 
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In subsequent US cases, judges have generally been more reluctant to sanction this form 
of donation. In In Re Richardson (La App 1973) 284 So 2d 185 the Louisiana Court of 
Appeal distinguished Strunk from the case before it which involved a 17 year old 
incompetent with a mental age of 3 or 4 whose parents were consenting to his being the 
donor to his sister: 
"We find the facts in (Strunk), particularly the conclusion relative to the best interest of 
the incompetent, are not similar to the facts in the instant case and we also find that both 
the procedural and the substantive aspects of the majority opinion are not in accord with 
Louisiana law ... (which) is designed to protect and promote the ultimate best interest of a 
minor.... since our law affords the unqualified protection against intrusion (sic) into a 
comparatively mere property right, it is inconceivable to us that it affords less protection 
to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of the loss of 
an organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor. Of course that statement 
and our conclusion are restricted to the facts of the present case. , 216 
The decisions in Richardson and Strunk are distinguishable for several reasons. The 
most substantial and convincing of these reasons is the fact that in -Strunk 
the potential 
donor's main contact with the outside world was the potential recipient and the two had a 
very close relationship while in Richardson the donor was not as dependant on the 
recipient for contact. 217 Re Guardianship of Pescinski [1975], 67 Wis 2d 4,226 NW 
2d 180 is reconcilable with Strunk - donation being rejected in Pescinski on the basis that 
the 37 year old incompetent would derive no benefit from donating to his brother. 218 
Richardson 219 was basically the first US case to fully articulate the principles in this area, 
stating that to be justified this kind of procedure must be: 
1. Urgent; 
216 Richardson, 284 So 2d at 187. 
2"Closeness is also an important factor with non mentally disabled/ill minors - see earlier section 
particularly Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 NE 2d 1319 (Illinois Sup Ct). 
218to an incompetent particularly should have his own interests protected. Certainly no advantage should be 
taken of him. In the absence of real'Consent on his part, and in a situation where no benefit to him has 
been established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or this court, to approve this 
operation" (Pescinski 67 Wis 2d at 8-9,226 NW 2d at 182). Pescinski simply rejected donation on it's 
facts; "the exercise ofjudicial restraint under particular circumstances" (Supreme Court of Wisconsin in In 
Re Guardianship of Eberhýjrdy (1981) 102 Wis 2d 539 at 565). 
2 '9Gullotta J at 188. 
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2. have no reasonable alternatives; and 
3. have minimal contingencies. 
Little is a post Strunk case of a donation from a mentally disabled / ill incompetent being 
220 
authorised. Little did not, however, follow the 3 justifying requirements laid down 
in Richardson. In Little the contingencies of donation were minimal but authorisation 
occurred without the procedure being evidently urgent and clinically there were 
reasonable alternatives, although donation by the incompetent was the best option. 
Little placed importance on the consent of the incompetent' s parents, a close relationship 
between donor and recipient and the involvement of the court . 
22 1 The law is now in 
some confusion. Not only is their uncertainty about what are the justifying requirements 
for donation but also uncertainty about how strict these requirements are. The factors 
given importance in Little are very basic and quite irreconcilable with the stricter 
Richardson requirements. 
7.3.3.3. The Involvement of the Adult Incompetent in the Decision. 
What is the relevance of the incompetent adult's views in determining what is in his/her 
best interests? Re Y is silent on the question of the involvement of the adult 
incompetent. The view of a mentally ill minor has been described as "a very material 
factor" by Balcombe LJ in Re W222 - although this case actually shows how an 
incapacitates view can be easily ignored; an ideal opportunity to treat the incompetent 
persons decision about treatment when incompetent as an anticipatory decision was 
rejected. 223 
With specific regard to living donation it has been commented that "it is unthinkable that 
,, 224 the 'best interests' test could be satisfied if the donor objected to the donation. 
However, the Law Commission has taken a modified approach in it's recommendation 
that those providing care, ".. should not enforce the doing of anything to which the person 
22OLittle 576 SW 2d at 499. 
22 'Ibid at 498499. 
222[ 1992] 3 W. L. R. 758,776. 
21 On the significance of the patients previous known views see also the U. S. case of Re Conroy [1985] 486 
A. 2d 1209 which held that the significance of such views will vary according to their remoteness, 
consistency, thoughtfulness and specificity. 
224 Ibid. 
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objects ... This provision 
is not to preclude the taking of steps which are necessary to avert 
a substantial risk of serious harm to the person concerned. , 225 Within this approach, if 
an incompetent objected to donation it could still go ahead - although the only possible 
situation in which it could be enforced would be where the prospective recipient has a 
close and essential relationship with the incompetent, there are no other donor and 
without donation by the incompetent their would be substantial risk of serious harm to the 
incompetent. Examples could be: where the prospective recipient would die without 
the donation leaving the incompetent traumatised; or the recipient has an essential 
therapeutic relationship with the incompetent which due to illness (s)he could not 
maintain without a transplant. 
Beyond the general need for absence of objection there will not be many situations in 
which it is acceptable to go ahead without the explicit agreement of the adult 
incompetent; it is difficult to show that the donation will have psychological benefit 
without such an agreement. One of the consequences of this is that it may be difficult to 
accept donation by people who are severely (mentally) disabled 226 unless the procedure is 
in their best interests because it averts significant harm - examples of this situation being 
provided in the previous paragraph. 
7.3.4. Jurisdictions Prohibiting Living Organ Donation by Incompetent 
Adults. 
Some jurisdictions exclude legally incompetent adults from being donors of any body 
material including 
27 CypruS, 228 Slovakia 229 R Federation, 230 S- JLussian ygan rab 
231 232 233 234 23 236 237 Republic, Tunisia, Cuba, Ecaudor, Panama, 5 Bolivia, Romania, and 
225Draft Bill clause 5 (Law Comm No. 231 at p62). 
226[ 1996] Med L Rev 205-207 at 207. 
227 Law of 1979 at section 7 requires a physician is to reject an organ for donation where the donor is 
Ifunable to take their own decision for mental or psychological reasons. 11 
229 Section 7 of Law No. 97 of 1987 On the Removal and Transplantation of Biological Materials of Human 
Origin. 
'29Section 46(l) of Law of 24 August 1994 - see IDHL, 1995,46(2), 151-154. 
230Law of 22 December 1992 at section 3. 
23 'Law No. 31 of 23 August 1972 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs From the Human Body at 
section 20). 
232 The donor must be in possession of all mental capacities under Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 On The 
Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs at section 2. 
233 Law No. 41 of 13 July 1983 On Public Health at section 80. 
234 Law No. 64 of 26 May 1987 Reforming The Health Code at section 1. 
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Poland . 
238 A few laws have requirements probably equating with capacity: Spanish 
law 239 requires donors to be, "in full possession of their mental capacities; " Slovenian240 
and 41 laws require the donor to have necessary / proper judgement, 
respectively. Greek law requires that the donor must not have been declared 
incompetent by a court Or be in the care of a guardian appointed by a court. 242 By 
implication, prospective donors not declared incompetent by a court might still be 
declared incompetent to donate based on a de facto inability to give true consent. 
243 
Some laws implicitly prohibit donation of organs by incompetent adults simply by 
requiring the donor to consent. 244 The laws of Hong Kong and UK have no general 
235 Law No. 10 of II July 1983 Regulating the Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Parts, and Laying 
Down Other Provisions at section I 0(l). 
236 Section 4 Regulations of the Use of Organs and Tissues 15 March 1982. 
2371 996 Law Regarding The Harvesting and The Transplantation of Human Tissues and Organs at Article 
4(l). 
23sLaw of October 26,1995 Regulating the Removal and Transplantation of Human Cells Tissues and 
Organs. 
239Law No. 30 of 27 October 1979 section 4(b). 
24'Article 10 of Law of 1996 Of The Transplantation of Human Body Parts For the Sake of Medical 
Treatment. 
24 'Section 183 of law of 1985. 
242 Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Tissues and Organs 
section 5(a). 
243 Hence the stringency or otherwise of Greek law would only be determined by case law. 
244BLI&: ian law requires consent to be given freely and knowingly (Law of 13 June 1986 On The Removal 
and Transplantation of Organs section 8(l)). Danish law requires that the patient understand the nature of 
the intervention, its consequences, and the risks (Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990). Norwegian law requires 
that the physician ensure that the donor has understood the nature understood the nature of the operation 
and it's possible consequences (Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 at section 1). Conversely Bulgarian law 
although stating the need for consent implies that legal representatives may consent on behalf of the donor 
(Ordinance of 1976 at section 2 states "it shall be necessary to obtain the written consent of the patient and 
also where the patient is a minor or subject to limited deprivation of rights, that of the parents or legal 
representatives. In the case of minors and persons subject to total deprivation of rights the consent of the 
parents or guardians shall be obtained). The Belarus Draft law emphasises the need for the donor to give 
consent in full awareness of the facts and also interestingly adds that the recipient must not be dependent on 
the recipient (Article 8 of Draft law of 1995 On the Donation and Transplantation of Human Organs and 
Tissues). South Australia requires that the donor, "in the light of medical advice furnished to him 
understands the nature and effect of the removal and the nature of transplantation" (The Transplantation and 
Anatomy Act 1983 at section 10(l)(b)). Iraqi law appears only to express the need for the donation to be 
voluntary which leaves the position regarding incompetents as unclear see Resolution No. 776 of 9 June 
1981 of The Revolutionary Command Council Promulgating Law No. 60 of 1981 On Kidney Transplant 
operations. The same position is reached in Indian law - section 2 of The Transplantation of Human 
Organs Act (No. 42 of 1994) - see IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38 at p34. See also Lebanon (Decree No. 109 
of 16 September 1983 On the Removal of Human Tissues and Organs for Therapeutic and Scientific 
Purposes. Section I states that the physician to ascertain that the donor has properly understood the risks 
of the intervention), Venezuela (Law of 19 November 1992 On The Transplantation of Organs and 
Anatomical Materials in Human Beings at section 12 - see IDHL, 1995,46(3), 329-330), Peru (Supreme 
Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 1988 at section 15 lays down that the consent must be free, conscious 
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provisions relating to competency but in each case have an authority set up under the law. 
This authority will only authorise non-genetically related organ donations where it is 
satisfied that certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the donor has 
given informed consent - which effectively precludes all persons who are incompetent to 
donat6245 although such persons could potentially become a genetically related donor 
under principles of common law. 246 
A number of jurisdictions have the approach of the WHO Guiding Principles which 
recommend the exclusion of organ donation by persons incompetent to donate by reason 
47 248 
of mental illness or disability' while allowing donation of regenerative material . 
Even donation of regenerative material by incompetent adults maybe subjected to special 
restrictions. For instance, the law of Netherlands allows for donation of regenerative 
material by incompetent adults on behalf of first or second degree relatives who are in 
danger of losing their life and such danger is not readily avertible in any other way and 
the donor attaches considerable importance to averting the danger threatening the life of 
the blood relative concerned. Consent by parents (or guardian / legal representative) and 
by the judge of the children's court is required and the donor, if possible, as well as the 
person consenting on behalf of the donor are to be informed of the nature and object of 
the removal and it's foreseeable consequences for the donor. 249 Despite applying to 
donation of non-regenerable tissue, The Netherlands provision will not allow 
incompetent donation of liver segment because under this law material cannot be 
and express (similar provision in repealed Law No. 23415 of I June 1982 at section 7(b)), Vietnam (Law 
of June 1989 On Protection of Public Health section 30(l)) and UDju--ay (Decree No. 660/991 of 4 
December 1991 at section I- see IDHL, 1994,45(l) at 38). 
245Except were there to be an instance of ULTRA being wrongly satisfied of capacity. 246 For these provisions in respective laws see HOTA 1989 section 2(3) and Hong Kong Ordinance No. 16 
of 1995 (The Human Organ Transplant Ordinance) at section 5(4) - see IDHL, 1995,46(3), 325-327 at 327. 
247A, VHO Guiding Principle 3 states that where an organ is being removed from the body of an adult living 
donor that donor should be "sufficiently informed to be able to understand and weigh the risks, benefits and 
consequences of consent" (Human Organ Transplantation: A Report On Developments Under the Auspices 
of WHO (1987-1991)VMO, 1992,8). 
24'The definition of organ for these purposes includes tissue. This is effectively suggesting that 
incapacitate adults should not become donors. However this must be subject o Guiding Principle 4 under 
which a minor rendered incapacitate by a mental disability or illness can in principle become a donor of 
regenerative material (Human Organ Transplantation: A Report On Developments Under the Auspices of 
WHO (1987-1991) WHO, 1992,10). 
249Law of 24 May 1996 at section 4(l) - 4(3). (also Hans Akveld, communication with EUROTOLD and 
response to legal questionnaire). 
224 
removed from an incompetent adult if it's removal will have lasting effects upon the 
donor's health. 250 
Several further jurisdictions have legislation which is framed in such a way that they 
result in some competent persons being unable to be organ donors. In France, a 1994 
law prohibits donation by adults who are the subject of legal protection measures. 251 
This is supplemented by a general requirement for consent which would indirectly restrict 
donation to persons with sufficient competence. 252 In Mexico there is prohibition on 
persons in a state of diminished awareness in addition to incompetent persons. Some 
laws might result in some competent persons not being allowed to be organ donors: 
253 Sri Zimbabwe prohibits donation by persons mentally disordered or defective; - 
Lanka, 254 Northern T ýýýo 255 Western Australia, 256 Tasmania257 and Queensland 258 
persons not of sound mind; Paragu persons with a disability prescribed by law. 259 
These laws can be viewed as an unacceptable restriction on the autonomy of adults who 
may be defacto competent to donate even with their mental 'difficulty' or 'condition. ' 
7.3.5. Court Involvement. 
Portuguese law is unique amongst transplant legislation in explicitly requiring court 
authorisation of living donation by an incompetent adult. 260 This approach is 
commendable, particularly in the context of organ donation. 
2501bid at section 4(l). 
25'Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 at Article L. 6714. 
252Article L. 665-11 ibid. 
253 The Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act No. 34 1976 at section 13(3) these terms 
are given the meaning under the Mental Health Act 1976. 
254'fbe Transplantation of Human Tissues Act, No. 48 of 1987 at section 7(2)(b)(ii). 
255 Law No. 121 of 1979 An Act To Make Provision For and In Relation To The Removal and Use of human 
Tissues, For Post Mortem Examinations, For the Definition of Death and for Related Purposes at section 
8(l)(b). 
256Act No. 116 of 1982 The Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 at section 8(l)(b). 
25'The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 9(c)(ii). 
258 The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979-1984 at section 10(b). 
25'Law No. 836180 of IS December 1980 Promulgating the Health Code at section 279. 
2601t provides that, "the removal of organs or tissues from majors who are incompetent by reason of a 
psychological anomaly shall only be possible with the authorisation of a court" (Law No. 12 of 22 April 
1993 On the Removal and transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues at section 8(5)). Psychological 
anomaly is not defined but presumably has an ambit which reaches beyond persons who are incapacitate to 
donate by reason of mental illness or disability. Court authorisation is limited to regenerative material 
(section 6(3) ibid); effectively meaning that living organ donation, except perhaps liver donation, would 
not be accepted. Argentinean law of 1993 only applies to material which is not naturally regenerable (Law 
No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 On The Transplantation of Organs and Anatomical Materials at section 1). 
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The Law Commission recommended organ and bone marrow donation by incompetent 
adults be treated as within a 'special category' of procedures under English law which 
should require the involvement of a Court forUM. 261 The Commission noted that this 
would require amendment of existing regulations under HOTA which require donors not 
classed as genetically related to have capacity. 262 Although it would be very rare to have 
justifying reasons for non-genetically related adult incompetent donation, it is possible. 
For instance, an incompetent could have a relationship with a prospective recipient 
spouse, partner or even friend that is so essential as to warrant (in the presence of 
additional justifying factors) donation as much as in a genetically related case. The 
Commission must be commended for the justice of it's approach. 
Under current general principles of English law, the House of Lords in Re F considered 
court involvement was desirable but not obligatory for proposed sterilisation (Lord 
Griffiths being the exception viewed Court involvement as mandatory) and Lord Bridge 
drew an analogy with organ donation. The Court of Appeal had drawn a similar analogy 
with Neill LJ suggesting that for these types of controversial procedure prior Court 
approval should be standard practice. It may well be that for the purposes of liability 
doctors can proceed without fear of legal liability, provided that the procedure can be 
shown to be in the best interest of the incompetent individual and someone with the legal 
authority to consent on the incompetent person's behalf has done so. Indeed this 
approach is consistent with the case of Re Y which stated that court involvement was 
"appropriate" without saying it was mandatory. 263 
In the US the necessity of Court involvement would depend on the evolution of the law in 
each particular state. In the cases brought to court so far, court involvement has been a 
pre-requisite simply because the relevant law has provided that only the Court has 
authority to allow donation. 264 
Donation of such tissue appears to be restricted to capacitate persons although this is not certain from the 
IDHL text (see e. g. section 13 which requires consent to have been freely given. However the law has not 
been presented in full - see IDHL, 1994,45(l), 35-36). 
16'The preliminary conclusion to this effect (HMSO, 1993, Paper No. 129, at 6.1 - 6.9) was confirmed as a 
final recommendation )Law Com No. 231 at p85). 
262 The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989 No. 2480) - reg 3(2)(b). 
263[ 1996] Med L Rev 204-205 at 205. 
264Strunk V Strunk (1969 445 SW 2d 145 (ky CA); Little v Little (Tex Civ 1979) 576 SW 2d 493; 
Pescinski, 67 Wis 2d 4,226 NW 2d 180; In Re Richardson (La, App 1973), 284 So 2d 185; In Re 
Guardianship of Eberhardy 1981), 102Wis2d539,307NW2d881. In the state of Washington the state 
attorney can authorise this procedure. 
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7.3.6. Conclusion. 
Current law in this area is something of a patchwork - many transplant laws have missed 
the opportunity to comprehensively address this area leaving the legal position to be 
determined by reference to the position of minors under transplant law as guidance 
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along with general principles of law which typically lack certainty in their application to 
LDT. Jurisdictions may be advised to use legislation to remedy these problems at the 
earliest convenience. 
Regarding the different approaches to this area which currently exist, it may be 
concluded that the vulnerability of adult incompetents makes it a reasonable approach to 
prohibit organ donation by this group. It is also reasonable to adopt the approach that 
someone else may authorise the donation on behalf of the adult (e. g. a judge or legal 
guardian) providing strict conditions are met. However, it may be extremely difficult 
for organ donation by an incompetent adult to be justified in practice - at least in countries 
where cadaveric transplant and dialysis are sufficiently well established and available that 
there would generally be no medical emergency or lack of reasonable alternatives on 
which to establish the case for donation; this was actually very much the position when 
Little was decided - it's justifying criteria appear to allow donation too easily. Even 11 
years before Little, in Strunk, dissenting opinions were stressing the viability of 
cadaveric kidney transplantation. Where viable alternatives exist the use of mentally 
disabled / ill donors seems unwarrantedly invasive and utilitarian. Other criticisms can 
be levelled at the approach of law in this area. Strunk itself can be criticised for giving 
limited focus to exploring the wishes of the incapacitate 266 -a connected argument being 
265Judges faced with such a lack of specific provision might draw on the relatively parallel situation of 
donation of body materials by incompetent minors. This would help to deduce the relevant principles in a 
number ofjurisdictions (e. g. Denniark, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Finland, 
Costa Rica and South Africa) where there is mention of minors but no mention of non-age related mental 
capacity. Some jurisdictions allow minors to donate in such a situation subject to the consent of others 
and in some cases donor agreement. The point can be made that whereas minors may come to take a view 
that their actions were of benefit a non-age related incapacitate may never do so (partly depending on the 
nature of the incapacity). This would make the justification of benefit to the donor harder to substantiate 
in this situation than with minors. 
266Tbe Strunk expert psychiatric testimony can be criticised as to heavily evaluative rather than facilitative - 
a more person centred approach could have reaped benefits (see chapter 4 and Appendix 4). 
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that psychiatric testimony is too heavily relied upon with it's independence and validity 
being questionable. 267 
The justificatory conditions for donation by this group are similar to those applying to 
incompetent minors. Adult donations where competency is in question could also be 
brought before the same legal forum recommended for minors. This forum could apply 
strict justifying criteria including the valuing of incompetent autonomy through a 
minimum that the incompetent agreed with the donation - in a meaningful way or at least 
in a way that evidence clearly suggested (s)he would have decided if competent. A 
further prior condition for donation would be that it had prospective psychological value 
significantly outweighing prospective (largely physical) detriment and that the detriment 
was maintained below a certain level; this would help to assure that the incapacitate was 
not being exploited for transplant's overall utility for society. 
7.4. Overall Conclusions on Capacity in Organ LDT. 
Two major points arise in the context of capacity in organ LDT. The first concerns the 
need for strong and comprehensive provisions that protect a vulnerable group from abuse 
by specifying clear conditions within which donation is acceptable. These conditions 
should be set within the context of all proposed donations by minors and adults with 
questionable capacity being brought before a legal or quasi legal forum which would 
probably be set up under transplant legislation. Transplant legislation, although 
currently patchy, provides certainty and seems like the vehicle through which the ethical 
and legal issues arising in this area can be comprehensively dealt with. The problem 
with general principles of law is that although they are somewhat flexible they were never 
designed in anticipation of dealing with an area involving such complex and unique 
ethical and legal issues. General principles also lack the degree of certainty and high 
proflle required to make practitioners more aware of the issues and encouraged to put 
forward minors and adult incompetents for living organ donation in appropriate 
situations. 
The rarity of organ donations by minors and adults of questionable capacity is such that 
the judicial forum described above would not be overburdened even if it's remit was to 
accept cases from a number of jurisdictions (e. g. the whole EU or the whole of the US). 
267 See e. g. T. S. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry: An Inquiry Into The Social Uses of Mental Health 
Practices, MacMillan, 1963 
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Over time, however, such a forum would build up expertise in the area and it's existence 
would help to allay the concerns of medical practitioners who, by being able to pass on 
such ethically and legally troublesome cases to an expert body, might actually be 
encouraged to consider the possibility of living organ donation more often in this area - 
particularly in the context of older minors. Nethertheless, living organ donation 
amongst minors and adult incompetents is likely to remain rare, particularly in Europe; it 
must be stated that in the context of incompetent donors this is comforting - even kidney 
donation is a detrimental and serious procedure for an incompetent to take on, 
particularly in an age where dialysis is common and the focus should be moving towards 
supplying sufficient organs without resort to radical options. 
The other major point arising from this area of medical ethics and law is the whole axis of 
autonomy. Michael Gunn makes the general point that, "respect for autonomy is the 
guiding principle in health law. v1268 This principle is no less critical when adults with a 
mental condition and minors are at issue, it is simply harder to apply. Gunn has 
suggested that the importance of autonomy leads to it being, 
"essential that a test for capacity sets a standard which allows as many people as possible 
to make their own treatment decisions. it269 
Some jurisdictions fail to not meet Gunif s goal in the context of living organ donation by 
outright exclusion or undue restriction of minors and person's with a mental condition 
who are de facto capacitate. Current law and medical practice also reflect a culture of 
authority of the physician and medical enterprise which as well as limiting patient 
autonomy reinforces dependency and incapacity to make decisions. On the other hand, 
the unique position of the donor has ensured the wishes of minors and incompetent adults 
are given some respect. The level of respect is more clearly evidenced with minors than 
with incompetent adults. The latter group may still be burdened by a pervasive societal 
assumption that if you are an incompetent decisions can be made on your behalf without 
significant reference to your involvement, values and wishes. In this context the Law 
Commission was right to infuse its recommendations with an underlying principle of 
maximising the opportunities for decision-making involvement of incompetent persons. 
'"Gunn, The Meaning of Capacity, Med Law Review, 1994 (Spring), 2,8-29 at 8. 
269Gunn, ibid. 
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The person-centred model of negotiation might be adapted for use in this contexe 70 as a 
legislatively embodied requirement to focus on therapeutic facilitation to help uncover 
deeper levels of understanding and viewpoint of the incapacitate, 271 thereby more 
significantly grounding decisions in autonomy. 
27OThe success of person centred therapists in working with, , unmotivated, deeply disturbed and often 
highly uncommunicative persons" such as schizophrenics, and disturbed children is relevant here (see 
E. T. Gendlin, Client-Centred Developments in Psychotherapy With Schizophrenics, Journal of 
Counselling Psychology, 1962,9,205-211 and Sub-verbal Communication and Therapist Expressivity: 
Trends in Client-Centred Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics, The Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute Bulletin, 
1 (1961); Rogers, Some Learnings From a Study of Psychotherapy With Schizophrenics, Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Quarterly, 1962,3-15; V. Axline, Play Therapy. Houghton Mifflin, 1947. 
"'See Appendix 4 for discussion of the work of Carl Rogers and the person-centred approach. 
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Chapter 8 Financial Exchange in Organ LDT. 
Over decades ideas about what financial exchange is acceptable in organ 
transplantation (and body materials generally) have been put forward. In an area 
raising strong emotions and perspectives there has been more thesis and antithesis 
than synthesis. The logical first step to transcending the myriad of conflicting 
approaches is to demarcate different aspects and levels of potential exchange in organ 
transplantation. This provides a framework for analysing current legal regulation of 
organ LDT and a sound basis to examine the merits of different approaches to 
exchange and regulation of exchange. Assessing the merits of different approaches 
involves assessing the rights of relevant parties (professionals, donors, recipients, 
entrepreneurs and the public at large) in the light of empirical data about the most 
efficient system of procurement for organ transplantation as a whole (in terms of 
numbers, quality, cost etc. ). 
8.1. Demarcating Levels and Aspects of Exchange in Organ 
Transplantation 
There are 4 main dimensions of potential exchange to analyse: exchange in the 
organisation of transplantation; exchange in the practice of transplantation; exchange 
in transplant participation; and exchange in funding transplantation. 
8.1.1 Financial Exchange in the Organisation of Transplantation 
Within all jurisdictions those who organise transplantation gain financial reward for 
doing so. The level of payment has ethical implications: 'tdo little' may be unfair 
treatment; 'too much' is equally unfair. Some notion of fair payment is critical, but 
what this notion could comprise is debatable. To some, charging what the market 
can bear is fair, to others fairness would represent an amount akin to what might be 
expected for similar work, to others still it involves a more egalitarian notions such as 
payment more comparable with a average wage with perhaps some premium for the 
skills, training and experience of the organisers. 
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Another issue in terms of payment of organisers is the matter of who pays the bill - 
this will be examined in 8.1.4. Finally there is the issue of ethics of payment related 
to who is doing the organising. Should there be limits on who can earn financial 
reward from the process? Should reward be limited to designated medical 
establishments or should it be expanded to include other persons or organisations who 
might advertise, broker and organise the financial exchange? This is a question of 
the economic rights of those persons and organsiations viewed within the context of 
the rights of others discussed below. 
8.1.2. Financial Exchan2e in the Practice of Transplantation. 
What is fair payment of practitioners where should it payment come from? 
8.1.3. Financial Exchane in Transplant Participation. 
The key issues here are ones of payment to the donor and/or the donors nominees. 
There are a multiplicity of variations in terms of levels of payment. Current 
terminology used for certain types of payment can be confusing. For instance 
6rewarded gifting' can be anything from a payment that is nominal to one that goes 
beyond any concept of reasonable payment for the donor's losses. A suggested 
demarcation of the key degrees of payments is as follows: 
1. Reasonable payment of the donor for financial losses resultant from the process of 
donation. This would usually be accompanied by free medical care in relation to 
the health consequences of donation. Payment of reasonable financial loss could 
include such things as loss of earnings due to hospitalisation / recovery from 
donation, costs of home help/childcare, travel and subsistence xpenses etc. 
2. Reasonable payment for unexpected health consequences resulting from donation. 
This would basically be a kind of no-fault compensation scheme whereby the 
donor would get paid if, for instance, there was sepsis at the wound site or failure 
of the remaining kidney. 
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3. Reasonable payment for expected health consequences resulting from donation. 
This is essentially paying the donor for what is physically endured - such as 
scarring at the wound site, pain and suffering etc. 
4. Payment of a reasonable wage to the donor for time and effort in the process of 
donation (any payment already made for lost earnings would be deducted from the 
calculation). 
5. Payment above a reasonable wage to the donor - either subject to limits or based on 
what the market will bear. 
The above payments could operate in combination or alone. The first two levels of 
payment can meet no real ethical or practical objection of significance since while a 
donor voluntarily subjects him / herself to risk (s)he is engaged in something viewed 
as for the benefit of others and should not be left to bear the economic consequences 
of any of those risks materialising. Payment they do not even compromise the 
volunteering nature of donation. They merely act to ensure that the donor does not 
suffer a 'double whammy' of losing out financially as well as enduring donation. 
The third to fifth levels of payment are where more controversy lies. 
The third level of payment for intrinsic health consequences can just viewed as 
reasonable expenses, much. the same as those often given to research subjects for 
example. The arrangement is quid-pro-quo rather than profit making; the donor 
simply gets something back for pain and harm endured. Nethertheless, this level of 
payment meets objections for violating the volunteering concept of donation. The 
fourth level goes into the realm of 'fair trade' - an economic exchange of reasonable 
payment for effort, time and suffering endured in the act of donation. The fifth level 
involves a more capitalistic scheme of profit making. This system places the market 
as primary with other principles such as equity as secondary - particularly if prices are 
based on what the market would bear, slightly less so if capped (perhaps by a 
government quango called Offbod') where necessary in the interest of consumers and 
/ or competition. principles. Who was paying for the organs would also have a 
bearing on equity. 
'Office of Fair Body Trading. Trading rules might include discounts for off-peak organs 
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Some methods of payment fail to fit neatly into one level. For instance, payment of 
a fixed fee by the state, recipient or insurance companies could be anything from the 
third to the fifth level of payment in practice depending on whether it was nominal, 
estimated according to likely donor health consequences / risks and financial losses or 
at a profit making level. places the market as primary with other principles such as 
equity secondary. 
8.1.4. Financial Exchange in Funding Transplantation. 
Costs of transplantation have to be paid somehow and the method of funding has 
ethical implications. The arrangements in most countries are collectivist; money is 
pooled from the public. The pool or pools are then used to pay for all costs. 
Private insurance companies act as pools and/or the state does in terms of a national 
health insurance plan. In some cases the arrangements remain individualist; some 
countries have little take-up of private insurance and no nationalised health care plan, 
or more specifically no funding for transplantation. Which approach is more 
appropriate for transplantation? 
The problem with individualist approaches and to a lesser extent private insurance is 
that some people will not be able to afford to pay for healthcare; distribution of 
transplantation would to some extent be based on wealth. On the other hand a state 
nationalised system, while making wealth irrelevant in distribution, involves an 
element of 'collectivist coercion' with the public having resources compulsorily 
6syphoned off them (i. e. tax) to meet objectives that are largely set at a central level. 
Within this system healthcare also becomes a 'right' which may be detrimental to any 
notion of individual responsibility for one's health. This debate raises too many 
issues to be answered within this Phl). One thing that could be stated is that the 
public, who in one way or another pay for transplantation have a right to value for 
money in terms of a system that is operated efficiently, maximising impact and 
minimising costs. 
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To some people a free profit-making market in transplantation would be the most 
efficient approach and one that respects the right to 'make a profit. ' Most, however, 
would consider that the system will be more efficient and fair if payment is limited to 
a 'reasonable amount based on services rendered' for those involved at various points 
of the process. This would involve excluding 'excessive wages' and 'excessive 
profits' by those operating the insurance system, the organisers of the transplants, 
practitioners and donors. The amount could be paid at either a market rate or a fixed 
rate. Within a regulated system with restrictions (for instance with a fixed rate for 
organs, paid for by the state and retaining the present waiting list system etc. ) or a 
rampant system where anything can be donated to anyone at any price with 
availability of organs for potential recipients depending largely on one's ability to pay 
the market price or even bid on an auction basis. 
8.2. Leaal Reiiulation of Commercial Dealinj! s in Orijans. 
8.2.1. Introduction 
For decades, international organisations have condemned trade in human organs. ' 
The Council of The Transplantation Society, ' Council of Europe and WHO' 
2 The first attempt to Internationally respond to commercial dealings in organs was back in 1970 when 
the Committee of Morals and Ethics of the Transplantation Society adopted a statement including the 
rubric that, "(t)he sale of organs by living donors is indefensible under any circumstances. " Ann of 
Intern Med, 1971,75(4): 631-633. 
3 Guidelines of 1985 on transplantation which stressed that surgeons / physicians should not advertise, 
the transplant team should establish the altruistic, non-profit, motivations of the donor, unrelated 
donors should have an independent advocate to ensure informed consent is given without pressure and 
there should be no payment except for reimbursement of lost work earnings and expenses (see Lancet, 
1985,2,715-6). For finther details of International responses see Human Organ Transplantation: A 
Report On Developments Under The Auspices of WHO (1987-1991), WHO, 1991 at 16. 
4 The WHO prohibitions has a lengthy genesis. The 37th World Medical Assembly which endorsed 
the World Medical Association Inc. 's 'Statement on Live Organ Trade' calling on the governments of all 
countries to take effective steps to prevent commercial use of human organs. This view of organ 
trading was confirmed by the 39th World Medical Assembly and World Health Assembly Resolution 
40.13 (Declaration on Human Organ Transplantation, Madrid, Spain, October 1987. See Appendix 
of WHO's book, Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation, Martinus Nyhoff, 1994). This 
resolution suggest that trade is, "inconsistent with the most basic human values and contravenes the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the spirit of the WHO constitution. " The United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is probably contravened (depending on one's opinion! ) as 
suggested given that Article I of the declaration provides that human beings, "should act towards one 
another in the spirit of brotherhood, " Article 3 provides for security of person which could easily be 
violated by the excesses of commercial dealings while article 25(l) providing the, "right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being" of the individual and his / her family may be violated 
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frameworks have promoted prohibition. WHO Guiding Principles provide a 
comprehensive framework of prohibition of trade as follows: 
"The human body and ifs parts cannot be the subject of commercial transactions. 
9 Accordingly, giving or receiving payment (including any other 
compensation or reward) for organs should be prohibited. "' 
" "Advertising the need for the availability of organs, with a view to offering 
or seeking payment, should be prohibited. ", 
" "It should be prohibited for any person or facility involved in organ 
transplantation procedures to receive any payment that exceeds a justifiable 
fee for the services rendered. ""' 
" "In the light of the principles of distributive justice and equity, donated 
organs should be made available to patients on the basis of medical need 
and not on the basis on financial or other considerations. "' 
The Council of Europe's Resolution (78)29' states that no substance may be offered 
for profit. Further Council of Europe statements are similar. " An important 
in the sense that giving up an organ has physical dangers and no-one should have to be drawn to it by 
fact of desperate poverty (signed 10 dec, 1948, G. A. Res2l7A(111)U. N. Doc. A/810atp7l). Later 
Resolution WHA42.5 noted the lack of success in preventing trafficking in human organs and called 
upon member states, "to take appropriate measures to prevent the purchase and sale of human organs 
for transplantation" adding that it was, "anxious to prevent the exploitation of human distress, 
particularly in children and other vulnerable groups, and to ftirther the recognition of the ethical 
principles which condemn the buying and selling of organs for purposes of transplantation" (May 
1989, WHA42/1989/RE C/1,7 see WHO's book, Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation, 
Martinus Nyhoff, 1994). Guiding Principles for Organ Transplantation were prepared and endorsed 
by the 44th World Health Assembly on 13 May 1991 in Resolution WHA44.25 to set out the 
parameters the assembly felt organ transplantation should take place within. For these Guiding 
Principles see Human Organ Transplantation, ED 87/12,19 Nov 1990 pages 4-5. See also Appendix 
of WHO's book, Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation, Martinus NUhoff, 1994 
5Guiding Principle 5. 
6 Guiding Principle 6. 
7 Guiding Principle 8. 
sGuiding Principle 9. 
'On Harmonization of Legislations of Member States to Removal, Grafting and Transplantation of 
Human Substances adopted by The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on II May 1978 
Article 14 
10The 3rd Conference of European Health Ministers Paris 16-17 November 1987 confirming the anti- 
commerce stance of the above resolution. There is some recognition that the sale of organs is a 
problem affecting Europe as well as other parts of the world. The Health Ministers Conference voiced 
this and it's final text concluded that, "a human organ must not be offered for profit by any organ 
exchange organization, organ banking centre or by any other organization or individuals whatsoever. " 
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distinction made by international organisations is between making money from the 
buying and selling of organs on the one hand and simply compensating donor losses 
on the other. To this end the Council of Europe's Resolution states that; 
"loss of earnings and any expenses caused by the removal or preceding examination 
may be refunded. The donor, or potential donor, must be compensated 
independently of any medical responsibility, for any damage sustained as a result of a 
removal procedure or preceding examination, under a social security or other 
insurance scheme. " 
WHO Guiding Principles are similar on this point. " 
In 1969 a survey was published in the International Digest of Health Legislation 
focusing partly on the anti-commerce aspects of legislation 12 and indicating that only 
Italy had a law prohibiting commercial transactions. Since then most transplanting 
jurisdictions have legislatively prohibited commerce (provisions on compensation for 
loss will be discussed in section 8.2.5. ). " Exceptions include Bulgari " El 
Final Text app. II at 13 reprinted in IDHL, 39,277. The report at this conference went as far as to say 
that, "to ensure that the donation of an organ is not tainted in any way, " and that, "it is totally 
spontaneous and completely without payment, " a ban should be made, "on the removal of non- 
regenerative organs from a living human who is not closely and genetically related to the recipient. " 
Council of Europe, Organ Transplantation: Ethical and Social-Cultural Problems Raised by Organ 
Transplantation (Paris Conference of European Health Ministers, Nov 16-17,1987) at 15-16. This 
and other International responses to commercialization in organ transplantation are discussed in WHO's 
book Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation, Martinus Nyhoff, 1994. 
"Principle5 prohibiting trade states that: "... This Principle does not prohibit payment of reasonable 
expenses incurred in donation, recovery, preservation and supply of organs for transplantation. " 
12 Use of Human Tissues and Organs for Therapeutic Purposes: A Survey of Existing Legislation, 
IDHL, 1969,20,3. For another account of law relating to this area see D. J. Wolfslast, 'Legal 
Aspects of Organ Transplantation: An Overview of European Law., University Gottingen, Gottingen, 
Germany (A copy is kept by the EUROTOLD Project). On legislation generally see: 'Commerce in 
Human Organs: Some International Responses'(WHO 1991); 'List of Jurisdictions Known to WHO 
HQ to Have Legislation on Organ Transplantation (above ref); S. S. Fluss, 'Preventing Commercial 
Transactions in Human Organs: An International Overview of Regulatory and Administrative 
Measures' (WHO, IDHL, 1989 (May), 154-163); P. Lee et. al., 'Worldwide Legal Regulations for 
Obtaining Corneas, ' Cornea, 1990,11(2) at p102-107: and most importantly the World Health 
Organization's recent comprehensive book, 'Legislative responses to Organ Transplantation, ' Martinus 
Nyhoff, 1994. See also EUROTOLD's Legisearch database (Ed D. Price and Austen Garwood- 
Gowers). 
13 As stated in chapter 4 some jurisdictions have no transplant law while other's have legislative 
provision only for cadaveric donation. In these instances there is no legal prohibition of the buying 
and selling of organs although medical practitioners engaging in such activities may be subjected to 
sanctions from their respective national medical organisations. This is the case with Ireland and with 
Germany where the Transplantation Code, binding on all physicians conducting transplantation states 
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Salvado " Jqpan, " Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, " Malgysia, " Norw " Pakistan, " 
Philippines, ̀  Sweden, " Tong I and Vietnam. "' The problem with not having 
prohibition is that professional guidelines do not affect participant and broker / 
middleman commercial dealings. Some jurisdictions are developing legislation that 
25 26 27 will prohibit commerce including Albani , Estonia and Israel. 
that "any trade in organs or any commercialisation of the transplantation... sector is, in principle, 
excluded" See Human Organ Transplantation, WHO, 1991 at p2l. Section 3 of the GDR 
ordinance of 4 July 1975 is still in force in the new German Landers that were formerly East Germany. 
This section prohibits commercial dealings. Legislation for Germany has been proposed for a number 
of years (see A-Tuffs, Germany: A Step Nearer a Transplant Law? Lancet, 1993,341 at 3634. In 
Malta there is no law but guidance issued by the Medical Council to the Health Authorities stress the 
need for clear evidence of genuine (presumably non-commercial) motivation particularly where a 
donation by a complete stranger is at issue. Liechtenstein does not have the technical capacity to 
undertake transplantation and hence has not considered it necessary to either regulate or consider the 
issue. However S. S. Fluss of the World Health Organization has stated in a more recent paper that 
Liechtenstein does have legislative prohibition (Organ and Tissue Transplantation in The European 
Union (Ed Y. Englert), Martinus Nyhoff, 1995 at 76). Egypt appears to allow only living related 
donation which are performed free of charge at State expense, this is not yet declared in formal law 
however (Fluss, Organ and Tissue Transplantation In The European Union (ed Y. Englert), Martinus 
Nyhoff, 1995,79). In Saudi Arabia there is no law but it is considered prohibited to buy or sell 
human organs in line with the "Unified Arab Draft Law on Human Organ Transplants" (see Human 
Organ Transplantation, WHO, 1991,25). Laws are currently under consideration for Estonia, 
Albania, a unified Gerniany and Belarus (new law) all of these countries are likely to prohibit 
commercialisation assuming the law is passed. Commerce is a concern for Germany with reports of 
Germans being involved in the buying of kidneys as recipients and being involved in marketing organs. 
Reports exist of West German! s openly offering to buy kidneys for transplant purposes from donors in 
Europe and the Third World. See Los Angeles Times, 1988, November 13, Pt. 1,22, Cols 1-3. 
The names of two prominent West German brokers and the cost of their transplant packages' are laid 
out in The Organ Grinders, South: The Third WorldMagazine, 1989, Apr, 77-78. One of them 
actually announced plans to sell in Great Britain (see The Independent (London), 1989, Jan 30,2 col 
4. The President of the West German Medical Association has condemned the trade in kidneys saying 
it treats third world people as 'living organ banks' to be cut up for sale. 
14 Ordinance No. 15 of the Minister of Public Health On the Transplantation of Human Organs, 30 
April 1976. However, WHO was informed in 1993 that a Draft law for Bulgaria was under 
discussion, section 5 of which would prohibit commercial dealings in organs. 
"Decree No. 955 Promulgating the Health Code II May 1988. 
16 Law No. 70 of 8 December 1989. 
17 Law No. 4 of 10 March 1982. 
"The Human Tissues Act, 8 March 1974. 
19Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 On Transplantation, Hospital Autopsies, Donations of Bodies etc. 
200rdinance No. III of 24 July 1990 To Provide for the Establishment of the Sindh Institute of Urology 
and Transplantation. 
"Presidential Decree No. 856 of December 1975 Promulgating the Code on Sanitation. However this 
position is likely to change, a bill addressing sale of organs was introduced. EUROTOLD is unaware 
whether this has become law yet (see p26 of Human Organ Transplants, WHO 199 1). 
12 Law No. 831 of 8 June 1995 (IDHL, 1996,47(l), 28-30) has no provision on this point and nor did 
it's repealed predecessor Law No. 190 of 15 May 1975. 
"The Corneal and Tissue Grafting Act 1958. 
24 Law of June 1989 On Protection of Public Health. 
'The process of developing legislation was begun in earnest in 1996. 
26 Legislation during 1998 seems likely. 
27 The status and breadth of Israel's position is uncertain - The WHO has heard that in the Public Health 
Ordinance new provisions will prohibit commerce in organs (S. S. Fluss p81 in Organ and Tissue 
Transplantation In The European Union (ed Y. Englert), Martinus Nyhoff, 1995. 
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Most laws define the ambit of body materials that is to be covered by the prohibition 
on commercial dealings. Sometimes the prohibitions relate only to organs and not to 
tissues, for instance UK law (see particularly section 7(2) HOTA 1989) and Hong 
Kong law. Occasionally prohibitions are limited by reference to types of organ 
subject to prohibition e. g. Dominican Republic Law corneas only, 21 an initial Italian 
law only kidneys. 21 Austria" and Singapore 'only covers cadaveric donation. 32 
8.2.2. Prohibition of Profit From Organ Donation. 
The general intention of 'anti-commerce provisions' is to prevent profit being made 
out of organ donation it is not to prevent compensation for expense incurred by a 
donor hospital in a removal procedure or other necessary activities associated with 
transplantation. " Most jurisdictions prohibit commercial dealings in organs 
generally, irrespective of the parties or organs involved. Transplant laws in 
Finland, ̀ France. " Indonesia, 36 Luxembourgý" and Spai ' do not prohibit the 
medical profession from profiting from the donation of an organ (e. g. by charge a 
recipient for organ donation and the organ itself) although this might be prohibited 
under general principles of law on public policy grounds. 
28Law No. 60-88 of 30 August 1988 On the Donation of Corneas at sections 11-12. 
29Law No. 458 of 26 June 1967. See IDHL, 1969,20,3. A later Italian law apparently relates to 
all organs (section 19 and 20 of Law No. 644 of 2 December 1975) however EUROTOLD has found 
reliable information on Italy difficult to obtain. 
"Section 62a of the Hospitals Law of 18 December 1956, as amended by the Federal Law of I June 
1982. 
"The Human Organ Transplants Act 1987. 
32 Other laws with limited scope of prohibition include Zimbabwe's law which states that only an 
authorised institution can receive payment otherwise it will be an offence to deal for fee profit or 
remuneration. This leaves a legal door open to organs being sold by institutions such as hospitals. 
ActNo. 34 of 1976 at section 17. Blood and blood products are excepted from this provision. 
33Undefined terms describing the ambit of activities being restricted, for instance organ dealings must 
not be for'profit, ' remuneration or 'commercial' need to read in this light. 
31 States that there shall be no remuneration paid to the donor or his Estate. Law No. 780 of 25 August 
1994 at section II (see IDHL, 1995,46(l), 33). See Lillich, Transplanting Organs From Living 
Donors: An International Regime or more Free Enterprise, in Finnish Yearbook ofInternational Laiiý 
1990 (copy held at WHO). 
3'Prohibits payment being given to the donor. Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 at Article L. 665-13 
IDHL, 1994,45(4), 474-482 at 474. 
3'Govt. Regulation No. 18 of 16 June 1981 On Clinical and Anatomical Autopsies and Transplantation 
of Human Organs and Tissues at section 16. 
37 Establishes a principle of non-remuneration of the donor. Law of 25 November 1982 Regulating the 
Removal of Substances of Human Origin at section 16. 
3'Crown Decree No. 426 of 22 February 1980 for the Implementation of Law No. 30 of 27 October 
1979 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs at sections 5 and 12. 
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United Kindom I has the most comprehensive method of prohibition of profit 
from organ donation within Europe in the HOTA 1989. Section I of HOTA 
prohibits any dealings or adverts of commercial nature. This theme is elaborated on 
in some detail to cover any possible angle of involvement in the organ market. It 
prohibits supplying, offering to supply, soliciting supply, negotiating / initiating of 
arrangement for payment / supply / offer of supply, various aspects of advertising 
with a commercial purpose and managing/controlling a body of persons (e. g. a 
company) involved in such activities. "' Indian law" draws extensively on the 
"The section states that; 
I (I)A Person is guilty of an offence if in Great Britain he- 
(a) makes or receives any payment for the supply of , or for the offer to supply, an organ which 
has 
been or is intended to be removed from a dead or living person and is intended to be transplanted into 
another person whether in Great Britain or elsewhere; 
(b) seeks to find a person willing to supply for payment such an organ as is mentioned in paragraph (a) 
above or offers to supply such an organ for payment; 
(c) initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the making of any payment for the supply of , or 
for an offer to supply, such an organ; or 
(d) takes part in the management or control of a body of persons corporate or unincorporate whose 
activities consist of or include the initiation or negotiation of such arrangements. 
(2) without prejudice to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) above, a person is guilty of an offence if he 
causes to be published or distributed, or knowingly publishes or distributes, in Great Britain an 
advertisement- 
(a) inviting persons to supply for payment any such organs as are mentioned in paragraph (a) of that 
subsection or offering to supply any such organs for payment; or 
(b) indicating that the advertiser is willing to initiate or negotiate any such arrangement as is mentioned 
in paragraph (c) of that subsection. 
(3) In this section "payment" means payment in money or money's worth but does not include any 
payment for defraying or reimbursing 
(a) the cost of removing, transporting or preserving the organ to be supplied; or 
(b) any expenses or loss of earnings incurred by a person so far as reasonably and directly attributable 
to his supplying an organ from his body. 
(4) In this section "advertisement" includes any form of advertising whether to the public generally, to 
any section of the public or individually to selected persons. 
(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) above is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard 
scale or both; and a person guilty of an offence under subsection (2) above is liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on that scale. General Medical Council Guidance for 
Doctors on Transplantation of Organs from Live Donors advises that, "The Council Regards it as 
unethical and improper for a doctor to take part in any way in the trading of organs or the 
transplantation of organs obtained from donors whose consent has been given as a result of any form of 
undue influence. A doctor who behaves in this way is liable to disciplinary proceedings by the 
Council. " General Medical Council Supplement News Review, December 1992 point 2. The 
Council's Guidance should be read in the light of section 1(3)a of HOTA (allowing reimbursement of 
medical costs in removing, transporting and preserving in supplying an organ and donor expenses and 
loss of earnings reasonably and directly attributable to supplying an organ) meaning it is perfectly 
acceptable for doctors to take part in such reimbursement. The Council's guidance was based on their 
belief that: "(i) human organs should not be the subject of commercial transactions: any donation of 
organs must be made altruistically, as a gift; (ii) where human organs are bought or sold, 
transplantation will be governed by money rather than by the medical interests of the donors and 
recipients, with the vulnerable and the poor inevitably exposed to exploitation. " (point 3 ibid). The 
duties of doctors include satisfying themselves that the donation has occurred without financial or other 
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approach in UK law and Hong Kong's law does even more so. " HOTA and 
pursuant regulations also contain specific requirements relating to preventing / 
sanctioning commerce in non-genetically related donations. Hong Kong's law also 
takes this approach. " Polish law states that, "it is prohibited to demand or accept 
any payment or any profits for the harvesting of cells, tissues and organs" and adds 
that "any person who for the purpose of material gain purchases or sells other people's 
cells, tissues or organs or act as an agent in the purchase and sale or takes part in 
transplanting illegally obtained cells, tissues or organs" is liable to criminal 
sanctions. " Peruvian law prohibits payment, any other compensation, benefits, 
financial or monetary advantages, or reciprocal arrangements of a similar or 
analogous nature. ' Chile's law" prohibits payment but also has an unusual, and 
useful, requirement that living donors must make a sworn declaration that they have 
received no compensation, valuable consideration, or other material benefit from the 
recipient or from other third parties. "' Iraq's I states that sale or purchase of organs 
in any form is prohibited and imposes a duty on physicians that if they are aware that 
organs are subject of sale or purchase are to refrain from proceeding with a 
transplant. "' Further provisions are listed below in Figure 4. 
material benefit or undue influence of any kind (point 7) while in no circumstances may doctors 
participate in or encourage in any way the trade in human organs from live donors. They must not 
advertise for donors nor make financial or medical arrangements for people who wish to sell or buy 
organs (point 6). A doctor independent of the transplantation team must assess the motivation of the 
donor (point 7). Each member of the team must retain and exercise individual ethical responsibility 
towards the patient - ibid at point 8. "00ne of the most important provisions bearing in mind its scale of commercially motivated 
transplantation. 
"in prohibiting making buying, selling, negotiating, managing, advertising organs on a commercial 
basis. Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(3), 325-327 at 325. 42 in prohibiting making buying, selling, negotiating, managing, advertising organs on a commercial 
basis. Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 2 QDHL, 1995,46(3), 325-327 at 325. 43 Articles 18 and 20 respectively of Law of 26 October 1995 (Copy held at EUROTOLD). Article 20 
also lays down the criminal sanctions. All jurisdictions prohibiting trade have criminal sanction 
attached to breach of their provisions. 
44 Supreme Decree No. 014-88-SA of 19 May 1988 at section 3. 
15 Section 145 and 152 of the Health Code as amended by Law No. 18.173 of 26 November 1982 law 
prohibits payment or any contract or agreement promising or supplying organs and tissues. 46 Section 3(f) of Regulations issued on 3 June 1983. 
47 Decree No. 698 of 27 August 1986 of the Revolutionary Command Council Promulgating Law No. 
85 of 1986 On the Transplantation of Human Organs at section 3. 
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Figure 4: Further Provisions Prohibiting Profit Making From Organ Donation. 
Argentina, 48 Australian state laws of Queensland, South Australia, 49 Northern Territory 50 Capital 
Territory, 51 New South Wales, 52 Tasmania 53 Western Australia, 54 and Victoria, 55 Belarus (Draft 
Law)'56 Bel giUm'57 Bolivia, 58 Brazil. 59 Canada! s model law 6'0 Colombia 61 Costa Rica, 62 Cuba, 
63 
Qyprus, 64 Denmark '65 
Guatemala, " HonduraS67 Hungn, 69 India, 69 Kuwaifs law, 70 Lebanon, 71 
"Prohibits "any financial gain or other benefit in exchange for the donation of organs.. or any 
intervention for financial gain. " Section 27 of Law No. 24193 of 24 March 1993 (IDHL, 1994, 
45(l), 35-36 at 35. 
49The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 contains a prohibition of trading in tissue under Part VII. 
"Act No. 121 of 1979 (The Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979) at section 24(l). Unders24(3)the 
minister of health can authorize such an arrangement however. The penalty for breaking this law is a 
$500 fine or imprisonment for 3 months which is quite typical of anti commercialisation provisions. 
"Ordinance No. 44 of 1978 on Transplantation and Anatomy prohibits trading in tissue in part VII. 
"Act No. 164 of 1983 - The Human Tissue Act prohibits trading of tissue in part VI. 
53 The Human Tissue Act 1985 prohibits commercial dealings in organs (part IV). 
54 The Human Tissue and Transplant Act 19 82 (No. 116) sections 29 (trading) and 30( advertising). 
55 The Human Tissue Act 1982 (No. 9860) prohibits trading in tissue (part VIII). 
16 Prohibits the buying and selling of human organs is under section 4 of Draft Law of 1995. 
57 States that organs and tissues, "may not be provided for profit, irrespective of the parties involved. 
Law No. . 32 of 13 June 1986 On the Removal and Transplantation of Organs at section 4(l). "Section 90 of the Health Code promulgated in 1978, prohibits trade but allows "interchange" for 
charitable purposes. The former law of former Yugoslavi prohibited commercial dealings in organs 
(Section 4 of Law of 15 July 1982 On the Conditions Governing the Exchange and Transport of Parts 
of the Human Body for Transplantation for Therapeutic Purposes). 
"Constitution of Federative Republic 5 Oct 1988 at section 199 states that organs must not be the 
subject of any commercial transactions. 
6OThe Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act 1990 section 15 states that, "no person shall buy, sell or 
otherwise deal in (except where lawful before the act and act complied with) organs. " 
6'Decree No. 1172 of 6 June 1989 section 17 prohibits donation for other than, "therapeutic, teaching, 
or research purposes. 
6'Prohibits any remuneration or compensation for organs and anatomical materials and makes procuring 
organs with a view to financial gain is an offence. Law No. 5560 of 20 August 1974 on Human 
Transplants at section 13 and 14 respectively. 
63 Law No. 41 of 13 July 1983 and Decree No. 139 of 4 February 1988 requires donation to be free and 
for humanitarian reasons. 
'Prohibits commercial agreements or transactions. LawNo. 97 of 1987 Onthe Removal and 
Transplantation of Biological Materials of Human Origin at section 60. 
6'States that it is an offence to offer or receive any form of compensation in respect of the removal or 
transceiver or to collaborate with these activities. Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 at section 20(3). 
66 Section 10 of the Regulations in Dealing in Organs and Tissues From Human Beings and Cadavers 
(Govt. Order No. 74086 of 26 September 1986) states that the provision of organs and tissues must be 
free of charge. 
67 Section 5 of the Law On the Transplantation and Removal of Human Organs and Tissues (Decree No. 
131 of 23 Nov 1982) states that no payment shall be made in respect of human organs and tissues. 
68 States that donation of an organ may be made only in the absence of payment and no person may 
request or get remuneration. Ordinance No. 18 of 4 November 1972 of the Minister of Health for the 
implementation of the Provisions of Law No. II of 1972 On Health Relating to the Removal and 
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues at section 2. 
69The Transplantation of Human Organs Act (No. 42) 1994 at section 2k (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38). 
70Decree-Law No. 55 of 20 December 1987 On Organ Transplantation at section 7 states that organs 
may not be sold or bought in any fashion nor any material benefit be obtained in relation to them. 
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Malawi '72 MexiC073 Lanama '74 Romania 
75 Russian Federation, 76 Singanore 77 Slovakia. 
78 
2-p =ý' 
Slovenia, 79 South Africa, 80 Sri Lanka. 81 Syrian Arab Repub] iC. 82 Ticino (Swiss canton) 83 The 
N_etherlands, 94 TuniSi '95 Turke '86 USA model law 
87 and Venezuelal88 
8.2.3 Ancillary Prohibitions Relating to Advertising. 
in addition to preventing profit making from organ donation, a small number of 
jurisdictions explicitly prohibit the solicitation of business for organs. This is a fairly 
71Decree (No. 109) of 16 September 1983 On the Removal of Human Tissues and Organs for 
Therapeutic Purposes at section 4 states that, "no form of compensation shall be provided in relation to 
the donation of tissues and organs. " 
71 States that selling, buying and supplying of organs is prohibited as is unauthorised export. No. 14 of 
1990 at section 16 and export is also illegal - see section 20. 
73 Federal Regulations of 16 August 1976 On the Use of Human Organs, Tissues and Cadavers at 
section 26 prohibits remuneration for organs. 
74 No. 10 of II July 1983 at section 4 prohibits remuneration for organs. 
75 States that the harvesting and transplantation of organs may not be subject to any transaction. Law 
of 1996 at Article 2(l). Subject to the fact that the hospital undertaking the transplantation meets any 
medical expenses (Article 13(l)). 
76 Prohibits buying and selling of organs. Law of 22 December 1992 of the Russian Federation on the 
Transplantation of Human Organs and/or Tissues at section 1. 
77 Medical (Therapy Education and Research) Act 1972 at section 15. 
7'Appears to prohibit payment for an organ. Section 46(5) of Law of 24 August 1994. (IDHL, 1995, 
46(2), 151-157 at 155). 
7'Prohibits the giving or receiving of payment or any other financial benefits for human body parts. 
Law of 1996 at Article 4 (copy held at EUROTOLD). 
"Section 28 of the Human Tissue Act No. 65 of 1983 lays down stringent prohibitions on payment 
relating to import, acquisition or supply of tissue or gamete. 
"Law No. 48 of 1987 The Transplantation of Human Tissues Act at section 17 prohibits buying, 
selling or otherwise disposing of organs. 
82 No. 31 of 23 August 1972 at section 6 prohibits remuneration for organs. 
83 Laws prohibit commercial dealings in organs. Law of 18 April 1989 On Health Promotion and Co- 
ordination of the Health Sector at section 15. Several Swiss Cantons have endorsed the guidelines of 
the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences which lay down that organ transplantation must be provided 
free of charge but do not comprehensively prohibit commercial dealings (see Human Organ 
Transplantation, WHO 1991. 
84 Law of 24 May 1996 at section 2 specifies that consent to removal of an organ is deemed to be null 
and void if such consent has been given in order to receive a compensatory amount greater than that of 
expenses, including lost earnings, deriving directly from the removal of the organ (IDHL, 1996, 
47(4), 469475 at 470). Organ donation can only occur within organ centres which are only given 
authorisation if they are operating for non-profit-making purposes (section 25) 
85 Law No. 91-22 of March 1991 On the Removal and Transplantation of Human Organs prohibits 
commerce in transplantation. 
96 Prohibits, "the removal or purchase or sale of any organ or tissue for profit or any other kind of 
remuneration shall be prohibited. " Law No. 223 8 of 1979 On the Removal, Storage, Transfer and 
Grafting of Organs and Tissues at sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
87 Many states have adopted the prohibition on commercial dealings in organs within the National Organ 
Transplant Act 1984 at section 10, see Human Organ Transplantation, WHO 199 1. 
8sLaw of 19 November 1992 at section 7 prohibits payment or compensation for organs, tissues, 
derivatives, or anatomical materials removed for therapeutic purposes (IDHL, 1995,46(3), 329-330). 
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common feature in new transplant legislation such as Belarus Draft law, " Poland, 
" 
Russian Federation, " UK, ̀  Hong Kong, " India. " Romanian" and French la , 
prohibit advertising intended to promote donation of elements and products of the 
human body for the benefit of a specific person or for the benefit of a specific 
establishment or agency. This effectively bans all commercial advertisements. 
Other laws with prohibitions in this field include Turkey, ' Queensland, " Western 
Australia, ' Singavore, "o Northern Territory"' Capital Territory'o' and New South 
Wales. "' 
Some jurisdictions allowing commercial adverts thereby leave a loophole in 
commerce prohibition; it being possible to get around the spirit of prohibition by 
advertising in the jurisdiction concerned to conduct commercialised transplant in a 
jurisdiction without prohibition. 
8.2.4. Additional Regulation Relating to Donor-Recipient Relationship. 
In line with the Council of Europe's Resolution (78)29"' and WHO Guiding 
Principles"' some statutory regimes restrict or exclude organ LDT between persons 
"Section 4 of Draft Law of 1995, copy held at EUROTOLD. 
"Article 20 of Law of 26 October 1995. 
9'Law of 22 December 1992 of the Russian Federation on the Transplantation of Human Organs and 
or Tissues at section 1. 
92 Section I of HOTA 1989. 
93 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(3), 325-327 at 325. 
94 The Transplantation of Human Organs Act (No. 42) 1994 at section 2k (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38 
at 34). 
95Law of 1996 at Article 4(2). 
96 Article 665-12 of Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994. 
97 Law No. 223 8 of 1979 On the Removal, Storage, Transfer and Grafting of Organs and Tissues at 
sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
"Section 41 ibid. 
"The Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (No. 116) at section 29 for trading and section 30 for 
advertising.. 
'OoMedical (Therapy Education and Research) Act 1972 at section 15. 
10'ActNo. 121 of 1979 (The Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979) at section 24(l). Unders24(3)the 
minister of health can authorise such an arrangement however. The penalty for breaking this law is a 
$500 fine or imprisonment for 3 months which is quite typical of anti commercialization provisions. 
102 Ordinance No. 44 of 1978 on Transplantation and Anatomy prohibits trading in tissue in part VII. 
103 Act No. 164 of 1983 - The Human Tissue Act prohibits trading of tissue in part VI. 
"Article 4 which suggests that the removal of non-regenerative organs from living persons not closely 
and genetically related to the potential recipient should in exceptional cases where there are good 
chances of success. Council of Europe, Organ Transplantation: Ethical and Social-Cultural Problems 
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without an existing emotional and / or genetic relationship. "' There provisions are 
partly aimed at reducing or eliminating the possibility of commercial dealings 
in 
organs, some of them make specific reference to this fact. 
Indian"' and UK law require all donations to be screened (by an Authority set up 
under the law) for commercial motivation except those between close genetic 
relatives. Hong Kong has a similar provision but scrutiny of spousal relationships 
over 3 years standing is not required. UK law (mirrored by Hon ý Kong law"') 
attempts to prevent / sanction commercially motivated non-genetically related 
donation. Under section 2(3) of HOTA to grant authority for such a donation 
ULTRA must, amongst other things, be satisfied that no payment has been made in 
contravention of section I of the Act. "' This requirement, repeated in regulation 
3(1)a of The Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989, is 
designed to provide 'extra cover' against commercial motivation by requiring medical 
practitioners to put forward proposed non-genetically related donations for 
authorisation by ULTRA. Continuing this theme regulation 3(2)c requires ULTRA 
to be satisfied that the donors consent was not caused by an offer of an inducement. "' 
The main motivation for greater scrutiny and regulation of non-genetically related 
donation... is that non-genetically related donation is considered more susceptible to 
Raised by Organ Transplantation (Paris Conference of European Health Ministers, Nov 16-17,1987) 
at 15-16. 
"'Guiding Principle 3 suggests that living donation should generally be limited to genetically related 
persons exceptions being made in the case of bone marrow and other acceptable regenerative tissues.. 
'06E. g. laws of France, Slovenia, Sweden, Portugal, Russian Federation, India, Hong Kong, UK. 
Additional restrictions exist in several countries in the specific situation of minor donation. Further 
analysis of this area is provided in chapter 7. 
107 Section 8 of Act No. 42 of 1994, IDHL, 1995,46(l), 36. 
108 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995, IDHL, 1995,46(3), 326. 
'091n other words not in contravention of all the various prohibitions laid down in the section. 
"ORegulation 3(1)c limits the scope of 3(2)c to those cases in which the organ is not being removed 
primarily for medical treatment of that donor - hence for instance regulation 3(2)c would not apply to 
situations in which a living person' s heart was used for donation as an incidental factor in a medically 
required removal of that heart from the donor. In other words there appears to be a distinction 
between persons whose primary role is that of a patient and those who role is completely that of being a 
donor, with greater protective regulation for the latter. 
"'ULTRA has produced 3 Annual Reports and usually examine more than 10 cases each year. This 
would seem to indicate that the Act has at least not significantly deterred transplant professionals from 
accepting unrelated donors which was a fear at the time the Act was passed. In fact the contrary may 
have happened in that transplant professional may feel more secure about putting forward non-closely 
genetically related donors because there is another body doing the ethical scrutiny for them and 
potentially as such protecting them from any scandal of commercial dealings (providing they 
themselves are not part of any dealings). A similar view to this was put forward by the Chair of 
ULTRA in a 1996 meeting with David Price. 
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commercial motivation. 'Gifts' etc. between genetic relatives could contravene the 
Act but the main 'evil' that the Act is directed towards is more fully commercial 
transactions. These are obviously most likely to occur between strangers or people 
who have 'manufactured' an emotional or legal relationship for the purpose, as the 
Under Secretary for Health stated, during the passing of the Act, Parliament "(could 
not) rule out the possibility of non-genetic relationships being formed solely for the 
purpose of the operation or of pressure - economic or otherwise - being brought to 
bear upon a donor to submit to a transplant operation. ""' 
Nethertheless, the beaurocratic rigour of going through ULTRA might seem 
somewhat insulting to persons who have been close for a long period, e. g. some 
couples who have been married or cohabiting many years. Hong-Kong's I is 
perhaps better for allowing donations by spouses of over 3 years standing to go 
unscrutinised by it's parallel authority. I" 
Kishore has suggested that restrictions and exclusions of non-genetically related 
donors are unrealistic and interfere with the continued development of altruism in 
society. "' However, strangers are more likely to come forward in the spirit of 
112 The then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State For Health in the House of Commons (HC Deb, 6 
July 1989). The Presidents of The International Transplantation Society and British Transplantation 
Society alleged in 1985, "that British surgeons are transplanting kidneys into Indian and Pakistani 
patients who have paid living donors to give up a kidney" (The Times (London), May 13,1985 at 32 
column 1). Bearing this in mind there was a real possibility of fake marriages being instituted for 
donation. The Act is often superficially pointed out to have been passed with haste but in fact nothing 
was done following the above statement. Lillich states that the pleas of the Presidents for the British 
Government o legislate to make such practices illegal had fallen on deaf ears until later reports of 
Turkish peasants being flown in to London and paid to be kidney donors (Transplanting Organs from 
Living Donors: An International Regime or More Free Enterprise, Finnish Yearbook ofInternational 
Law, 1990. This case involved the exclusive private London hospital Wellington Humana where two 
Turkish people had been paid; C2,000 each to donate their kidneys (see The Independent (London), Jan 
18,1989, at 2 columns 1-3). Dr Raymond Crockett was struck off by the General Medical Council 
for his involvement in this affair. The media outrage appeared to finally get the Secretary of Health to 
do something about a practice he had said in 1985 was "outrageous " and would be reviewed by 
Parliament "urgently. " (see D. Brahams, 'The Outcry Over the Humana Affair, ' Lancet, 1985,1, 
285). During the debates the government was criticised by the opposition for dragging it's feet on the 
issue. One Conservative M. P. spoke in favour of the commercial market (see Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons) Second Reading Committee (16.5.89) and Standing Committee A (8.6.89)). 
This may indicate one of the underlying reasons that the government did not act faster; a dislike of 
'controlling or interfering with market forces' - preventing person's doing as they please with their body 
being a part of this. 
113 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 5(l). 
""'There is no scope for dogmatic postures. Open-mindedness should be the approach while dealing 
with an issue like organ transplantation. Families are not unconnected or antagonistic fragments of 
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entrepeneurship than the spirit of universality. The only way to allow strangers to 
express altruism with limited risk of commerce would be for their donated organs to 
go into a'pool'with anonymity between donor and recipient. This system is widely 
utilised for blood donation. It might be practical despite the limited 'shelf life' of 
organs. However risks and definite consequences are much higher in donating 
organs than donating blood; there might be considerable ethical objection to a 
stranger assuming such risks and consequences. The counter to this is that, as 
rescuers, people regularly assume high levels of risk and consequence for strangers. 
What, for instance, the difference between rescuing someone from a burning house 
and donating. If non-commerciality and non-psychopathology are assured stranger- 
donation becomes a highly liberated form of giving; untroubled by intra-familial 
pressures and conflicts that not infrequently impinge on familial donations and 
expressing a noble human solidarity. 
At this stage stranger donation is unlikely to achieve sufficient public and professional 
consensus to become a common reality. However, laws should at least to be subtle 
enough to accept emotionally related donors like spouses and close friends"' who can 
be a significant source of organs. 
8.2.5 The Donors Assurance Against Negative Economic Consequences 
From Donation. 
Negative economic consequences from donation are potentially wide-ranging. They 
can include lost earnings/holiday entitlements, travel and subsistence expenses, 
childcare and reconnaissance expenses, reduction of job security/dismissal, reduction 
of ability to get life insurance and, within a private health care system, costs of 
society. After thousands of years of continuous efforts the individuals on this search have attained a 
state of organic and functional integration. Atornisation of society on the basis of consanguineous 
proximities amounts to reversal of this holistic trend. " Organ Donation: Consanguinity Vs 
Universality - An Analysis of Indian Law, Forthcoming Publication, Trans Proc, Dec 1996, copy 
held at the EUROTOLD Project. 
115A good example here is the acceptance by ULTRA in 1996 of a lung lobe from a friend of the 
prospective recipient; the primary justification being that 2 lobes were required and only one was 
available within the family. 
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healthcare/affectation of the status of health care insurance. Does law and practice 
adequately assure against such negative consequences? 
8.2.5.1. Assurance Within Transplant Law. 
Transplant law lacks uniformity in ifs approach to assuring donors against negative 
economic consequences. While a small number of transplant laws (including the 
Belarus draft law "' Belgium, "' Finland France "I Panama, 110 Slovenia"' and 
Spain"') assure donors as a matter of right, some jurisdictions (including Honig 
Kong"' India, "' Luxembourg, "' The Netherlands, "' Singapore for cadaveric, 127 
Ticino, 128 Tunisia 129 UK, 110 USA"' and the Australian state laws of Northern 
116Article 11 of draft law of 1995 (copy held at EUROTOLD). 
117 States that, "the crown shall make rules concerning the compensation of living donors at public 
expense or by the social security agency designated by it. Such compensation shall cover both the 
costs and loss of income directly resulting from the provision of an organ. " Law No. 32 of 13 June 
1986 at section 4(2). 
118This has a limited arrangement in place whereby donors having to take a day or more off work 
receive a daily allowance. Law No. 780 of 25 August 1994 at section 11 (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 33). 
The daily allowance is in accordance with the provisions of Health Insurance Law (364/63). 
119AIlows reimbursement of expenses incurred in the process of donation. Arrangements are being 
made to reimburse living donors of their necessary costs. Article 665-13 of Law No. 94-654 of 29 
July 1994 (IDHL, 1994,45(4), 473-482 at 474). 
120 States that, "should the donor request he shall be entitled to payment of hospital medical expenses, 
laboratory charges, and similar expenses incurred by him, as well as compensation for loss of earnings 
during his absence from work by reason of examinations and other necessary procedures. " Law No. 10 
of II July 1983 at section 4. The recipient is also entitled to free medical care - section 4. 
12'Law of 1996 at Article 4. 
122 States that, "the living donor shall be guaranteed the care necessary for his recovery as well as the 
coverage of any costs incurred as a result of the donation and operation. " Crown Decree No. 426 of 
22 February 1980 at section 5. 
123 Ordinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(3) at 325). 
124 The Transplantation of Human Organs Act (No. 42) 1994 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38 at 
34) see Organ Donation: Consanguinity -Vs - Universality. An Analysis of Indian Law by Dr R. R. 
Kishore, manuscript held at EUROTOLD Project, soon to be published in Transplantation 
Proceedings. 
125Law of 25 November 1982 at section 16 allowing for reimbursement of loss of revenue and other 
expenses that may be occasioned by organ removals. 
126 Law of 24 May 1996 - section 7 states that the donor may be compensated for the expenses referred 
to in section 2 which are compensation for expenses including lost earnings deriving directly from the 
removal of the organ. 
127 Medical Therapy and Research Act 1972 at section 14(3). 
128Law of IS April 1989 at section 15. 
129Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 
130Under section 1(3) b of HOTA including, "any expenses or loss of earnings incurred by a person so 
far as is reasonably and directly attributable to his supplying an organ from his body.,, See also 
Circular No. 308 of 7 September 1989 On the Arrangements for The payment of Costs and 
reimbursement of expenses Incurred by the Removal from Living Donors of Human Organs or Bone 
Marrow Intended for Transplantation. 
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Territo1y, "' South Australia, "' Tasmania"' and Western Australia"') only explicitly 
allow it - leaving it to the discretion of government department or practitioners as to 
what form and even whether assurance occurs in practice. The majority of 
jurisdictions do not address assurance for donors within transplant law; the extent of 
assurance in practice depending much on the vagaries of whether and to what extent a 
donor is covered incidentally via labour and welfare law and deliberately by voluntary 
financial support (e. g. from a hospital, employer or recipient). Some of the areas 
least likely to be compensated for are childcare, home reconnaissance (e. g. home 
help) and travel costs - these being dependent on welfare law (which is typically 
becoming more limited) and voluntary financial support (which is sporadic""). 
Some limits to assurance are designed to avoid it being a 'back door' route to paying 
donors for their services. For instance, Indian, "' Hong Kong'" and UK"' laws 
allow expenses or loss of earnings incurred by the donor in supplying the organ from 
his body provided they are reasonable and directly attributable to the donation. 
Other limits derive primarily from a lack of legislative attention to this issue than any 
deliberate policy. For instance, in creating HOTA, UK legislators were so 
'myopically concerned' with preventing 'trade and other malpractice' that they failed 
to explicitly debate whether or not donor assurance should be a matter of right. 
Meanwhile, Finnish law manages to provide for compensation of the donors lost 
13 'National Organ Transplants Act has been adopted by many states in respect of it's explicit allowance 
that the donor's expenses maybe provided for. Section 10 of the Act see also p19 of Human Organ 
Transplantation, WHO 1991. 
132 The Human Tissue Transplant Act No. 121 of 1979 at section 24(5). 
133 The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 section 35(4). 
134 The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 27(3). 
135The Human Tissue and Transplant Act No. 116 of 1982 at section 29(3). 
13'European hospitals only provide support sporadically -see chapters 10. One possible point of 
hesitancy for hospitals is that they might feel wary of making such payments for fear of being 
misconstrued as a commercial incentive, or uncertainty as to the legal position. 
137 The Transplantation of Human Organs Act (No. 42) 1994 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 34-38 at 
34) see Organ Donation: Consanguinity -Vs - Universality. An Analysis of Indian Law by Dr R. R. 
Kishore, manuscript held at EUROTOLD Project, soon to be published in Transplantation 
Proceedings. 
1380rdinance No. 16 of 1995 at section 2 (IDHL, 1995,46(3) at 325). 
139Under section 1(3) b of HOTA including, "any expenses or loss of earnings incurred by a person so 
far as is reasonably and directly attributable to his supplying an organ from his body. " See also 
Circular No. 308 of 7 September 1989 On the Arrangements for The payment of Costs and 
reimbursement of expenses Incurred by the Removal from Living Donors of Human Organs or Bone 
Marrow Intended for Transplantation. 
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earnings as a matter of right"' but does not consider other donor costs. A number of 
laws refer to donor expenses but leave it to statutory interpretation as to whether this 
includes lost earnings (see e. g. Northern Territoly, "' South Australia, "' Tasmam "' 
Western Australia"' and Tunisia"'). Some adverse consequences, including 
discrimination in obtaining life insurance"' and protection from employment 
dismissal on grounds of being a donor would not be covered by a 'lost expenses and 
earnings' provision and need specific legislative protection against. 
While a donor could expect to be compensated for the consequences of negligent 
medical practice (s)he might also reasonably want to be compensated for any physical 
harms that were an unexpected consequence of the donation whether their had been 
negligence or not. In order to give effect to this wish legislative provision is required 
- either within transplant legislation or within the context of a no-fault liability 
compensation scheme. Examples of provision in transplant law include Slovenian 
law which makes provision for compensation of donor physical harms (free medical 
treatment and indemnity according to the rules of invalids insurance).. as does the 
Belarus draft law. "' Portugal's law provides for the donor to be compensated for any 
injury suffered, irrespective of whether there has been any misconduct, "" the 
transplantation centre is required to take out insurance for the donor"O (interestingly, 
it has no provision to compensate donors for other financial losses"'). However, 
this needs to be read in the light of an earlier provision which prohibits compensating 
donors for harms which are an immediate result or direct cause of the intervention 
itself. "' Consequently, it appears compensation will not be given for harms which 
"'This has a limited arrangement in place whereby donors having to take a day or more off work 
receive a daily allowance. Law No. 780 of 25 August 1994 at section 11 (IDHL, 1995,46(l), 33). 
The daily allowance is in accordance with the provisions of Health Insurance Law (364/63). 
14'The Human Tissue Transplant Act No. 121 of 1979 at section 24(5). 
142The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 section 35(4). 
143 The Human Tissue Act 1985 at section 27(3). 
144 The Human Tissue and Transplant Act No. 116 of 1982 at section 29(3). 
145 Law No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991 
146Although in countries such as the United States this is agreed on a National level with the relevant 
insurance companies. 
147 Law of 1996 at Article 4. 
14BArtiCle II of draft law of 1995 (copy held at EUROTOLD). 
149 Section 9(l) ibid. 
"OSection 9(2) ibid. 
15'Law No. 12 of 22 April 1993. 
"'Section 5(2) ibid. 
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are necessarily the result of the procedure (such as loss of the transplanted material, 
scar and immediate pain around the removal site etc. ) but will be given automatically 
for non-intrinsic harms resulting from a donation (such as the donor developing 
chronic uremia, hypertension or septicemia in the removal site). Slovakian law also 
requires health establishments engaging in organ removal to take out a special 
insurance policy against liability for damages that may be caused to a living donor 
during organ removal. This implies that donor may claim for damage but leaves it 
uncertain as to whether proof of negligence is required. "' 
8.2.5.2. Assurance Provision Within Employment/Social Securitv Law. 
Since unemployed donors will generally be receiving benefit anyway the fact of 
donation should have limited adverse financial impact provided that ancillary 
expenses uch as travel are taken care of (e. g. by the hospital). Conversely, a person 
doing paid work could suffer considerable financial loss consequent upon donation. 
What are the possibilities for sick pay/benefit for employed donors? There are two 
critical issues here: 
Firstly the qualifying conditions for obtaining the benefit and their relationship to 
living donation. The donor has 'chosen' actions causing an illness. This means the 
qualification of donors may be under question in some laws and structuring / 
interpretation of regulations by courts and / or government departments will be 
critical. Any ambiguity is likely to be resolved in favour of the donor who is acting 
as a rescuer, 154 and is indirectly saving the state money through donation. 
Secondly the nature and degree of payment and how this relates to living donors. 
The extent to which donor's lost earnings are compensated will partly depend on the 
percentage rate of sick pay vis-A-vis the normal wage. Since donors may be off work 
for a considerable period of time there will also be a question of whether the length of 
time sick pay is available for covers the donor's required time off. Required time-off 
"'Law of 24 August 1994 at section 46(3). IDHL, 1995,46(2), 151-157 at 155. 154 The legal position of rescuers is discussed briefly in chapter 6. 
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work varies between donors but a general approximation can be made and matched 
against sick pay provision within each jurisdiction. 
EUROTOLD donor questionnaires asked 27 donors how much time they needed off 
work. The mean (of 25 responses) was approximately 9 weeks but with a significant 
minority of donors requiring 3 or more months off (1/6) and a small minority 6 
months or more off (1/12). Another study that is useful in this respect is that 
conducted by Westlie et al. on the Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors. "' 
This study"' indicates post*-donatiOn hospitalisation periods of 7 days or less for 
56.7% of donors, 8-14 days for 35.6% of donors, 15-30 days for 6.1% of donors and 
31 days or more for 1% of donors. 0.6% of donors did not remember the length of 
their post donation hospitalisation. Calculating time required off work from these 
figures is a matter of estimation because living donor nephrectomy is a serious 
operation and might have incapacitating consequences, such as fatigue, extending 
beyond the hospitalisation period. For instance, 12.3% of donors in Westlie's study 
said they had experienced significant medical problems"' Additionally some time 
off might be required for pre-operative work. A reasonable assessment might be 9 
weeks time-off as an average with most donors covered by a3 month period. 
The time-off work requirements of Norwegian donors in Westlie's study are the best 
basis available with which to test the adequacy of time-off provision under sick pay 
regulations globally. 158 Figure 5 looks at employment provisions as they relate to 
donors based on the above assessment of sick pay needs. An additional factor 
155A Copy of this Study can be obtained from the author through The Department of Medicine, 
Oestfold Sentralskyehus, Fredrikstad, Norway. See also Quality of Life In Norwegian Kidney 
Donors, Neph Dial Trans, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
156 Involving 494 living kidney donors in Norway who had donated over a span of 19 years. 157 However these problems are not necessarily attributable to the donation of an organ indeed it is 
notable that of unemployed donors in Westlie's study 10.3% were on sick leave whereas 30.5% of the 
unemployed in the control group were on sick leave. This might suggest hat the effects of donation 
are minimal, although it might be stated that the donors are likely to have started off more healthy than 
an average member of the population due to the donation screening process excluding more unhealthy 
persons. 
'"In the EUROTOLD study 9% of donors were in hospital for 0-7 days, 64% from 8-14 days, 27% 
froml5-30days. These are similar figures to those for hospitalisation in Westlie's study and would 
be likely to give rise to similar time-off requirements. 
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examined in these tables is job security; it being a serious consideration that a donor's 
"illness" could be used as a justification for the termination of his / her employment. "' 
Figure 5: 
Country 
Sick pay covers 
normal wages? 
Time-off requirements 
of all donors covered? 
Donor qualifies for 
benefit? 
Job security legal rights 
affected by time off? 
Argentina Fully Virtually all 
160 Probably"' Unstated 
Australia Generally fUI1162 Probably with most Condition unstated Unstated 
Austria 163 Most-All MoStI64 Probably'65-- Affected 166 
Bolivia Varies 167- Varies Varies Unaffected"" 
Brazil Uncertain Some 169 Conditions unstated Unstated 
Bulgaria"' 70_90%171 Virtually All 172 Probably... Unaffected 174 
Chile Varies 175 Unstated - [-Varies 176 Unstated 
Canada Most to fUI1177 Virtually all I Conditions unstated Unaffected"" 
'"The table has utilised the 'bible' for worldwide employment provisions, the International 
Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations as the foundation for analysis. This is an 
ongoing work edited by Prof Dr R Blanpain and published by Kluwer. 
160131anpain, 2, p124, para 599. Full salary paid for up 3 months when length of service is less than 
5 years and for 6 months when more than 5 years, more for workers with family responsibilities. 
1611bid, p123, para594. Incapacity must not have been intentionally provoked. 
162 Ibid, p115, para235. 
163 Ibid, p93-4, para, 325-334. "Within the limits outlined above, an employee should suffer no 
financial disadvantage because of illness.. Apart from the regular wage or salary, this also includes 
other benefits of either a normal or exceptional sorý such as commission, incentive- premi.. " 
164 Ibid, p94, para 33. Period varies on the employees length of continued service with the same 
employer but is sufficient for most donors whatever their length of continued service. In the case of 
the state of Arbeiter less than 5 years entitles the employee to 4 weeks, 5-15 years to 6 weeks, 15-25 
years to 8 weeks and over 25 years to 10 weeks. Most donors are likely to have 4-8 weeks or which 
would be sufficient for some only. The position in Angestellte is even better with up to five years 
employment entitling an employee to 6 weeks leave, 5-15 yrs; to 8 weeks, 15-25 yrs to 10 weeks and 
over 25 years to 12 weeks. This would cover nearly all donors. 
165 The employee has the right to continued wage payment "where he is not at fault" Page 95, para 336 
ibid. There is also a provision which allows short term time-off where the employee, "is prevented 
from working through no fault of his own for important personal reasons (para 337-338). 
166p93, para 325 ibid, "there is no protection against losing a job because of illness. Indeed from the 
point of view of dismissals protection law in general, an employees sickness can be ajustification for 
givingnotice. " A donor is vulnerable to losing job at least if employed on a more casual basis. 
167 Blanpain, 3, p58, para32. Social benefits can be voluntarily paid, stem from the labour contract 
itself or be paid by law. 
168 Sickness results in suspension of the labour contract without legal rights being affected. 
169BIanpain, 3, p97, para 189. Payment is made: "During short periods of sickness, and also for 
the first 15 days or more of serious illness. " 
170Art 152 of the Labour code 1951 (social insurance scheme) see Blanpain, 3, p 120, para 250. 
17'Amount depending on the length of uninterrupted service as an employee. P121, para 251 ibid. 
172 The only apparent limit is where a worker becomes understood to be permanently incapacitated. 
173p 12 1, para 254 ibid. A donor may be covered as looking after a family member who is ill. 
174Art 325 it 9 Labour Code. Termination of contract only possible for illness of long term nature. 
175 Blanpain, 4, p84, para 132. Level of assistance is based on the amount the worker earned in the 6 
months prior to his illness. 
176 Entitlement is based on having made 3 months contribution to the social insurance scheme. 
177 Blanpain, 3, p99-100, para 220. Employers duty to compensate is established by the Canadian 
Supreme Court and in civil law in the case of Quebec. Statutory schemes provide about 60% of 
wages, employer schemes top this up. 
178 In the situation of temporary illness the Supreme Court has deemed the contract as continuing. 
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Country Sick pay covers 
normal wages? 
Time-off requirements 
of all donors covered? 
Donor qualifies for 
benefit? 
Job security legal rights 
affected by time off? 
Denmark ull Unstated Uncertain"' Unaffected"" 
Ecuador Most/all 182 Probably nearIX all Conditions unstated Unaffected"' 
_ Finland Not stated Probably most"' ProýabTly`nT Unaffected 
_ France Probably most"' Varies Varies Generally unaffected 
187 
. Germany... Full most", Almost certainly'90 Unstated 
Great Britain Varies'Tr- ' Virtually all 192 Qualifies 193 Generally unaffected'§T 
Greece Unstated Usually most9' Probably` Unaffected"' 
Hungary Full'98 Unstated Conditions unstated Unstated 
Ireland Varies'99 Varies Varies Unstated 
Italy VarieS200 Varies Varies Varies 201 
179p 130, para 291 ibid. Employee is entitled if (s)he has worked for a minimum of 13 weeks 
comprising at least 120 hours work. Otherwise will receives social benefits corresponding to the usual 
wage subject to a ceiling. 
18OP135, para 305. No payment where employee contracts illness through more than slight negligence 
orintent. Living donor could argue serious illness amongst near family as a justification. 
181P127, para282. Where employee contracts illness due to serious negligence or intent the employer 
has the right to terminate the employment contract without notice. This has to be very serious 
behaviour however and is unlikely to apply to a compassion situation like organ donation. 
182 Blanpain, 5, p124, para 307. A comprehensive social insurance scheme provides sick pay. 
193 Ibid. Law prohibits the termination of contract for a period of illness of not more than one year. 
184 Ibid, p9 1, para 177. The employee must have been working at least one month in order to qualify 
for benefit. Wide ranging scheme but length of time off it covers is not specifically stated. 
1851f employee willfully or by gross negligence caused the illness no wages will be paid, hence payment 
of donors is not totally assured. 
186 Responsibility appears to fall to sickness insurance schemes or the employer him/herself where this is 
specified by collective agreement, coverage can thus vary. 
187 Blanpain, 5, p 103, para 194. Additionally; "collective agreements often mention the precise 
duration of a longer period of absence during which the termination of the contract cannot occur. " 
Such duration varies depending on the seniority of the worker and the particular agreement itself. 
Donr job security thus depends very much on the particular employment situation of the donor. 
1881n the Federal Republic of Germany rules on sickness govern former GDR also. 
189BIanpain, 5, p83, para 204. Sickness payment is for 6 weeks. 
19OPara 205 ibid. Continued remuneration does not apply where the illness is the employee's fault. 
Fault is defined as acting "in a manner which is strongly opposed to what a reasonable man would do. "' 
Absence for LDT would probably be interpreted as reasonable. 
1911bid 6, p135, para 243. Not payable for the first 4 days of sickness. Employees do not get 
normal wage paid under Statutory Sick Pay (they get E54.55) but may do so via a top-up in the 
employment contract or by custom and practice etc. 
192 28 weeks for any one period of incapacity for work for which eligibility starts immediately. 
193 This has been decided at governmental level. 
194 Dismissal with notice can occur with impunity unless the employee has been with the employer long 
enough to claim statutory unfair dismissal. 
195 Blanpain, 6, p 103, para 205. For one or more years service the employee has the right to one 
month's remuneration or a half month where employed for less than a year. 
196Ibid. Some uncertainty here as the illness must not be due to employee negligence or fraud. 
197 Ibid. Normal notice requirements apply. 
1981bid, pl18. 
1991bid, 7, p112, para244. In Ireland most employees have a contractual scheme (express or implied 
by custom and practice). Schemes vary but in most donor illness is likely to be short enough to be 
covered for its duration, usually at basic or average pay. If there is no contractual scheme or the donor 
is unemployed disability benefit is payable from the 4th day of absence onwards. From the 14th day a 
pay related supplement is given. 
2001bid, 7, p84, para 164. Sick pay is often payable by the employer - schemes vary according but 
are generally fairly comprehensive, qualifying conditions vary. 
"'Varies according to collective agreement. Workers on trial do not usually have protection. 
254 
Country Sick pay covers 
normal wages? 
Time-off requirements 
of all donors covered? 
Donor qualifics for 
benefit? 
Job security legal rights 
affected by time off? 
Libya Probably most.. Probably with most - 
Conditions unstatcd Unstated 
Luxembourg Full... Virtually all'a Conditions unstated Unaffcctcd'u" 
Malaysia Full" VirtualIX allM7 Conditions unstated Unstated 
Mexico Full"" some"' Conditions unstated Unaffected"' 
Morocco Varics'rr- ' Varies Unccrtain Vulnerable"' 
New Zealand Usually mose" Varies Uncertain Generally unaffected. ""' 
Nigeria Varies"' Varies"' Uncertain Generally una[Tcctcd"'- 
Panama Uncertain some", Conditions unstatcd Generally unaffected"" 
Pakistan Probably rull"' Virtually all"' Varies"' Unstated 
Peru some 213 Virtually all'N Conditions unstated Unstated 
Philippines Varies 225 somcimost", Conditions unstated 
227 Gcncrally unaffectcd"7 71 
Poland Usually 75-100% Virtually_all'2' Conditions unstated Unstated 
"2131anpain, 8. 
2*31bid, 8, pill, para209. Subject to a ceiling of 5 times the minimum salary. 
20"Bcnclit is payable for 52 weeks. 
"sAn employer generally cannot terminate a contract during a period of Illness 
206 Ibid, 8, p48, para 53. Full pay is given. 
207 Ibid. Entitlement for 14 days in each year if the employee has served the employer less than 2 years 
(18 days for 2-5 yrs, 22 days for 5 yrs+). It is for 60 days in cases requiring hospitalisation. 
"'Blanpain, 8, plOO, para367. 
209 Ibid. Illness disabling the worker appears to result Ina social security entitlement of one months 
ray extendable by twelve days for each year of service. 
'OBlanpain, 8, plOl, para371. Ile employee has the basic right to return to work after Illness. 
2111bid, 8, p76, pam 170. Extcnt/availability of payment varies according to contract. 
212 Ibid, 8, p77, para 176. Employer entitled by law to terminate contract in cases of illness. 
2 "Ibid, 9, p 102, para 162. Varied employer schemes exist usually via collective agreement, they 
do not usually give payment forthe first day of illness. There is also social sccuritysickncssbcncrit- 
if it is known in advance that the period of incapacity will be 3 weeks or more the bcncrit can be paid 
from the day following the cessation of wages otherwise it will be paid from the eighth day of 
incapacity or the day following cessation of the wages whichever is the later. Additional bencrits arc 
paid to those of limited income and cash. 
4 4 Ibid, p 106, para 173. Protracted (not temporary) illness may frustrate an empoymcnt contract. 
21JIbid, p97. para 167. The great majority of contracts, especially those Influenced by collective 
agccmcnts provide for sickness benefit. There is an optional national fund also. 
2"See above. 
2171bid, p95, para 163 ibid. Longer term illness can frustrate the contract. Frustration Is unlikely to 
apply in the relatively short absences generally required for living donation. 
2 'Ibid, p99, para 274. Sick pay is given for 12 hours for every 26 days served or 144 hours per year. 
Social security also exists. Any shortfall af1cr combining these has to be met by'cating Into' holiday 
entitlement. 
2191bid, p99, para274. The contract can be suspended for up to 6 months in cases of Illness. 
220131anpain, 9, pl6l, para466. Payment takes effect from the first day of illness. 
2111bid. Sickness leave can be up to 121 years per year. 
U21bid. Benefits are only payable if 90 days of contributions have been paid. 
2"The employer has an obligation to continue to fully remunerate forthe first 20 days of sickness. At 
the 21st day onwards the worker receives illness benefit from the Social Security Institute. Some 
donors would be fully covered within the 20 day period but some might have to go on to social security 
which may not provide full compensation. 
2241bid. 
2"Blanpain, 10, p124, para 387. The employer Is not legally required to provide sickness bencrit 
but employees in most companies have it. Social security also provides benefits. 
"'Where provision exists it varies the common practice Is to grant sick leave of IS days with pay after 
at least one year of service. Social security operates after this point. "I lowevcr if the illness is longer than 6 months termination of contract Is possible. 
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Country Sick pay covers 
normal wages? 
Time-off requirements 
of all donors covered? 
Donor qualifies for 
benefit? 
Job security legal rights 
affected by time off? 
Portugal 2/3 or more"' Unstated Conditions unstated Unaffectedz" 
Romania 50-85%232 Virtually all'33 Conditions unstated Unstated 
Spain 50/234 0 60-7 ( 
35 Virtually a112 Conditions unstated 
236 Unaffected 
Sweden - 90-100%73-1 Virtuallx all Conditions unstated Unstated 
South Africa 
f7 
UTIIIW Some` Conditions unstated Unstated 
Switzerland IINT Generally all 1242 Almost al 
43 Probably2 Unaffecte&" 
TheNetherlands 70% Virtually all245 Conditions unstated Unstated 
Tunisia 5oo/, 
246 Usually 111.41 Nearly a Y248 Probabl 
249 Generally unaffected 
Turkey Unstate&" Unstated Conditions unstated Unstated 
Uruguay 701/6 Some I Conditions unstated Unaffected-" 
Venezuela _ Fm`osP7 Probably most I Conditions unstated 1 Unstated 
228BIanpain, 10, pI 12, para 239. Workers employed more than 8 years are entitled to 100% of 
normal wage, 3 to 8 years entitles workers to 80% while less than 3 years entitles the worker to 75%. 
There is a one month qualifýing period. 2291bid. Benefit applies for 6 months from the first day of sickness / incapacity. 2301bid, 10, pIll, para365. Workers are entitled to the minimum wage guaranteed bylaw for the 
sector or 2/3 of his regular remuneration whichever is higher. Social security is also available. 23 'Ibid, p108, para 344 ibid. Employee's rights are not to be harmed in any way. 232 Ibid, p 105, para 194. Up to 2 years entitles the employee to 50% of wage, 2-5 years 65%, 5-8 
years 75%, over 8 years 85%. 
233 Benefits generally apply from the first day until the end of the illness (maximum of 65 days in any 
one calendar year for those on fixed term contracts - conditional upon having at least 4 months service during the 12 months preceding the sick leave, or 10 months in the last 2 years. 
234 Blanpain, 11, para 292. This includes average overtime if worked. 
235Ibid, p77, para 294. Payment continues for 18 months. 
236 Ibid, para 295. Illness only suspends contract and employees have right to return to work after. 
237 ibid, p98, para 241. A social insurance scheme pays 90% of normal wage and is often topped up 
to 100% by the employer. 
238BIanpain, 11, p99, para 242. 
2391bid, para 169. 
240Employee's who work 5 days or less per week are paid sick leave of 30 days per sick leave cycle. 
Where an employee works more than 5 days this is increased to 36 days. A sick leave cycle is a 
period of 36 consecutive months. The extent of leave would cover the living donation but the concern 
is that it would take up most of the entitlement for the whole 3 year cycle. In the first 12 months a 
person working 5 days or less per week is only entitled to paid sick leave at the rate of one working day 
for every 5 weeks of employment completed (the rate is a day / month for those working more than 5 
days / week). 
241131anpain, 11, pl 16, para 369. Combination of social insurance and an employer scheme. 
242 Ibid p 117, para 370.3 month qualification period, benefit is for 3 weeks for those employed for 
one year or less. More for longer term employees - around 6 months for very long term employees. 
243 IbidplI6, para371a. The injury must not have been the employees fault. 
244 Except illness can result in termination where it is of longer duration or in the case of a trial period. 
2456 weeks or 3 weeks only is it is a small enterprise. This is paid by the employer and after it is 
exhausted sickness benefit paid by the state takes over at the same rate for a maximum of 46 weeks. 
2461bid p60, para 145. Payment according to collective agreement, otherwise by social security 
payment of 50% of the daily wage, 2/3rds on the 45th day following the beginning of the illness. 
247 Ibid, para 146 ibid. In the case of ordinary illness payments of social insurance begin after 5 days 
and are paid for 180 days this may be extended upon the advice of the medical board. 
248BIanpain, 11, p60, para 145. The injury "must not have been inflicted intentionally. " 
2491bid p64, para 161. Termination only justifiable with illnesses of a long term nature. 
250See Blanpain, 12. 
2511bid 12, p 154, para 292.70 % of wages/salary up to three times the national minimum wage. 
7.52 Blanpain, 12, p153, para291. The employer must keep the job open for a year. 
253 Ibidl3, p47, para176. First 3 days not pain unless this is made so by collective agreement. 
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Those countries where transplant legislation compensates donors also have general 
principles of employment law that would protect the job security of donors (see e. g. 
Finland"' and Belgiu "). What general points can be brought out of Figure 5? 
Clearly the provision of sick pay is an overwhelming norm. However, as regards 
compensation for lost earnings the working donor is typically faced with a financial 
shortfall that would need to be made up by him/herself or some other source such as 
the hospital. There are several reasons for the shortfall: Firstly, compensation is 
typically not at the level of 100% of normal earnings; secondly, donor qualification 
is not always certain; 2.56 and, thirdly, a minority of donors are likely to be ill or 
recovering beyond the duration of time for which sick pay is available. 
Most countries in Figure 5 have job security provision solidly protecting workers that 
would leave living donor job security unaffected by the fact of having time off for 
donating. A number of other countries require that at least notice be given, often 
starting from the period of return to work. Since living donation usually involves a 
relatively short absence it is difficult to see the employer benefitting economically 
from giving notice, although this might be done if the employer has filled the post 
with another person. Donors engaged in lower status work are generally more 
vulnerable through being more replaceable. Legal protection tends to be weaker in 
cases where workers are only recently employed, temporary or on trial. 
8.3. Ethics of Financial Exchange in_Organ LDT. 
Determining what legislative framework is appropriate for financial exchange in organ 
LDT involves drawing conclusions as to the ethical acceptability of different levels 
and types of exchange. Systems of exchange of body materials have been the subject 
of long standing investigation, indeed, it was 25 years ago that Titmuss' landmark 
study concluded that, 
254 Illness suspends the contract rather than terminating it. 
255 Blanpain, 2. 
256 The gaps in provision appear to be larger in countries outside Europe. 
257 
"the commercialisation of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of 
altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers scientific standards, limits both 
personal and professional freedoms, sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and 
clinical laboratories, legalizes hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical 
areas of medicine to the marketplace, places immense social costs on those least able 
to bear them - the poor the sick and the inept - increases the danger of unethical 
behaviour in various sectors of medical science and practice. ""' 
The problem has been that much of the investigation has had an apparent attachment 
to achieving a particular outcome. "' This has often led to the confusing use of 
terminology with a simplistic distinction been made between unpaid and paid systems 
of exchange or, as they are often described, commercial and non-commercial 
systems. One of the clear objectives of this section is to move beyond the confusion 
and apparent bias of many studies to develop a systematic and neutral analysis of the 
ethics of financial exchange. This requires both an analysis of empirical information 
and ethical values in the light of all the major systems of financial exchange laid out 
in 8.1. 
8.3.1. Empirical Data and Its Significance 
8.3.1.1. Current Practice and Different Systems 
Some of the most systematic surveys of financial exchange in transplantation relate to 
blood donation including Richard Titmuss's landmark study of 'voluntary' and 
6regulatorily controlled commercial' blood donation systems. Titmuss's study 
concluded that a system of commercial exchange was less effective empirically for 4 
reasons: It was highly wasteful of blood with the demand and supply position being 
characterised by chronic and acute shortages; it was administratively inefficient, it 
was more costly (in the US commercial system "five to fifteen times more costly than 
voluntary systems in Britain"); and tended to lower quality with more likelihood of 
257 Taken from The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, Pantheon, 1971 see also 
P. Rodriguez, 'Paying Donors and the Ethics of Blood Supply, ' JofMedEth, 1989,20,31-35. 
... As noted by Radcliffe-Richards in Organs For Sale, Unpublished 1995 Paper, Department of 
philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK. 
258 
contaminated blood. "' Titmuss's study gave rise to considerable comment including 
an ongoing debate between Arrow and Singer. Arrow maintained that except for the 
danger of post-transfusion hepatitis Titmuss had not shown the inefficiencies in the 
US system of blood donation were due to commercialisation. "' However, Singer 
shows how Arrow had not even noticed some of the important empirical evidence 
presented by Titmuss including the proper contrasting of the British voluntary system 
with the US commercial system and on the link between wastage and commerce. "' 
More recently, Fagot-Largeault, in examining the recent crisis in the voluntary blood 
donation system in France, has suggested that a voluntary system "removes some 
adverse effects but creates others. 11262 Fagot-Largeault's overall finding was that 
261 higher health and safety standards resulting from paying blood donors in France. 
On the other hand, John Keown, in a paper defending. the principle of voluntary, 
unpaid donation in EC directive 89/381 uses the ground of safety as one of five 
arguments. 264 Keown accepts that "non-payment no more ensures safety than 
payment precludes safety" but his argument that it is prudent to have a voluntary 
unpaid system is hard to rebut . 
26' His main points are simple but powerful: that it is 
not possible to screen out problems with 100% success; that viruses are likely to be 
found in heaviest contamination in commercial blood and plasma products; and that 
this makes theoretical sense because paid donors tend to be less well off and have a 
financial interest in concealing any ill health. 266 
However, while payment for blood may attract donors concealing health problems, 
organ donation is a much more lengthy and involved process and is only likely to 
attract such donors where the rewards are above what is reasonably obtainable from 
259The Gift Relationship, Pantheon Books, 197 1. Other aspects of this study are discussed later. 
26OGifts and Exchanges, Philosophy andPublic Affairs 1972,343-362 at 361. 
26'Altruism and Commerce: A Defence of Titmuss Against Arrow, Phil Publ Affairs 1973,2,312- 
320 at 314. 
262 Fagot-Largeault, Does Non-commercialisation of the Human Body Increase Graft Security, Chapter 
2 in Organ and Tissue Transplantation in The European Union, Y. Englert (ed), Martinus NUhoff, 
1995 at 13. 
263Fagot-Largeault, Does Non-commercialisation of the Human Body Increase Graft Security, Chapter 
2 in Organ and Tissue Transplantation in The European Union, Y. Englert (ed), Martinus NUhoff, 
1995. 
264 The Gift of Blood in Europe: An Ethical Defence of EC Directive 89/3 8 1, J Med Eth 1997,23,96- 




ordinary gainful employment. If incentives increased the number of donors coming 
forward this could increase organ safety and organ quality by allowing greater clinical 
selectivity of donors. "" At the same time empirical studies of non-voluntary 
donation in centres not having due regard to health and safety has coincided with 
serious deleterious consequences including: Much higher recipient complication, 
disease and death rates; 26' increased incidence of manipulation of uninformed donors 
and outright coercion; 269 discouragement of voluntary-gifting procurement; 2" and in 
267 Barnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, Inquiry, 1992,29,372- 
378 at 376. 
268G. M. Abouna studied I 10 Kuwait renal failure patients who had bought organs in the marketplace in 
such countries as India and the Philippines. His observations of the 59 he saw at the Kuwait 
Transplant Centre were of inferior quality of care and high complication rate in recipients. 6 patients 
were known to have died shortly after the operation, 13 to have lost grafts through complications, 14 
others to have had serious surgical complications and almost all the remaining patients had come with 
acute rejection, sepsis or other medical problems. Some had communicable diseases including 
incidences of AIDS (Commercialization in Human Organs: A Middle Eastern Perspective, Trans 
Proc, 1990,22(3), 918-92). Al Khader reported results of 20 patients from Saudi Arabia who had 
gone to certain hospitals in Bombay for commercialized living non-related transplantation (Al Khader 
et al XI Int. Cong. Trans. Soc. Helsinki, August1986, Abstract No. SII. 4). The numbers of patients 
who died perioperatively from such perilous engagements was not mentioned by the authors but of 
those who came back they had been sent away within 3 weeks without adequate referral letters and 95% 
required admission to hospital in Saudi Arabia to treat rejections and infections or to adjust 
immunosuppression. A total of 25% had significant renal artery sterosis and fully 40% lost their 
grafts. One patient acquired Malaria. Similar results come from patients transplanted in Bombay 
who came from Oman and Dubai (The survey was taken in the period September 1984-December 1986 
of 36 patients from Oman 9 died within the period -6 within the first I 00days and the other 3 within a 
year. At least 2 more had lost grafts and were back on dialysis in Oman. Of 27 patients from Dubai 
6 died within 3 months, 4 others had rejections and were back on dialysis (P. J. Morris, Kidney 
Transplantation, 1988,3rd edition, p72). K. V. Johnny et al. have described a critical shortage of 
available organs in Kuwait. Conducting a study of 53 patients who have received transplants from 
unrelated donors, mostly abroad in India they found that from 1985-1990 4 patients had lost their grafts 
and 3 had died from reasons relating to their transplant. A further 6 had hepatitis B and 7 had 
tuberculosis (Values Gained and Values Lost in Live Unrelated Renal Transplantation, Trans Proc, 
1990,22(3) (June), 915-917). Dr B. N. Colabawalla view of commercial donors from India was that, 
"most of such donors come from a strata of society where their health and nutrition are already 
compromised due to economic stringency. Many of these donors may not have been adequately 
investigated for transmissable diseases and hence pose a danger to the recipient. In this context it is 
worth noting that of late some reports have documented the occurrence of AIDS in recipients who have 
received kidneys from this category of donor. " 
269Colabawalla noted the problems of informed consent of Indian donors due to the generally low levels 
of social and literacy skills. Abouna reported cases of coercion from his study (Commercialisation in 
Human Organs: A Middle Eastern Perspective, Trans Proc, 1990,22(3), 918-92). News reports 
have provided evidence of coercion being not uncommon. Mukesh Kosla has reported that, "there are 
cases of poor patients who have gone for a simple operation having had a kidney removed. " (This 
Week, 1989, September 24,5 1). The Times of India of 3rd February 1990 reported that 3 young 
men died at the hands of a'kidney gang. ' Evidence also exists for the practice of buying and selling of 
children (especially orphans) so that they can be cut up (dead or alive) for their organs. Sydney 
Morning Herald, Wednesday 26 September 1990. See also the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council Commission on Human Rights 47th session Agenda item 12 report submitted by Mr. Vitit 
Muntarbhom on the sale of children. 
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some cases breach of a basic ethical criteria for LDT that benefit (mainly to the 
recipient) should outweigh detriment (usually mainly to the donor) . 2'1 Obviously if 
incentives are to be allowed they must be underpinned by successfully enforced 
controls, such as to ensure donor voluntariness and informedness and high public 
safety and health standards for donor and recipient. The question is: can controls be 
successfully enforced in the presence of profit motivated incentive? Roscam. 
Abbing's common sense argument is that profit would be a disincentive to applying 
controls, 
"it is a daily reality that one tends to become lenient on safety standards when trade is 
involved. ""' 
In the final analysis, prudence supports a voluntary, or at least non-profit making, 
system in organ donation much as it does with blood. 
8.3.1.2. Procurement Consequences of Different Systems. 
Profit Based Systems 
While profit making by donors might have deleterious health an other consequences 
and profit-making by organisers, probably would, some commentators have argued in 
favour of one or both primarily on the grounds that this would be outweighed by 
significant increases in the available supply of organs . 
271 Barnett et al., have argued 
that a donor and organiser profit based system would "address both the problem of 
270Abouna reported an adverse impact on local non-commercial transplantation centres from 
commercial trade in organs (Commercialization in Human Organs: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 
Trans Proc, 1990,22(3), 918-92). 
27'The sale of corneas from live donors has become increasingly common and provides a classic 
example of counterproductivity with one person, usually inspired by a desperate need for money giving 
up sight in one eye to another person. 
272 Transplantation in the European Union: Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to 
Donors (ed. Y Englert), Martinus Nyhoff, 1995,99. 
273 See for example R. L. Horton and P. J. Horton, 'Supplying Organs For Transplantation, ' Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy andLaw, 18(l), 175-188; J. Peters, 'Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in 
Cadaveric Organ Donation, ' JAAM, 1991,265,1302-1305; H. Hansmann, The Economics and 
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, Yale University, 56-85; G. Dworkin, Markets and Morals: The 
Case For Organ Sales, The Mount Sinai Journal ofMedicine, 1993 (Jan), 60(l), 66-69. Barnett et 
al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, Inquiry, 1992,29,372-378. 
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potential donors refusing to donate and that of their never being asked. " The 
altruistic system addresses neither problem while a donor only profit system merely 
addresses the refusal problem. "" Barnett et al., potently suggest that in such a free 
functioning market with procurement firms having an incentive to collect as many 
organs as profitable and donors profiting from their action "shortages simply cannot 
persist. ""' Common sense supports their view that there would be a greater drive to 
procurement. Furthermore, the current trade in living donor corneas which are 
never donated out of 'altruism' (except where donation is incidental to a 
therapeutically necessary removal)276 supports the view that a profit incentive will 
attract a body of new donors. All other things being equal the potential for 
improvement would be highest in those areas with a low transplantation rate - where 
the organs would be most needed. 
However, economic variables are an insufficient barometer for predicting human 
behaviour. With regard to organ donation specifically, most people are unattracted 
to treating body parts as a commodity. Refusals to donate in an unpaid system are 
often strongly linked with a reluctance to treat the body as an object. "' 
Commodification will overcome the reluctance in some cases but merely amplify it in 
others. Furthermore, the majority of people are firmly against a profit making 
systemý` and many could refuse to participate in a profit making system simply 
27413arnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, Inquiry, 1992,29,372- 
378 at 372. 
275 Ibid at p374. 
276 This practice has been fairly commonplace in India for instance. 
277 There is some reluctance on the part of relatives to see the body as just an object with almost two 
thirds of those in one study refusing to allow donation doing so because they didn't want their relative's 
body mutilated (Prottas J, Batten H, The Willingness to Give: The Public and The Supply of 
Transplantable Organs, J Health Polit Policy Law. This evidence might translate into reluctance to 
treat the body as a commodity. 
278A typical public study found 78% of respondents rejecting the idea that families of cadaveric donors 
ought to be paid for granting permission for cadaveric donation. Amongst the sub group of people 
unwilling to donate, 65% rejected payment for the families of cadaveric donors. J. Prottas and 
H. Batten, The Attitudes of the American Public, Report to the Health Care Financing Administration, 
April 1986. "Hostility to payment is strongest among those in the population presently most willing to 
donate, about 80% reject any payment system. Among families that have actually donated, an even 
greater percentage reject the idea of payment. If the percentage of people who refuse to participate in 
a paid system approaches these numbers, then a market system is a catastrophe. It would result in far 
fewer organs at far higher cost ... even much smaller refusal rates would 
have a marked impact. " 
J. Prottas, Buying Human Organs - Evidence that Money Doesn't Change Everything, Transplantation, 
53(6), 1371-1373. 
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because they did not agree with commodification. '" The problem is summed up by 
F. Cantarovich commenting on the Argentine experience of transplantation, 
"the attitudes of society towards donation are crucially important for this medical 
practice., Only faith in the legal and ethical behaviour of physicians will maintain 
public support. This trust could be undermined if it became known that unrelated 
living donors might be used in unethical commercial practices or if cadaveric organs 
were allocated in an unjust manner. ""' 
Not-for-Profit Reasonable PUMent Systems 
On current evidence developing a profit-making system would be risky in terms of it's 
procurement consequences but what of systems that are more reflective of reasonable 
payment for services than profit making? There has been no objection to such 
systems as regards the payment of staff so why not pay donors a 'mild' incentive such 
as: a small fixed fee payment representative of effort, inconvenience and harm; or 
paying the funeral expenses of cadaveric donors; '" or a health insurance premium 
reduction plan; 112 or just compensating for expected as well as unexpected physical 
harm resulting from the operation? Public opinion is less set against such incentives 
- for instance an NFK/UNOS study found marginally over half of the respondents in 
favour of 'mild incentives. "" Nethertheless, one of the stumbling blocks is the 
possibility of adverse public reaction amongst those not in favour of incentives. 
There may be a lack of sophistication in terms of much of the public's ability to 
distinguish between schemes that are for-profit and those that are for fair payment for 
service rendered. For example, one survey in the USA where the majority of the 
40% of respondents opposing regulated incentive schemes simply stated their major 
279 See for instance, Austen Garwood-Gowers, To Pay or Not to Pay: That is the Question? An 
Analysis of the Economic Rights of Donors in D. Price and H. Akveld (ed. ), Living Organ Donation in 
the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,163-173. 
280'Values Sacrificed and Values Gained by the Commerce of Organs: The Argentine Experience, ' 
Trans Proc 1990,22(3), 925-927. 
28 'T. G. Peters, Life or death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, JAAM, 1991,266, 
1302-1305. 
282 H. Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, Yale University, 56-85 at 
63. 
283jiM Warren (Financial Incentive Controversy Continues, Dialysis and Transplantation, March 
1993,156-158). 
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reason as being opposed to "buying organs. ""' However, there must be a balance 
struck between respecting public opinion and not being imprisoned by it; the balance 
may prove to be rejecting profit-making but allowing fair payment provided there are 
no overriding ethical objections to it. The first step might be adopting Jim Warren! s 
suggestion of adopting a limited incentive scheme in certain areas on an experimental 
basis. "' It has been suggested that incentives might hinder attempts to increase 
participation of community groups already suspicious of the medical enterprise"' but 
accompanied by clear explanation to the public non-profit incentives could encourage 
more prospective donors than the number put off. 
Could a limited incentive approach be adopted for cadaveric donation as well living 
donation? L. R. Cohen has explored the possibility of a futures market where donors 
choose during their life time what to do with a sum of money given at their death. 
He says he can, "think of no reason why anyone who now signs an organ donor card 
would decline to do so if informed that in the process they could also specify their 
designee (which could be a charity) would receive a sum of money as a result. "' The 
problem with this approach is that it is going into the realm of profit making - while a 
living donor engages in work and endures physical harm that can justify a limited 
incentive as non-profit making a cadaveric donor's only work was to get and sign a 
donor card! A consistent approach should be taken and this means excluding profit 
making unless substantial ethical ground can be found to counterbalance it's probable 
deleterious practical consequences. 
Assurance Donors Against Their Losses But Not Puing Them For Donatinjz. 
The piecemeal state of legal provision in this area has resulted in some donors 
suffering financial hardship in practice. The study of Westlie et al., 111 looked at the 
284 B. Teo, Organs For Transplantation: The Singapore Experience, Hastings Centre Report, 199 1, 
Nov-Dec: 10-3. 
285jiM Warren suggests this in the contexy of the US (Financial Incentive Controversy Continues, 
Dialysis and Transplantation, March 1993,156-15 8). 
286 L. M. Sanders et al, The Organ Donation Committee: An Ethically Responsible Approach to 
Increasing the Organ Donation Rate, Chest, 1992,102(5 November), 1572-1577 at 1573. 
287 L. R. Cohen, A Futures Market in Cadaveric Organs: Would it Work? Trans Proc, 1993,25(l), 
60-6 1. See also L. R. Cohen, George Washington Law Rev, 1989,580). 
288Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Neph Dial Trans, 8,1146-1150. 
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financial aspects of donating a kidney and found that 17.7% of donors said they had 
personal expenses associated with donation. In the majority of cases these were met 
by insurance but a significant minority lost vacation time or had to draw on their own 
or family financial support (23.6%). Of these a small number were helped out by the 
recipient (3%). 16.2% of donors replied yes or to a certain extent when asked if the 
donation caused financial hardship. 6.4% of those who had tried to obtain life 
insurance had difficulties although the basis of these difficulties may have been health 
generally rather than in relation to the donation. 3.2% of donors said that the 
donation had influenced their personal income / career although it was not specified as 
to how or whether or not this was positive. In terms of procurement it is quite 
conceivable that without clear assurance provisions some donors will be deterred from 
donating on economic grounds, this alone is a ground for an integrated, 
comprehensive system of legal regulation. 
8.3.2. Ethical Principles and Systems of Exchanlle. 
8.3.2.1. Distributive Justice. 
What is a just system for distributing organs and what is it's significance? Anotion 
in some countries is that quality of health care provision should not depend on one's 
ability to pay. In practice no system whether nationalised or based on private 
insurance has fully lived up to this principle; although systems like the NHS have 
come close there has always been the potential to buy better quality healthcare. 
Some systems have prided themselves on being privatised with many body parts 
distributed on an ability to pay basis. "' The question is what approach to distributing 
health care and specifically organs is just? One response is to say that if people have 
'earned' their money they deserve better services including access to better health care. 
This would certainly accord with many people's understanding of what fairness is; 
otherwise people who deserve what they have earned would be paying for those who 
haven't done anything to deserve this. However, while a cohesive society requires 
289As far back as 1993 over 50 artificial body parts were distributed this way in the US as well as a 
number of natural bodily substances (Gerald Dworkin, Markets and Morals: The Case for Organ Sales, 
MtSinJMed, 1993,60(l), 66-69at67. 
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that people do not live off other people's effort, compassion and societal integrity 
necessitate some degree of mutual support; the evolution of all life requires that 
people co-operate in assisting the evolution of others as well as themselves (Titmuss 
recommended a fully socialistic system of distribution and collection of blood partly 
on this basis). "' Additionally, inequalities in resources are not just brought about by 
some people deserving more, they are also brought about by capitalistic exploitation 
with some getting more than their just deserts by maximising profits from the labour 
of others. "" Unethical human behaviour makes it impossible to devise a fair health 
system so it is a matter of doing the best possible. In the case of organ distribution 
this does not necessitate a system of free-to-all distribution. Charging very wealthy 
recipients might be fairer. Equally distributive justice does not necessitate unpaid 
donation. Indeed it would enhance justice if donors were given a fair sum for effort 
and inevitable physical harms as well as being assured against losses if this was 
financed by those who are benefitting from the savings of taking recipients off dialysis 
(e. g. the state and/or insurance companies). 
8.3.2.2. The Slippery Slope. 
Abouna has suggested that, 
"it is in the nature of things that whenever a service or medical procedure is carried 
out solely for commerce or profit and there are vast numbers of patients who are in 
desperate need of that service, there is often the opportunity and the temptation for 
deception, exploitation and corruption and a disregard for some of the most cherished 
moral and ethical values of society. 11292 
290R. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, Pantheon Books, 197 1. Compassion demands that at least 
some vulnerable members of society are protected e. g. children. 
291 Capitalism undoubtedly plays iVs part in the transplant regimes of some countries - with transplant 
professionals earning large amounts of money that are disproportionate with average earnings by 
several multiples. What is the distinction between this and medical professionals profiting out of 
organs themselves? From this point of view they can both be aspects of exploitation. 
292Commercialization i  Human Organs: A Middle Eastern Perspective, Trans Proc, 1990,22(3), 
918-921. 
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Abouna specifically talks about a slippery slope where medical professionals are 
already operating a system of profit e. g. private health care and even a market system 
for organs where they take money for acting as 'middlemen! etc. What is being 
examined here is something different - whether a regulatory framework that allows 
profit making or some less incentives will lead down a slippery slope to objectionable 
practices. Evaluating slippery slope arguments is, as Raanan Gillon suggests a 
matter of weighing anticipated benefits of an innovation, and their probabilities, 
against anticipated harms and their probabilities. 293 In this respect the slippery slope 
exists as a part of other ethical and empirical questions rather than in its own right. 
8.3.2.3. Exploitation. 
Some commentators have suggested that the profit making and other incentives in 
organ donation are not exploitative. For instance, Harris has suggested that paying 
donors is not exploitative because it affords them some money(! )"' while Radcliffe- 
Richards almost suggests that not payment is exploitative, 
"to forbid the trade, therefore, is to take away what seems the best option open to 
someone whose position is already so appalling that this is his best option. It is to 
make the worst off worse off still. ""' 
She adds that by stopping the poor donate, 
"(w)e can do them nothing but harm by taking options away. The only radical cure 
for exploitation is the elimination of poverty. Failing that (since we lack either the 
will or the knowledge to do it), the best thing is not to forbid trade but to subject it to 
stringent controls: to organise a system that completely rules out all dealings with 
donors or organs of dubious origin and profiteering by middlemen, to get the highest 
293 Defending 'the four principles' approach to biomedical ethics, JMedEth, 1995,21,323-324 at 
324). 
294 September 1991 talk at the Bioethics and Profit Making Conference at Manchester University. 
295'For Him that Hath Not, ' a paper presented at the Munich ESOT Conference on'Ethics, Justice and 
Commerce in Organ Replacement Therapy, ' Dec 1990. This can be obtained from the Department of 
Philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK 
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price for the organs that the market will bear, to counsel prospective vendors fully 
about both medical matters and the use of money, and to provide insurance and after 
care. Provisionally, then, it seems necessary to conclude that this is what we should 
be doing. We should be eliminating not the trade, but the abuses. tt296 
Richards' point can be applied to both the donor and the recipient. However, for the 
recipient it only holds up for payment systems that enhance procurement (in terms of 
numbers and quality of organs) thereby promoting the interests of all recipients. 
Whether or not properly regulated systems paying the donor are exploitative will 
depend on the context. If a system is devised that pays the donor but damages 
procurement it is exploitative if one considers the rights of the recipient more 
important. As earlier noted, there is a very real possibility that systems based on 
profit-making will have a damaging impact on procurement. A further potential 
exploitation in profit making systems is exploitation of the donor: Firstly, safety 
standards in the treatment of the donor (including potential use in more experimental 
situations"') may inevitably lower if their is profit making by organisers; Secondly, 
neither profit nor the maintenance of standards applied to voluntary and informed 
consent can be guaranteed - although whether there would be more exploitation of this 
kind where a profit-based system is legal than there is at present is questionable; and 
thirdly, even if profit making is restricted to donors there is a danger that the poor be 
treated as an organ bank with this in itself becoming an exploitative disincentive to 
providing more solid assistance to encouraging people out of the poverty trap. The 
fact that the poor are already being used as an organ bank in some areas is partly 
indicative of how a minority capitalistic interest has treated human and natural 
resources as means to an end (units for profit"') consequently reducing the scope for 
self-determining, self-sufficient resourcing by the majority. On a global level the 
appropriate remedial action is to address the exploitation and expropriation and its 
296 Ibid at p4-5. 
29'Keowns recent blood donation article (The Gift of Blood in Europe: An Ethical Defence of EC 
Directive 89/381, JMedEth 1997,23,96-100 at 98) points out Titmuss'finding of unethical 
experimentation and plasmapheresis in a commercial system and dangerous frequencies of donation in a 
recent study (survey of 10,000 plasma donors finding that over 3 0% donated more than 18 times in a 
period of only three months - N. B. Paull, Safeguarding Donors: First, Do No Harm, JAm Blood Res 
Ass, 1993,11 (Spring), table 4. 
298For an article detailing this process see Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 
Relative Autonomy of the Law, Law and Sociology Rev, 1977,11,571. 
268 
causes rather than placing attention on the temporary 'solution! of selling body parts. 
While this points towards preventing profit-making by donors, any legal 
responsibilities and sanctions need to be placed on the organisers of transplantation - 
the donor is merely trying to better him/herself. 
A voluntary system can also be exploitative for not paying donors a fair arnount for 
the physical damage and effort involved in donation. The exploitation is doubled 
where the voluntary system fails to properly assure donors against losses. 
8.3.3.3. Rights to Donate an Organ for Monev and Ownership of the Human 
Bodv? 
Some writers have considered the body as a form of property salable in the same way 
as other essential commodities such as food and shelter. "' Andrews, who is in 
favour of profit making for donors and organisers"' has suggested, 
"humans have the right to treat certain physical parts of their bodies as objects for 
possession, gift and trade. ""' 
Whether or not body can be considered "property" and "owned" is largely a technical, 
legalistic issue. The important question to ask does a person have an ethical right to 
dispose of it as they please? Blumstein has noted that donor profit making (and by 
analogy profit making by organisers), 
"emphasizes respect for the autonomy of the donor.. de-emphasizes paternalism, and 
strengthens the hand of the individual rather than the family. ""' 
Expanding on this theme Radcliffe-Richards states that preventing donor payment, 
299 See comment "Retailing Organs Under The Uniform Commercial Code, " JMarshaIILR., 1983, 
16,393. 
30OThe Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections -A Response to J. F. Chidress, Trans 
Proc, 1992,24(5)October, 2149-2151. 
30'Andrews, "MyBody, MyProperty, " Hastings Center Report, 1986,16,28at36. 
302 The Case for Commerce in Organ Transplantation, TransProc, 1992,24(5)at2190-2197. 
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11 .... obviously runs against the 
fundamental liberal principle that although people's 
freedom of action may legitimately be curtailed to prevent their harming others, it 
may not be curtailed to prevent their harming themselves. Anyone who takes this 
principle to be absolute, as many do, must obviously rule out paternalistic 
intervention completely. 303 
The limitation of this approach is that regulatory intervention is not necessarily about 
paternalism in the first place - it can equally be about upholding the reputation of 
transplantation as based on ethical standards of conduct and protection of prospective 
recipients (and donors) from potential adverse consequences arising from systems of 
donor payment that allow profit making. Radcliffe-Richards provides a counter- 
argument by stating that, 
"Even if it is argued that some of the potential vendors are being subtly coerced, or 
are too ill informed to make rational decisions, the absolute version of the principle 
can justify intervention only in particular cases. It cannot permit a general 
prohibition which curtails the freedom of all. "O" 
However, it must be questioned whether a payment system, at least one involving 
profit-making, can successfully maintain levels of respect for informed consent. 
More potently, the donors rights must not be viewed in isolation but as part of a 
broader picture involving the rights of those paying for transplantation and the 
recipient. Those paying for transplantation have a right to expect a system that 
maximises ethics and benefits and minimises costs (without exploiting those 
involved). The problem with allowing profit-making is that it would increase costs, 
potentially reduce ethics and (aside from the direct economic benefit to the donor) not 
assuredly raise benefits (indeed it might reduce levels of organ quality and 
procurement). Danger of lower benefits justifies legislative intervention as a 
cautionary measure; the recipient's right to the most beneficent system is more 
303 For Him That Hath Not in W. Land and J. Dossetor, Ethics, Justice and Commerce in Organ 
Replacement Therapy, Kluwer, 1990. 
304 For Him That Hath Not in W. Land and J. Dossetor, Ethics, Justice and Commerce in Organ 
Replacement Therapy, Kluwer, 1990. 
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important than any donor or organiser interest in selling. "' In any case what the 
donor and organisers actually have a right to is not to economically exploit by profit- 
making but obtain payment representing a fair non-profit making payment for services 
rendered. 
8.3.3.4. Altruism and Social Solidaritv. 
Proponents of unpaid donation like Titmuss"' and Keowr? " have emphasised the 
unquestionable social utility of altruism and social solidarity. From an empirical 
standpoint these values will no doubt play a central role in unpaid donation, as 
Keown's review of studies of why people donate blood in an unpaid system has 
illustrated. "' In addition, profit making payment system may damage procurement. 
However, neither of these conclusion is obviously a reason to favour unpaid donation 
over a system of reasonable donor payment. Prospective social utility of 
volunteering must be insufficient grounds for an unpaid donation system - otherwise 
payment would only be available for the useless or detrimental activities in society! 
Why mark out donation for volunteering then? Keown has emphasised the potential 
deleterious societal impact of paying donors in the form of encouraging a trend toward 
commercialisation at the expense of social solidarity. 10' However, if paying donors a 
reasonable amount is fair our paid or unpaid time may be better spent addressing more 
fundamental reasons for waning social solidarity and altruism such as (capitalistic) 
exploitation of people and natural resources as almost solely means to an end (units 
for profit). Otherwise the position of the state becomes hypocritical; on the one 
hand regulating to push for volunteering in one area and on the other hand being 
reluctant to intervene to address one of the real causes of exploitation; a global 
3051t could, however, be realistically suggested that many of the donors are also in a desperate quality 
of life situation and that given this they are almost as important in the consideration as recipients - see 
Radcliffe-Richards, Organs for Sale 1995. However it has already been suggested that organ sale, at 
least where involving profit-making is not a constructive way of dealing with poverty. 
306 The Gift Relationship, Pantheon Books, 1971 
307 The Gift of Blood in Europe: An Ethical Defence of EC Directive 89/3 8 1, J Med Eth 1997,23,96- 
100 at 96-7. 
308The G ift of B lood in Europe: An Ethical Defence of EC Directive 89/3 8 1, J Med Eth 1997,23,96- 
100 at 96-7. 
3091bid at 97. 
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economy where consumption and profit are placed above the notion of economic 
endeavour as a service to real human needs. 
8.4. Conclusion. 
Legal prohibition of commercial trade in organs is becoming almost universal within 
countries with the technological capacity to undertake transplantation. Limitations 
include some laws only focusing on preventing payment of the donor and / or 
recipient and most not excluding advertising. The regimes in Hong Kong, Lndia and 
United Kingdom, which are some of the most recent pieces of transplant legislation, 
provide a reasonable model for comprehensive prohibition of trade that could be 
adopted more widely. 
Despite assertions that the level of trade in organs has been exaggerated by the 
mediaý` trade is clearly extensive globally. Whether or not this means legislative 
prohibition of trade should be developed is both a practical question and an ethical 
one. Practically, establishing a correlation between legal prohibition and a reduction 
in commercial dealings is crucial; without it the law is paper tiger. Kishore arguing 
that scarcity breeds crime, has suggested that experience has shown that laws 
preventing commercialisation are breached and circumvented "and do not provide the 
answer. 011 In many countries banning the trade it continues to thrive on a significant 
scale, 312 essentially because of global organ shortage combined with financial 
incentive to participate in a 'black market' (and ultimately as the result of adopting 
transplantation as an approach to dealing with organ disease). On the other hand, 
common sense would suggest law is likely to have some deterrent impact. 
The dominant vision underlying transplant law is the conscious or unconscious pre- 
eminence given to the notion of donation-as-voluntary-gift. Donors are not 
3 10See e. g. H. Kreis, Chapter 10 in Organ and Tissue Transplantation in the European Union: 
Management of Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors, Y. Englert (ed), Martinus Nyhoff, 
1995. A review of this book is produced by A. Garwood-Gowers, IDHL, 1996,47(l), 126-7. 
3 "Organ Donation: Consanguinity Vs Universality - An Analysis of Indian Law, Manuscript with 
EUROTOLD. 
312 For instance Argentina, Brazil, Russian Federation and India. Some national legislation such as 
the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (section 1) prohibits iVs nationals from buying an organ abroad 
but most laws do not. However this and other limitations in organ can only be a partial explanation for 
continued trading. 
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compensated for physical harms that are a normal consequence of donation (e. g. 
scarring, pain, inconvenience) or for time and effort expended because this would 
mean a shift from volunteering (unpaid work and gift) to gainful employment. The 
not-for-employment approach is questionable but what is more serious is that while 
donors will get free medical care in relation to donation and it's consequences (some 
laws make this explicit - e. g. Portugals law states that donors have the right to medical 
care until completely recovered"' with transplantation centre insurance being 
mandatory partly for this purpose"'), they do not, as already seen, get 
comprehensive as of right assurance against negative economic consequences from 
donation. Consequently a donor can end up in a far worse position than an ordinary 
volunteer - having to endure a'double whammy'of physical harm and economic loss. 
It has been argued that assuring against physical harm might create a falsely amplified 
impression of the risks of donation in the minds of potential donors. However, this 
seems unlikey given donors at present tend to have an unrealistically low perception 
of risks"' and given compensation for physical hann could unobtrusively be part of a 
wider package of assurance clarifying and expanding on Article 9 of the Council of 
Europe's Resolution (78)29 which includes the statement that, "... (t)he donor, or 
potential donor, must be compensated independently of any medical responsibility, 
for any damage sustained as a result of a removal procedure or preceding examination, 
under a social security or other insurance scheme. " There are also several positive 
reasons for integrated, comprehensive donor compensation provisions including the 
fact that it may save money and improve quality of life be encouraging more people to 
donate and the fact that it shows respect to the donor right not to lose out when doing 
such an important public service. 
Beyond compensation for loss the ethics of financial exchange is more difficult to 
determine, especially because reliable evidence is limited. Introducing a profit- 
making system, particularly for organisers but also for donors is likely to have 
negative empirical consequences. It is more ethical and less risky to introduce a 
313 Section 9(l) ibid. 
3 "Section 9(2) ibid. 
315 See chapter 9. 
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reasonable payment system on an experimental basis in some areas. The likely 
damage of a profit based system is enough to justify prohibition. 
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Chapter 9 Research With Donors and Recipients in LDT. 
9.1. Introduction. 
Research with living donors, recipients and their families, which has been conducted 
over a period of 30 years, has focused on the perceptions, processes and effects of LDT 
largely to derive data about the clinical, attitudinal and motivational aspects of the LDT 
process. This chapter had a slightly broader aim of highlighting practice relevant to the 
ethical and legal issues in LDT discussed in the 6 preceding chapters. There were 5 
particularly significant areas of consolidation and expansion on existing research: 
" Firstly, problems with 'patient' medical decision making processes have been 
identified in the general psychological literature and partially verified with regard to 
donors. ' However, this research was needed to refocus attention and contemporise 
evaluation based on the fact that only a few studies have been conducted more 
recently than the 1970's; 2 
" Secondly, the European focus of this research builds on a currently sparse European 
profile of donor-recipient research most of which has been conducted in the United 
States; 
" Thirdly, this research pioneers a multi-national approach to donor recipient 
interviewing - acting as a model for direct cultural and societal comparisons between 
different centre and national LDT participant experience; 
" Fourthly, this research focuses on professional information disclosure and 
communication aspects of the LDT consent process. Aside from Wrestle et al. 's 
Quality of Life of Norwegian Donors Study3 this has been a fairly neglected area of 
research; 4 and 
" Fifthly, this research develops the theme of consideration of the financial 
consequences of donation which really only began in earnest with Westlie et al's 
research in the early I 9901S. 5
I See chapter 6. 
2E. g. L. Westlie et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Xeph Dial Trans, 1994,8,1146- 
1150. 
3L. Westlie et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Neph Dial Trans, 1994,8,1146-1150. 
4MOSt studies are focused around donor and recipient psychological and physical health - with an angle on 
the decision-making process but not the information that was given. 
5L. Westlie et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Neph Dial Trans, 1994,8,1146-1150. 
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9.2. Research Methodology. 
The method of investigation with donors and recipients was interviews using a 
questionnaire format. As stated in the application for funding to the European 
Commission, 
"... this interview method has been chosen to allow the full context of the decision making 
process to be expounded and for strength of feelings and attitudes to be able to be fully 
expressed, an essential facet of the research. "6 
9.2.1. Techniques Utilised. ( 
The earlier half of the research was conducted on a tape recorded basis interviewing 
donors and recipients based on a semi-structured questionnaire. This was similar to the 
approach of Fellner and Marshall's 1968 12 donor study. 7 
Donor-recipient issues include deeper concerns such as motivational issues not amenable 
to being fully understood through fully structured multi-choice questionnaires. Semi- 
structured interviews allowed donors and recipients more freedom to focus on areas most 
important to them. Counselling abilities8 supported a more neutral and 
phenomenological approach designed to facilitate in-depth researcher and participant 
reflectivity to the issues. In the second half of the research a fully structured 
questionnaire was used (administered face-to-face). This questionnaire had the 
advantage of obtaining more quantitatively consistent data. 
9.2.2. The Sequence of Investigation. 
9.2.2.1. Ouestionnaire Development. 
Initially the questionnaires were developed by David Price and I with assistance from 
Professor Ronnie Mackay, Anne Simpson, former transplant co-ordinator at Leicester 
6EUROTOLD (unpublished). 
7"conducted in an open ended fashion with a pre-arranged questionnaire.. tape recorded. " Twelve Kidney 
Donors, JAAM 1968,206(12), 2703-2707 at 2703. 
8During the course of the investigation I gained a counselling qualification which has since been 
supplemented by counselling experience. The approach adopted was person (see Appendix 4). 
275 
General Hospital, and Professor Peter Donnelly, former transplant surgeon at Leicester 
General Hospital and EUROTOLD project leader. 9 Expert psychological collaboration 
was provided by Leicester General Hospital staff including Christine Cordle a clinical 
psychologist. Dr Arnt Jacobsen of the Oslo Transplant Centre10 provided external 
clinical consultancy. The pilot study involved interviewing former donors and recipients 
of the Leicester General Hospital's transplant centre during the years of 1992 and 1993. 
Hospital Ethical Committee approval was granted for this. 
A set of questions was developed for both donors and recipients. The first set of 
questionsl I was used in both the Leicester and Oslo samples. A few developments were 
added for interviews in Dublin. 12 In these 3 centres a total of 58 participants were 
interviewed (28 donors and 30 recipients). 
During 1993 the EUROTOLD Project gained funding from the European Commission 
and the questionnaire a second method of fully structured interviewing was utilised. 13 
This new method gave multiple choices to recipients with answers being filled in on the 
questionnaire itself. EUROTOLD's PECO collaborators in Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Romania and Poland conducted interviews using this method with a total of 102 
participants being interviewed (48 donors and 54 recipients). The results of these 
interviews were collated and analysed by myself and are presented in this chapter. 
With Albania having no transplant programme at present Myftar Barballushi was inspired 
to develop a questionnaire for Albania on 'Attitudes Toward Transplantation of the 
Families of Albanian End Stage Renal Failure Patients. 14 51 participants were 
interviewed. The results of this questionnaire were collated and analysed by myself and 
again are presented in this chapter. 
9AIison Lea and Susannah Carr, successive EUROTOLD scientific co-ordinators, assisted in later 
revisions. 
IOPart of the National Hospital of which he is the director. 
II Figures 1 &2 Appendix 2. 
12Figures 3&4 Appendix 2. 
13Figure 5 Appendix 2. EUROTOLD's scientific co-ordinator at the time (psychologist Alison Lea) 
contributed strongly to these new developments along with other members of the EUROTOLD group such 
as myself and David Price. External clinical consultancy was provided by EUROTOLD participants across 
Europe. 
14This questionnaire was adapted from the donor- and recipient questionnaire simply because no LDT's 
have occurred in Albania. 
276 
9.2.2.2. Centre Selection. 
Centres were chosen for conducting the interviews based on existing collaborative links. 
Some centres refused the opportunity to collaborate in interviewing, primarily because of 
the time commitment involved. 15 
One issue that the research raised was whether centre selection produced any bias. 
Whilst only Oslo and Leicester have significantly high rates of LDT p. M. p, 16 some bias 
might be expected through the fact that all participating centres had a positive attitude 
towards LDT and through a degree of selectivity exercised over participant choice. 17 
9.2.2.3. The Proaramme for Interviewing. 
The pattern of the 211 interviews was as follows: 
o Leicester Transplant Centre (Leicester General Hospital) 1992-3 22 participants 
interviewed (12 recipients 10 donors)'s most at home, some at the hospital; 
9 Oslo Transplant Centre (National HosPital) Summer 199219 26 participants (13 
recipients 13 donors) interviewed at the hospital; 
150ne centre was activated to discuss the development of it's own living donor protocol as a result of 
receiving the questionnaire. Another was willing but the time scale remaining was too limited to gain the 
necessary prior ethics committee approval and conduct the research. 
160r indeed, a high percentage of LDT"s out of the total number of transplants conducted and Albania does 
not conduct transplants and the Eire centre in Dublin has recently only conducted LDT's in exceptional 
circumstances (e. g. twins). 
17There were three elements of selectivity of participant choice predisposing the research to bias: Firstly, 
in some cases (particularly Oslo) a certain degree of selectivity was used in choosing research participants 
(by the hospital nephrologist in the case of Oslo). This was primarily done to produce a varied spread of 
participants including some non-genetically related pairs (6 spousal and I brother in law pair out of 13 pairs 
in Oslo) but may also have consciously or unconsciously involved exclusion of certain donors and 
recipients based on sensitivity to their needs which might have produced bias (e. g. less of a tendency to put 
forward donors and recipients in cases of graft loss or death of one of the pair); secondly, selectivity was 
applied in terms of geographical and general accessibility (the ability of donor's and recipients to meet-up 
for interview). It might be expected that those who were unable to be interviewed for this reason would 
tend as to have more problems with the donation process than their interviewed counterparts (e. g. more 
financial costs from travel and lost time, more stress); and thirdly, bias may also have entered inevitably 
through some donors and recipients choosing not to participate precisely because of a less positive attitude 
to their experience. 
181n collaboration with Peter Donnelly and Anne Simpson respectively former transplant surgeon and 
former transplant co-ordinator at Leicester General Hospital. 
191n collaboration with Arnt Jacobsen now director of the National Hospital and with two nurses providing 
oral translation in the interviews. 
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" Dublin Transplant Centre (Beaumont Hospital) Spring 199320 10 participants 
(5 
recipients and 5 donors) were interviewed at the hospital; 
" Poland (from the base of the Warsaw centre) 1995-199621 45 participants were 
interviewed (21 donors and 24 recipients); 
Slovenia 199622 46 participants were interviewed (24 donors, 22 recipients); 
Romania 199623 5 participants were interviewed (5 recipients); 
Slovakia 199624 6 participants were interviewed (3 donors and 3 recipients); and 
Albania 1995 interviews conducted with 51 participants who were members of 
families of ESRF patients. 25 
In the case of the semi-structured interviews results were transcribed in detail. A 
distillation was then produced for this chapter with the aim of retaining a unique flavour 
of interviews as well as drawing broader conclusions related to LDT ethical and legal 
issues addressed in the PhD so far. Results from the questionnaires used by Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Romania were inscribed on the questionnaire and form a more standardised 
body of data which lent itself to a more exclusively statistically oriented write-up. 
Albanian results were written-up in similar fashion. 
9.3. Substantive Findings. 
9.3.1. Benefit and Detriment in LDT. 
9.3.1.1. The Donor 
Self-esteem 
This study somewhat bore out the conclusion that LDT can positively benefit a donors 
self-esteem, although overall the benefits are not that marked with only one donor stating 
201n collaboration with Dr Murphy a transplant surgeon and the two transplant co-ordinators. 
21 Interviews were conducted by Professor Rowinski's team and analysed by myself. 
221nterviews conducted by Igor Luksic (a EUROTOLD PECO participant in Slovenia) and analysed by 
myself 
231nterviews conducted by the Romanian PECO team and analysed by myself 
241nterviews conducted under the co-ordination of Barbara Grantnerova, a Slovakian nephrologist with 
analysis by myself. 
25Under the co-ordination of Dr Myftar Barballushi nephrologist at the Tirana Hospital using a 
questionnaire he adapted for the purpose. All but two (grandmothers) of those interviewed were immediate 
nuclear family members (blood and spousal relationships) of an ESRF patient. The questionnaire was 
analysed by myself 
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that they felt very much higher after donation. 21 donors in the Polish sample responded 
to the question as to how they thought of themselves post-donation compared with self 
perception prior to donation. 5 donors said they thought of themselves a little more 
highly now, 16 donors said there was no difference. The recipients view of donor self- 
perception was more marked -5 recipients feeling that their donors viewed themselves as 
having very much higher self-esteem, 2a little higher and 10 no difference. The 
Slovenian sample produced very similar results; I person thought of themselves "very 
much higher, " 5 "a little higher" and one, suprisingly, "a little lower. " Recipients also 
generally thought the donor's self-perception was unchanged (16 "no different, " 5 "a little 
higher, " I "very much higher"). Similar results were obtained in Romania26 and 
Slovakia. 27 
Donor-Recivient Relationship. 
Another of the benefits of LDT for the donor could be that it can build a closer 
relationship with the recipient. Greater closeness was found in a significant number of 
interviews and is probably not simply attributable to the passage of time. 18 Polish 
donors said that there was no change in their relationship with the recipient as compared 
with the position pre-donation/transplant, whilst 3 donors said that it had improved. 28 
This picture of largely unchanged but occasionally improved relationships was confirmed 
by the recipients; 21 saying the closeness of their relationship to the donor was unchanged 
post-donation whilst 2 said it had improved. Most Slovenian donors (14 of 24) assessed 
their relationship with the recipient as close and in most instances (17 of 24) unchanged 
after donation (5 improved, I greatly improved and I got slightly worse). Slovenian 
recipients had a similar perspective. 29 The small Romanian sample, on the other hand 
presented a more positive picture of change from the recipients perspective; all recipients 
expressed having extremely / very or fairly close relationships with the donors and in 3 
261n the Romanian interviews most recipients felt the donor's self-perception was unchanged (4 out of 5- 
the fifth "a little higher"). 
27Donor self-perception and health were unchanged. 1 recipient felt a donor had "a little higher" self 
perception 
281n 90% of instances the donors described themselves as being very close to the recipient even before the 
donation/transplant. 
29With this recipient assessments of the relationhip before donation were divided between very close (11) 
and fairly close (10) with little change after donation (17 "didn't change, " 4 "improved, " I "got slightly 
worse"). Interestingly in 4 Slovenian donors and 2 recipients stated that donation caused family conflict; 
reasons for this were not clearly illuminated. Although the recipient in one interview commented that both 
parents wanted to donate and in another interview the recipient stated that the donoes wife had been worried 
about the donor donating 
279 
out of 5 cases this had improved after the donation. 30 In 7 out of the 13 Oslo 
intervieWS31 the participants stated that they had a close relationship with each other 
which in 3 of these cases was closer after the operation. 32 The quality of donor recipient 
relationship was commented on positively in most Leicester intervieWS33 the typical 
response being that the participants felt they were closer as a consequence of sharing the 
experience of LDT. 34 All the Slovakian donors viewed themselves as very close to their 
recipients and that this relationship was unchanged after the operation. 35 
Physical Health 
Insufficient interviews were conducted to derive much information about physical 
detriment to donors - EUROTOLD has developed the Donor Health RegiStrY36 to explore 
this aspect more thoroughly. Nethertheless, donor quality of health issues were 
discussed in a number of cases. The most surprising feature was that some donors 
actually felt their health had improved after donation! 37 
301n 2 cases remaining unchanged. 
316,7,8,10,11,12,13. 
328,12 and 13. For example, the donor in interview 13 stated his relationship with the recipient was closer, 
a feeling echoed by the recipient who stated that, "we talk more about feelings now. " 
331 and 2,3,4 and 5,6 and 7,8 and 9,12 and 13,14,15 and 16. 
34Closeness was also examined by many of the recipients from their perspective. In one Leicester 
interview (15 and 16) the recipient remarked that he felt slightly further apart from the donor but "not to any 
effectreally. " Ina fiifther interview (17 and 18) the recipient felt that he and the donor had never been 
close and he wasift able to visit because of his discomfort with being a passive smoker - The recipient said 
he would "love to be closer to the donor. " Interestingly the donor felt that her family never smoked in his 
presence; there was clearly a degree of breakdown in communication. 
35No family conflict had been caused in donation. 
36See chapter 9. 
37polish donors were asked how their health had changed since donation. 4 stated that it had got slightly 
better, 13 said it was the same and 4 said that it had got slightly worse. Amongst the sample of Slovenian 
donors health was largely unchanged, although 5 participants stated that their health had "worsened slightly" 
(details included less energy fatigue, more nervous and slight elevation of blood pressure) and I that it had 
"improved slightly" as a result of donating the kidney. In interview I and 2 of the Leicester interviews the 
donor expressed problems with sepsis of the wound site, similar problems were expressed by the donor in 
interview 12 and 13. The donor in interview 4 and 5 discussed temporary discomfort and sleeping 
difficulties after the operation. The donor interview 15 and 16 discussed still getting twinges. In the 
Oslo interviews, the donor in interview 3 said he picked up a hospital virus afterwards. In one interview 
the donor said there could have been more check - up's and a six month sick note was not long enough (11). 
In interview II the donor said her recovery had been slow and as yet incomplete, but added that this might 
bepartlyherage. In interview 10 the donor said that he had pains for quite along time from his ribs being 
removed. In interview 9 the donor stated that he had a cold and stomach cramps for a while and could not 
sleep on the side where the incision was made. One donor could not walk for a time after the operation 
and was exhausted. There were no long term effects however. the donor said that the pain of one of the 
rib bones being removed took some time to dissipate. No health complications were mentioned amongst 
the Dublin donors. 
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9.3.1.2. The Recipient. 
While the sample was not significant enough to draw out quantitative conclusions on 
recipient health a few interesting points can be highlighted. In only one case was clear 
unhappiness expressed about receiving an LDT because of health problems; 38 
interestingly the donor in this case was still happy with his decision. Several recipients 
in the Oslo interviews specifically spoke of side effects of drugs with one saying that 
were "tremendous. "39 However, at the same time, several also commented to the effect 
that it was a new lease of life. 
Some psychological strains were reported including strain on the spousal relationship in 
one interview4O where there had also been sexual problems after the transplant in the 
spousal relationship. Sexual problems were also reported in two other interviews. 41 
This might be an area where practitioners should give warnings prospective recipients. 
9.3.2. Disclosure and Informedness. 
9.3.2.1. The Donor 
Disclosure 
In general the picture of the quality of disclosure to donors is somewhat mixed. At the 
one extreme there were 4 donors who said they were not informed about any risks (2 in 
Slovenia and 2 in Poland) plus a number who expressed negative overall picture of 
disclosure - for instance in the Leicester sample one donor felt that he did not have a 
clear perception of the facts of risks being involved, "I doift remember anybody saying 
anything about risks um, no they just told me straightforward this is what will happen 
and if they though there was any risk at all they wouldn't have done it ... 1142 Several 
donors also expressed more specific concerns such as: not being informed about the 
38Leicester interview 12 and 13. 
3913. 
401, eicester interview 3. 
41This was also the case with the recipienVs relationship with his wife in Leicester interviews 15 and 16 - 
although possibly in this case due to a dysfunctional relationship than a straightforward physiological 
consequence of the transplant. In the Oslo interviews one recipient had sexual problems associated with 
transplant. 
424 and 5. 
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possibility of sepsis at the incision site; 43 that information concerning "whether or not I 
would be O. K. on one kidney could have been better; " and that they could have been told 
more about the possible impact of the donation on their sex life. 44 
On the other hand in the majority of interviews the overall assessment of disclosure was 
positive. In Oslo 8 out of 13 donorS45 felt the quality of information was wholly 
positive, with such phrases as "very good information" and "I felt the doctors told me 
everything. " In the Leicester interviews one donor stated, "I do believe the doctors 
really tried to make you aware"46 and another said, "they went to a great deal of trouble 
to ensure that I knew what was going to happen and I felt quite happy about that. "47 In 
Dublin the comments of the 5 donors about disclosure were all positive. 48 Some 
Slovenian donors were aware of being told more than one risk. The most common risks 
donors were aware of being told about were surgical complications (6) and possible graft 
failure (2). Polish donors typically mentioned being informed of one or two of the risks 
of donation - risks mentioned included; surgical (5), risk of living on one kidney (3), 
post-operative complications (1), failure of recipient graft (4), reduction of physical 
abilities (1), high blood pressure (1), pneumonia (1) and infection of the urinary tract 
(1). 49 
In one of the Norwegian interviews the recipient, with the agreement of the donor, made 
a comment that might apply to many centres that the information had improved over time 
431 and 2. 
441. The generally satisfied view of information provision seemingly correlates with positive comments 
made by most participants about the quality of care with comments including "very happy, " "a good 
experience, " "felt safe and in good hands, " "felt secure, " "trusted the professionals. " One of the pairs 
who had expressed a reservation about the quality of information also said that donors should have more 
check up's afterwards (interview 2) although donor I who was satisfied with the information nethertheless 
stated that the hospital was disorganised in finding him a bed after the operation (interview 4). 
451,4,6,7,9,10,11,13. 
4615 and 16. 
4721 and 22. 
481n interview I the donor said the information was "good enough. -though perhaps not as much as today. " In interview 2 the doctors told the donor that there can be problems and put this in percentages. In 
interview 3 the donor states that there were meetings where there were so many people to talk to about the 
process. In interview 4 the donor and recipient simply said the information was 'great. ' Ininterview5the 
donor commented that the information was very good but given what her sister was going through, "of 
course I was going to do this ... I didrft really need information. "491 donor did not remember what risks he was informed of, another donor stated he was only informed of 
the positive consequences (this was a twin donation). 
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having been "satisfactory most of the time" but "radically improved from 1989 
(onwards). " 50 
Informational Dependence 
Donors in Slovenia, Poland and Slovakia were asked about their sources of information 
about LDT. Several of the 24 Slovenian donors received information about the positive 
and negative consequences of donation from more than one source. The main source 
was a nephrologist (19 donors) with other sources including surgeon (2), nurse (3), 
transplant co-ordinator, boyfriend and family doctor (I each). Most donors did not seek 
out their own source of information (17) although a few did (4) - citing medical 
professionals and medical publications as sources. 
Polish donors were typically informed of the positive and negative consequences of 
donation by more than one person. transplant co-ordinators (13 out of 21), nephrologists 
(14 out of 2 1) being most relied on surgeons (5 out of 2 1) and nurses (I out of 2 1) much 
less so. In addition 13 out of 21 donors sought out additional information from other 
sources including medical books (2), press (7), ex-donors (7), television (6) and G. P. 's 
2. The Slovakian donors had been informed of the possible negative and positive 
consequences by a nephrologist in all cases and also by a surgeon in one case. They did 
not seek information from other sources. 2 out of 3 were informationally dependent on 
one person. 
Infonnedness 
These interviews did nothing to dispel the image of non-reflective donor decision-making 
exhibited within other studies. 20 out of 24 Slovenian donors knew they wanted to 
donate right away and did not need to think it over, stating that they were not aware of 
the risks at the time of deciding to donate. Apparently, donors were not very concerned 
about risks - 18 of them stated that a main worry was whether the transplanted kidney 
would work while only 3 stated their own health / medical complications as a main worry. 
At the time of the interview nearly half the donors (11) could not remember what risks 
they were told about, which is somewhat disturbing even if an allowance for lapse of 
time is made. Certainly there may have been an unconscious attempt to avoid ambivalent 
5012. 
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feelings that a genuine consideration of risks might have led to in many instances -a point 
confirmed by the underassessment of the risk factor in LDT with 18 donors stating LDT 
carried "no risk whatsoever" (4 answered "little or no risk" and I answered "a very small 
risk"). Polish responses were a little less extreme but even so a majority of donors still 
decided right away and nearly half were not aware of the potential risks at the time of 
donating. 51 Of the remaining samples only 3 Slovakian donors were interviewed52 and 
none were interviewed in Romania. 53 However, some interesting qualitative points 
arose from the interviews in Leicester and Oslo. Whilst only one Leicester donor 
expressly stated54 she decided before being aware of the risks55 another, according to the 
recipient, refused to accept information beyond a certain point because "ifll put me off - 
if it happens it happens, thafs it. 1156 His decision was fairly automatic to give to his 
daughter, with no apparent reflection or weighing up of the risks and benefits. One 
Oslo donor57 stated that he was met by a doctor who was explaining the risks and benefits 
to him, but after 4 or 5 minutes he interrupted saying "oh no problem. " He added that, 
5113 out of 21 Polish donors stated that they knew right away that they were going to donate and did not 
need to think it over. The remaining 8 donors only decided after talking to medical staff (and in some 
instances after the completion of tests also). 20 out of 21 donors did not reconsider their original decision 
to donate. Asked if they were aware at the time of making the donation decision of any potential risks to 
their health II donors answered that they were aware and 10 that they were not aware. Ofthosewhowere 
aware 4 said they were aware of general surgical complications, 2 of post-operative complications from 
nephrectomy, I of effects on postdonation physical capacity and 5 of problems which might affect the 
remaining kidney. 
52At the time of making the decision to donate, 2 out of 3 Slovakian donors stated that they were aware of 
the risks to their health (I specifying potential loss of the other kidney). The other donor, through not 
being aware could be stated to have not given an informed consent. The donors all specified only 
"whether the transplanted kidney would work" when asked their main worries. They did not in any case 
choose "your own health / medical complications. " This could be viewed as a natural consequence, 
putting the recipient as the ill person first, but it could also be the consequence of denial or minimisation of 
the risks by such donors. All 3 donors stated that they knew right away that they wanted to donate and did 
not need time to think it over. I donor felt that there was quite a risk to his health in donating but the other 
two clearly distorted, or didift understand, the reality by marking "no risk whatsoever. " 
53AIthough some data was collected regarding recipient decision-making: The 5 recipients were asked if at 
the time of their decision they were aware of any potential risks to their health. 3 responded no and 2 
responded yes specifying knowledge of the possibility of rejection. Clearly there are some risks involved 
in transplantation for the recipient and this lack of knowledge in 3 out of 5 recipients is disturbing. Asked 
if they were aware of risks to the donor at the time of donation I responded no and 3 responded yes of 
which 2 specified surgical risks. 4 accepted the LDT only after talking to the donor and one accepted 
straight away not needing time to think it over. Respondents were asked what was their impression of the 
risk to their health. 2 marked the response "a very small risk" and two marked "quite a risk. " They were 
also asked what they thought the risk was for the donor. 1 marked "little or no risk" and 3 marked "a very 
small risk. " Perhaps the most interesting fact is that I recipient thought there was no risk whatsoever 
which is clearly not the reality. 
544 and 5. 




"I really didn! t hear... I didn't want to speak about it because it was decided. (i. e. he had 
already made up his mind). "58 One donor specifically commented that she diddt like 
hospitals and diddt want details of what was involved in the proceSS. 59 
On the other side of the equation, one Leicester donor commented that he had two long 
interviews before deciding to donate. 60 The Oslo donors were perhaps the most 
informed in all the samples - some described risks of donation in great detail. 
For 
instance, one donor said "I knew I might have pain afterwards, that I might feel sick, .. 
about the possibility of narcosiS"61 another commented on the risks being well explained 
and added that he knew the success rate of living donation to be around 90-92% because 
of good statistics given to him and that he knew the wait for a cadaver kidney was one 
year or more with possible deterioration on dialysiS. 62 
9.3.2.2. The Recipient 
Disclosure 
Polish recipients were typically informed of more than one of the risks and benefits of 
LDT63 (although 2 recipients reported that they were not informed of the positive and 
negative consequences) as were Slovenian recipients who were most commonly told of 
effects on the donors health (10), earlier transplant (10), pre-planned operation (8) and 
better match (12). From a selection of better match, pre-planned operation, earlier 
transplant, effect on donor's health and any other comments all 5 Romanian recipients 
only marked 'better match' in response to the question; "what risks/benefits were you told 
about? " Poland recipients had almost universally first heard about the possibility of LDT 
from medical staff, although 2 had found out from medical literature and 3 from a 
member of family / friend risks when they donated. 
58flowever, this donor was married to the recipient and had known for some time about her problems of 
kidney disease. It is therefore probable that he already knew at least some of the factors involved in 
donation. 
599. 
6021 and 22. 
615. 
6210. 
6311 recipients mentioned being informed of better match, 9 of pre-planned operation, II of earlier 
transplant, 10 of the effect on the donor's health, I of the positive consequences of not being on dialysis. 
I recipient was not informed of any risks or benefits of LDT. 
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What these quantitative results do not convey is the mixed picture, as regards satisfaction 
with disclosure of interviewed recipients. 6 out of 10 Leicester recipients interviewed 
expressed concerns about disclosure as did a few of the Norwegian recipients. 64 
Comments by Leicester recipients included: feeling "left in the dark... there was no real 
information" and that there was a lack of communication about what was going to happen 
in the operation. Specifically he was also not informed of a possible deleterious impact 
on his sex life from the operation, he also felt that his brother the donor (who could not 
be interviewed) had been treated like "a piece of meat; 1165 feeling uninformed about the 
possibility that her eyesight would deteriorate after the operation (she was diabetic); 66 
feeling the doctors seemed to have no time ". -I'm one of those people who 
likes to ask 
questions, it was frustrating. There was only one doctor who didn't talk down to you. 
They don't explain - sometimes you are left in the dark; "67 feeling uninformed about drug 
side effects (including moon face); 68 and (a recipients wife)69 feeling the recipient was not 
aware of many risks at the time of the operation, which had he been aware of them he 
might not have gone through with the operation. 70 One Oslo recipient felt that she could 
have been informed more about the medicines she would have to take and their side 
effectS71 and another felt that "sometimes the doctors forgot they were dealing with 
people. 1172 
There were variations in who disclosed information and the degree of informational 
reliance of the recipient. In all 5 Romanian interviews instances a transplant co- 
ordinator had discussed with the recipients the positive and negative consequences of 
donation only I out of 5 had sought information from another source (being the medical 
literature). Polish recipients were also typically informed of the positive and negative 
consequences of donation by one person, this normally being the nephrologiSt. 73 Only 4 
64The recipient in Dublin interview 2 said going out into society was hard and she would have liked to have 
had counselling. This has now been introduced for donors, recipients and families of those with organ 
disease at the Dublin centre. An information worker is also available. Comments about the quality of 
care were positive except in so far as the recipient in interview I said the care was not as personal as it used 
to be and associated this change partly with the change to a bigger hospital. 
653. 
6612 and 13. 
6717 and 18. 
6814. 
6915 and 16. 
701n this case the graft had failed. 
715. 
729. 
731n 13 cases; a surgeon informed in 2 cases, nursing staff 1, psychologist 3, transplant coordinator 1, ex- 
patients 1, doctor in the USA 1, parents 1, ex-patients 1. 
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recipients had found information from sources other than medical staff although in 
mitigation it needs to be added that 5 of the recipients were minors at the time of 
receiving an organ; cases involving minors may have warranted a different approach. 
In Slovenia the positive and negative consequences of donation were primarily discussed 
by nephrologists (16), but sometimes by transplant co-ordinators (2) and nurses (5). In 
one instance these were stated as not discussed. A significant proportion of recipients (6 
out of 22) sought information from other sources, primarily previous transplanted 
patients (2) and medical literature (2). All 3 Slovakian recipients had the positive and 
negative consequences of donation discussed with them by a nephrologist (being 
dependent informationally on this sole source), 
Informedness 
6 Polish recipients knew right away and did not need to think it over; 74 6 recipients 
reconsidered their original decision (of these 3 were worried for the donor's health and 2 
others commented that they were thinking about / expecting a cadaver). 75 Amongst the 
22 Slovenian recipients 12 recipients did not need to think over the decision to receive a 
kidney, deciding right away. The remainder talked it over with the donor and/or 
medical staff first. None of the 3 Slovakian recipients made immediate decisions to 
accept a living donor kidney -I talked it over with the donor first, another with medical 
staff and a third after talking with staff and the completion of tests. 
Asked if they were aware, at the time of making the donation decision, of any potential 
risks to their health 12 Polish recipients said they were aware of risks to themselves and 
10 said they were not aware. 14 recipients said they were aware of risks to the donor76 
and 9 said they were not aware. 2 out of 3 Slovakian recipients were not aware of 
potential risks to their health at the time of donation. 2 out of 3 were aware of potential 
risks to the donor, I of them citing the possibility that the donor might need dialysis in 
the future. 2 out of 3 Slovakian recipients felt aware of risks and benefits of LDT, citing 
'better match. ' All 3 felt there was "a very small risk" attached to being an LDT recipient 
while 2 assessed the risk to the donor as "a very small risk" and one as "quite a risk. " 
747 talked to the donor first, 3 were minors so did not make the decision themselves, 2 talked to staff and 
completed medical tests first and 3 talked to medical stafff and the donor. 
7513 recipients did not reconsider their original decision. 
76Risks to the donor recipients focused on were loss of remaining kidney (9 recipients) and problems 
relating to surgery (3 recipients). 
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Only 8 out of 22 Slovenian recipients were aware of the potential risks of receiving an 
LDT when they accepted it. Those aware of risks all cited the possibility of failure of 
the transplant with one also noting the possibility of death. Most (17) were aware of 
risks to the donor at the time of acceptance most commonly citing the possibility of 
failure of the remaining kidney (5) and problems with it (7). Some recipients gave a 
number of responses when asked their main worries about receiving a kidney with the 
most commonly marked being the health and medical consequences for the donor (16) 
and whether the transplanted kidney would work (12). Some recipients were unable to 
accept the reality of risk -9 personal assessing that there was no risk to there own health 
(6 little or no risk, 4a very small risk and 3a big risk). This also applies to some 
degree in respect of recipient assessment of the donor's Position; 5 recipients stating that 
there was no risk (4 little or no risk, 4a very small risk, 5 quite a big risk and 4a big 
risk). Recipients were however on the whole much more realistic about risks to the 
donor. 
Not much data was produced from the Oslo and Leicester samples on this question 
although one Oslo recipient commented that she may have shut some information out, 
"well basically I was very ill... so I was not -I was restricting what I wanted to use my 
brains to cope with and somehow I did not er... want to study the risks or anything or ask 
questions about that because I just didift want to know... this seemed to be the solution. 1177 
9.3.2.3. Conclusions 
A significant minority of donors expressly stated concerns about the quality of 
information giving and communication (sometimes recipients had concerns on the donors 
behalf as well). These were very serious concerns in some cases, particularly amongst 
the Leicester sample, however, in general concerns were higher with the recipients. 
Time lapse led to significant recall problems but even given this there must be concerns 
about the level of informedness of donors: 
7713. 
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" Firstly, donors tended not to be able significantly detail what was disclosed and 
tended to tick only one heading when choosing from a list of the types of risks to 
choose from as factors that they were told aboUt78 
" Secondly, a small minority of donors stated that they had not been told of any risks. 
" Thirdly, they tended to rely on one source of information; and 
" Fourthly, most donors made an immediate decision to donate without thinking it over 
or talking to medical staff. 
Donors also tended to underestimate the significance of risks, which combined with the 
above factors suggests that many of them were unconsciously attempting to avoid feelings 
of discomfort relating to the decision to donate. 
Recipients tended to have a slightly higher ability to describe risk and benefits of 
donation and more awareness at the time of deciding to donate. They also had a less 
degree of informational dependence - tending both to have more sources of disclosure and 
communication than donorS79 and to seek out their own information more. 
9.3.3. Voluntariness in LDT. 
Motivation in LDT, as evidenced for instance by pre and post donation feelings about is 
important both in its own right and for verifying or otherwise that the decision to donate 
or receive was made on a voluntary basis. Other areas of data pertinent to voluntariness 
are the situational context of donation (a potential indicator of motivation, pressures and 
influences), recognised pressures and attitudes towards different classes of donor. Most 
of the findings in these areas relate to the donor, although points are specified in relation 
to the recipient on occasion. 
9.3.3.1. Why LDT Was Chosen 
In the Slovenian sample the recipients stated in 17 out of 22 instances that there was more 
than one person offering to give them a kidney with the final decision almost always 
being stated as having been taken on medical grounds. The donors had a slightly 
different perception of the situation with 15 out of 24 saying someone else had also 
78As they were in Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland. 
7913ut still only sometimes. 
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offered. The final decision was invariably grounded in medical reasons, but in 1 case it 
was classified as 'psychological' and in another the alternative donor was in a greater state 
of fear about the donation. No data was available on the choice of LDT in preference to 
cadaveric donation. In 2 out of 3 Slovakian cases donors they said they were the only 
person offering and were finally chosen for medical reasons which all 3 recipient said had 
been the basis for their decision. No data was available of preference for LDT over 
cadaveric. In Romania in 4 out of 5 instances there was only one person offering a 
kidney. This seems somewhat unusual since even if there was only one available close 
genetic relative, in 4 out of 5 cases the recipients were married and spousal donation 
might have been an extra option. In 4 instances the recipient stated that the particular 
donor was chosen for "medical reasons"80 
In Leicester one recipient8l had a failed cadaveric transplant and continued to resist living 
donation for a further 4 years before accepting. A large range of family members were 
tested for suitability as donors, the final choice being medically based. One donor82 
stated that, "it was a natural thing to do" and appeared mocking and laughed ironically 
about the recipients brother refusing to donate because of "something to do with 
insurance. " "Oh well he's rather arrogant - he and his wife are hypochondriacs. " A 
further donor83 Simply said he "basically thought that it was a good idea, " whilst another 
donor84 had not liked to see her brother ill and so had offered to donate. In another 
interview85 it was clear that there were other living donor options but these were not 
considered. Asked why her mother was not considered the recipient simply stated that 
she "thinks her mother would not have been able to cope with being a donor. " In one 
intervieW86 the donor, whilst not regretting his decision to donate to his sister, appeared 
to be very angry that her husband had refused to consider donating - feeling this was very 
selfish. In two further caseS87 the decision to use living donation may have been heavily 
influenced by the fact that the recipients were minors in considerable distress on dialysis. 
80The 5th did not respond to this question. 
816 and 7. 
824 and 5. 
8315 and 16. 
841 and 2. 
8514. 
8612 and 13. 
878 and 9,10 and 11. 
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One recipient in the Oslo interviews had a genetic family whose members were precluded 
from donating by the nature of the kidney problem. His spouse donated because she 
"hoped to help my husband.. I had seen so much.. after I had seen his illness I wanted to 
do something. " In a further Oslo intervieW88 the donor said "it was not a nice feeling" 
that the recipient had two rejection crises and he felt very down "if that happened - to give 
a kidney and it should not succeed -I wouldn't like to think of that. " This may suggest 
that altruism in the sense of a 'detached compassionate giving' was not fully present. 
The donor's feelings about the donation hinged partly on it's outcome. It is uncertain 
whether or not he would regret his donation had it failed but this is possible. In a 
different interview the recipient had a part of the kidney taken out with the fear that that 
might be the end of the graft, but when I asked the donor if the failure of the graft might 
lead to feelings of rejection of what had been given, the donor responded "it was not 
because it was mine it was because it was my sister. "89 Participants in the Oslo 
interviews generally expressed views on living donation as compared with cadaveric 
donation. 7 pairs indicated a specific preference for LDT over cadaver. 90 Thoughts on 
this point included: The fact that cadaver donation had a long waiting list; 91 LDT offers 
the chance to prepare for the operation and be in control of timing more; 92 a lesser rate of 
rejection / better success rate; 93 LDT offers the chance for someone else to have a 
cadaver instead; 94 and one donor rather surprisingly said that he simply hadn't considered 
cadaver as a possible first option! 95 
Some participants in the Dublin interviews expressed views on the preference for living 
donors. In interviews 2 and 5 the quality of the match was mentioned, with the matches 
being very high at 95 and 100% respectively. In interviews 1,2 and 5 the graft had 
survived a long time, perhaps indicating that this was anticipated when the decision was 
made to donate. In interview 1 the recipient was deteriorating in health rapidly and 
required 10 hours inclusive of travel time, each time he dialysed, thus a quickly arranged 










9.3.3.2. Feelings About the Decision to Donate or Receive. 
A few donors expressed ambivalence about their decision. In Slovenia 2 out of 24 cases 
the donor reconsidered the original decision, on one occasion this was because there had 
been a delay of a year after offering and a lack of information, on another occasion the 
donor was afraid for the recipient. 96 Asked if they would go through the process again if 
the 'clock was turned bacle 2 Slovenian donors said no - the reason in one case being that 
the donor had "lost money in his job" and in the other that being that the donor had waited 
a long time for it to happen. -I Polish donor also felt this way - he had not realised that 
the donated organ would not function for a lifetime. Similarly there were 3 recipients 
who would not go through the whole process again - one in Leicester who had had severe 
health problems and 2 in Slovenia, one of whom simply stated a preference for cadaveric 
donation while the other was concerned about graft failure (the reason for this latter 
concern was not expressed although it was clear that the recipient had had a number of 
failed grafts). There may be a connection here with the fact that 7 responding Slovenian 
recipients found the decision to donate extremely / very diffiCUlt. 97 A number of Polish 
recipients also found it hard to accept a kidney. 98 There was also some ambivalence at 
points in the decision-making process for a very small number of recipients including 2 
out of 3 Slovakian recipients who had reconsidered their decision (but did not say why), 
as had I out of 22 Polish recipients (through being worried for the health of the donor). 
The recipient in one Leicester interview had uncertainties at various points after LDT 
partly connected with the fact that the graft had failed. 99 
However, the main picture was that donors and recipients were happy with their decision, 
regret was not a significant factor in any of the interviews in Leicester, 100 Dublin (where 
the 3 out of 5 donors reflecting on this were happy with their decision), 101 Romania'02 or 
OS10.103 Positive attitudes were most illuminated in Oslo and included: disappointment 
that the kidney had failed but feeling the right decision had still been made; 104 "I can 
96The reason for this fear was not stated. 
975 said it was quite difficult and 10 not very difficult / easy and 10 foundit not very difficult / easy 
987 said it was extremely difficult, 3 very difficult and I quite difficult; 6 recipients found it easy or not 
difficult. 
9915 and 16. 
1004 and 5,6 and 7,8 and 9,10 and 11,17 and 18,21 and 22. 
1011,5. 
102None of the 5 recipients had ever reconsidered their decision to receive LDT. 
103There were no negative comments expressed about living donation although it must be stated that this 
may have been influenced by donors having been picked by a nephrologist at the Oslo centre. 
1041. 
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recommend it" seeing the recipient recover was "the best happening in my life-I never 
had such an experience in my life; "105 it was a normal thing to do; 106 it was "very 
natural ... I'm very satisfied; "107 "a natural process; "108 a donor feeling fear about the 
process but stating this was more on the surface with deeper feelings in favour of 
donation; 109 a further donor fearing hospitals but wanting to help out her sister. 110 
, 
9.3.3.3. Unconscious Motivationa 
Besides the question of most decisions to donate being made instantaneously and risks 
being underestimated other issues having a bearing on unconsciousness of motivation 
arose. Of course these issues would only have a bearing on the legal position if they 
indicated incapacity or were combined with an external pressurising agent. III 
One of the factors that could reduce the incidence of unconsciously motivated donation is 
the donor being offered the opportunity to change their mind without the family knowing 
the real reason. The donors given this opportunity included: 2 out of 24 in the 
Slovenian sample; 5 out of 21 in the Polish sample (plus I recipient); at least 2 out of 5 
in the Dublin sample; ' 12 3 out of 3 in the Slovakian sample (plus 2 recipients); and I out 
of 5 Romanian recipients. 
Another relevant issue is whether recipients feel indebted to the donor and if so whether 
feelings of indebtedness in any way reduced the value of donation. Recipients were 
equally divided in the question of whether they were indebted to the donor and 
interestingly a significant minority experienced this as a burden (e. g. 3 out of 11 Oslo 
recipients, 4 out of 10 Polish recipients and 0 out of 3 Romanian recipients). 
In the Leicester sample some interesting comments arose around this theme. In 
interview I and 2 the recipient expressed gratitude but did not have any sense that he had 







III See chapter 7 for ftu-ther details of this debate. 
1121,5. 
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"showered with gifts" by his sister-recipient, to which he felt embarrassed since he 
"would have done it for anybody in the family. " The recipient in interview 17 and 18 
felt that he owed the donor "a great debt but I don't have to repay it. " 
Linked to the question of indebtedness i the issue of whether donation can ever be a free- 
gifting altruistic act. From a phenomenological point of view it is possible to 
distinguish decisions at one end of a spectrum which are made in accordance with a 
persons true will and reflect their core values, potentially including expressions of 
compassion through gifting and other activity, and the other end of the spectrum 
decisions which are superficially based on automatically assumed socialisation (of society 
and/or family etc. ) and/or the product of other unconscious processes. A vivid example 
of this being grappled with occurred in the 13th Norwegian interview, an extract of 
which is presented in Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6: Is There a Reality to 'Free' Gifting? 
Donor: ... it was just a matter of course. That's how it is. Me: Somehow then, erjust sort of .. the right thing to do Donor: Oh yes ... there's a problem that you have no other choice but er... you were very glad also that you 
were accepted as a donor (laughing). 
Recipient to Me: .... But may I ask a question? Although you are doing the questioning! Recipient to Donor: You say you had no choice and I think that I understand what I mean but isn't that sort 
of contrary to what the situation should be. I mean when, isift it supposed to be that before people 
become living donors ... shouldn't he have a choice ... I mean you felt compelled to 
do this - or what do you 
mean by'had no choice'? 
Donor: I think that first of all of course you have a responsibility as a father, you have to live up to that and 
you have to do the best for your own child ... thats one thing and er.. if I had been asked and given the 
possibility to say yes or no I would feel like there's no question of yes or no in a situation like ours. this 
was, as I tried to put it, as a matter of course and on that point there was no question of a choice. We had 
never thought of doing anything.. I was I would say very blessed that I was able to do this sort of thing. It 
generated great happiness. One could say beforehand that we should do it together, we should fix it, and 
then the situation was clear, there were no obstacles, it was go ahead. 
Me (later): ... when you say you have no choice that can be taken in two ways and I take it one way but 
some people would say they have no choice and this meant they were like forced or pressured. 
Donor: Yes but I didn't mean it that way. 
Me: Yes, like this was a different kind of feeling of no choice.. you know that this was just the right thing. 
Donor: Yes at this stage it (the choice) did not exist and that way I was not given the choice in a positive 
way. 
Me: Umm (listening). 
Recipient: I have been thinking a bit about that - both my parents have a terrible sense of duty - you know a 
sense of duty to life in general.. and er er.. I saw that particularly right before we had the surgery... and you 
know I knew that things could go wrong and I thought that would be absolutely awful -I couldn't live with 
that but then I sort of remembered the situation at the summerhouse. I was sitting on the terrace over 
breakfast and I sort of put this question sort of timidly and I just remembered they both jumped in their 
chairs and said, 'please I want to do this. ' This spontaneous reaction was my proof that this was really 
something they wanted to do and not something they felt they should do from any kind of negative duty.. so I 
sort of cling to that (laughing). That was very important to me. 
294 
In interview 9 of the Oslo interviews the participants reflected upon the possibility that 
illness in one person can result in them adopting an "ill role" with other members of the 
family taking on the supporter role focusing their attention on the ill person. This could 
indicate a psychological patterning relating to these 'roles' with one person 'needing to be 
saved' while the other 'needs to save. 'I 13 
9.3.3.4. Proactive or Reactive Approach in LDT 
In the main the study found that patients are pro-actively informed of the possibility of 
LDT as distinct from doctors only discussing it in response to a patient enquiry. Half the 
24 Slovenian donors half had first been told by the recipient that (s)he needed a 
transplant. Most of the others had been first been told by other medical staff, although 
one person had found out through a medical publication and another by television. In 
the Polish sample in 17 cases someone explicitly made the donor aware that the recipient 
needed a transplant; a member of the medical staff in 14 cases, 114 the recipient himself / 
herself in 2 cases and in one case the sister-in-law. This hints at a certain degree of 
medical staff proactivity in informing prospective donors but whether a proactive 
approach to LDT is routinely taken is uncertain, especially given that about half of the 
recipients first heard of the possibility of LDT from a non-medical staff source (e. g. 
family member in 6 cases, ex-patient in 3 cases). In Slovakia of the 3 donors 
responding, I had first become aware that the recipient needed a transplant from the 
recipient, the other two from medical staff. 
Of 22 Slovenian recipients nearly half (10) had been informed of the possibility of LDT 
by a kidney specialist, most of the remainder had heard from other medical staff but in 2 
instances a patient had found out through the literature and in a further 3 cases from a 
member of family / friend. Of the 3 Slovakian recipient respondents 2 explained that 
113The interview reflected this with the focus being heavily on the recipient. Despite several invitations on 
my part, the donor did not speak much. The underlying feelings may respectively involve manipulation 
attention seeking and guilt / compulsive need to feel useful. 
IMIn the case of medical staff this was frequently a nephrologist or member of staff in the dialysis unit. 
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they had first heard it was possible to have a kidney from both a kidney specialist and 
another patient. 
A significant minority were actually asked to donate as opposed to simply being informed 
the donor needed a kidney. Half the Slovenian donors (12 of 24) had been asked to 
consider donating their kidney on 6 occasions by the recipient, 4 the nephrologist, once 
both and once unstated. 10 donors agreed explicitly that they donated without being 
asked. In Slovakia 1 of the recipients stated that (s)he had asked the donor to donate and 
another said that a nephrologist had asked. In Romania 3 of the 5 recipients had asked 
someone to give them a kidney. In all instances the mother was asked. In the Leicester 
interviews one recipient115 had tentatively, and in an embarrassed way, asked his 
brother. In Poland 4 cases out of 21 recipients specifically asked someone to donate. 
In 7 of the cases where they did not ask, someone else did. These figures approximately 
correspond with the perceptions of the donors. 
9.3.3.5. Direct Pressures 
None of the donors in any of the sample stated that they were pressured to donate or 
otherwise intimated this. However, 5 out of 21 donors in the Slovenian sample 
experiencedpressure not to donate. 
A small minority of recipients felt pressure to receive including 1 out of 22 in the 
Slovenian sample (pressure from the donor), I out of 3 in the Slovakian sample (by the 
donor and by parents) and 3 out of 23 in the Polish sample (specifying pressure by 
medical staff in I case and by medical staff in two others). In one Norwegian interview 
the question of possible pressure from doctors was unanswered with the recipient stating 
that it was the "doctor's decision" based on the "hurry to get a kidney. " There is no 
evidence there was any particular hurry in this instance, so it could be that the doctors 
were not neutral in their discussions. 116 
1153. 
11 60ne could hypothesise that they were partly influenced by the utilitarian consideration that another living 
donor would free up the waiting list a little. It is possible, however, that the recipient was using her 
words casually and inaccurately. 
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I Slovenian recipient felt pressure not to accept (coming from members of the donor and 
recipient families). 2 out of 21 cases Polish recipients stated that medical staff had tried 
to persuade them and in I case out of 18 LDT had caused family pressure. 117 
On the other hand there was some evidence of donation on the whole not being pressure. 
None of the Slovakian donors or recipients or the Romanian recipients felt the medical 
staff had tried to persuade them in one way or another although. In Dublin in interviews 
I and 2 the donor specifically stated they did not feel any pressure to donate or otherwise. 
There are also some good qualitative examples in the Oslo sample of donation appearing 
not to be based on pressure: One donor stated that she "did not feel any pressure to be a 
donor, completely voluntary.. no threat of pressure from the hospital - my own decision. " 
Further evidence that she had chosen out of her own will comes from the fact that the 
kidney had been rejected and yet she "still did not regret anything-but of course it would 
be much better if he could have kept it. " A ftirther donor (interview 3) had married the 
recipient knowing that she had kidney problems which might get worse. However in the 
interview this was clearly a sign that he knew what he was getting into rather than a sign 
of possible dubious (e. g. commercial) motivation for marrying her. In one instance a 
man had donated to his brother in law (who had the same rare blood group type), there 
being no evidence of dubious motivation in this case. 
9.3.3.6. Conclusion 
Donors generally expressed positive feelings about the donation with negative feelings 
confined to specific aspects of the process"' rather than relating to the fact of having 
donated. There was no evidence of psychopathology in donation and only 3 donors and 
3 recipients who experience post donation regret. In addition none of the donors 
expressed the view that they were pressured to donate. 
Whilst these are significant findings, the potential for unconscious motivations is high 
and just as donors often deny the reality of risks it is possible that they will deny the 
presence of pressure or, where it is more subtle or situational, not even be aware of it. 
117The reason given being that the donor was found to have a psychological disorder (post-transplant) 
118E. g. quality of information disclosure. 
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Over the centres as a whole there is clearly a mixture of ways being utilised to bring about 
living donation. Typically donors are informed of the recipients need, then in many 
instances left to take the initiative and in others actually asked, usually by the recipient or 
medical staff. A proactive approach to informing potential donors can meet little 
objection the question is whether actually asking is acceptable given that it probably 
amplifies the situational pressure that may be experienced by donors - i. e. making it 
harder for them to refuse. Clearly if prospective donors are to be asked it is preferable 
that this is done in a way that minimises pressure e. g. by a member of the staff not 
involved in the care of the prospective recipient and is expressly giving the prospective 
donor a way out without losing face - at this stage this is not routinely done in the centres 
sampled except for Oslo. 
9.3.6. Attitudes Toward Different Classes of Liviniz Donation. 
In Poland donors expressed their views about different forms of living donation being 
totally in favour of closely related donations (19 out of 19) and very solidly in favour of 
spousal (14 in favour, 3 against and 2 not sure), distantly related (17 in favour and 2 not 
sure), friends (15 in favour and 4 not sure) and strangers (16 in favour, I against and 2 
not sure). A similar picture in favour of donation was presented with recipients being in 
favour of closely related donation (18 in favour, 1 against and 4 not sure) although there 
was more ambivalence with other classes of donation (spousal donation 13 in favour, 4 
against and 6 not sure; distantly related 16 in favour, 2 against and 5 not sure; friends 13 
in favour, 6 against and 4 not sure; and strangers 13 in favour, 3 against and 7 not sure). 
In Slovakia recipients were unanimously in favour of all classes of donation except 
between strangers; which 2 out of 3 recipients were in favour of. Donors were in 
favour of close and distant related donation but mixed in response to spousal and friends 
(I in favour, I unsure, I against) and strangers (I unsure, I against). 
In Slovenia donor views expressed on different forms of living donation were totally in 
favour of closely related, largely in favour of distantly related (22 in favour, 2 unsure) 
and spousal (21 in favour, 3 unsure) becoming slightly more ambivalent for friends (18 
in favour, 2 not and 3 unsure) and strangers (15 in favour, 4 not and 6 unsure). The 
recipient picture of attitudes toward living donation generally was that 22 of 22 were in 
favour of closely related while in all other forms there was ambivalence but still a general 
picture of favourability. 
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In Romania recipients expressed their -views about different forms of living donation, 
being in favour of closely related donation (4 out of 4), against distantly related, friends 
and strangers (5 out of 5) and uncertain about spousal donation (5 out of 5). 3 out of 4 
recipients felt they would go through the process of living donation again. The recipient 
who would not have gone through it again did not state why. 
In Albania attitudes toward transplantation were generally favourable amongst relatives 
of renal patients but interestingly almost I in 5 people with a definite view about 
cadaveric donation were against it. LDT by close relatives was fairly unequivocally 
favoured (96%) and even spousal donation was marginally preferred to cadaveric (78% 
for spousal; 71% for cadaveric). Positive attitudes toward LDT do not typically apply 
to donation by friends and strangers (61% and 78% against respectively) although a 
minority was in favour (22% and 12% respectively). 
To conclude, attitudes towards different forms of donation were: Almost exclusively in 
favour of closely related donation; very much in favour of distantly related donation; 
largely in favour of spousal donation (several Oslo interviewees from their personal 
experience recommended the use of spouses as living donors with one couple'19 
suggesting that it was a better alternative than offspring); and, to a lesser extent, in 
favour of donation by friends. However, attitudes were fairly equally divided and 
ambivalent about strangers as donors. Perhaps the most interesting point about these 
findings is that participants have a much more liberal attitude than professionals to classes 
of potential living donors. 120 To some degree this was expected; those going through 
the process tend to focus on the benefits and the need for more transplants, professionals 
also do this but they probably also focus much more on the ethics involved with different 
classes of donor, the potential dangers (e. g. cominercialisation, psychopathology) and 
the need to 'be seen' to do something that most of society will accept. 
The attitudes of Albanian families are worth a particular mention: they are sufficiently in 
favour of living donation to suggest this might be a vital source of organs when Albania 
commences a transplant programme. 16% of respondents were against cadaveric 
donation; a figure that is of some concern because it is likely to be amplified in the 
11912. 
120See chapter 9. 
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general population and would present resistance to a cadaveric programme. Religious 
attitudes (predominantly Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox) may prove to be a particular 
barrier. 
9.3.7. Issues Relatinz to Capacitv. 
Data here was limited to one interview with a minor donor-recipient pair in Dublin who 
were identical twin sisters who nearly 14 years old at the time of donation. The doctors 
had made it clear to the donor that she could change her mind at any time. She said, 
"that thought never occurred to me. " She added that "I knew I'd have the best match.. 1 
couldn't really understand the commotion of it ... the doctors explained to me what it would 
all involve but when I heard.. it didn't matter what was involved. With what she was 
going through of course I was going to do this. " The donor said the information "was 
very good" but felt she really didrft need information (i. e. already knew her decision). 
The recipient adds that "there was a lot of information. " The donor said she would have 
been more aware of the side effects if she had been older. 
It is difficult to be sure from the interview whether informed consent was given by the 
donor. Largely the process for the donor seemed to work along the same line as some 
adults who make the decision without any lengthy reflection on details about risks etc. 
More evidence would be valuable in this area but difficult to find because of the rare 
incidence of minor organ donation. 
9.3.8. Financial Aspects of Donatiniz and Receiving. 
9.3.8.1. Buying and Sellina Organs 
While there was no evidence of buying and selling some information was collected about 
attitudes towards it. Of the 21 Polish donors, 13 were against the buying and selling of 
organs, 2 were in favour of it and 6 were unsure. Of the 23 recipients, 12 were against 
the buying and selling of organs, 3 were in favour of it and 8 were unsure. In Slovenia 
there was some ambivalence about buying and selling of organs amongst donors (8 not in 
favour, 6 not sure and 2 in favour) although a remarkable 19 of 22 would have 
considered buying an organ for the recipient. Slovenian recipients were almost 
universally against the buying and selling of organs (19 against, I in favour 2, not sure) 
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but were far more ambivalent about considering buying an organ for an actual sick 
relative (7 would have considered, 15 wouldn't). 
In the Leicester sample complete disagreement with the buying and selling of organs was 
expressed by 6 participants. 121 One participant in favour122 stated that there was nothing 
wrong with commerce; "somebody gets paid and saves someone else's life. " Two 
further participants made very qualified statements: The donor in interview 12 and 13 
basically didn't agree with the buying and selling of organs but added that "everybody has 
their price and it depends on your situation; " the donor in interview 21 and 22 felt it was 
alright if the recipient wanted to reward the donor in some way. In Albania 90% of 
responding family members of ESRF patients were against the buying and selling of 
organs. 10% were in favour. 4 out of 5 Romanian recipients were against the buying 
and selling of organs and would not have considered it, one was in favour and would 
have considered it. Slovakian donors were all against the buying and selling of organs 
but 2 out of 3 would have bought one for their relative. Contrastingly, the recipients 
were all against buying and selling and none would have considered buying an organ for a 
sick relative. 
9.3.8.2. Compensation for Loss 
In Slovenia average time after donation before returning to work / normal everyday 
activities was approximately 2 and a quarter months, with variations from 2 weeks to 9 
months. 13 donors had received time off work on full wages, I on 85%, 2 just time off 
and 3 did not get time off. In one instance the job was not kept open for the donor. 3 
said they were able to claim state benefit of social and health insurance at 100% of their 
earnings level, 20 said they coulddt get state benefit but most of these appear to have got 
full wages anyway. Asked if donating the kidney had affected them at all financially 19 
donors said not at all, 3a little and 2a great deal. 2 of these respondents incurred a 
30% income loss and one felt it had affected him positively to a great extent. None of 
them got compensation from the recipient. 
In the Leicester sample the recipient in interview 3 lost E2000 paying the donor's travel 
expenses and lost salary which "really broke" the family finances. He would have liked 
12 1 Recipients in I and 2,4 and 5,8 and 9,14, donor and recipient in interview 19 and 20. 
122Donor in 4 and 5. 
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more support from the hospital. The recipient in interview 6 and 7 was initially put off 
living donation for a number of years because help with expenses was not available. 
The recipient in interview 15 and 16 said that it had been difficult for his family 
financially. The donor in interview 21 and 22 suffered some financial hardship, which 
had been partly alleviated by the recipient. 
In the first Oslo interview the donor stated that social security did not cover all of her 
expenses. The opposite was the case in interview 6. In interview 8 the participants 
stated that the donation caused no financial hardship. In interview 10 the donor 
expressed the view that transplantation saved a lot of money and could be encouraged by 
fully compensating donors for travel expenses and loss of earnings. 
One donor in the Dublin interviews had been economically disadvantaged by the fact that 
taxi and bus fares to and from the hospital could not be claimed. The recipients in the 
Romanian interviews assessed that donation had affected the donor financially "a great 
deal" in one instance, "a little" in 2 cases and "not at all" in the remaining 2.1 donor 
was perceived as having received compensation for losses in connection with the 
donation with 4 not being compensated. 
Of the 3 Slovakian donors there were no reported adverse effects on their employment. 
I donor was able to return to normal everyday activities after a month, the other 2 did not 
answer this question. 2 out of 2 donors got time off work from their employers, all 3 
were partially compensated for lost earnings through sick pay. Despite this, and one 
person marking that they had travel costs, all of them marked that donation had not 
affected them at all financially. The recipients confirmed this. 
Future Economic Impact 
In some interviews comments were made about the economic impact of LDT in terms of 
subsequent employment. Of the 3 Slovakian donors there were no reported adverse 
effects on their employment. In Slovenia 2 out of 24 donors felt donation had affected 
their performance at work, these being fairly mild deleterious effects. 3 donors reported 
an adverse impact on income, I an improvement and 19 no impact. 2 felt it had 
affected promotion, in a positive way. 
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13 out of 22 Slovenian recipients felt that donation had affected their performance at 
work, 8 in an adverse way and 5 in a positive way. 7 out of 22 felt it had affected their 
income; 4 in a positive way and 3 in a negative way. 3 out of 21 felt it had affected 
promotion, all in a positive way. It took recipients between I month and 2 years to 
return to work / normal everyday activities. The average was 6 months, which is quite a 
long time and may have significant ramifications in terms of potential financial hardship 
although in fact 21 of 22 recipients felt that the transplant had not affected them at all 
financially (it had affected Ia great deal). 1 out of 22 had received compensation for 
losses associated with the donation, this being from a health insurance company. In 
Romania of 5 recipients, 2 felt that receiving a kidney had improved their performance at 
work, no adverse effects were reported in this regard. 
The donors were not systematically asked about the impact of donation on their ability to 
obtain life insurance. However, in Dublin one donor had difficulties in obtaining life 
insurance. In Slovenia only 1 donor had applied for life insurance and had not had any 
difficulty. 
Attitudes Towards Compensation for Loss. 
Attitudes towards compensation for losses were mixed. Of 21 donors and 18 recipients 
expressing a view on this in Poland, 9 donors and 5 recipients were in favour of such 
compensation, 10 donors and II recipients were against it. 2 donors and 2 recipients 
were not sure. Slovenian recipients were more equally divided over the question of 
whether any payment should be permitted such as compensation of losses (12 no, 10yes) 
with comments including; a health insurance company should compensate, moderate 
award should be given and donation should be a non-commercial voluntary / emotional 
act. Slovenian donors were also roughly equally divided on this question (10 yes, 11 
no, 3notsure). Comments infavourof compensation included suggestions for health 
insurance company compensation and compensation for lost earnings. The majority of 
Romanian recipients felt compensation was acceptable (4 out of 5- this was not 
surprising given 3 out of 5 donors had suffered financially from donation). The 
Slovakian donors all responded "no" when asked "should any payment be permitted, for 




The impact of donating an organ on employment status appears to be limited. 
Occasionally material adverse effects are observable in terms of performance and income. 
In a significant minority of 19 cases moderate to severe financial consequences of 
donation were reported. This was not surprising since it was clear that there tended not 
to be full compensation for donor losses. It was explicitly stated in 2 cases that the 
recipient had helped the donor out in terms of expenses associated with donation. One 
of the recipients reported that having to pay the donors expenses had contributed greatly 
to stress within the family. Little data was available on the consequences of donation for 
life insurance. 
Where attitudes towards commercialisation of organs were expressed by donors and 
recipients the general consensus was against the practice (68 out of 103) but there was a 
sizeable minority who were uncertain or had mixed feelings (24) with the remainder in 
favour (11). However, asked if they would consider buying a kidney for a relative a 
remarkable 32 from 55 respondents said they would. The attitudes amongst ESRF 
patient family members in the Albania sample were generally against the buying and 
selling of organs. 
9.4. Overall Conclusions for Donor and Recipient Ouestionnaires. 
The first thing to note about the study is that limited interviewee recall exerted a 
distorting influence on the findings. In particular limited recall makes it difficult to 
determine quality of practitioner disclosure. Nethertheless, the research brings out 
some important issues and findings. 
In a limited way the findings resonate with the bulk of earlier work which suggests 
adverse psychological aspects of the process of donation are extremely limited. 123 There 
were 3 out of 84 incidences where recipients would not go through the process again. 
There were 3 out of 76 donors who would not go through the process again - this 4.5% 
representing a slightly lower figure than the 5% - 8% reported in R. G. Simmons et al. 's 
123See chapter 3.4.2.3. 
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Sty124 and significantly higher than the 1.4% in Westlie et al. 's study paying they 
definitely would not donate. 125 
This study also confirmed the broad notion in several earlier studies that donation can 
result in increased self-esteem for some donors. 126 However, the increases were fairly 
low compared to some previous studies. For instance, a number of studies conducted 
by Simmons et al. found that donation was typically an exceedingly positive 
experience. 127 Studies by Fellner and Marshall, 128 Eisendrath, 129 Bunzendahl et al., 130 
and Westlie et al, 131 have also reported higher levels of positive impact. 
This study found little family stress and strain - although one might have found slightly 
higher incidence of problems if the methodology had been more family oriented and the 
interviews conducted at the time of donation rather than at a later date when stress and 
strain might be 'played down! to avoid discomfort. 
Whilst previous studies found pressure to donate in a significant minority of incidences 
this study found no cases. However, pressure by it's nature is difficult to detect, 
especially when it is subtle or systemically embedded. In addition, one must be 
cautious about ascribing altruistic motivation to donation when the reality is that few 
donors can clearly articulate their rationale for donation. Many donors appear to have 
decided without any real reflection on the issues - an approach already seen in landmark 
124The Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 
1977 at 431-3. 
125L. Westlie et al., Quality of life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1993,8, 
1146-1150. 
126See chapter 3.4.2.3. 
127R. G. Simmons, S. D. Klein, R. L. Simmons, The Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of 
Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 1977 confmned in a later follow up (R. G. Simmons, 
C. R. Anderson, Social-Psychological Problems in Living Donor Transplantation, in J. L. Touraine et al., 
(ed), Transplantation and Clinical Immunology XVI, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1983,47-57). 
128C. H. Fellner, J. R. Marshall, Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm. MedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 and 
Kidney Donors Revisited, Am JPsychiatry, 1977,134,575-576. 
129R. M. Eisendrath, Psychologic Considerations in the Selection of Kidney Transplant Donors, Surg 
Gynec Obstet, 1969,129,243-248. See also, The Role of Grief and Fear in The Death of Kidney 
Transplant Patients, AmJPsychiatry, 1969,126,381. 
130Retrospective Evaluation of Psychosocial Factors in Former Living Related Kidney Donors in Organ 
Replacement Therapy: Ethics, Justice and Commerce, (ed. Land and Dossetor, Springer Verlag, 1991 at 
p57). Similarly improvements in self esteem had been found in Sadler et al's study (in The Gift of Life: 
The Social and Psychological Impact of Organ Transplantation, John Wiley & Sons, 1977, p502). 
13 1 Quality of life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Nephrol Dial Transplant, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
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studies by Fellner and MarshaII132 and Simmons et al. 133 While it is difficult to be 
certain, underestimation of risks in this study may be connected with Fellner and 
Marshall's finding that donor's insulate themselves from cognising information that would 
result in decision stress by challenging their decision (in this case to donate but it could 
also be relevant to the decision not to donate). Certainly underestimation of risks and 
forgetting about the risks do support the goal of avoiding ambivalence about donation and 
discomfort with its realities. 
Fellner and Marshall's asserted that some donors "go along passively and let the selection 
process decide for them"134 and Simmons et al. 's assertion that some donors exhibit 
helplessness in the form of feeling locked into making a positive decision, more so with 
each successive step of the donation process. 135 This finding was neither supported or 
contradicted in the interviews. 
The one thing that may be stated in defence of donors in the modem age is that the 
benefits of LDT are often much higher than they were at the time of Fellner and 
Marshall's (1968) or even Simmons et al's (1977) report; this points toward it being 
easier for donors to quickly conclude that donation has value. On the other hand, CDT 
is now so well established that an immediate unreflective decision to become a living 
donor could quite typically be viewed as an overly hasty rejection of CDT - perhaps often 
motivated more by a 'saviour complex' than by common sense. The vulnerability of 
donors, and even recipients, to making decisions out of guilt or for other negative 
reasons and then suppressing the reality of this are amplified by their typically being 
dependent on one source of information for LDT. A model protocol for living donation 
could valuably be developed to include best practice directions for minimising situational 
pressure in all its dimensions within the prelude and process of LDT decision-making and 
maximising the facilitation of true will decision-making by the donor, and indeed the 
recipient. One of the approaches of interest here is that adopted in the Dublin centre 
where both a counsellor and an information officer are available to help donors, 
recipients and family members. 
132Twelve Kidney Donors, JAm MedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707 at 2706. 133GiftofLife, WileyandSons, 1977at431-3. 
134Twelve Kidney Donors, JAmMedAssoc, 1968,206,2703-2707at2706. 
135R. G. Simmons et al., Gift of Life, Transaction Books, 1987 
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Not nearly enough is known about why LDT is chosen in the first place, and hence the 
rationale of using it - say in preference to CDT. Obviously medical factors will exclude 
some people from being donors. From, the limited number of instances where other 
factors at work were made explicit, it is clear that social perceptions of who is the most 
appropriate person to donate can be influential as can viewpoints as to efficiency of the 
family unit, psychological strength or weakness of individual members and anticipated 
refusal. There was no clear evidence of the 'black sheep' phenomenon operating within 
this study. The choice of LDT over cadaveric was often associated with the clinical 
superiority of LDT in general or in the specific case (e. g. where identical HLA match of 
prospective donor and recipient). 
The questionnaire methodology was not sophisticated enough to bring out a holistic 
picture of why LDT was preferred. However, it must also be stated that even when a 
more open-ended interview style was adopted donors and recipients were typically unable 
to present a comprehensive picture as to why LDT was preferred. This in itself could be 
seen as a finding; being indicative of a lack of sophistication in reasoning during the 
decision-making process. In the worst case scenario we could perhaps be witnessing a 
simplification on the part of some donors which is something like as follows, "the 
recipient is ill, I can make him or her better, therefore I will help. " At best it is still 
probably that the majority of donors are not sufficiently weighing up the pros and cons to 
decide beyond reasonable doubt that LDT is the best option. 
Clearly there is a need for future European study developing extra questions to derive 
additional information on motivational aspects of the decision-making process. To 
really address the issues there may also be a need for a more sophisticated methodology - 
for example interviews before, during and after donation of the prospective donors, 
recipient and other key family members. To fully adopt this methodology researchers 
will have to work over a longer time scale than the EUROTOLD project and bridge the 
issues of getting several centres to agree to access of their prospective interviewees when 
such a time consuming, rigorous and potentially exposing methodology is being utilised. 
What may be clearly stated at this point is that enough evidence of concerns about the 
process have emerged to warrant more thorough attention being placed, in regulation and 
centre protocols, on ensuring donor informedness and testing donor motivations (for 
recommendations to this end see chapter 11.4). 
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This was one of the few studies deriving significant information of attitudes of donors 
and recipients towards different classes of donor in LDT. Attitudes were very liberal - 
more so than those of practitioners. The most poignant example of this was that as 
many participants expressed views in favour of strangers donating as those who expressed 
views against. It must be doubted whether such a view will ever be replicated amongst 
practitioners. The EUROTOLD study found that 3.5% (or less) of practitioners would 
consider strangers (represented within the term 'other' in chapter 10.2.3.4). Onlyl5%of 
practitioners in the USA, which has traditionally been more forthright on these issues, 
would consider stranger donation in Spital's most recent survey. 136 Although many 
donors and recipients would consider buying an organ for a relative in need it is clear 
from the sample interviewed that they are against the buying and selling of organs in 
general. This is consistent with the attitude of the general population. 137 
The issue of compensating donors for losses associated with donation is clearly much 
more than a theoretical one with donors suffering real financial hardship in practice (and 
sometimes the recipient by compensating the donor suffers hardship). This finding is in 
broad confirmation of Westlie et al's study discussed in chapter 8.138 Further research in 
this area, including a more in depth look at the post-transplant economic consequences of 
donation. However, there is enough evidence to warrant countries taking legislative 
action to assure the economic rights of donors. 
136A. Spital, Unrelated Living Kidney Donors, An Update of Attitudes and Use Among U. S. Transplant 
Centers, Transplantation, June 1994,57(12), 1722-1726 
137See studies in chapter 7. 
138L. Westlie et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian Kidney Donors, Neph Dial Trans, 1993,8,1146-1150. 
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Chapter 10 Professional Attitudes and Practice in LDT. 
10.1. Introduction. 
Attitudes towards transplantation have been investigated in a large number of studies 
which have, for instance, surveyed population attitudes, the attitudes of recipients, 
intensive care units and attitudes of transplant professionals. ' However, there has been 
a much more limited field of studies concerning LDT specifically. These have been 
discussed in the previous chapters, including Spital's surveys on attitudes of US 
transplant centres to LDT. 2 
10.2. The EUROTOLD Ouestionnaires. 
10.2.1. Introduction. 
The EUROTOLD Project Management Group collaborated to produce 2 main 
questionnaires. The first of these, a European Transplant Centre Questionnaire, 
contained both factual questions pertaining to transplant practice and questions about 
centre policies towards LDT. The second questionnaire, entitled the 'Attitudes Towards 
Living Donation Questionnaire', focused around hypothetical clinical scenarios with 
multiple choices given to respondents to select from as solutions. This was designed to 
test current attitudes in action and also to see how well these correlated with centre 
policies. 
The questionnaires were worked-up in 1993 and 1994 in consultation with the whole 
management group which included a psychiatrist/nephrologist (Peter Veitch), a clinical 
psychologist (Christine Cordle), a transplant surgeon (Peter Donnelly) and a transplant 
co-ordinator (Anne Simpson). External expertise was drawn on, including that of the 
Oslo transplant centre - in particular Arnt Jacobsen. In 1995 the questionnaires were 
'See e. g. G. Schutt and P. Schroeder, Population Attitudes Toward Organ Donation in Germany, Trans 
Proc, 1993,25(6), 3127-3128; J. L. Stark, P. Reiley et al., Attitudes Affecting Organ Donation in the 
intensive Care Unit, Heart andLung, 1984(July), 13(4); H. Gabel and K. Lindskoug, A Survey of 
Public Attitudes Toward Cadaveric Organ Donation in a Swedish Community, Trans Proc, 1988,20(3), 
43 1; A. M. Munster, R. E. Stengle, M. Clinton Miller III, Community Attitudes to Renal Transplantation, 
AmJofSurg, 1974,128,415-418. For further studies see chapter 2. 
2 E. g. Unconventional Living Kidney Donors - Attitudes and Use Amongst Transplant Centres, 
Transplantation, 1989,48 (August), 243-248 and Unrelated Living Kidney Donors, An Update of 
Attitudes and Use Among U. S. Transplant Centers, Transplantation, 1994,57(12), 1722-1726. 
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distributed across Eastern and Western European Countries. Questionnaires were sent 
to 190 transplant centres representing 27 countries across Europe. The Centre 
Questionnaire was designed to elicit a whole centre response and was completed by 
Centre Directors, often collaboratively with their medical teams. The Attitudes 
Questionnaires was designed to be answered by all different transplant personnel within 
each European centre. Responses were received from a wide variety of personnel 
including surgeons, nephrologists, anaesthetists, transplant co-ordinators and nurses. 
In some instances the questionnaire was filled in collaboratively and returned as a 'centre' 
rather than individual attitude response. 
The Centre Questionnaire was cross correlated with the Attitudes Questionnaire, the 
result being a confirmation of the internal validity of both questionnaires. Underlying 
this cross correlation was the development of a numerical coding system for attitudes 
questionnaire responses (see Appendix 3A(vi)). A scaling for attitudes from liberal to 
restrictive was developed in each of the 4 key areas, comprising: 
attitudes with regard to use of dialysis / transplantation; 
attitudes with regard to age matching; 
attitudes to dialysis / pre-dialysis; and 
attitudes toward related / unrelated donors. 
The two questionnaires were complemented by the development of a scoring system for 
laws. 3A numerical system was developed (see Appendix 3A(v)) with a scaling for LDT 
law according to restrictiveness / liberality on the following 8 points: 
0 basic clinical conditions in which living donation takes place; 
restrictions on living donors who are not close genetic relatives of the recipient; 
restrictions on risks / consequences a donor can be exposed to; 
the combination of I to 3 as the basic legal framework of restriction of clinical 
judgment; 
restrictions on the use of minors; 
the status of the law in terms of ifs completeness in considering the various 
aspects of LDT; 
9 provisions considering financial compensation of the donor; and 
3 Complementing the LEGISEARCH database developed by David Price and 1. 
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the length of time the law has been in existence. 
Actual laws across Europe were then scored in these 8 areas according to their points on 
the scale; the more positive a score the more permissive the law on organ LDT, the more 
negative the more restrictive (see Figure 7). 



















I Albania 0 0 0 0 .2 0 -2 
2 Austria 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 
2 Belgium .3 0 0 0 2 3 2 
3 Belarus 0 0 0 -2 1 0 -1 
3 Cyprus 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
3 Denmark 0 0 -1 1 2 0 2 
1 Eire 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 
1 Estonia 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 
3 Finland 0 0 0 -2 2 2 2 
3 France 0 -2 0 -2 2 2 0 
1 Germany 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 
3 Greece 0 0 0 -2 2 0 0 
3 Hungary 0 0 -1 1 2 0 2 
1 Lituania 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 
1 Norway 0 0 .1 1 2 0 2 
2 Poland 0 0 -1 -2 2 0 -1 
2 Portugal 0 -1 1 -2 2 2 2 
2 Romania 0 -2 0 -2 2 0 -2 2 Rus. Fed. -3 -3 -1 -2 2 0 -7 
3 Spain 0 0 0 -2 2 3 3 
2 Slovakia -2 0 0 -1 1 1 -1 
2 Slovenia -2 -1 0 -2 2 3 0 
3 Sweden 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
3 Turkey 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0(-2) -2(2) 0(3) -2(3) 
3 Switzerland 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3 U. K. 0 -1 0 0 1 1 1 
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This legal coding system is unique in the transplantation field, although similar systems 
have been used in analogous contexts including a, study of the effect of legislative 
requirements relating to informed consent on breast conservation surgery across different 
jurisdictions in the USA. 4 Scores for laws were cross correlated with results in both the 
Centre and Attitudes Questionnaires to test if there was any positive or negative 
correlation between the liberality / restrictiveness of the legal framework and attitudes 
and practice in transplantation both in general and on specific points (e. g. use of minors 
etc. ). 
Both the legal and attitudes questionnaire scoring systems were developed through 
considerable discussion in the EUROTOLD management group and are based on 
reasoned and clear criteria but inevitably slightly different interpretations could have been 
made with equal validity. The scoring systems are in effect approximate and 
accordingly results are approximations. 
10.2.2. General Results. 
10.2.2.1. Questionnaire Responses. 
Of the 190 transplant centres appraised in 26 countries 56% of centres responded. This 
5 is a similar response rate to the 1996 EDTA report. There were no responses from 7 
countries these having a combined total of 14 centres (Bulgaria (2) Slovenia (1), Finland 
(2), Eire (1), Luxembourg (1), Turkey (2), Portugal (5)). There was a 78% response 
rate from the transplant centres in the remaining 20 countries. The responding centres 
covered a total of 211.3 million population in Europe with the catchment area of 
individual centres ranging from 0.5 million (Cyprus) to 10 million (Romania). 
'New EnglandJournal ofMedicine, 335(14), 1035-1040. See also a study using coding in the context of 
advance health care directives (Journal ofLaw, Medicine and Ethics, 24,108-117. 
5 62% response, Valderrabano et al., Report on Management of Renal Failure in Europe XXV, 1994 End 
Stage Renal Disease and Dialysis Report, Neph Dial Trans, 1996,11 (SuppI 1), 2-2 1. 
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86% of responding centres had an LDT programme (85% when weighted by catchment 
population). In the year of the survey, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Armenia 
respondents were not performing LDT's. A the other end of the scale one centre 
(Cyprus) had an LDT rate p. m. p. of above 20. 
One of the limitations of the questionnaire was that it was not translated and this may 
have contributed to a low or non-response from some countries. Non-response of some 
centres may also be attributable to more negative attitudes towards LDT, although it was 
stressed in accompanying letters sent out with the questionnaires that the objective was 
not to promote living donation but to obtain an accurate understanding of practice and 
attitudes. 
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10.2.2.2. The Possibilitv of Exl2anding Use of LDT. 
96% of the responding centres answered the question of whether they foresaw an 
expansion of their living donor programme. Of those answering 55% said "yes", 10% 
said "no" and 29% said "maybe. " From this an expansion in LDT use may be forcasted. 
Results were even more impressively favourable to expansion when weighted by 
catchment population (respectively 66%, 28% and 6%). However, due to caution on 
the part of clinicians, positive attitudes are not always fully reflected in increased usage 
of LDT. Of figures for responding centres in the Centre Questionnaire, the totals in 
Estonia, Denmark and to a lesser extent Austria demonstrated a trend of increased usage 
of LDT in relation to total transplant activity whilst figure for Belgium and Spain showed 
the opposite. 
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10.2.2.3. Cadaveric and LDT vis-h-vis Dialvsis. 
40% of responding centres would consider cadaveric transplantation before dialysis. 
51% would consider cadaveric transplantation when dialysis was needed and 9% only 
when the patient has been on dialysis for some time. General quality of life and 
economic benefits of transplantation over dialysis were reflected in 91% of respondents 
being prepared to consider transplant before dialysis or when it is needed. The rationale 
of 9% of respondents only doing cadaveric transplant after the patient has been on dialysis 
for some time is difficult to understand; it would be difficult to justify on grounds of 
clinical work-up because results tended to indicate that pre-dialysis transplantation is the 
"gold standard. t16 
For centres with a living donor programme 60% considered LDT before dialysis, 29.33% 
when dialysis was needed and 10.67% after a period of dialysis. These results are 
similar to those provided for cadaveric vis-a-vis dialysis and are surprisingly positive in 
the sense that active LDT centres are generally prepared to consider the clinical benefits 
of pre / at-dialysis with no rigid rule that living donation should only be used in the last 
resort. These centres would appear to have assessed that the ethical problems of using 
living donors do not per se outweigh clinical advantages of pre-dialysis living donation. 
The logic is that if one is using LDT the most benefit may as well be derived by using it 
pre-dialysis. Some centres are taking a pragmatic go-ahead attitude that with long 
waiting lists LDT should be used as soon as possible where it is a good option. The 
counter-perspective would be that what matters is not the general waiting list but only 
using LDT as a last resort in an individual situation e. g. where patient health is 
deteriorating and the possibility of finding a cadaveric donor is low. From a donor 
perspective the former approach moves somewhat in the direction of emphasising overall 
utility, although this could be tempered by imposing a requirement for the LDT to be 
justified as better than an average cadaveric match. It could be an acceptable approach 
providing it is transparent to the prospective donor who could be told something to the 
effect of "your donation will be of overall benefit by reducing the waiting list for CDT. 
We are suggesting doing an LDT now because it is the best time to do it. However, you 
may decide it is better to wait to see if a good cadaveric organ turns up within a 
reasonable space of time. " 
"Confirming P. K. Donnelly's view in'Pre Dialysis Living Donor Renal'Transplantation - Is it Still The Gold Standard for Cost, Convenience and Graft SurvivalT Trans Proc, 1995,27(l)). 
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The Attitudes Questionnaire also produced results relating to pre-dialysis transplant with 
a scoring system being devised to analyse liberality of attitude towards pre-dialysis 
transplant. There was little difference in attitudes towards pre-dialysis between different 
medical specialities. A small correlation (. 233) was found between the centre living 
donor rate per million population and attitudes toward pre-dialysis. This could be 
explained as the more 'adventurous' centres being the ones who do more living donation 
p. m. p. Pre-dialysis was significantly more favoured (T. test=5.402 p=O) by those centres 
with a living donor programme (mean sd score 2.94 3.16) than those without (-. 23 3.1). 
This was fairly predictable. Countries with the most favourable attitude towards pre- 
dialysis transplantation were Cyprus, Norway, Italy, Sweden, Holland and Albania (all 
5.0), those with the most restrictive attitudes were Belgium (0.6), Spain (0.8), Slovakia 
(1) and Hungary (1.1). Norway is an example of a country with a more favourable 
attitude towards pre-dialysis transplantation which has a deliberate policy of transplanting 
patients as soon as possible. On the whole the countries with the most favourable 
attitude toward pre-dialysis significantly rely on LDT. Equally countries having a more 
restrictive attitude to pre-dialysis typically have low reliance on LDT. 
Scoring was also developed to analyse the overall results of the Attitudes Questionnaire 
for positive attitudes toward transplantation vis-a-vis dialysis. Countries with the most 
favourable attitude towards transplanting were Cyprus (11), Norway (10), Italy (7.4), 
Poland (5.3) and Armenia (5) with the least favourable being Belgium (-5-4), Spain (- 
4.2), Hungary (-3-3), Romania (-3) and Germany (-3). Some of these results are not 
surprising - for instance the fact that Norway was positive and Germany one of the least 
favourable is correlative with transplant rates in these countries (see Graphs 17 and 18 
respectively). However other results are difficult to interpret, such as Belgium and 
Spain which have very high rates of transplantation in practice (Graph 17). Despite 
extremely low use of transplantation, Italy and Poland have very positive professional 
attitudes to transplantation. This suggests the obstacles to further developing the 
programme lie elsewhere (e. g. political and public attitudes respectively). The more 
favourable attitudes were positively correlated (. 217) with centre rates of living donation 
p. m. p. and not surprisingly more favourable attitudes were found (T-test--5.796 p=Oj at 
centres with a living donor program (0.38 7.44) than those without (-7.63 7.33). As 
between specialities there was some evidence that nephrologists had a less liberal attitude 
(0.7 7.5) than surgeons (1.8 8) and other professionals (1.1 8.6) but this was not 
statistically very significant. The more positive attitude of surgeons is not surprising. 
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10.2.3. Results Related to Ethico-Lepal Aspects. 
10.2.3.1. Basic vreconditions for Conducting LDT. 
Legalily of LDT. 
Respondents answered the question did they consider LDT was legal. In Spain 5 out of 
10 respondents felt it was not, in Italy 3 out of 8, in France 2 out of 12, in Belgium 3 out 
of 5, in Austria I out of 4 and in Germany I out of 14. LDT is in fact legal in all these 
countries, the perception that it is not may indicate some confusion as between 
restrictions on LDT and ifs outright illegality. There may be a need for a more positive 
framework of expression of when LDT is legally permissible. Comprehensive LDT law 
in Austria, Italy and Germany would be useful here and more generally codes of practice 
/ guidance could be fin-ther developed on the national level, as for instance have 
accompanied the passing of HOTA 1989 in the UK. A correlation (. 2694 statistically 
significant at 5%) was established between whether or not LDT was considered legal by 
centres and the status of LDT law (as regards its completeness), ifs overall clinical 
restrictiveness / liberality (. 3468 significant at 0.1%) in the jurisdictions the centres 
respectively came under and the length of time the law was in place (. 2206 significant at 
5010). 









Whether or not an expansion in living donation was foreseen by centres was negatively 
correlated with the status of LDT law (-. 362 significant at 5%). Interestingly there 
appears to be no correlation between a well developed law and the foresight of more 
expansive use of LDT although, as discussed below, there is a correlation between a 
clinically law which is liberal with regard to basic preconditions applied to conducting 
LDT and the foresight of expansion of LDT. 
Clinical Conditions Applied to LDT 
Most laws leave the question of HLA match to clinical discretion. More than half 
(54.14%) of responding centres with a living donor programme had a centre policy of 
requiring a minimum HLA match (although this was only 46% when weighted by 
catchment population). The majority of centres 80% - 81% when weighted by 
catchment Population) tissue type and cross-match all prospective donors that have an 
ABO blood match. There was no strong correlation found between legal requirements 
as to the clinical conditions within which LDT occurs and clinical exclusion criteria 
applied to LDT by responding centres. This is not entirely surprising since law generally 
imposes non-stringent requirements based largely on ethical imperatives leaving specific 
clinical issues to be determined by transplant centres or national codes of practice. 
Nethertheless, a correlation (. 32) was established between the liberality / restrictiveness 
of law with regard to restrictions on the exercise of clinical judgment and whether or not 
centres with a living donor programme foresaw it's expansion. In other words the 
clinical framework within which LDT (although not stringently regulated) can legally be 
maybe impacted by or have an impact on attitudes about use of living donation. 
A correlation was also established (. 2921) between attitudes towards pre-dialysis in the 
Attitudes Questionnaire responses and the legal scoring on basic preconditions for 
conducting LDT. Whether this is positive practitioner attitudes towards pre-dialysis 
transplantation being reflected in the law, or a liberal law helping to generate more 
positive attitudes, is hard to say. This is something of a chicken and egg argument but it 
may be tentatively concluded that law could be used as a tool to promote more expansive, 
or indeed restrictive, attitudes towards LDT. 
Maximum age criteria are usually applied in transplantation practice but generally not 
prescribed within transplant laws. This survey shows considerable variations in 
maximum ages prescribed on a centre by centre basis (for centres with an LDT 
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programme only). Maximum ages varied between 60 and 80 with the Norwegian centre 
(Oslo) having no maximum age limit. It is surprising that age criteria are generally a 
centre rather than national policy matter. 20% of units matched for age, which again is 
a centre policy rather than something decided on a national or legal basis. 
10.2.3.2. Informed Consent. 
67% of centres with LDT programmes had a protocol for evaluation of donors (73% 
when weighted by catchment population) but only 37% had written guidelines as to use of 
living donors (49% when weighted by catchment population. A protocol and written 
guidelines, if more universally adopted, would assist in developing a methodical 
approach to living donation within which it could be ascertained to a certain extent that 
ethical and legal concerns as to both informedness and voluntariness of consent had been 
addressed. 
, 
10.2.3.3. Minors, Adults and Capacity. 
Non-age Related Mental Capacily 
What appears to be the case is that donors are not routinely tested for questionable 
capacity on grounds of mental illness or disability in the majority of centres. Only 
31.4% of centres with a LDT programme undertake a donor psychiatric/psychological 
evaluation (41% when weighted by catchment population. Presumably in other centres 
the evaluative process may occur in a more informal way with the possibility of a 
psychiatric expert being brought in where the competency of the donor is not clear. 
Use of Minors. 
Centres responded on a question asking them the minimum and maximum ages at which 
they would consider living donations. There were no significant attitude differences 
discovered between different medical specialities with regard to acceptable minimum age 
for donors. The range of minimum's within individual centres was 1-30 years. It is 
bizarre that aI year old could be considered old enough by a centre to be a living donor 
and that conversely a 29 year old could be considered not old enough. Analysis of this 
question in greater detail reveals that one centre put forward a minimum age of 30, a 
second put forward 25. One centre put forward I as a minimum age and one centre put 
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forward a minimum age of 6! Removing these four centres the spread is 10-21. 
However of the remaining centres it could be stated that those not allowing 18-21 year old 
donors are overly paternalistic. Conversely the principle of informed donor consent is 
probably not being applied in situations where the donor is 10 years old; a person is 
unlikely to be able to give a proper understanding and meaningful agreement to LDT at 
that age. 
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Ilie legal scoring system indicates that more recent legislation tends to be more restrictive 
than older legislation as regards prescribing conditions for minor LDT. This is less 
likely to be a deliberate attempt of laws to make the position more restrictive than the fact 
that old laws tended to be less restrictive simply through the absence of specifically 
paying much attention to minor LDT. A negative correlation (-. 433 which is statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level) was established between minimum ages of donor accepted 
in centres (centre questionnaire) and the restrictiveness / liberality of law on minors 
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(under the respective jurisdictions of the centres). It is most surprising that there is no 
apparent link between practitioner minimum age criteria and legal minimum age criteria; 
in other words legal policy apparently does not correlate to policy/practice of clinicians. 
The Attitudes Questionnaire had one question relating to minors as follows; 
"a 14 year old boy has been on haernodialysis for 3 years but is experiencing, severe 
psychological problems with needling. He is unsuitable for CAPD as a result of 
previous urological surgery as an infant. His mother is a single parent with three other 
children, one of them being his identical twin. This patient reacts strongly to mother on 
cytotoxic crossmatch as a result of a previous transfusion. "
Respondents chose from 3 alternative solutions as follows; accept the twin 36%, await a 
good cadaver match 39% and await a blood group compatible cadaver graft 25.4%. 
Clinically speaking the twin is almost the perfect choice bearing in mind the clinical need 
for transplantation to occur as soon as possible and the fact that it would provide 
approximately 4 times the graft survival expectancy of an average cadaveric graft. If 
such a clinically perfect choice of 14 year old is rejected by two thirds of transplant 
professionals it can probably be stated these professionals in Europe will never use 
minors of 14 or younger. A minority of professionals would use such minors in a 
'clinically perfect' situation such as this but it is uncertain whether or not they would use 
them were the clinical benefits less exceptional. This more liberal attitude in the United 
States to minors around the age of 14 is notable 7_ as is the more liberal practice. Why 
the reluctance to use 14 year old twins in Europe when they are a magnificent form of 
LDT is terms of prospective graft outcome? There may be both concerns about how to 
test for capacity and the need to be seen to make 'safe' decisions. 
10.2.3.4. Use of Different Classes of Donor 
Respondents with an LDT programme answered the question of who they would consider 
as a living donor as follows: Parents 98.8%, Siblings 98.8%, Spouse 54.5%, Relative 
by Marriage 23%, Grandparent 54%, Son/daughter 52.9%, Friend 10.3%, Other 3.5%. 
Perhaps the most interesting factor was that 54.5% of respondents with an LDT 
programme would consider using spouses; a percentage exceeding that for grandparents 
7 See Spital's results on minors presented in chapter 7.1. 
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and son / daughter matches. Presumably this is based on the clinical significance of age 
matching, with spouses tending to be a closer match and more preferable as living donors 
in this regard. However, age matching is clearly a secondary factor at times; parents 
are almost universally considered yet are not any more age matched than son / daughter 
donations which are not so accepted. Presumably son /daughter donations are 
considered to be less appropriate to donate partly on a psychological basis, in the sense 
that while donation by a parent is typically viewed as a natural expression of parental 
, love, ' donation by a child to a parent is considered more prone to being influenced by 
guilt etc. However, this is a somewhat socially relative perception - with people of 
some cultures (particularly Asian) typically viewing the family as a unit with mutual 
rather than more one-way caring responsibilities. Lesser use of 'offspring! donations 
may also be due to practical considerations such as the possibility that they may have 
their own dependants to look after. A closer examination of attitudes in this area would 
be valuable as there could be underutilisation occurring. 
Figure 18: Consideration of different classes of living donor by responding centres 
with an LDT programme 
00 
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Strategies to increase LURD in Europe will almost exclusively have to focus on spousal 
donation if they are to strike a chord with transplant centre aspirations. However, in the 
main it is likely that the primary increases in LDT in Europe will be achieved through 
increased parent and sibling donation. There was a positive correlation (. 290) between 
centres considering spousal donation and the liberality / restrictiveness of law relating to 
classes of donor outside close genetic relatives. Law may be a key element in 
facilitating spousal donation. 
The Attitudes Questionnaire also yielded useful information about different types of 
donor with an overall scoring system developed to analyse responses according to degree 
of positivity about LURD's. The most positive attitudes toward LURD's were found in 
Armenia (8), Slovakia (7) and Norway (7) with fairly positive attitudes found in 
Denmark (4.1), Poland (4), Switzerland (3.8) and Italy (3.7). Interestingly while 
Denmark, Switzerland and Norway have relatively high rates of LDT p. m. p. the other 
countries do not and so the positive attitude toward LURD needs closer examination. 
One possible explanation is that Italy, Armenia, Slovakia and Poland all have low rates 
of kidney transplantation p. m. p. and are clearly very keen to explore avenues of 
programme expansion. Fairly low rates of LDT at present in these countries may be 
more to do with organisational, financial and cultural obstacles than cautiousness 
amongst transplant professionals. Countries with the more restrictive attitudes towards 
LURD in the survey included Romania (4), Cyprus (-3), Czech Republic (-2.8), 
Estonia (-2), Slovenia (-1.7), France (4) and Belgium (42). Romania! s reluctance 
may be partly stem from having insufficient equipment to do living donations with the 
8 highest safety standards. Cyprus has a high living donor rate which makes it's centre's 
relative antipathy toward living unrelated surprising. France and Belgium have 
traditionally adopted a more conservative stance towards living organ donation as a 
whole, although this appears to be somewhat changing in Belgium. The reasons for the 
relative antipathy toward living unrelated in the other 3 countries are not clear. 
Not surprisingly those professionals (165) responding from centres with a living donor 
programme (mean sd score of 1.47 4.1) were found to have more positive attitudes 
towards LURD (T-test-- 3.404 p=0.0007jp r) than those responding (35) from centres 
without a programme (mean sd score of -1.03 3.07). A correlation (. 249) was also found 
sProfessor Proca in presentation given at the Budapest EUROTOLD workshop, March 1996. However 
there are signs that Romania is becoming increasingly active in LDT with 12 LDT's conducted in 1996 with 
good results (Professor Proca, EUROTOLD communication, December 1996). 
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between extent of centre living donor programmes and positivity of attitudes toward 
LURD. No significant differences were detected in the attitudes of different specialities 
toward LURD. 
Spital's studies9 indicate that Europe is much more conservative as regards LURD in 
both it's attitude and practice. In 1994 Spital followed up an earlier survey of the views 
and practices of all transplant centers in the United States regarding unrelated living 
kidney donation. 10 64% of centers responded (127). 88% of these would accept 
spouses as donors, 63% would accept friends and 15% would even consider altruistic 
strangers. Commenting on the relationship of this study with his study 6 years ago 
Spital stated, 
"it became clear that support for unrelated living kidney donation had increased, as the 
great majority of centers now believe that emotionally related donors are acceptable. On 
the other hand, while more of these donors are being used, they still account for only a 
small fraction of all kidney transplants. It appears that the medical successes and 
favourable ethical arguments have generated broad support for some types of unrelated 
living donors, but more in principle than in practice, as there still seems to be some 
hesitation to actually proceed. "" 
Although this is a true reflection of the statistics, as Spital notes there still have been 
changes in patterns of use. 22 of the responding centers had actually used friends as 
living donors compared with only 3 in the survey 6 years before, although this still only 
amounted to 40 such transplants in the previous year. The number of centers now using 
spouses was more than twice that in the previous survey. However, of the small 
number of centers accepting the idea of strangers as donors in principle none had actually 
used them in practice. Opposition appeared to revolve around the difficulties of being 
certain of altruistic motive as opposed to financial in such a situation and also factors like 
the lack of available guidelines, possibility of psychopathology and the view that it was 
unethical. 
9E. g. Unconventional Living Kidney Donors - Attitudes and Use Amongst Transplant Centres, 
Transplantation, 1989,48 (August), 243-248 and Unrelated Living Kidney Donors, An Update of 
Attitudes and Use Among U. S. Transplant Centers, Transplantation, 1994,57(12), 1722-1726. 
"Unrelated Living Kidney Donors, An Update of Attitudes and Use Among U. S. Transplant Centers, 
Transplantation Vol 57,1722-1726, No 12 June 1994 at 1722-1726. 
"Ibid at 1723. 
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10.2.3.5. Voluntariness /Pressure. 
Respondents answered the question "How do you identify prospective donors? " More 
than one answer was often given. 72% stated that the patient approaches the family, 
39% stating that the spouse or parent of the patient approaches the potential donor, 12% 
stating that the transplant co-ordinator approaches the donor and 46% stating that 
nephrology staff approach the donor. The EUROTOLD findings appear to suggest that 
around one half of centres with an LDT programme proactively use staff to approach 
potential donors. This is a similar picture to that found by the British Transplantation 
Society in its recent survey of U. K. transplant centres (15 out of 31 active in LDT took a 
proactive approach to potential donors). 
12 There is an ethical dilemna about which 
approach to use; on the one hand a proactive approach is likely to be very effective and 
on the other it can give rise to situational pressure on the donor. 13 As we have seen, 
most centres do not routinely obtain a psychiatric/psychological evaluation of donors - 
surprisingly, given the concerns about motivation in donation. 
10.2.3.6. Financial Exchange Issues. 
Compensation for Loss 
The centre questionnaire asked centres if they discussed the financial implications of 
donation with the donor and 42.86% of centres with an LDT programme do. 
Unfortunately, this question did not have the required specificity to ascribe clear 
meanings to the response. For instance, this could have been interpreted as meaning 
solely discussion of free medical treatment, or it could have been interpreted as such 
factors as discussing compensation for travel expenses, lost earnings, non-intrinsic 
harms resulting from donation, compensation for intrinsic harms and even actual profit 
from donation. 35-29% of centres with an LDT programme stated that financial help 
was available but it was again unclear how this question was interpreted and what help 
was available. One thing that is clear is that more than half of responding centres do not 
discuss these questions and in about two thirds of cases no financial help is available. 
12 See P. S. Veitch, Recent Initiatives From the British Transplant Society in D. Price and H. Akveld, Living 
Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,19-23. 
13 For a finther discussion of issues in this area see chapter 6. 
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This is a matter of serious concern based on the fact that studies indicate that a significant 
minority of donors undergo financial hardship through donation. 14 
Profit makiniz. 
There were no questions on this area within the Centre Questionnaire but the Attitudes 
Questionnaire had one question (No. 2) which could be related to profit making which 
stated that: 
"A 50 year old Asian man with diabetic renal failure has been on dialysis for 5 years and 
is starting to get retinopathy. He has not been offered a cadaver kidney. He has no 
suitable or willing donors in his immediate family. He wants to go to India to have a 
kidney from an unrelated donor" 
The responses from the 3 choices were as follows; let him go 24%, offer him a blood 
group compatible cadaver kidney 24% and leave him on the waiting list 55%. 
It is difficult to deduce support or otherwise for commercially oriented transplantation 
from these answers. Firstly, it is not definite that the kidney in India would be supplied 
on a commercial basis, although this is probable. Secondly, the 24% letting him go 
may have responded in this fashion simply because they might not have much control in 
the matter. Perhaps the most interesting result is that 24% of respondents would be 
swayed into upsetting principles of distributive justice in the waiting list by offering him a 
blood group compatible kidney. It would appear that some transplant professionals are 




The attitudes of transplant professionals are a key in determining whether use of LDT will 
be expanded and if so in what ways. European attitudes suggest that an expansion of 
use if likely to occur. However, as well as the practical obstacles to overcome, there 
are several attitudinal factors which must be addressed if expansion of LDT is to occur 
within reasonable thical limits. 
14 See chapter 8.3. 
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More must be learnt about the reasoning for antipathy towards living donation, in general 
or specific forms of it, amongst some centres. Centres with an existing LDT 
programme have, on average, the most liberal attitudes towards LDT and will probably 
deliver a lot of the initial increases in its use. However, addressing the organ shortage 
may also require 'bringing to the light of day, ' through further attitudinal research, why 
some centres are choosing to not use LDT or use it rarely. 
It may already be theorised that irrational attitudes are having a restrictive impact on LDT 
use - for instance many practitioners will consider first degree relatives as living donors 
but not spouses or sons and daughters. Additionally, most professionals would 
apparently reject out of hand a 14 year old twin as a living donor. 
Inevitably, liberal attitudes often take time to filter through into practice. It is likely that 
the main expansion will come through increases in more conventional forms of LDT like 
sibling and parent-child donation. There also appears to be scope for increase in spousal 
donation. Although positive towards LDT, EUROTOLD's results are nowhere near as 
enthusiastic as results of Spital's 1994 US study. This study found that over half of the 
responding centers prefer living related donation to cadaveric, while only 8% took the 
reverse view, 
... "while a 1985 survey revealed that 54% of responding U. S. transplant centers preferred 
living related donors just two years later that number had fallen to only 36%. Now the 
present data show that over the past six years this previous downward trend in the 
popularity of living donors has reversed.. "15 
Spital suggests that the basis of these changes is as follows, 
"Besides its obvious potential to mitigate the organ shortage, other considerations 
supporting unrelated living kidney donation may be surnmarised as follows: (1) the risk to 
a healthy living donor is very low and is independent of the relationship to the recipient; 
(2) the more distant the relationship of the donor to the recipient, the less likely there is 
to be psychological coercion, and the more likely the altruistic donor is to be a true 
volunteer; (3) the fear that unrelated donors harbour psychopathology has been disproven 
15 lbid at 1725. 
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by studies demonstrating that altruism is generally what motivates these remarkable 
people to give; (4) in other areas of life, taking risks to help people is generally 
considered heroic, not crazy; (5) motivation should not even be an issue when the donor 
is closely related to the recipient emotionally; (6) like having related donors, many 
unrelated donors benefit psychologically from donating through meaningful and 
persistent increases in self-esteem; and (7) surveys of the public have shown that the 
great majority are willing to donate to their spouses and most believe that donations by 
friends and even strangers should be permitted. " 16 
While these are clear arguments for looking on living donation favourably most of them 
do not really explain the sea-change of attitudes in the US in the last 6 years. Most if not 
all of these factors were known well before the 1990's - for instance many of the studies 
done with donors and recipients were done in the 1970's, as noted in the previous 
chapter. These points have tended to be confirmed with time but probably the single 
most reason for the changes in attitude has been the fact that waiting lists have been 
increasing in size and has become increasingly unrealistic to suppose demand will ever be 
met by cadaveric supply in practice even if this goal could be obtained in theory. 
The research in this chapter points toward there being significant scope for further 
development of protocols and guidelines for use of living donation. Such development 
should help to facilitate greater use by providing a clear framework for practice. It may 
be hypothesised that the fact that the majority of centres have not got written guidelines 
has mitigated significantly against their expansive use of LDT. In particular, the 
absence of clear written guidance is likely to deter practitioners from using forms of LDT 
perceived as more ethically marginal, such as spousal donation and use of minors and 
may explain why practice is nowhere near as liberal as attitudes. In addition, guidelines 
would bring benefits in terms of explicating a clear method of 'approaching' the subject of 
LDT with prospective donors. The advocation of a proactive or reactive approach can 
be made, as well as wider consideration of how the process leading up to the act of 
donation might be best designed so as to ensure informedness and voluntariness in the 
process. More research is needed in this area but there would also be no harm in centres 
acting now to develop clear written guidelines. In addition, there appears also to be a 
role for developing laws and national guidelines; most importantly to address ome of the 
161bid at 1725. 
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misconceptions that exist about the basic legality of LDT and improve understanding 
about the conditions under which it is legally acceptable for living donation to take place. 
Most centres do not have a clear policy on issues of financial exchange. The process of 
compensating donors for losses is not just piecemeal because of the regulatory position in 
many countries but also because the issues are not always discussed (in fact they were 
discussed in less than half of the centres responding) and help is not standardly available 
(it was available in only half of the responding centres). More study of attitudes towards 
levels of financial exchange is required, in addition to more consideration of the issues 
by clinicians. 
Finally, further research is needed to decipher the relationship between law and practice. 
However, as a matter of common sense it is clear that regulation will have some impact 
on this practice. To this end, regulation must be designed to facilitate LDT as much as 
possible within the context of an ethically sound framework. It is immediately apparent 
that facilitation could include: 
offering relief to practitioners at the centre level from making decisions on more 
ethically marginal forms of LDT (perhaps providing the option to go delegate the 
decision or take recommendation from an authority set up under law); 
making regulation comprehensive but at as simple as possible, backed by 
guidance and education; and 
encouraging cross-fertilisation of knowledge of laws between countries (such as 
facilitated by LEGISEARCH, the work of WHO and this research) and where 
appropriate the development of detailed legal models and harmonisation. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusion. 
11.1. Introduction. 
With only a few countries being able to keep up with the increasing demand for 
organs through bolstered use on uncontroversial methods of cadaveric procurement, 
the field of transplantation is at a cross-roads; continue on the well trodden path of 
limited LDT use or adopt a more adventurous approach and gain the quality of life 
and economic rewards that can come from much higher rates of transplantation. 
Legislators and transplant professionals must draw firm conclusions as to the 
legitimate use of LDT rather than drift along a line unconsciously set by conformity, 
over association of LDT with the organ trade or the 1980's dawn of (generally) false 
hope for CDT sufficiency. The conclusions of LDT studies like EUROTOLD and 
this PhD come at a most opportune moment to assist a swift resolution of the ethical 
and public policy factors fashioning the contemporary role of LDT and equally speedy 
action to re-allign regulatory frameworks with these factors is critical for procurement. 
11.2. General Justifications for LDT according to Philosophical 
Theories and Principles of Bio-medical Ethics. 
The general legitimacy, or otherwise, of LDT is basically a matter of applied ethics; 
requiring a rational synthesis of philosophical theories and the 4 principles of 
bioethics. 
An extreme form of utilitarianism would ignore donor autonomy and aim simply at 
the most beneficent outcome in organ transplantation. This would no doubt be the 
elimination of waiting lists using the best donors (i. e. those likely to suffer the least 
harm and generate the highest benefits for recipients). Under this regime cadaveric 
bodies would be automatically mandated for prospective utilisation in transplantation 
according to clinical criteria. Living donation would be a rare supplemental activity. 
This approach is unacceptable because it sublimates individual autonomy to a practice 
which many do not even agree with and ignores the widely accepted belief that 
333 
collective human development rests very much on respect for the sanctity of 
individual decision-making in so far as this is compatible with the rights of others and 
common-sense protection of the vulnerable. It can be concluded, in living donation 
and elsewhere, that: utilitarianism limits itself because the most useful approach is 
one that respects rights; or that utility must be conditioned by the philosophy of rights 
and principle of autonomy. 
In the context of the 4 principles it is not reasonable to treat maleficence as an 
absolute principle preventing living donation especially given that most allopathic 
treatments cause hann (side effects) which are only justified by reference to overriding 
benefits. The problem is that while in the overall assessment donations have the 
potential to advance justice, beneficence and autonomy' they can generally only be 
justified for the donor as an exercise of autonomy. The empirical research (including 
that conducted for this research) and general psychological literature have highlighted 
the problems there are in trying to show, on psychological grounds, that being a 
living donor is beneficent or prevents maleficent psychological consequences. 
Indeed, this is a key reason for the unease shown towards the idea of donation by an 
incompetent. 
The starting point of bioethics and law has always been to presume that autonomy is a 
legitimate basis for action. The significance of autonomy in living organ donation 
will of course vary according to the circumstances. There is less reason to restrain a 
donor's autonomy where the 'balance sheet' of donor and recipient benefit and 
detriment is 'in the black. ' However, concern to protect all prospective donors 
arises because the decision-making context is rarely neutral (structures, personnel and 
processes of transplantation are typically aimed at eliciting a yes-to-donation 
response) and decisions typically immediate and impulsive - possibly in some cases 
reinforced by unconscious distortions (e. g. strong underestimation of risks) more than 
rationale. 
'Ethical Aspects of Different Types of Living Donation, in Price and Akveld (ed), Living Organ 
Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,40-48 at 40. 
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Another area where autonomy might be restricted is on the basis of the rights of 
others. The public and those involved in transplant organisation have a right to 
expect protection of the wider beneficent reputation of the medical enterprise and the 
ethical and economic value of transplant activities. Endorsement of living donation 
may properly be restricted to instances where prospective detriment is both limited 
and heavily outweighed by prospective benefit. This will help to ensure that 
LDT's conducted are transparently and very significantly beneficent, and a 
consequent efficient use of resources, endorsement of the reputation of the profession 
and, for the overriding majority of practitioners, identifiable as potently ethical and 
valuable to engage in. This approach still offers plenty of leeway for using living 
donations as a major kidney procurement source, significant leeway in liver segment 
transplantation and a limited leeway in the case of some other organs or at least their 
parts (e. g. lung segment). 
Upon the above principles, and with the proper utilisation of cadaveric donation, 
each organ procurement area has the capacity to develop a strategy of reducing 
waiting lists/times, eventually to an insignificant level. Many countries would need 
to fairly extensively use living donation simply to bring the waiting list down to the 
2 level where less than one-year waiting times were the norm. Even with transplant 
need on the increase, the goal of low waiting lists should be achievable for nearly all 
countries instituting a good cadaveric programme in combination with rates of LDT 
3 still considerably below Norway's. Exceptions are countries which continue to have 
powerful cultural and attitudinal obstacles to 'normal' methods and levels of cadaveric 
procurement. 4 
2 Conversely, one or two other countries wouldn't need to adopt this approach e. g. in Eire the waiting time for a kidney transplant is generally less than one year and LDT is rarely used 'Graph 14 (end of chapter 3) illustrates that many Western Countries would have reduced waiting lists by 25% over the period 1990-1994 by having a level of LDT less that 15 p-m-p. For further statistical details see chapter 3, including the graphs at the end of it. 4 E. g. Japan, Poland. 
335 
11.3. Recommendations For A Rational Regulatory Framework For 
LDT. 
While emphasising the role of law in transplantation Casabona. has suggested that, 
"control by professionals, preventative control by health authorities and public 
education on ethical attitudes concerning organ donation, among other measures, are 
also very important. "5 
Clearly a package of provision is required for transplantation, and specifically LDT. 
LDT needs more comprehensive legislation than an average medical procedure due to 
being an area where there is a vulnerable party (the donor) and general ethical 
complexity and debate (fuelled by ongoing developments). As Price concludes, 
"(t)he absence of legislation concerning LDT creates uncertainty, variability of 
practice, and an absence of transparency. 116 
General principles of law do not evolve quickly enough to fulfil the main function of 
law in transplantation; to establish clear minimum principles and conditions for the 
acceptable conditions under which living donors can be utilised. Unfortunately, 
existing transplant legislation does not comprehensively deal with all the significant 
LDT issues in a straightforward and clear manner, understandable to practitioners; as 
a result it may be generating wariness of innovation amongst practitioners, the 
majority of which are doubtless already cautious about moving beyond the norm of 
low LDT use. 
Having a single, comprehensive transplantation law in each jurisdiction is clearly the 
goal. Nethertheless, because legislation takes time to change, it may need 
supplementing with a layer of regulation amenable to speedy alteration such as 
5 Legal Issues Concerning the Living Donor and Some Criteria for Harmonized Legislation, in D. Price 
and H. Akveld (eds), Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, 
EUROTOLD, 1996,139-155 at 139. 
6 The Texture and Content of Living Donor Transplant Laws and Policies, Trans Proc 1996,28(l), 
378-379 at 379. 
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statutory instruments and/or use of a legislative authority (such as ULTRA in the UK). 
While the structure within which LDT takes places should be nationally - and to some 
extent internationally - determined, centres, areas and individual practitioners should 
be encouraged to develop protocols for use and must retain the right to further restrict 
or even prevent living donation in their area (without preventing prospective LDT 
participants from seeking their opportunity elsewhere). 
11.4. Summation of Ethical Issues in and Proper Rej! ulation of 
Specifi c -Aspects of 
LDT. 
11.4.1. Regulation of the Context in Which LDT May be Considered as an 
Option. 
Legislation has often been used to demarcate the context in which LDT may be 
considered as an option. A basic legislative framework here could be as follows: 
1. LDT, in the circumstances of each case, must be the optimum remedium as 
regards the combined interests of the donor and recipient. In considering the 
optimum remedium practitioners should have regard to his/her centres average 
standard of cadaveric organs and average level of wait for a cadaveric organ in 
excess of the time that would be required for LDT to occur. LDT must be a 
significantly more beneficial clinical outcome for the recipiene than the average 
CDT in order to justify donor detriment.. Procedures with higher levels of 
prospective detriment than a standard kidney LDT 8 must be justified by exceptional 
need. 
2. Where a prospective recipient is toward the front of the waiting list for a cadaveric 
organ, or otherwise likely to receive one shortly, only exceptional circumstances 
can justify use of LDT. Exceptional circumstances might include: Exceptional 
recipient need; and a prospective donor, neutrally presented with the fact that 
7 E. g. because of high quality match or high recipient need. 'E. g. liver segment, lung lobe. 
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donation can be of value both to the prospective recipient and to the wider 
community of persons waiting for a transplant, unsolicitedly volunteers to donate. 9 
Regulations or Codes of practice may periodically give concrete guidance on such 
matters as health and safety standards, minimum levels of organ compatibility and 
practical advice on how to balance detriment and benefit in the light of current 
practice. 
11.4.2. Limits to Donor Detriment 
The key ethical purpose of regulation in this area is to limit the level of prospective 
detriment posed to the prospective donors health and ensure they are significantly 
exceeded by prospective recipient benefits. Accordingly legislation should 
determine that: 
1. Safety checks for the donor must reflect a reasonable assessment of best world- 
wide practice; 10 
2. The likelihood of death for the donor must not significantly exceed the 
likelihood of death from being placed under general anaesthetic; 
3. Expected detriment to the donor must be low including, minimal likelihood of 
serious injury (The extreme rarity of mortality from kidney donation and the 
apparently low levels of short and long-term risks" means it would meet this 
criteria under normal circumstances as would some other forms of living 
donation like liver segment or lung lobe. Living donor pancreas vessel donation 
might be ruled out altogether. 12 Alternatively, the prospective detriment of such 
a procedure might limit it's use to circumstances where it is the only and life 
saving alternative with reasonable likelihood of success); 
9This provision is essentially designed to make sure that it is the donor knows and consents to the exact 
purposes of his/her donation and is not unknowingly led into a donation that is justified almost solely 
according to ifs prospective benefit for the collective body of prospective recipients when thinking that 
in fact the donation is very much chosen as being optimal the optimal choice for their situation as individuals. 
1OThis would result in the exclusion of donation at centres or in countries not being able to afford the 
necessary equipment (e. g. Romania) or cutting comers to derive greater profit (see chapter 8). "See chapter 3.4.2. 
12 For discussion of the risks see chapter 3.4.2. 
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4. Authorising professionals must weigh up expected and possible detriments and 
only proceed where these pose a limited threat to the prospective donor which is 
significantly exceeded by prospective benefit to the recipient (this involves 
legislative embodiment of a more of less standardly applied ethical principle, 
one which still leaves plenty of practical scope for living donation but at the 
same time acts as a safety net against LDT's of dubious or marginal value). 
A regulatory body set up by statute (as with HOTA in the UK) could determine a list 
of organs which could be considered for donation, be called upon by practitioners to 
give guidance in any individual case and determine the acceptability or otherwise of 
new forms of procedure. Such a body, or again a professional body, could give 
specific guidance for different types of organ LDT as a whole. 
The above principles treat the principle of non-maleficence as paramount where 
prospective detriment is above a certain level. 13 At the same time as setting firm 
limits they allow the justifiable exercise of donor autonomy in taking small 
consequences and risks of harm for the anticipated significant benefit of others. 
Clearly where the donor is unable to consent the level of acceptable maleficence could 
be further restricted and/or the required beneficence increased. Suggested regulation 
of donation by persons unable to consent is examined at 11.4.5. 
11.4.3. Procedural Requirements 
1. Donors must evidence their informed, voluntary and non-profit motivated 
consent by signing a form stating that the donation is a voluntary not-for-profit 
act done with knowledge of the major possible and inevitable consequences in 
accordance with their true will or by a method of equal veracity where following 
method is not practicable. 14 
13 A most obvious example would be corneal donation where not incidental to a clinically therapeutic 
removal for the donor. This point has been brought sharply into focus by the fact that one of the Leicester donors wants to give his remaining kidney to a second son with end stage renal failure. Such 





Recipients must evidence their informed voluntary consent by signing a form (or 
an equally veracious method) stating that the organ LDT reflects their true will 
and they have knowledge of the major possible and inevitable consequences for 
theirself and the donor. 
A duration of at least 48 hours (or exceptionally 24 hours) must have elapsed 
between agreement and removal. 
Professionals giving information to, or asking for consent of, the prospective 
donor shall not be the same people as the professional involved in caring for the 
prospective recipient. 
The above provisions are not intended to be an exhaustive list for all situations. For 
instance, additional requirements could be imposed where necessary to ensure the 
informed, voluntary and non-profit motivated consent of prospective donors or 
classes of donor in a jurisdiction with a history of organ trade, or simply to ensure 
bona-fide motive for donation with certain classes of donor in all jurisdictions and to 
protect vulnerable prospective donors such -as those unable to give consent for 
themselves. 
11.4.4. Professional-participant communication 
Professional communication to the donor is a critical area. Not just the neutrality of 
information, which relates to the issue of voluntariness discussed later, but also the 
general extent of communication and the process of verifying that the communication 
has been successful. 
Professionals shall make all reasonable attempts to inform prospective donor and 
recipient of the clinical risks and benefits of the procedure for both parties. The 
information shall be given in broad terms but also highlight specific areas of 
significance such as the main normal physical and psychological consequences, 
risks of serious injury or death and risks of detriments significant in nature 





from time to time specify the types of risks that would need disclosure under this 
provision in relation to the different forms of organ LDT. 
Professionals shall make all reasonable attempts to inform the prospective donor 
of other matters relating to the LDT process that are likely to be significant to the 
prospective donor in their own right or as part of the decision-making process. 
This must include information as to how to claim financial compensation for 
donation and the likely financial implications of donation having regard to the 
compensation available and the situation of the specific prospective donor. It 
may also include information relating to the possible social and psychological 
impact of donation on the donor having regard to studies in this area and the 
donors specific situation and motivations for donating. 
The package of information offered and the methods for ifs communication (e. g. 
audio visual, tape recorded, multi-media, signed, paper-written and spoken) 
must reflect a reasonable attempt to address, the needs, abilities and disabilities 
of the prospective donor and recipient, bearing in mind the ideal result of the 
donor understanding all the significant factors involved in the process. The 
information may also be from different sources - such as different professionals 
within the centre, former LDT donors and recipients and literature. 
LDT can only be conducted subject to both donor and recipient evidencing a 
comprehension of the significance of their decision. " To this end all donors 
and recipients must be properly informed irrespective of their wishes. 
Infonnedness in LDT is treated with great seriousness in the above provisions. This 
is entirely reasonable given the imPortance of good decision-making as a justification 
for LDT and the context of empirical and theoretical concerns about disclosure and 
the basis upon which decisions are made. As regards donor decisions, evidence 
from previous studies and this research indicates that donors typically make 
apparently impulsive decisions to donate and in some case exhibit unconscious 
motivations (post-decision distortion of reality in the direction of favouring donation 
"Regulations passed under the legislation are to set out best practice in this area such as post- 
communication getting the donor and recipient to write a statement as to their understanding of the 
major prospective consequences of the LDT for both parties. Further communication could then take 
place where there were significant gaps in understanding. 
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in order to avoid uncomfortable feelings e. g. about risks, possibility of using another 
donor etc. ) and sometimes shut off from a discussion of risks etc. That is simply not 
good enough where they are engaging in a procedure which is against their 
physiological interests. The recipient has been given special consideration because 
his/her peculiar interdependence with the donor warrants it; it is one thing to not fully 
understand what one is getting oneself into but where one is getting another involved 
as well there is an ethical duty for you to be informed, to know what is involved in 
detail and to make a reasoned assessment as to whether involving that other person is 
legitimate in the circumstances. The doubts concerning donor decision-making 
processes serve to amplify this duty (i. e. by making it more critical that the recipient 
makes a decision about the value and ethics of the donation and whether it is justified 
in the circumstances to receive from the prospective donor). 
To prevent practitioners from being deterred, regulations pursuant to legislation 
should closely detail what is required to comply with the legislation. An authority 
set up under law could advise transplant centres on compliance with the criteria.. 
The donor and recipient can take action in most jurisdictions only in cases of 
negligence and battery. A scheme of no fault liability should be instituted in this 
area, if not more generally. 16 
11.4.5. Use of Donors Without Full Capacity 
All cases involving incompetents persons shall be referred for to an authority set up 
under the legislation which shall determine which donations shall go ahead according 
to the principles below (practitioners may also refer to this authority for a 
detennination of whether a person has capacity in borderline cases): 
The consent (or otherwise) to donation of competent minors and adults who have 
a mental illness or disability, but are nethertheless competent, shall be 
determinative of whether donation takes places, irrespective of the wishes of 
16 In addition donors and recipients might have some grounds to complain under a Citizens Charter type format where practitioner standards meet legal requirements but are still below par. A nominal 
compensation of donor and recipient might also be acceptable here. 
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parents and subject only to the normal rules relating to donation applying to 
competent adults who have no mental illness or disability; 17 
2. In order to become organ donors, incompetent persons should at least give 
meaningful agreement to donation, their must be special justifications for the 
procedure and the relevant legal consent(s) must be given in accordance with 
general principles of law. 
The incompetent's assent and lack of objection to donation shall be sufficient 
where there is a high probability that (s)he will endure low detriment from 
donation and suffer serious detriment from not donating due to the nature of 
his/her relationship with the prospective recipient and the donation being the 
only viable course of action to avoid serious danger to the life or health of the 
recipient. 
The general need for meaningful agreement by incompetents helps to ensure that the 
donation is a meaningful exercise of autonomy whilst preventing donation by persons 
with no significant comprehension of how to weigh the procedure and its 
consequences is in some regards protecting them. A tight exception to this is created 
where the donation is more assuredly in the prospective incapacitate donor's best 
interests as avoiding the high probability of serious detriment. 
11.4.6. Use of Different Classes of Donor in Terms of their Relationship 
with the Recipient. 
1. Prior to undertaking a donation the practitioner must ascertain the nature of the 
relationship between the donor and recipient. 
2. Where genetic relationship is claimed a scientific screening test shall be utilised 
to test the accuracy of the claim. 
3. Where the relationship claimed is of a non-genetic familial nature, clear 
evidence of a long term significant relationship and non-commercial motivations 
(e. g. altruism, family solidarity) for donation shall be required. Where such 
'7As already seen in chapter 7, some laws prohibit minors from donating altogether whether or not they have capacity and prohibit donation by competent people who have a mental disability or illness. 
343 
evidence is lacking (as it might be in the case of some friends) the prospective 
donation must be referred for a determination by an authority set up under the 
legislation who shall closely investigate and analyse the motivations of the 
prospective donor and recipient. 
The law that comes closest to meeting these objectives is Hong Kong's 1994 
Ordinance. 18 This approach to regulation provides a framework within which doctors 
can have the legal certainty and practical support to take clear action which in turn 
may increase LDT use, 19 particularly spousal donation. 
20 
While there is no clinical reason to discriminate between different classes of donor 
per se discrimination against certain classes does occur on pragmatic grounds of 
avoiding financially and psychopathologically motivated donation. The 
impracticalities of effectively policing motivation in stranger donations, combined 
with the likelihood of suspect motivation, warrants the exclusion of this class unless 
an anonymous method of giving can be established. However, excluding other 
classes of donor may be excessive and inconsistent given suspect motivation 
21 
probably exists as much in familial as in friendship donations. 
11.4.7. Voluntariness and Informedness of Donor Consent. 
1. Practitioners must make reasonable attempts to ascertain that the act of donation 
reflects the true will of the donor. To this end a psychological evaluation 
should be made, including evaluation of a short written statement by the donor 
of his/her main feelings about the donation and reasons for wanting to donate. 
"Which treats spouses of 3 or more years standing in the same way as close genetic relatives and 
through an authority set up for the purpose adopts a more rigorous analysis of motivation of other 
prospective donors who are not close genetic relatives of the recipient. Hong Kong's law is similar to 
HOTA 1989 as already observed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
"This view has been stressed by Bob Pilling, Chair of ULTRA, in David Price's 1996 communication 
with them. In personal communication Ferenc Perrier of the Budapest transplant centre has also 
expressed this view. 
IOAn area attracting considerable interest which, with appropriate scrutiny is possible to conduct with 
relative certainty that commercial motivation is not present. Hong Kon& Ordinance is a possible 
model for regulation here in requiring the spousal relationship to be of three years standing or to 
otherwise be scrutinised for commercial motivation etc. by an Authority set up under the law. 
21Albeit often of a different kind. 
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2. Practitioners must make reasonable attempts to ensure that the process leading 
up-to donation presents as neutral and unbiased a climate as possible for 
prospective donors to consider their decision. 
3. The donor must be able to revoke the decision to donate (verbally, in writing or 
by any other method) at any point before the procedure commences (the same 
provision should exist for the recipient). 
Clear centre protocols should be developed out of national guidelines. Such 
protocols should address issues that are central for the prospective donor in the 
process of decision-making, including: who makes the initial approach to the 
prospective donor (e. g. family, recipient, a medical professional); whether 
prospective donors are offered 'a way out without losing face' (e. g. professional stating 
that donation was not possible for medical reasons); where prospective donors will 
get information from as a matter of course and further sources of information they can 
seek out; at what point in the process are prospective donors are asked to make a 
decision and by whom; and who will work with the donor exploring motivation (e. g. 
counsellor, psychiatrist, psychologist) and exploring donor misconceptions (e. g. 
distortion of level of prospective detriment). 
One of the criticisms of living donation is that almost whichever way the donor is 
informed of the possibility of donation the fact of being informed itself creates a 
pressure to donate. 22 However, while not approaching people to donate and just 
waiting for them to volunteer is the safest approach, approaching the donor is 
reasonable if done with care. 
11.4.8. Limits to Financial Exchange. 
1. Profit making from organ donation by any parties shall be prohibited. 
2. Acceptable payments are limited to: the normal salaries given to persons 
involved in the organisation and practice of transplantation at goverment 





sanctioned hospitals; and the compensation of the donor for physical and 
financial losses reasonably incurred in the LDT process 
Donor compensation of the kind described above is a right. Where the donor 
cannot get full compensation from other sources the state shall make up the 
shortfall, e. g. through a fund set up for the purpose. Losses covered shall 
include: those associated with time-off work (both for self-employed and 
employed); cost of convalescence care; childcare requirements; reasonable 
hotel / travel expenses under limits set out by the government; and reasonable 
compensation (under limits set out by government) of normal and unusual 
harms arising from the donation process. 
Legislation shall require employers and financial organisations to pay 
compensation for, respectively, prejudicial treatment of the donor in the 
workplace and obtaining life insurance. 
Legislation may on an experimental basis provide the donor with a reasonable 
but basic payment reflecting the amount of time and effort expended that has 
not been otherwise compensated for in the above provisions. The impact of 
this approach on factors like organ quality and levels or procurement shall be 
monitored closely by each transplant centre who shall relay this information on 
a regular basis to an authority set up under the legislation. The authority will 
monitor the national picture and make recommendations for legislative 
changes where appropriate. 
The above approach both ensures that donors suffer no economic detriment from the 
act of donation and allows policy-makers to dip a toe into the realm beyond voluntary 
exchange but still restricted within a non-Profit making framework. The idea of 
allowing a basic payment would put donors in a somewhat similar position to some 
medical research volunteers. 
11.5. Critical Analysis and Areas for Future Research 
At the beginning of this research it was clear that LDT needed serious consideration as 
a method of reducing organ shortage. Xenotransplantation has developed rapidly 
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during the 1990's but'its usage as an organ procurement will not become a reality in 
the short term. The need to facilitate greater use of organ LDT is urgent. To this 
end regulation must help to bridge the gap between professional attitudes and practice 
creating a framework where practitioners have: More scope to use LDT; more 
certainty as to what the constraints are; and more unequivocal support from policy 
makers for the principle of extensive use of LDT. Poor draftsmanship, or lack of 
consideration of the issues, has resulted in elements of legislative vagueness, 
irrationality, restrictiveness and coverage limited to a particular area of LDT (such as 
financial exchange). International bodies must encourage the creation of ethically 
assured but facilitative regulatory frameworks for LDT and cease discounting LDT as 
a major source of organs; it is hoped that investigations like EUROTOLD and this 
PhD encourage the sea change in approach which may be beginning in Europe 
through the Council of Europe's 1997 Draft Protocol on Organ Transplantation23 and 
will hopefully be reflected in the current review of the WHO Guiding Principles on 
transplantation. 
Of the suggestions for regulation in different areas of LDT examined in the previous 
section of this chapter, one feature stands out; the continual re-appearance of the 
recommendation of use of a legislative authority set up under law. Such an authority 
is effectively being suggested both as a quasi-judicial body (determining issues like 
whether to allow prospective donors without capacity or friends or strangers to 
donate) and also in a wider capacity of promoting and checking standards of practice 
in LDT. The use of such an authority will ensure the most difficult ethical issues for 
practitioners are independently examined. A practitioner faced with an option that is 
toward the margin of normal practice may be encouraged to consider it if the difficult 
considerations of ethics and law are examined by a competent outside body that is in 
no way as formal as a court. The authority itself may feel more unconstrained to take 
a bold interpretation of the regulations - as occurred for instance in the recent 
acceptance of a lung lobe LDT between friends by ULTRA. 24 At the same time 
practitioners would still, of course, be at liberty to reject the possibility of doing 
"Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI) Strasbourg, II February 1997. Likely to be 'declassified' 
soon. 
24David Price interview with Bob Pilling, chair of ULTRA. 
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organ LDT (in particular cases or in general) where this was inconsistent with their 
policy. At a time when use of more marginal forms LDT (both LDT of non-renal 
organs and more marginal renal donations) is increasingly being considered, the 
expertise such an authority would build up in dealing with complex ethical and legal 
issues would be vital. 
A final interesting feature of regulation to point out is the large number of legislative 
provisions suggested in the previous section of this chapter. As Price has noted, 
there has been a trend in transplant legislation away from a small number of 
provisions towards a framework that is "very detailed and comprehensive., '25 This 
trend is borne out of the increasing body of ethical issues that have arisen in practice 
and the sophistication with which ethical issues are in general now viewed. 
However, even the most recent attempts at legislation still have a long way to go. 
The logical way forward may include bringing policy makers together for increased 
efforts at harmonisation of legislation under the auspices of the EC in Europe and 
influenced by the WHO on a world-wide basis. Now is also a good time for the UK 
specifically to resolve if s legislative inadequacies and in particular ifs simple over 
reliance on the common law. 
Increasing organ shortages also demand that practitioners urgently re-examine the 
reality of the negative consequences of non-extensive LDT use. Investigations such 
as EUROTOLD and this PhD along with wider exposure of the issues at international 
transplant meetings can play an important role in highlighting through statistics, 
economics and quality of life arguments that living donation must be considered 
seriously as a mainstream procurement modality. 
As well as action, there are specific areas in LDT that need further multi-disciplinary 
investigation: 
Firstly, non-renal forms of LDT are relatively new; parallel with ongoing use of such 
LDT's there must be a detailed empirical analysis - not only of data pertaining to 
'Questioning Attitudes to Living Donor Transplantation, EUROTOLD Project Management Group 
Final Report, ch2 at p36 (Ed EUROTOLD PMG with this part written by D. Price). 
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detriment and benefit but also participant and practitioner attitudes and experience. 
This will help an ongoing evaluation of the ethics of non-renal forms of donation and 
their appropriate regulatory framework; 
Secondly, there must be ongoing monitoring and practical and ethical evaluation of 
xenotransplantation. 
Thirdly, along with new regulatory provision being put in place, there needs to be 
ongoing empirical study of processes of informing participants, levels of participant 
understanding and reasoned decision-making and motivations, pressures and 
voluntariness in donations. This is not merely to provide evidence for the ongoing 
justification or otherwise of LDT but also to enable periodic refining of regulation in 
allignment with what the ethical concerns are in practice. 
Fourthly, ongoing European, indeed world-wide, study of practitioner attitudes is 
another important feature. Such study will involve periodic survey and analysis of 
centre and practitioner practices and attitudes, addressing misconceptions and specific 
concerns in modifications to regulation where appropriate. 
Finally, one of the main criticisms of this research is a reiteration and elucidation of 
the comments in chapter I on the limitations of utilising the medical model in 
response to organ disease. Problems of scarcity are common to conventional 
medicine; in transplantation both scarcity of financial resources and scarcity of organs 
exist. Scarcity, and with it the maleficence of side effects in organ transplantation, 
risks and consequences to living donors and potential pressures on the donor, could 
be avoided through the utilisation of a successful holistic approach to prevention and 
neutralisation of organ disease. The irony of holding fast to the current system calls 
to mind a Danish Gruk; 
"we shall have to evolve problem solvers galore 
since each problem they solve 
creates 10 problems more. v126 
26piet Hein, quoted from Linda Neilson's paper: Living Organ Donors: Legal Perspectives From 
Western Europe in D. Price and H. Akveld (ed. ), Living Organ Donation in the Nineties: European 
Medico-Legal Perspectives, EUROTOLD, 1996,58-71. 
349 
Although public interest in holistic medicine is increasing its role is still largely 
minimised in the medical mainstream. In most countries holistic medicine has not 
been seriously and systematically considered within the context of organ disease 
despite the fact that many forms of holistic medicine have been established for 
thousands of years (e. g. herbalism) and even now are the 'conventional' system for 
medicine in a significant proportion of the world (perhaps most notably China and 
many other areas of the 'East'). A large scale comparative study of holistic and 
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Appendix 1: Associated Scholastic Activity. 
1A: Papers and Reviews Given 
1. Review of 'Organ and Tissue Tranplantation i  the European Union: Management of Health 
Difficulties and Health Risks Linked to Donors (ed. Dr Yvon Englert, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 
published in the World Health Organization's International Digest of Health Legislation, 1996. 
2. To Pay or Not to Pay That is the Question: The Economic Rights of the Living Donor (In D. Price and 
H. Akveld (ed) Living Organ Donation In the Nineties: European Medico-Legal Perspectives, 
EUROTOLD, 1996: 166-173). 
3. EUROTOLD statistical database. Presented at the Rotterdam Symposium November 1995. 
4. Review of Commerce and Compensation Provision in European Legislation Related to Living Organ 
Donation 1996. Compiled as part of LEGISEARCH (David Price and Austen Garwood-Gowers 
available on the Internet: http: //www. maths. ac. uk: 2080/MedStats/Eurotold). 
5. Poster Presentation on Legal Aspects of Living Donation in Europe at the CITIC Conference On Organ 
Shortage: The Solutions, Lyon, June 1994 
in addition I was second author to two of David Price's papers (Transplantation From Minors: Are Children 
Other People's Medicine? Contemporary Issues in Law, 1995, I(l), 1-27 and The Texture and Content of 
Living Donor Transplant Laws and Policies, Transplantation Proceedings, 1996,28(l), 378-379). 0 
IB: Contacts Established During The Period of Research. 
Main contacts relevant to the Phd are discussed below. EUROTOLD had an extended 
number of contacts in addition to these including several hundred clinicians from centres 
across Europe that participated in answering the EUROTOLD questionnaires / filling 
donor health form responses for the EUROTOLD Donor Health Registry. 
IB(i): Methodology, Statistics, Questionnaires and Interviewing. 
Mr Denis Murphy (interviewing), 
Consultant Urologist/Transplant Surgeon, 
Beaumont Hospital, 




Dr A Jakobsen / B. Nygaard / A. Knudsen 
(methodology/qustionnaires/interviews), 
University of Oslo, 
Rikshospitalet, 
Dept of Surgery, 
00270slol, 
NORWAY. 
Dr Katerina Koniavitou (statistical expert), 
Assistant Professor, 
Director of Molecular Immunopathology & 
Histocompatability Laboratory, 
Onassis Cardiac Surgery Centre, 
356 Sygrou Ave, 
Athens 176 74, 
GREECE. 
Lars Westlie (research methodology), 




Dr Marek Pacholczyk (interviews / questionnaires), 
Department of General and Transplantation Surgery, 
Warsaw Medical School, 
ul. Nowogrodzka 59, 
02-006 Warsaw, 
POLAND. 
MTJDr. Barbara Grandtnerova (statistics), 
Department of Medicine, 
Roosevelt Hospital, 
975 17 Banska Bystrica. 
SLOVAKIA. 
2 
Dr Ioancl Sincscu (interviews / questionnaires), 
Spital Clinic Fundeni, 
Clinica de Urologie, 
SOS Fundeni NR 258, 
Bucharest. 
ROMANIA. 
Dr Robin Henderson . (statistics / methodology / questionnaires), 
Department of Medical Statistics, 
University of Lancaster, 
Lancaster, 
UNrIED KINGDOM. 
Dr Igor Luksic (statistics / questionnaires), 
University of Ljubljana, 
Faculty of Social Scinces, 
61000 Ljubljana, 
SLOVENIA. 
Christine Cordle (methodology), 
Department of Medical Psychology, 
Leicester General Hospital, 
Leicester, 
UNrIED E3NGDOM. 
MOD: Ethical Aspects of Livintz Donation. 
Judge Christian Byk (ethicist/lawyer) 
62 Bd de Port Royal 
F-75005 Paris 
FRANCE 
Florence Paterson, OSC (sociologist) 
FNSP-CNRS 
49 Rue de l'Universite 
75007 Paris 
FRANCE 
Frank Th de Charro (Health Economist), 
Centre for Health Policy and Law, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
PO Box 1738, 
3000 DR Rotterdam, 
THE NETHERLANDs. 
Charles Erin 
(PhD on Conunercialization of Body Materials), 








Sara Fovargue (PhD student: transgenics), 
Newcastle Law School, 
University of Newcastle, 
21-24 Windsor Terrace, 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU. 
UNrMD EJNGDOM. 
Dr David Lamb (ethicist), 
Department of Bioethics and Biomedical Science, 
University of Birmingham, 
Edgbaston, 
Birmingham B 15 2TT, 
UNrIED KINGDOM. 
JB(iii): Clinical Contacts in Eastern and Western Europe 
Dr Myftar Barballushi (PECO Participant), 
Department of Nephrology and Haemodialysis, 
University Hospital, 
Nr. 1 Tirana, ALBANIA. 
Professor Peter Donnelly 
(EUROTOLD Project leader), 
North Queensland Clinical School, 
The University of Queensland, 
PO Box 1805. 
Townsville Qld 4810 AUSTRALIA. 
Professor S Lindkaer Jensen, 
Aarhus Universitetshospital, 
Kirurgisk afdeling L, sektion AAS, 
Aarhus, 
DENMARK 
Dr Ants Pettsalu (PECO Participant), 
Dr P. Dmitriev (PECO Participant), 




Klinik für Abdominal-und 
Transplantationschirurgie, 
Abteilung für Psychosomatische 
Medizin und Kinderklinik, 
der Medizinischen Hochschule Hannover, 
Konstanty-Gutschow-Strasse 8, 
3000 Hannover 61, 
GERMANY. 
prof B. Dainys, 
Head Lithuanian Kidney Transplantation Centre, 






Spital Clinic Fundeni, 
Clinica de Urologie, 
SOS Fundeni NR 258, 
Bucharest, 
ROMANIA. 
Professor Jean-Pierre Wauters, 
Chief, Division of Nephrology, 
Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois 
(CHUV), 




Department of Surgery, 
Leicester General Hospital 
Gwendolen Road, 
Leicester 
Sven Arvid Birkeland, 
Odense University Hospital, 
Department of Nephrology Sdr. Boulevard 29, 
DK 5000 Odense C, 
DENMARK 





Dr. Judit Sandor / Professor F. Perner 
(PECO Participant), 
Sernmelweis University of Medicine, 
370 Budapest H- 1445, 
HUNGARY. 
Professor W. Rowinski / Dr Beata Lagiewska 
(PECO centre), 
Department of General and Transplantation 
Surgery, 
Warsaw Medical School, 
ul. Nowogrodzka 59, 
02-006 Warsaw, 
POLAND. 
Dr H Ekberg, 
Malmo General Hospital, 
Lund University, 
Department of Surgery, 
Transplant Unit, 




Professor Mehemet Haberal MD FACS 
Baskent University 




Cardiff Royal Infirmary, 
Department of Transplant Surgery, 
Newport Rd, 
Cardiff CF2 1SZ. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
4 
Mr C Rudge, . 
Department of Renal Medicine and 
Transplantation, 
The Royal London Hospital, 
VAiitechapel, 
London El IBB, 
UNITED KINGDOM. 
Mr A Bakran, 
Renal Transplant Unit, 
Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen Hospitals, 
Prescott Street, 
Liverpool L7 8XP, 
UNITED KINGDOM. 
MOO: Le2al Aspects of Livint! Donation. 
Professor Nys, 





Ms Linda Neilsen, 
Faculty of Law, 
University of Copenhagen, 
Studiegarden, 
6 Studiestraede, 
DK - 1455 Copenhagen K, 
DENMARK 
Professor Dr. Dieter Giesen, 
Director of the Institute of International, 
Foreign and Comparative Law, 




Equal Status Ombud, 





Professor Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona, 
Professor of Criminal Law and 
Dean of the Faculty of Law, 
Universidad e La Laguna, 
3 8071 La Laguna, 
Tenerife, 
SPAIN. 
1C: Conferences and Svmposia Attended. 
Dr Hans EM Akveld (Senior Law Lecturer), 
Centre for Health Policy and Law, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
PO Box 1738, 






Mr Sev S Fluss, 
Chief, Health Legislation Unit, 
World Health Organisation, 
20 Avenue Appia, 
CH - 1211 Geneva 27, 
SWrI7XRLAND. 
1. Manchester Conference on Bioethics, November 1991, Centre For Ethics and Social Policy, 
Manchester University. 
2. Rhodes, 6th ESOT Conference, October 1993. 
3. Warsaw Symposium on Living Donation, March 1995, Organized by EUROTOLD and the Warsaw 
Medical School. 
4. Rotterdam Experts Meeting on Legal and Ethical Aspects of Living Donation, November 7-8 1995, 
Organized by EUROTOLD and the Rotterdam Centre For Health Policy and Law. 
1D: International Visits. 
S 
1. Geneva, World Health Organization, 1992. Given access to WHO databases on transplant laws. 
2. Oslo, Rikshospitalet, August 1992. Interviewing donors and recipients and various professionals 
concerned with transplantation. 
3. Dublin, Beaumont Hospital, April 1993. Interviewing donors and recipients and various 
professionals concerned with transplantation. 
4. Leicester, 1994, Visit of Hans Akveld and Frank de Charro (dutch EUROTOLD collaborators) to 
Leicester to meet members of the EUROTOLD Project and engage in wide ranging discussions 
relating to ethical and legal aspects of transplantation. 
5. Leicester, October 1995 as above. 
6. Frankfurt, December 1995. Meeting of PECO participants for discussion of living donation in 
Eastern Europe and the development of the PECO scientific programme. 
7. Budapest, April 1996. As above. 
6 
Ap pendix 2: Donor and Recipient Interview Materials. 
Ap pendix 2A: Questionnaire Formats. 
Fh! ure 1: First draft for interviews with Livint! Donors 
1. What Organ did you donate, whenandtowhom? What is your relationship to the recipient? 
2. Looking back, would you describe your impressions of the experience as a donor as essentially 
positive (favourable/good) or negative (bad)? What are the primary reasons for these positive/negative 
impressions? 
3. Would you donate again if you could turn the clock back to a time just before the donation? Are you 
very glad you donated, not very glad you donated or not glad at all about it? 
4. How did the question of youdonating your organ first arise? Who first approached you about the 
matter? Were you given a direct invitation to donate or were you simply informed that the party concerned 
required an organ for transplant purposes? 
5. When did you actually make a decision to donate? Was it an instantaneous decision or did you take 
time for reflection and consideration? 
6. What was the main factor behind your decision to donate? Did you worry that you would feel guilty 
later if you did not donate? Did you feel a sense of family duty to donate? 
7. Did you have any doubts or uncertainties about donating at the time? Would you have described 
yourself as very sure, fairly sure, rather uncertain or very uncertain? 
8. Were you the only suitable candidate for donation? If not why were you the one who eventually ended 
up donating? Did you consider yourself to be the most apporpriate donor at the time? 
9. Was any actual pressure exerted on you by family members to d0nate? If so, was this direct pressure? 
what form did it take? Did you feel any pressure to donate quite apart from any pressure being deliberately 
applied to you? 
10. What was your relationship with the family as a whole like at the time of donation? Was there any 
porevious event in your life which attracted widespread disapproval? 
11. Was any pressure to donate exerted on you by either the recipient or the medical team? 
7 
Figure 2: First draft for Interviews with organ recipients 
1. What organ did you receive, when and from whom (name and relationship)? 
2. What was your likely prognosis without the transplant? 
3. Was your transplant a success? 
4. How has your mental and physical health been since the date of the transplant? 
5. Looking back, are your feelings about the donation essentially positive or negative? 
6. How would you describe your relationship with the donor prior to the donation? How has your 
relationship with the donor developed/changed since the date of the transplant? 
7. Did you play any part in the selection of the donor or apporach the donor about a potential donation? 
8. Do you feel any guilt that you cannot fully repay your debt to the donor? Do you think that the 
donor expects morte gratitiude than you can give? 
9. Were there any cultural or religious difficulties in the path of your receiving the donated organ? 
10. How do you feel about your cominnuication with the medical team? Did you experience any 
difficulties of communication with them? Were there any very good points about your relationship with the 
medical staff? 
11. Do you feel you were fully aware of the nature of the procedure and the risks and benefits attaching to 
it, at the time of the transplant procedure? What additional information would you like to have been given? 
12. Do you consider that donations of organs to persons who are only distantly related to the recipient, or 
only emotionally related to him/her e. g. spouses, cohabiting partners, friends etc. are acceptable? 
13. Is the practice of buying and selling organs for transplantation acceptable in any circumstances? 
14. What is your name, age and occupation? 
Figure 3: Approach to interviews with donors in the Eire study 
Communication and Information 
We would like to understand how you feel about the information and communication within the process. 
Specificafly: - 
where did you get information and understanding about the process of donation Erom? 
what was your understanding of the risks and benefits of donation? (as much detail as possible) 
bow well did you feel you understood the risks and benefits involved? (prompt specific short 
and long term risks, rrdnor/major). 
how well were your needs for information and communication satisfied? 
were there things that you would have liked to have known more about? 
bow you felt about the quality of support and care from your famiuly and the medical staff? 
Exploration of the cadaver alternative 
We are wondering about the process by which living donation was decided upon in preference to cadaver 
Exploration of alternative donors 
We are wondering about the process that led up to you, specifically, being a donor 
Who are the other people in the recipients family? 
were all of them treated as potential donors? If not we would like to understand how a lesser range of people 
were drawn up. 
how did the process take it's course to exclude other possibilities? 
Vie processfor donating 
We would like to understand the process that led you to donate a kidney and your feelings within this process 
how did you first become aware that the recipient needed a transplant? 
did you offer without being asked or did someone ask you? 
when did you make your decision? straightaway? after talking with family and medical staff .9 after tests? did you ever reconsider? 
what were your concerns (if any) about being a donor? 
Motivation andfteedom in the decision 
Did you feel you could freely get out of the decision if you wanted to? 
we'd like to understand if you felt anyone was pushing their opinions on you about donation? 
if yes did this make a difference to the way you decided? 
we'd like to understand the meaning that the donation had for you, can you describe how you felt about being a donor? 
was it something you felt pressure inside yourself to do or did you feel free inside yourself about it? 
If you could turn the clock back with what you know now do you think you would reach the same decision? 
Relationships 
We'd like to understand the impact the donation had on your relationships with the recipient and with other 
family members. 
we are wondering if through the process these relationships were enhanced or otherwise and whether the process 
contributed to family conflict or not. 
Financial 
We would like to understand the impact the donation had in terms of money and matters like life insurance. 
did you feel that you were fully compensated for any losses or could the hospital or some other agency have done 
more 
9 
Figure 4: Approach in interviews with recipients An-the Dublin study. 
Communication and Information 
We would like to understand how you feel about the information and communication in the process 
where did you get your understanding about the process of LDT from? 
what did you understand about the risks and benefits of having a living donor? 
how well did you feel you understood the risks and benefits? 
how well were your needs for information and communication satisfied? 
were there other things that you would have liked to have known about? 
how you feel and felt about the quality of care and support from your family and from medical staff? 
Exploration of the cadaver alternative 
(As with donor - fig 3) 
Exploration of alternative donors 
(As with donor - fig 3) 
77je processfor donating 
not applicable 
Motivation andfreedom in the donation 
What do you understand as the motivation for the donor to give you a kidney? 
was it a decision that you felt you and/or the donor could freely get out of? 
did you feel anyone pushed their opinions about donation on you or the donor or not? 
is yes did this make a difference to either or both of you in the way you decided? 
what meaning does the donation have for you? 
Relationships 
(As with donor - fig 3) 
OUESTIONNAIRE: ORGAN RECIPIENT 
only 
Personal Details 
Name Male 13 Female 13 
Addt= 
Date of Birth Age - 
Religion 
1. How many transplants have you had? 
First: Cadaveric 13 Living donor 13 Date: 
Second: Cadaved 13 Living Donor 13 Date: 
Third: Cadaveric 13 Living Donor 13 Date: 
Others: 
2. What is your relationship with the living donor? 
Father 13 Mother 
Brother 'Sister 
Grandfather Grandmother 
Other Please specify - 
3. Do other family members have kidney problems? 
No 0 Yes 0 
If Yes, please specify 
4. Was the living donor living with you at the thne of the donation? 
No cl Yes 0 
If Yes, who else was living at home? 
If No, where was the donor living? 
5. What was your marital status at the time of the transplant? 










6. Has this changed since the transplant? No 
13 Yes 
If Yes, how? 
Finding a donor 
7. When did you first become aware that you would need a transplant? 
More than 5 years before reaching ESRF 
0 
Between 1-5 years before reaching ESRF 
Less than 1 year before reaching ESRF 
8. Did you have dialysis? No 
13 Yes 0 
If Yes, what sort if dialysis? First Second Tbird 
Haemodialysis at home 13 0 
Baernodialysis at dialysis centre 13 
Complete Ambulatory Peritoneal Dialysis 
(CAPD) 
HaemofiltrationO 0 13 
9. When did you start dialysis? Month/Year 
10. When were you placed on the kidney transplant waiting list? 
MonthNearý___ 
11. Was this before being on Dialysis? 
No El Yes 0 
12. Were you ever suspended from the waiting list? 
No Cl Yes Cl If yes, why? 
13. When did you first hear that it was possible to have a kidney from a living donor? 
14. Who told you that it was possible to have a kidney from a living donor? 
Kidney specialist 
13 Family doctor 
Transplant coordinator 
13 Nursing staff 
Another patient A member of your 
family or friend 
Other person who? 
0 
12 
15. Did = ask someone to consider giving you a kidney? 
Yes 13 No 1: 1 
If Yes, who did you ask? Mother 
1: 1 Brother 13 
Father Sister cl 
Other 13 who'. ) 
If No, did someone lse ask? 
No C3 Yes 
If Yes, who asked? 
Who did they ask? Mother 
13 Brother 13 
Father 13 Sister 13 
Other Cl who? 
DR Did someone volunteer without being asked? if so who volunteered? 
17. At wbat point did you make your decision to accept a living donor kidney? 
Did you know right away you wanted to accept and did not 
need to think it over 
After talking to the donor 
After talking to medical staff 
13 
Only after talking to medical staff and completion of tests 
0 
18. At the time you made the decision to accept a living donor kidney were you aware 
of any potential risks to your health? 
No 1: 1 Yes 1: 1 If Yes, what risks were you aware of ? 
19. At the time you made the decision to accept a kidney from a living donorwere you 
aware of any potential risks to the health of the donor? 
No 13 Yes 1: 1 If Yes, please explain 
20. At what point did medical staff formally ask you to make a decision, if at all? 
21. Did you at any point reconsider your original decision to accept a kidney from a 
living donor? 
No Yes 13 If Yes, why? 
13 
22. Were you offered the chance to simply change your mind without your family 
knowing the real reason (ie: would the hospital give you a medical reason? ) 
Yes 13 No 0 
23. Was there more than one person offering to give you a kidney? 
Yes 13 No 13 If Yes, who were the other potential donors? 
24. How did you and the medical staff decide which donor to accept a kidney 





25. Did you feel pressurised by anyone to accept a kidney from a living donor? 
No 13 Yes 1: 1 If yes, who? 
Donor Member(s) of your'family 
13 
Medical staff Member(s) of donoes family 
Other who? 
26. Did you expenence pressure NOT to accept a kidney from a living donor? 
No 13 Yes 13 If Yes, by whom? 
Donor 
13 Member(s) of your family 
Medical staff 
13 Member(s) of donoesfamily 
Other 13 who? 
27. Did accepting a kidney from a living donor, ever cause any fan-Lily conflict? 
No Yes If Yes, could you explain 
28. On a scale of 1 to! 
Iddney was? 
I-Extremely difficult 
2 --- Very difficult 
3--Quite difficult 
4--Not very difficult 
5--Easy 




29. What were your main worries about accepting your kidney? 
Were you worried about; 
Your own health/medical complications 
Health/medical complications of the donor 
Financial implications to the donor of donating a kidney 
Mie effect on your family of accepting the kidney 
Whether the transplanted kidney would work 
Did you have any other worries? 
Impact of Donation 
30. Who discussed with you the possible positive and negative consequences of 
having a kidney transplant? 
Nephrologist (kidney specialist) Surgeon 
Transplant coordinator Other 
If Other who? 
31. Were any positive or negative consequences of having a kidney from a living 




Effect on donor's health 
Any other comments?, 
32. Did you feel that the medical staff tried to persuade you in one direction 
or another? No 
C3 Yes C) If Yes, could you elaborate 
33. Did you seek information from any other sources? 
No 1: 1 Yes 11 If Yes, where from? 
34. At the time of the transplant what was y= overall impression of the 
risks to y= health? 
1---No risk whatsoever 13 
2 --- Little or no risk 
13 
3 --- A very small risk 
4 --- Quite a risk 
5 --- A big risk 
Is 
35. At the time of the transplant what was y= overall impression of the 
risks to the donor's health? 
1--No risk whatsoever 
2 --- Little or no risk 
3 --- A very small risk 
4 --- Quite a risk 
5 --- A big risk 
36. How long were you in hospiml for? _days 
37. How long was the donor in hospital for? _days 
38. How was your relationship with the donor before the operation? 
I --- Extremely close 
2--Very close 
3--Fairly close 
4 --- Not very close 
5 --- Not close at an 
39. Did this relationship change after the operation? 
1 --- Greatly improved 
2--Improved 
3--Didn't change 
4 --- Got slightly worse 
5 --- Got much worse 
cl 
13 
40. Do you think the donor thinks more highly of themselves as a result of giving 
you a kidney? 
1--Very much higher 
2 --- A little higher 
3--No different 
4---A little lower 
5--Very much lower 
41. How has your health changed as a result of having a kidney given to you? 
1--Greatly improved 
2 --- Improved slightly 
3--NO change 
4--Worsened slightly 
5 --- A great deal worse 
42. Do you feel indebted to the donor in anyway? No Yes 
if Yes, is this a burden to you? No Yes 
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Employment 
43. Were you employed (outside the home) at the time of your decision to 
accept a kidney from A living donor? 
No1: 1 Were you; 
Unemployed Retired 




Are you employed now? 
No D Yes 13 
If Yes, what is your job? 
0 44. What was yourjob? was it physicaUy demanding? 
1 45. What is your job now? is it physicafly demanding? 
46. Do you feel that having a kidney transplant has affected your performance 
at work? No 
13 Yes 13 
If Yes, has it: Improved 13 or Worsened 
13 
47. Has this affected your income? No 
13 Yes 13 If Yes, how? 
48. Has having a transplant affected promotion at work? 
No 13 Yes 13 If Yes how? 
49. How long was it before you returned to work/returned to normal everyday 
activities after the transplant? 
50. Did donating a kidney affect the donor financially? 
I -A great deal 
2 --- A little 
3 --- Not at all 
What losses/expenses did they incur? 
51. Did the donor receive compensation for losses in connection with thedonation? 
No 0 Yes 0 If yes, where/who from? 
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52. Taking into account your experiences of having a kidney transplant from a living 
donor would you go through the whole process again? 
Yes 1: 1 No 0 
If No, would you prefer a transplant from a dead donor? 
Yes 11 No 1: 1 
53. How satisfied were you with the level of support from your family? 
1 Extremely satisfied 
0 
2 Very satisfied 13 
3 Moderately satisfied 
4 Not very satisfied 
5 Extremely dissatisfied If scoring 3,4 or 5 In what ways could the level of 
support have been improved? 
54. How satisfied were you with the level of support from the hospital? 
1 Extremely satisfied 
2. Very satisfied 
3. Moderately satisfied 
4 Not very satisfied 
5 Extremely dissatisfied If scoring 3,4 or 5 In what ways could the level of 
support have been improved? 
55. What are your views on the use of, 
(a) closely related donors ie: parents, brothers, sisters 
In favour 
13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
(b) Distantly related donors ie cousins 
In favour 
13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
13 
(c) Husband/wife donation 
In favour 
13 Not in favour Not sure 
(d) Friends (non related) I 
In favour 
0 Not in favour cl Not sure 
(-% Strangers? W1 
In favour 
13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
56. What is your view of buying and selling organs? 
In favour 
13 Not in favour Not sure 13 
57. Would you have considered buying an organ? 
No 13 Yes C3 
is 
58. Should any payment be permitted, for example to compensate for losses 
incurred by the donor? 
No 13 Yes 13 
59. Are there any other matters that you would like to mention? 
60. Have you any questions? 
61. Is the transplanted kidney from the living donor still functioning? 
Yes 13 No 0 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE: ORGAN DONOR 
Personal Details 
use only 
Name Male 13 Female 13 
Date of Birth (DD/MM/YY)- Religion 
Date of Donation (DD/mm/YY - 
Age at donation 
1. What is your relationship with the recipient? 
Father Mother 
Brother Sister 
Other Please specify_ 
2. Do other family members have kidney problems? 
No 13 Yes 1: 1 If Yes, please give details 
3. Were you living with the recipient at the time of thd'donadon? 




If No, where was the recipient living? 
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Has this changed since the donation Yes No 
If Yes, how9 
The Decision to Donate 
5. How did you first become aware that the recipient needed a transplant? 
Recipient told you 13 
Medical staff told you who? 
Other please specify 
6. Did someone ask you to consider donating your kidney 
Yes 13 No If Yes who asked? 
Recipient 13 
Other family member 
Medical staff 
Other 
if No, did you offer without being asked? 
Yes 13 No 0 
7. Did you know right away that you wanted to donate and 
to think it over? 
OR Did you make your decision only after talking to medical staff?. 
OR only after talking to medical staff and completion of tests? 
8. At that time were you aware of any potential risks to your health? 
No 0 Yes C3 
if Yes, what risks were you aware of? 
9. At what point did medical staff formally ask you to make a decision? 
did not need 
10. Did you at any point reconsider your original decision to donate? 
No 0 Yes 13 If Yes, why? 
11. Were you offered the chance to change your mind without you family 
knowing the real reason? 





12. Were you the only person considering offering a kidney 
No 0 Yes 0 If No, who were the other potential donors? 
13. Why were you the one who finally donated the kidney? 
Medical reasons 
C3 Otherreasons 1: 1 please specify 
14. Did you feel pressurised by anyone to donate? 
No 13 Yes 13 If Yes, by whom? 
Recipient 
Members of your family 
Medical staff 
Other 1: 1 please specify 
15. Did you experience pressure NOT to donate your kidney? 
No 13 Yes 13 If Yes by whom? 
Recipient 13 




Other 13 please specify 
16. Did donating your kidney ever cause any family conflict? 
No C3 Yes 1: 1 If Yes, in what way? 
17. On a scale of 1-5 how difficult was your decision to donate your kidney 
I ------- Extremely difficult 
2 ------- - Very difficult 
3-... ---Quite difficult 
4 --------- Not very difficult 
5-----Easy 
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18. What were your main worries about donating your kidney? 
Were you worried about; 
Your own health/medical complications? 
Financial aspects of donating your kidney? 
The effect on your family of donating your kidney? 
Whether the transplanted kidney would work? 
Did you have any other worries? 
The Impact of Donation 
19. Wbo discussed with you the possible positive and negative consequences of 
donating your kidney? 
Surgeon 





20. Did you feel that the medical staff tried to persuade you in any way? 
No 0 Yes C3 If Yes, please explain/elabora. 
21. What risks were you told about? 
22. Did you seek information from any other sources? 
No 13 Yes 13 If Yes, where from.? 
23. At the time what was y= overall impression of the risks to your health? 
I . -No risk whatsoever 
2 --- Little or no risk 
3--A very small risk 
4 --- Quite a risk 
5 --- A big risk 
24. How long were you in hospital for? _days 
25. How was your relationship with the recipient before the operation? 
I --- Extremely close 
2-Very close 
3--Fairly close 
4 --- Not very close 
5 --- Not close at all 
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26. Did this relationshil 
1--Greatly improved 
2 --- Improved 
3 --- Didn't change 
4 --- Got slightly worse 
5 --- Got much worse 
3 change after the operation? 
0 
If your relationship has changed could you explain in what way? 
27. Do you think more highly of yourself as a result of donating your kidney? 
I --- Very much higher 
2 --- A little higher 
3-No different 
4 --- A little lower 
5---Very much lower 
28. How has your health changed as a result of donating your kidney? 
I-Gready improved 




5-A great deal worse 
13 
Please give details of how your health has changed 
Employment 
29. Were you employed (outside the home) at the time of your donation? 
No 0 Were you; Unemployed 
0 Retired 
Housewife 13 Full-time student 
Other 13 please specify 
Are you employed now? 
No 13 Yes 13 
If Yes, what is your job 
Yell What was your job? Was this a physically demanding job? 
30. What is your job now? is this a physicaUy demanding job? 
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3 1. Do you feel that donating a kidney has affected your perfommce at work? 
No 17, Yes 13 If Yes, how9 
32. Has this affected your income? No Yes If Yes, how? 
33. Has this affected promotion? No 
13 Yes If Yes, how? 
34. How long was it before you returned to to normal everyday activities/work? 
35. If working in paid employment did your employers give you time off work? 
No 13 Yes If Yes, did you receive full wages? 
If No, was your job kept open for? 
36. Were you able to claim state benefits? 
No 171 Yes 1: 1 If Yes, what benefits were you able to claim? 
37. How has donating your kidney affected you financially? 
1 --A great deal 
2---A little 
3 --- Not at all 
38. What losses/expenses if any have you incurred? 
39. Did you receive any compensation for expenses/losses? 
No 1: 1 Yes 13 If Yes where/who from? 
40. Have you applied for life insurance since donating your kidney? 
No 13 Yes 0 If Yes, did you have any difficulty getting insu=ce? 
41. Taking into account your experiences of donating your kidney would you go 
through the whole process again? 
Yes 13 No 13 If No, could you explain why? 
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42. How satisfied were you with the level of support from your family? 
I Extremely satisfied 
2 Very satisfied 
3 Moderately satisfied 
4 Not very satisfied 
5 Extremely dissatisfied If scoring 3,4 or 5 what could have been improved 
43. How satisfied were', 
I Extremely satisfied 
2. Very satisfied 
3. Moderately satisfied 
4 Not very satisfied 
5 Extremely dissatisfied 
you with the level of support from the hospital? 
If scoring 3,4 or 5 in what ways could the standard of 
support, or care have been improved? 
44. What are your views on the use of, 
(a) closely related donors ie: parents, brothers, sisters 
In favour 13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
13 
(b) Distantly related donors ie cousins 
In favour 0 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
13 
(c) Husband/wife donation 
In favour 13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
13 
(d) Friends (non related) 
In favour cl Not in favour 13 Not sure 
(e) Strangers? 
In favour 13 Not in favour Not sure 
45. What is your view of buying and selling organs? 
In favour 13 Not in favour 13 Not sure 
46. Should any payment be permitted, for example to compensate for losses incurred? 
Yes 0 No 1: 1 Not sure 
13 
47. If it was possible to buy a kidney would you have bought one for your relative? 
No 13 Yes 171 
cl 
48. Is the transplanted kidney still functioning? 
Yes 0 No 13 If No, do you know why? 
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49. Have you any questions? or other matters that you would like to mention? 
Please continue over the page 
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213: The EUROTOLD Semi Structured Interview 
213(i): Dublin. 
The practice of LDT in Eire has virtually come to a standstill over the last few years. At the sole tranplant unit 
in Eire (Beaumont Hospital, Dublin) we were informed by members of the transplant staff that the supply of 
cadaver organs is increasing such that the demand for organs as a whole, and thus also the waiting list, has 
greatly decreased. In these circumstances the staff without having a formal policy of not using LDT have 
barely used it in practice. These 5 interviews represent a small sample of about 100 living donor transplants 
that have taken place at the centre. Since most of the interviews significant changes have taken place in the 
set-up of the unit. In particular some people interviewed mention not having counselling available at the 
hospital around the time of the transplant when now a counsellor is available for donors, recipients and their 
families - as well as those still at dialysis stage. The hospital also has a dialysis and transplant information 
officer. 
The counsellor at the Dublin centre takes a person - centred approach to her work based upon the philosophy of 
Carl Rogers (see Appendix 4 for details of this approach). 
Interview 1. 
The donor, Jane, and recipient, Sean, are sister and brother respectively. The transplant took place in 1979 
1) Quality of decision making. 
I ask the Jane how she came to donate. She replied that she was the closest match in the family, 6 people 
including the parents and three other siblings offered to donate. I continue, "bow does it feel to have donated? "
Jane replies, "ifs just an operation, when you're young you don't think of it. I watched him ill for 3 years. I 
looked after him because I was the only member of the family in Dublin at the time. " I asked, "did you have 
any fears about donating? " Jane replies, "no. " I continued "did they talk much about risks and benefits and 
so on? " Scan (the recipient) responded, "I don't think there was much risk involved what can happen with 
one kidney can happen with two you know. " Jane adds, "A car accident is the only thing Where you might 
damage one. There's nothing else.. I was very healthy. " I asked Jane if it was a quick decision. She 
replied, "yeh, but I had a6 month old child - it was a hard decision. " Sean continuing says, "it was sudden 
all went through in a matter of 3 years. I'd never been in a hospital before 1976 (i. e. not for anything other 
than the kidney problems). 
I said to Jane, "I'm trying to understand how you made the decision... did the hospital ask you -I mean how did 
things get raised at the time? Jane responds, "I could have refused right up to the operation... could have 
changed my mind - the doctors made me aware of that. I didn't feel any pressure. 
(Note: It was unclear from the interview exactly why they preferred LDT to cadaver. Possible reasons are 
firstly that Sean's deterioration was fairly fast, secondly that it took him 10 hours, including the travelling to 
and from Dublin, each time be wanted to dialyse. Thirdly in 1979 LDT was generally thought to have a much 
better success rate than cadaver donation on the whole. ). 
Jane felt the information was "good enough" though perhaps "not as much as today. " Sean said they knew the 
rate of success was much higher for the family. Jane added that they were not a perfect match and the doctors 
lowould have liked it closer. " 
2) Feelings ajler the donation. 
Nothing to add. 
3) Quality of care. 
I asked, "what is your view of the medical care? " Sean replies, "I would say the nurses and that are very 
good. I'd say it's probably not as personal as it used to be.. you're more a number now. " They both associate 
this partly with the change to the new and bigger hospital. Jane says the care was "fine" for her and mentions 
that although She has had only one check up since the operation she feels that she doesn't need more. 
4) Quality ofdonor-recipient relationship. 
When I asked if they had got closer through the operation Sean replied simply, "well we've always been close. " 
They added that the donation had not led to any family conflict. 
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5) Quality of Life. 
Sean says, "I have a family of my own. les been fantastic - the whole thing has served some purpose - given 
me the quality of life. " I asked if he had any side effects he responds, "drugs affect the skin you know, other 
than that... I mean you wouldn't be a 100% but you don't think about it.. you forget about it" (he takes small 
doses of imurin and prednisilone). After the operation he stayed in hospital for 3 months with a blood 
infection. Sean says the kidney is still "working well" he feels that long term the drugs are probably a greater 
health problem than the possibility of the kidney failing. 
6) Other Aspects. 
Unusually the recipient was only born with one kidney. Jane did not get any money for her taxis and fares to 
and from the hospital. Jane says that she has had no problem obtaining life insurance, Sean says that it has 
been expensive for him " 75 a month with no savings policy. " 
Tnterview 2. 
Ibedonor, Mark, andrecipient, Helen, are brother and sister respectively. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
Helen says, "my brother was a 95% match and it's so far lasted 14 years. " I asked, "how did you decide to 
do a living donor or did that.. ?" Helen says, "well the doctor approached the family. " Mark continues, "we 
all did the blood test. I went for a week of tests. They interviewed me asked if I was under 21 and asked if there 
was any family pressure. " I respond, "how old were you? " Mark says, "20.1 was quite happy about it - it 
was very easy - clear cut. " I continued, "did they tell you about the risks and benefits and things? " Mark 
replied, "well of course they explained that there can be problems and put it in percent. " 
[Note: Mark explained to me that there were 3 other brothers of Helen in all who went for testing -I had the 
wrong blood level, another had had 2 operations already and the third he (Mark) was more histocompatible 
than]. 
I asked, "how do you view the overall standard of information? " Helen replied, "there was no counselling. 
After the transplant I found it awfully hard. You're back into the big wide world and you're out into society, 
living. When I had freedom I didn't know what to do with it. I am sure I could have done with counselling, 
there's a counsellor - Maýorie - here now. There's an awful lot of investigation going on now into the nceds of 
the fan-dly through the kidney association. " I asked, "what about the counselling before and during the 
process? " Helen continues, "there wasn't any. " Mark adds, "well there was from my point of view but that 
was only because I was 20. " 
On the choice of living donation in preference to cadaver Helen says, "when I had my transplant cadavers were 
only 50% successful whereas LDT was 80% (and with this particular donor it was 95%). Nowadays they're 
kind of neck and neck the treatment is so good. " 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
I asked Mark if he was happy with his decision he replied, "oh yeh. " He added that he felt no loss in giving 
the kidney. Helen says to receive she felt "great" and added that "it did feel slightly imbalanced. " I asked, "did 
it feel slightly alien? " She replies, Intitially it did but not now... it's like it never happened the way it is - 
which is the way it should be. " 
3) QualitY Of care. 
Helen said her care was "super, " she later added, "they are all vey nice, they know all the patients on a first 
n=e basis. "
4) Quality ofdonor - recipient relationship. - 
I asked, "has it impacted upon your relationship at at. Have you come closer through it all? " Helen replies, 
"ah yes, well we live in the same house. " I asked if the donation had led to any conflicts within the family, 
Helen replied, "none. " Mark continued, "no there aren't any - the only problem we had was who was 
going to get there first! " (we laugh) 
5) Quality of life. 
Helen says, "my kidney function is fine, small problems like a low pottassiurn level and stomach problem... 
I have warts. I also had a rash on my face. I work out -I cycle, play badminton do various things to keep f IL 
I'm not on cyclosporine I'm on imurin and prednisilone. " She later notes that because of the quality of the 
match she is on a minimum of treatment. 
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6) Other aspects. 
Neither is in favour of commercialization of organs. Helen says, "it's a dodgy situation. " Mark feels ahight 
about the idea of distant related and unrelated donors but Helen has reservations he is concerned particularly 
about he dangers of disease such as AD)S being transmitted. 
Interview-3. 
Billy, the donor is the father of Seamus the recipient who was a minor when he received the kidney. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
I ask, "what do you think of the support and the information and counselling involved? " Billy replies, "I 
didn't get any counselling but I didn't seek any help. There were so many people you could talk to that you 
didn't actually need to go for counselling. It's a good thing if you need it but we didn't. " Billy insisted that 
his son, not yet a teenager, was involved in all the meetings o that he'd know what was going on for himself, 
"he seemed to handle it well so there was no problem. He's never been a really scared child... I let him go to 
the hospital on his own and if they wanted to do something he didn't want he'd call me and I'd come to the 
hospital.. I felt that from really young he was able to think for himself. "
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Nothing to add. 
3) Quality of care. 
Billy, "their on the ward the nurses were taking him to town to the pictures.. When he first transplanted the 
atmosphere at the hospital was like a family - the patients were helping the nurses.. you come in here and most 
of the doctors and nurses they are so human. So that's great because I think if you're really friendly with 
someone you have more confidence in them. " 
4) Quality of donor - recipient relationship. 
Nothing specific said, Billy has been the primary carer for his son since his wife died. Their relationship 
seems unstrained and one in which Seamus does not have his autonomy greatly fettered. 
5) Quality of life. 
ale transplant from Billy to his son has failed and so has another one. Seamus in spite of all this seems to 
have a positive attitude toward transplantation and life generally. 
6) Other aspects. 
Nothing to add. 
Interview- 4. 
John is the donor - brother of Mary the recipient. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
I asked, "how do you feel about all the care and information - how was that? " Mary replied, "that was great, 
the doctors were great, helping you know. " John added, "it's great... it wasn't a long time in the operation and 
recovery room. " 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Nothing to add. 
3) Quality of care. 
Both John and Mary said they found the care "great". 
4) Quality of donor - recipient relationship. 
I asked if the donation made for any conflict within the family. Both John and Mary replied no. 
5) Quality of life.. 
. Mary says that she was on dialysis three times a week beforehand, "it took an awful lot out of me - no energy 
whatsoever. " Now she describes her health as "fine. " 
6) Other aspects. 
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Neither John or Mary bad a problem obtaining life insurance. They both disagree with the buying and selling 
of organs. 
Interview 5. 
Ile donor and recipient are identical twin sisters. I shall give them their real names since it would be very hard 
to cover their identity. Siobhan was the recipient and Linda the donor. They were both 13 years of age (nearly 
14) at the time of donation. Their story has appeared on national Irish television and also in the kidney support 
magazine published by the Irish Kidney association. Their case was taken through a hospital ethical committce 
before the transplant could go ahead. One transplant surgeon at the hospital commented that although they were 
quite young it would be signifcant that the success rate for transplants of these sorts is vastly superior (about 
quadruple) to the average. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
Siobhan mentions finding it difficult to remember about the transplant as it was such along time ago. Linda 
says, "I knew I'd have the best match.. I couldn't really understand the comotion of it. " Iasked, "wasitmore 
of an intuitive decision? " Lindareplied, "the doctors explained tome what it would all involve but when I 
heard.. it didn't matter what was involved. With what she was going through of course I was going to do this. " 
I continued, "was it scary? " Linda replied, "only beforehand - the only thing I feared was if it failed and 
someone lse in the family would then be doing it. If it happens when you are older you are more aware of the 
side effects and that. " 
I ask, "do you remeber much about the process of information - the information they gave you? " Linda 
responds, "it was very good. " Siobhan agreeing adds, "there was a lot of information. " Linda added that 
she felt she didn't really need information. 
[Note: In their joint article in "Kidney Kids" (published by the Irish Kidney Association) Linda says that the 
doctors made it quite clear to her that she could change her mind at any time and that would be alright. "but 
that thought never Occurred to me. Helping Siobhan was all that mattered. " She adds at the end of the article, 
"Siobhan had a new kidney - and a new life. I still had my sister. "]. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Linda says, "Fm glad for the fact that rve done it. " 
3) Quality of care. 
They both feel that the quality of care was "great. " 
4) Quality of donor - recipient relationship. 
The relationship between the two of them has always been close though it has changed. I felt that they had a 
very strong telepathic link. For instance as they recounted when one of them had a back injury the other, 
though in a different country at the time, felt back pains without having any back problems. 0 
5) Quality of life. 
Siobhan does not take any drugs now she says her health is "great. " Linda says there have been no problems 
for her except that she was a little sore afterwards. 
6) Other aspects. 
Neither liked the idea of buying and selling of organs but both felt that the use of distant related and unrelated 
donors was fine. 
2B(ii): Norway. 
The interviews were conducted over a period of 7 days at Rikshospitalet in Oslo, 
Norway during the summer of 1993.1 participated with a donor. recipient pair in all interviews. In all but the 
last interview a nurse was present to act as translator (Norwegian to English and English to Norwegian). A 
total of 26 people came for interview (13 donor recipient pairs). The interviews were all tape recorded and 
subsequently =scribed -in some cases in full and in others an edited version. The interviewees were chosen 
by one of the nephrologists at the hospital not as a random sample but with a limited amount of 
representativeness in terms of attempting to reflect several different outcomes (including cases involving 
rejection and one case involving rejection and loss) and donor-recipient relationships. Donor-rccipient 
relationships included the more unconventional, such as brother's in law and spouses. 
Interview 1 (through translation) 
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a) The decision making process. 
The recipient, Andrew, states that his Kidney problem was familial and that consequently he did not want any 
of his family to be donors. He and his wife had heard about he possibilities for spousal donation so they 
discussed it. Both he and the donor, Jessica, had discussed the option of cadaver but felt that "it was so long a 
waiting list. " 
Jessica agrees with Andrew that she was scared but she also says she felt safe, "and hoped to help my 
husband Andrew .. I had seen so much.. after I had seen his illness I wanted to do something. " She 
went to talk with a nephrologist and was in hospital taking all the tests, I felt secure and wanted to give him 
that (the kidney) so it would not be so long a time for him to wait. " 
Andrew the recipient adds that he, "trusted the professionals" and, "felt secure. " He later describes how 
he felt he could, "talk out and get answers.. if s easier here than in other hospitals. " 
Later Jessica adds that the quality of the information she was given was, "very good.. I wnet into the 
nephrologists office, I felt peaceful. I could ask questions and I got all the information I wanted... it 
was very good overall. " She also says, I did not feel any pressure to be a donor, completely voluntary.. 
no threat or pressure from the hospital, my own decision. "
Andrew, the recipient, felt he could have been given more information about the sex life afterwards. 
b) Feelings about the donation aftenvards. 
Andrew had a rejection losing the kidney after six months and has been back on dialysis waiting for a cadaver 
kidney. I asked Jessica if the rejection was difficult for her, she replies, "I felt that I had given away 
something that was not good .. bitter.. down and I took it personally.. then gradually I went over the feelings 
and it was better with my husband. " It was like a rejection of what she had given, "I was really disappointed 
and had expected it to go better.. and I knew that I could not get my kidney back! I bad got information about 
that! So that was o. k.! (we all laugh) But still I do not regret anything.. but of course it would be much 
better if he could have kept it. " 
[Note: this aspect of the interview shows clearly that although she didn't like the way things went she still 
didn't regret her decision. Some people consider that family donors, particularly or at least where spouses 
only give out of the interest of having the "family unit" work better again. Here I think Jessica had this 
motivation exposed by the "failure" of the kidney to work with Andrew which maybe leads us to the source 
of her feeling down, taking it personally, bitter etc. However the rest of the extract particularly that she didn't 
regret her decision suggests that she was at least partly motivated by the sheer value of the act of giving in 
itself. 
c) Quality of care. 
Expressed feeling above such as trust and good information but few statements more exclusively about everyday 
care. Jessica describes the hospital as a second home and that "they feel free that anytime anything happens 
they can just call- it has been important to me to feel the support.. they ask how I've been .. I feel they understand. " 
d) Quality ofdonor- recipient relationship. 
They express no negative points although they say it has been hard for them at times, they feel they have 
spiritual strength and an age enough to deal with the sexual problems. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Jessica says that they live day by day. She feels that despite all that has happened she still has a positive 
feeling. She does not describe having had any health problems since. 
1) Some other aspects 
The social security did not cover all the donors expenses - she would want it different. The feelings she had 
around Andrews loss of his kidney were also interwoven with the feeling she had for the death of their 
grandson a month later. 
Tnterview 2. (translated) 
a) Quality of decision making. 
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Translated from what participants discussed: Robert, the recipient, was ill and eveything went 
quickly-the whole family came to discuss transplantation and in the beginning it was said that Robcrf s 
father should give the kidney but after a while they found that Robert's mother, Jane, had the best kidney. 
She didn't feel any pressure because she felt well ifs a matter of the children, for her it was not hard 
to give the kidney.. the only thing she was afraid of was narcosis. Jane felt that the information 
before the operation could have been better - she had more questions about whether she would be ahight 
with one kidney.. and some other questions as well. She was scared about the operation but spoke with the 
anaesthetist beforehand which was good. I 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
Jane thinks it was a normal thing for a parent to do. Robert says he doesn't agree but hasn't made it into a 
big thing. When I ask Jane if she feels more love for herself for doing this she says yes. Not much here that 
indicates her motivation for donation. 
c) Quality of care. 
Translated as: they are really satisfied with their stay at the hospital.... They think that maybe the sick note 
from the doctors for just six months was not enough. 
d) Quality ofJonor recipient relationship. 
Not verbally expressed. 
e) Quality of life. 
Not anything extra expressed. 
.0 
Sonte other aspects. 
In contrast to the first interview this interview yielded little. This was partly attributable to the other 
participants speaking for long periods in Norwegian which were only translated as summaries. 
Interview 3 (mostly spoken in English. little translation needed). 
a) Quality of decision nwking. 
Ile donor, Rowan is married to the recipient, Jenny. Jenny's long standing illness suddenly got worse after 20 
years. She was asked by the doctor most involved if she had anyone in the fan-dly who would give her a 
kidney. She had two sisters but they refused, "which I was very disappointed about... and then he (the 
doctor) asked 'do you think your husband can help youT and I asked him (the husband) and he said yes. " 
I asked Rowan about his feelings -when he was asked he replied, "before it was a fact.. my feelings - for 
sure ifs no problem if I can help her ... it was decided in one or two seconds, it was no problem. " He says he 
felt no fear. 
He said he was met by a doctor at the hospital who was explaining the risks and benefits to him but he says 
he thinks he interrupted her after not longer than 4 or 5 minutes saying, "oh no problem. " He puts it 
that, "I really didn't hear.. I didn't want to speak about it because it was decided. " (i. e. he'd already made up his 
mind. ). Jenny felt there was not enough information about the rejection of the kidney but Rowan is not 
sure. 
b) Feelings about the donation aftenvards. 
A guess at some of Rowan's motivation can be taken from the fact that he knew when he married. Jenny that 
she had kidney problems which would probably get worse. 
He described his feeling after as one of having a good trip (with the drugs he'd been given), "like a 
wonderful movie. " He described seeing Jenny for the first time after the operation, recovering as, 
the best happening in my life.. I never had such an experience 'in my life. " Later she had 2 strong rejections 
for him, "that was not a nice feeling" for 2 days he felt very down, "and if that had happened -to give a kidney 
and it should not succeed -I wouldn't like to think of that" He later adds that if that happened, "I think I could 
be depressed. " Overall he seemed very positive about his donation, "I can recommend it, " he said at a 
later point. 
Jenny felt fantastic, very happy - to be able to have a transplant after her family had said no. 
c) Quality oftare. 
Rowan says, "I came in and everybody was friendly- it seems that everyone appreciated - friends and other people 
in the hospital, the doctors and the sisters they cared very much about me.. very nice experience.. exciting also. 
Jenny says says she felt safe at the hospital, "all the time" over the 20 years she had been there. 
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d) Quality of donor-recipient relationship 
Not expressed specifically. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Rowan had some health problems afterwards with a hospital virus, "that was the only thing. " 
fi Sotne other aspects. 
Little to add. 
Interview 4 (translated). 
a) Quality of decision making. 
The donor Jim is the brother in law of the recipient John. John had had a long history of illness. His 
brother was going to give a kidney but John thought hat because his brother was, "rather hysterical" he 
thought it, "would be too tough for him... Then his brother in law without any question was looking at his 
papers from the military and was saying by himself that'we have the same blood group maybe you can have my 
kidney. "' 
Jim came out alright on the tests and donated. I asked him if it was easy for him to make that decision he 
said, "it was no problem but I just had to lose 16 kilo's before they could put the knife in me! " (chuckling) 
I asked him what he knew about the risks involved he replied, "I was in hospital for a week before the 
operation and I feel that I got all the information, that I didn't miss anything. " *Ibough he later adds that 
from his previous experiences he doesn't trust doctors. (John felt the opposite on this point). 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
I asked Jim if he was glad about everything he responded "he (John) got on his feet again (chuckles) 
that was the main thing. I haven't put much energy in thinking around the psychological things in 
transplatation to me I just took the decision and that was it. " John said it was special to him.. that otherwise 
maybe he would have had to wait a long time for a kidney because of his difficult blood group. 
c) Quality of care. 
Nothing expressed other than comments on information stated above and Kim's feeling that the hospital was 
disorganized over one aspect - they didn't find him a place to sleep after the operation other than in the 
corridor. 
d) Quality of donor-recipient relationship. 
Nothing specific expressed. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Jim expressed no concerns about his health since. 
1) Some other aspects. 
None to add. 
Interview 5 (translated). 
a) Quality of decision making. 
Ruth has received a kidney from her mother Helen. I asked how the decision came about. Helen replied 
"it was a natural thing it came from ourselves.. we knew this was possible" Ruth (rough translation) 
said "I was so weak around the time of the transplant.. I felt I didn't have much strength to think about it. 
I knew there were better results but also in a way it was the doctor who took the decision because be realized 
there was a hurry to get a kidney. I think it was terrible for my mother to have to go through the operation as 
a healthy person... they didn't feel any pressure" 
I then asked Helen what she knew about the risks she replies, "I felt that I knew everything" and specifically, 
"I knew I n-dght have pain afterwards, that I might feel sick ... about the possibility of narcosis. " Ruth felt "maybe I could have been informed more that I would need to take a lot of medicines.. and more about their 
side effects... and depression" though later she adds that, "I have a lot of confidence with the nurses and the 
doctors, they are small gods for me! " 
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[Note: That Ruth says that in one sense she feels it was the "doctors decision" based on the "hurry to 
get a kidney" - what did Ruth mean by this? It seems that she had almost handed over decision making to the 
doctor]. 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards 
I asked Helen if she sometimes felt empty without the kidney. She replied "no. " 
I asked her how she felt about what she had done, she said, "I feel that its an important thing. " 
Ruth felt like she had been given "a second life" and added later "Im more concerned about the small 
things in life.. I have longer time to see things.. " "I'm nearer of the day today" (living more in the now). 
said, "it sounds somehow more free- more spontaneity. " Ruth replies 
"Uhum. " 
I asked Helen if things had changed for her she replied, "I'm just happy that it goes well with my daughter" 
c) Quality of care. 
Nothing expressed except for what Ruth mentions above about being generally confident with the doctors 
and nurses. 
d) Quality ofdonor-recipient relationship. 
Nothing specific expressed. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects) 
Helen expressed no concerns aboput, her health. Ruth (see b above) talks about having a second life. 
_j) 
Some other aspects 
Ruth had little sight left which was connected with her diabetes - she didn't express any loss of sight being 
caused or connected with the transplantation itself - unlike the one person who was diabetic out of the Leicester 
group. 
Interview-6 (not translated). 
a) Quality of decision inaking. 
Hilary the recipient describes how she spent much time sick and was on dialysis. I asked her "did you 
hope for a nekro kidney- a cadaver? " She replies "no my husband was ready when I needed it. " I turn to her 
husband, Alex, the donor and ask "uhmm.. did that come from you then, the decision? " Alex replies, "yes it 
came from me. No eff .. protests from anybody ... this was voluntary, no pressure from anybody. Thats 
O. K., and the family afterwards they said that it was great that I did it. " I later asked Alex if he had fear 
when he gave the kidney. He replied, - "no, not much at all... beforehand we were shown a film about this 
thing ... but 
it didn't frighten. And before the operation I was quite calm. You see the doctor talked about 
it... quite simple.. it was very good- the doctors to talk about it beforehand, here in the hospital. " "a 
good communication? " I enquire. "Yes" replies Alex. Alex continues I feet very well that they took 
care about us. " 
Alex was "the only one" who came forward. Hilary explained that they bad a son but that he was dying and 
couldn't give. "So I was the only one in the family and I was very glad, " Alex said. 
b) Feelings about the donation aftenvards. 
Alex said "its sweet" (to have done this). I asked Alex if he "felt slightly lower after the operation. " 
Here I was referring to a possible down/depressed sort of state but did not make that clear. Alex, I think took 
it that I was referring to a more permanent state of being, replying "I don't feel lower, I don't feel reduced 
in any way. " This in itself I think is useful in perhaps uggesting that donating bad no negative impact for 
him. 
I inform Alex, "I'm trying to catch your feeling about giving the organ. " He replies, "I feel nothing special I 
manage very good with the one I have so I don't think about it. If something should happen and I can damage 
the other one it will be dangerous.. but I'm so old the risk is small. I don't open parachutes or handgliding or 
anything like that! (we laugh). "
Hilary adds, "my doctor said he (Alex) is the right person to give - he will have back.. I was nothing and 
he will get back a wife" 
Me: "also, to me, if it hadn't worked it would be a special thing - is this how you are feeling? " Alex: 
"Oh yes, we didn't know when we started that it will work, we didn't know when we started.. if it had 
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not worked well that was bad, but it was a try and I thought that was very important.. and maybe she could 
get a nekro, and I had done my best - nothing more to say about that. " 
Hilary mentions still having "hanging over her head" the knowing that her old kidneys will need to be taken 
out later on. She feels stronger and "very happy" with what has happened. 
c) Quality of care 
Alex says, I feel very well that they took care of us" 
Other information expressed in part a) 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship. 
Iley have been together for 50 years. I asked them if by being in this experience they had come closer. Alex 
replies, "ah yes, more - after this we having something together" Hilary said that, "one day we will be one... 
we must think that one day one of us will disappear. " She later says, "we have really a good life together- 
and he is really quite special he is so kind and good to me. And I don't complain! " (she is crying - "tears of happiness" I say, yes she says). 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Hilary (as for most recipients) has a freer diet more free now than before. Before the operation, Alex said, she 
was just skin and bone. Hilary has difficulties such as with her bones (cortisone? ) she expressed these in the 
context of talIdng about the side effects of the medicines but added that "some of the difficulties may be the 
age not the medicine. " 
J) Some other aspects. 
Alex felt that all his expenses had been covered by the social. Alex, expressed that the cut that was made was 
"a little harm" but that was over in a fortnight and then he was o. k. 
Interview 7 (translated partly). 
a) Quality ofdecision making (partly translation partly spoken directly in English). 
I said to Anna, the donor, I wonder about the process of how you came to choose the kidney. " Anna replies 
that "they (the doctors) wrote to the family - my mother and father and the other sister I think- and they 
checked our group and they found out I was the most like her so then they asked me. " 
Me: "uhum.. Did you discuss in the family if you prefer nekro (cadaver) or living? " 
Anna: "No. " 
Me: "You just thought living was.. " 
Anna: "Yeh. " 
Me: "Better? " 
Anna: "Yeh. They never asked me about nekro. " 
Alfhild who is translating elaborates, "They knew about it but it was never really talked about it. 
c) Quality ofcare 
Noadng to add 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship 
Nothin- to add 0 
e) Quality of Life 
Anna, couldn't walk for a time and felt exhausted. Now she describes her health as "great. " Caroline got a 
reaction (rejection) afterwards - the response of Anna to that is detailed in a) above. Caroline says the kidney works "very well" now and finds it "incredible how healthy it's possible tobe"- now she's "been healthy 
more than she has been sick. " 
fi Some other aspects. 
NotWng to add. 
a) Quality of decision noking. 
Joanne, the recipient, and Tony the donor are married to each other. 
Joanne through Alfhild: "I was very weak and just at the limit for starting dialysis and then the doctor asked 
him (Tony) if he wanted to give the kidney if the match was right and the first tests were fine and showed that 
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it was possible and then it just went on. I had second thoughts about it because I was scared what would 
happen to my husband during surgery.. 
Me: Did the doctor speak about the risks and ... (fading away). 
Joanne and Tony through Alfbild: "We think the information was very good and we got very much 
information and it went alright. 
I ask Tony if they discussed any alternatives to him donating, Joanne replies, "I have asister but she's not so 
healthy so it was not any alternative. " 
Me: "and the nekro (cadaver) kidney? " 
Joanne: "In the beginning I thought that I had to wait for that, but there was a waiting list" 
Me to Tony: "So you felt it would be better to give your kidney? " Tony nods in agreement. 
Me: "Was it er.. I'm trying to understand how you made this decision -was it a quick decisionor..? 
Tony: "No second thoughts, it was an easy clear decision. " He says that he knew the operation was more 
serious for him (than her). He adds later that, "since the relationship has been so good it has been all so 
natural to do. " 
Joanne explains that they felt good that they could prepare, had more control over timing "and we heard that 
the risks of rejection of the kidney were less with a living donor than with a nekro. "Joanne feels that its 
good that husband-wife can be a living donor pair "because they have such a long waiting list. " 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
Tony says it was a "very natural" thing for him to do. He says, "I'm very satisfied. " Later he says, "I don't 
regret it -I never had any grief about the loss of the kidney. Joanne says now she doesn't think so much about 
it "since it has gone all so fine. 
c) Quality of care. 
Joanne finds it a special year for her even with the surgery "because I have met many nice people.. it 
has been a very good experience. " She finds the staff very nice, the follow up good and that they get all the 
information they want. 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship. 
Expressed above (part b) by Tony that relationship has been good. 
I later asked if the relationship had come closer for them both with this experience. Tony replies that it was 
very close and maybe in some ways has now been closer. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Tony was "out only for six weeks after" for which he got compensation from the social and his employer. 
He says his health is "fine. " "No" complications. Joanne also says she feels "so fine" - though mentions 
being bigger in the face through cortisone and having less endurance bu I have to respec 0"tt my age also" Joanne xpresses having a second life after the operation with more Ereedom. 
Sonx other aspects - -,,, j 
They suffered'no financial hardship' as a result of compensation as mentioned in part e). 
interview 9 (rarely needed translation). 
a) Quality of decision inaking process. 
Caroline, the donor, has given to her sister, Mary. Mary describes how she has rheumatism and then 
connected with that she got a kidney disease 10 years before she was transplanted. When she was in hospital 
with the situation becoming more acute she describes how the doctor said "'you're going to need a kidney have 
you any other relativesTand I said I have some sisters and he said best thing to ask them yourself whether they 
are prepared to give. " She met two sisters and a brother -a sister and a brother offered to go for tests, the 
other sister wasn't suitable as she had a disease. 
I asked, "did you discuss the possibility of a nekro kidney at all? " 
Mary replied, "No, because the family was the first thing to try and if none of them was suitable.. then 
afterwards .. but the 
family is the first thing. " 
Me, "for you or..? " 
Mary, "for everyone, because er its the best results if you can have one with a good match. " 
(is she meaning a 100% match situation or does she view results of 50% matches as still better on average 
than cadaver - interesting whether many people know of the fine distinctions or not - since in this 
situation I think they are crucial in the comparing of success rates). 
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Caroline: "Our brother had a different kind of blood so he wasn't good - so it was only me left (she laughs). 
Well really I had no choice, yes I think so- I mean I'm healthy, I've been healthy all my life but it was a 
hard decision because I'm rather scared of hospitals... so it was rather hard- I have been healthy all my life 
and she hasn't. " (these feelings of no choice and of her sister being less healthy could be interpreted as 
guilt being the motivation perhaps combined with a sense of duty. Being in the interview myself I did 
not get a sense that either of these feelings, or both combined formed a major part of her motivation). 
Caroline: "Yes, yes and even if I said it was rather hard because of my situation inside me and my .. fear of hospitals.. " 
Later I said to Caroline: "I haven't yet got a picture of how the information was for you - the risks, the 
benefits and the psychological side too" 
Caroline: "Well I came in here and I had a lot of tests.. they all proved I was quite sound (she smiles) and I 
was talking to some people sometimes and doctors and they said I didn't have to do this thing it was my own 
choice -I didn't have to, but I always thought what sort of a life should I have afterwards if I said "little sister 
I'm not going to help you, do whatever you will but me strong lady I'm going to live my own life. I 
couldn't live with that so I had no choice - not really. " 
Alfhild: "But did you get the information from the doctors? "
Caroline: "No, I didn't ask -I didn't want to know too much about hospital things, no. " 
Mary: "you dont like details. " 
Caroline: "No, no, no. " 
Me: "Did they (the doctors), come and ask to give you details or..? " 
Caroline; "Ee, well you know the day before the operation they told me things but I don't know.. er.. 
perhaps I could have asked more but I didn't like to know.. because thafs my feeling inside- I don't like 
hospitals, I don't like to know I have blood running around my body- I don't like to feel that (she laughs). " 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
Mary says it was "a fantastic feeling when you are out of the operation. " She feels that sometimes 
after the operation the doctors forgot they were dealing with people. Mary also feels that if she hadn't asked her 
sister would not have got any control. 
c) Quality of care. 
Mary expresses one or points of complaint about the human contact as above and says she feels that nobody 
paid much attention to her feelings after she had gone home shortly after the operation. 
Caroline also had complaint but that was more in regard with how she had been treated at her local hospital. 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship. 
Little expressed directly on this point - Mary was concerned much that Caroline, who bad been her best help 
through the kidney problems, came to be directly bound up in the problem by being a donor. A person 
suggested to me something to the effect that where one family member has rheumatism she can become quite 
fixed in the "ill role" with other family members quite fixed in the "supporter role" and that this can 
become an unhelpful pattern if ingrained. I had very much wanted to hear equally or more of Caroline as the 
donor but the interview became very much more oriented around Mary -I wonder given this if Mary and 
Caroline feel to any extent that their relationship is ingrained in such a way or have a very different 
understanding of their relationship. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects). 
Mary says she gets some side effects with the cortisone and other drugs. Caroline, when asked by Alfbild 
whether there bad been any change in her life merely said, "oh I don't think so! (we laugh a little) when I sleep 
on this side I feel my wound.. but it doesn't hurt.. and now I must lay on the other side in bed. " Caroline 
had a cold and stomach cramps for a time. 
fi some other aspects. 
Little to add. 
-Interywew 
im aransiation generaijX not neegeo). 
a) Quality of decision making. 
David has given to his son, Simon. David explained that Simon knew be bad had this disease for 8-10 
years but that suddenly it became a real problem about a year ago and that his state was such that the doctors 
said he would have to have a transplantation in 1992 then he goes on to say "and concerning the - perhaps you 
have come here for to ask why - or how was your decision to donate .. and I think in any country if a father is 
asked it, you only could give - your not allowed to say no - naturally as you have brought up the child iVs 
part of it... " 
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Me: "its part of the process of caring..? " 
David: "Yeb, I would say so.. when you are explained medically that you can make itjust as good with one 
kidney ies no problem at all. " 
Me: "What was it like then.. explaining all the risks .. how was your information? " 
David: "Well I think it was quite well explained to my understanding.. very well explained .. and also the rate of 
success for live donors was about 90-92% - they had very good statistics on that.. so er .. and for the donors 
situation. " 
Me: "Was the donors rate of success then something that influenced you to give rather than say have a nekro 
kidney? " 
ý'David: "Well er, we never reflected on that position at all because we certainly were told also that If we 
should take a nekro donor we should have to wait one year or more to do this .. and in the meantime he 
(Simon) would have to go through dialysis for this period and with that risk.. and also a quite lower rate of 
success if you have a nekro donor.. so the decision was quite clear. " David says he felt no fear, felt relaxed 
and everything happened very quickly. Later I asked David if anyone else in the family had considered donating 
he replied, "Oh yes, the whole family except the youngest brother- he's too young- 15 at that time. Simon's 
sister, at that time 22, was tested as well as the mother. " (and one of Simon's friends). 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
Me: "I wonder for afterwards.. how you felt about your decision and how you feel now... people say they have 
different feelings afterwards. " 
David: "I know, I heard about that... Nothing special.. but happy that this had been possible ... I would be 
very sad if I lost one of my kidneys but when it's been removed and it's been used for the benefit of a close 
relative then of course Im happy for that.. so er, as a total for me its been quite a natural process.. not too 
much thinking of it afterwards.. of course it has been a very exciting period when we have had these 
rejections.. I say we! (we all laugh) but er.. that is perhaps like iCs so close that it's we, us, not me and him.. 
it's so joined. 
Me: "Ies something you've gone through close together. Did you have a period of feeling down afterwards. of 
feeling low? " 
David: "No. "later David says: "One thing that has come up is that Simon has not thanked me and I'm happy 
for that because it's so natural. " 
Me: "To me though it still feels quite a big thing and a special thing - is it not..? " 
David: "I think many relatives and friends they felt it more that way than I did myself- I just did what I had to 
do- of course ies a big thing but I didn't feel it was that big.. no special feelings about it. Perhaps because 
I am a scientist myself and I look at it more from a scientific point of view than an emotional point of view. " 
Me to Simon: "I get the feeling that you have taken this experience and used it to grow. " 
Simon: "Yes, I would say so, I learn a lot about me and my friends.. and I look on life in another 
way.. when I got in the hospital I was very ill.. I was very bad.. very high protein in blood- 1600! " 
c) Quality of care. 
David: "When it happened I felt quite safe that we were in good hands" and later "the doctors they have done a 
marvellous job... Ibe hospital took a really good action in this - I'm really impressed of their ability to do this 
quick and efficient.. " (Simon gave an "umm" in agreement) 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship. 
Me: "And I wonder for each of you how er.. you feel your relationship has been since.. do you feel iVs 
grown stronger. " 
Simon: "Yeh stronger. " 
David: "Yeh, perhaps. " (cautious about making definites here I think as opposed to throwing cold water on 
what Simon had said. ) 
e) Quality of Life (some other aspects). 
Simon expresses having some problems with rejection afterwards, but over 2 or 3 months since the last one, 
"ifs just fine -I would say the recovery has gone slow but fast enough for me. " He later speaks of the side 
effects he has had such as problems with his bones from cortisone. Later he agrees with my expressed 
intuitive feeling that he "had taken this experience and used it to grow, " he says he "looks on life in another 
way (now). " 
David expresses how Simon's intestines encircled themselves and he consequently needed to be reoperated on 
later- "but that can happen to everybody I think in such a big operation, so it's no complaints to the hospital. " 
David himself took "some time to recover.. I had some pains for quite a long time.. due to one of the rib bones 
being removed. " 
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J) Sonte other aspects. 
David spoke about the political aspects of transplantation saying that dialysis costs the community 
"enormous amounts of money" and that some things could be better done to encourage transplantation such as 
with living donors to pay their travel tickets to and from the hospital and to ensure that full compensation is 
paid for loss of earnings. 
Interview 11(translation generaft not needed). 
a) Quality of decision tnaking. 
Lynn is the donor and Philip the recipient. They are married to each other. Philip had a heart operation at 
which point problems with his kidneys were discovered and he went onto dialysis. 
Me to Lynn: "How did it come to you I wonder - like the evolution from this point until you decide- umm 
I wonder how you came to decide to give? " 
Lynn: "Umm, I knew of the two possibilities of course and we decided that we would see if I could do 
this one.. so umm I don't think we decided at that moment, we decided to see the results of the 
investigation and then take the decision. "'
Me: "Were there any other alternatives for living donors? " 
Lynn: "We have 3 children but we didn' want to have them give their kidneys? " 
Me: "Too young? " 
Lynn: "Yes. "
Philip: ".. so we decided to have the complete testing to see how we corresponded with regard to tissue 
correspondance.. and we also decided if it were not good we would prefer another donor so we decided to wait 
until everything came out before we decided the kind of transplant to use.. but we also knew that there were a lot of people waiting for a kidney so umm.. that was another important (issue).. so if she could give a kidney 
somebody else could have a kidney too because there's a lack of kidneys -- (to Lynn) so you thought it would help the list for waiting? " 
Lynn: "and I was thinking that it was not necessary for him to wait so long time to get a kidney. "
Philip: "what Lynn was afraid of was that it would interfere with the emotional situation between us.. it has not been a problem I think. " 
Me: "Did you discuss this then with the doctors? " 
Lynn: "Yes they informed me about the possibility of problems. " 
Me: "And the physical problems too? " 
Lynn: "Yes. "
Me: "How did you feel about the information and communication? " 
Lynn: "Oh I think that was rather good, I think they spent ime to explain and to.. but I was very scared of 
course.. I don't know if I -If it was possible to take all the information. " 
Me: "Yeb, umm, umm. So it was a hard time for you? " 
Lynn: "it was not so bard really .. 
it was a chance.... we bad a chance. " 
Philip says that Lynn's operation was harder in terms of recovery than be had expected and harder than 
the doctors had described but later added that the hardness of recovery could have had to do with her age, hard 
job and looking after an old mother living nearby. Iasked Lynn if she felt she could have been better 
informed as regards the "hardness" of the operation. She replied, "yes - perhaps. " 
b) Feelings about the donation afterwards. 
Me to Lynn: "How do you feel about your decision now? " Lynn: "Glad, of course. I think it was of value to 
me -I do something because this was the only thing I could do for him. " Later she adds, "talking of the 
relationship between.. I have no feeling of loss.. not at all. I was a bit sorry because I was healthy and I had a 
strong body and I didn't like the idea of them cutting me with an operation.. that was a bit difficult but no other 
things. " 
C) Quality of care. 
Philip said, "the staff at the hospital is very kind and friendly and warm people always feeling that they want 
to help us in every respect. " 
d) Quality of donor- recipient relationship. 
Me: "So how would you say its been in your relationship since.. through this experience.. would you say it's 
helped you to grow or..? " 
Lynn: "Between us? " Me: "Yeh. " 
Lynn: (laughing) "It's still good, there's no difficulty- we can talk about it and laugh, make jokes. " 
Philip: "But we had a very good basis (beforehand) .. 
I was thinking how would it feel to have the part of 
another person within my body but because it's hers that's a good feeling. " 
Me (empathy not question) : "Doesn't feel too alien. " 
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Philip: "No, (agreeing with my statement) I think iVs quite a natural thing. " 
Me: "I wonder sometimes, and I wonder here if this has helped the kidney stay.. you know your feelings sccrn 
to be that Ws not alien and iCs not something too strange so I wonder if this helps it stay and not reject. " 
Philip: "Yes, I wonder too.. so I don't think anybody can answer it so far but of course it's a very complex 
biological situation so.. probably it helps. " 
e) Quality of Life (some other aspects). 
philip says of his side effects, "its hard to know actually - but no significant at least. " He was up and about 
the day after the operation but as described above Lynn took a lot longer - indeed she is not back working full 
time now (8 months after the operation) though this may as be partly or wholly connected with other aspects 
such as age etc. 
.0 
Some other aspects. 
Nothing to add. 
Interview 12 (not translated). 
a) Quality of decision making 
Mark is the recipient and Janet is the donor. They are married to each other. Mark's difficulties with his 
kidneys were bound up with problems with his heart which he had several operations on. The problems with 
the kidneys got steadily worse over a period of years 
Janet: "All the children - we have four children - we had all to find out who would be the best donor but 
we would not like to have the children because they have there own family and their own health to think about 
and so we were happy that we could make good use of mine. " 
Me: "You didn't want to create a risk for them? " 
Both Mark and Janet replied yes then Mark added: "A couple of the children were willing to give a kidney but 
they were denied by her (Janet) and I more principally rejected it- so I had had a good life already. " 
Me: "So if the match was not good would you have chosen maybe a nekro - cadaver. " 
Mark: "Yes that would be a possibility, yes. " 
Janet: "Yes. " 
Mark: "But there are some advantages with a family kidney I understand, they can make a date for the 
operation- well it suited us rather well and she was willing to give it and I got the best of hersl" (we chuckle) 
Janet: "You see the children would give there kidneys but err they had there own problems.. and because they 
ban could use my kidneys -I thought I had very good health.. and the c ce with the family was, Dr... told us, 
much better than with the nekro. 
Mark. - "Yes we understand that statisticailly they were more successful. " 
Me: "How did the idea of giving feel to you? " 
Janet "Oh, I felt very good, yes, I wanted to help him, he had very little chance because both the kidneys 
and the heart- he had so much problem- he was not looking so good. " 
Later I asked: "I wonder how you found the information and the communication with the doctors 
''here ... particularly 
before the operation. " 
Mark: "Yes, err I think the information we got was satisfactory ... most of the time. " He goes on to describe 
that the information was given over a long time - the problems being long standing ones. He also notes a 
"radical" improvement in the information and communication from 1989 onwards as distinct from when he was 
having heart problems in the 1984 period. "The teamwork which the doctors did on my case all through 1989 
and the first half of 1990 - cross discipline- very nice work done to me. " 
Janet: "The same for me -I got the answers I wanted from Dr.. and be asked me if I was afraid and such 
things. " 
mark: ".. It has been handled in a very fine manner.. the feeling of their willingness to listen to us and so on.. er 
I think that was very important help to us- gave us a kind of feeling of security and so on. " he later adds that 
the doctors had wanted a sibling to donate rather than Janet but that they gave way on that point and came 
more into agreement when they saw that Janet was a very good match. 
Later I asked Janet "Were there some details then for you as a donor about any risks for you? " 
Janet: "Dr .... told me that perhaps 
I could feel a little weak - he asked me to come to him if I felt weak 
afterwards... He told me about complications. " 
Later Mark says: The hospital informed that we would have the possibility of getting a nekro kidney- 
they wanted us to use a family kidney but just informed us that this is also a good alternative - dcscribed the advantages. about the decision not to let the children donate he adds: "principally I made the 
distinction, which very many do, that the one who had lived a longer time should be able to take more risks than the one who had lived a shorter time- I think thats generally accepted. 
Me: And also perhaps they have their own family units too.. their own families.. 
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Mark: Yes both of them- of course they are having there responsibilities in another direction, of course thaCs 
right. 
b) Feelings about he donation aftenvards. 
Me: How do you feel about your decision now? 
Janet: I am the same. 
Me: Is it positive? 
Janet: Yes I could bave done it once more if necessary! 
need only one so I can give one 
c) Quality of care. 
as above. 
I found I had two good kidneys and I thought well I 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship 
Me: And for you both has it helped your relationship to grow through the experience? 
Mark: Our relationship? Yeh I would say that in some respects ifs better... there have been no tensions 
because of the kidney giving. Sometimes of course (he adds jestfully) I am afraid that she should want it 
back! (we all laugh). 
Me: It seems a very positive thing. 
Janet: Yes very positive -I would recommend it! The spouse instead of the children if ifs possible. 
e) Quality of life (some other aspects) 
Nothing further. 
J) Some other aspects. 
Nothing further. 
Interview 13 (without translation and without translator being present). 
a) Quality of decision making. 
Margaret had kidney problems for around four years before transplant and seemed to have some preparation 
through this: ".. in 89 my kidney function was very bad practically no function left at all and it was decided 
to do the transplantation but I had been introduced to the idea of transplantation several years earlier 
and the first time at Rikshospital - and I remember this clearly because I talked with Dr ... and SO on and he said very lightly'well don't worry because when your kidney's give out we just give you a new one. (we 
laugh) So that was kind of reassuring.. it happened over a long period of time.. their was nothing really 
acute about it so I was asked if, very carefully if their might be anyone in my family who would be 
possibly considering.. and so on and so forth and I said that I thought maybe and so on and so forth. So I put 
the question to my parents. (turning to speak with her father who was the donor) Remember we were at the 
surnmer house? And I sort of asked and that was a very good experience because both parents jumped up and 
volunteered! (we laugh) And I remember you saying very clearly sort of putting my mother down "no it's best 
that I do this because you know we need to be taken care of afterwards and you're better at that. " So this 
was the medical decision.... I had no brothers and sisters so they were the only possible choices. 
Me: Did you discuss the possibility of having a cadaver, nekro, kidney? 
Margeret: No. Not really because they wanted to check out if either of my parents would be compatible.. 
that was the first step. 
Me: Did you consider then the cadaver option? 
Margaret: No it never came up because as it happens both my parents were suitable so the question 
was never really- I didn't have to consider. Of course now- if I lose a kidney now I would have to reconsider 
in that way but er- that's a whole 'nother story. 
[She and her father, John, go on to add that it was a good match and that the doctor preferred his kidney and 
general health to Margaret's mother's]. 
John says that for him to donate was "very easy.. it was no problem whatsoever" 
Me: How did you feel about er.. I guess there was communication and information at this stage? 
John: Well we got a very thorough information at this stage - we got how they were going to operate also 
the risks involved - gave me some statistics.. er .. also gave me some possibilities. 
Margaret had to come happily through the transplantation so this was very open er- I should sat 
discussions.. good organization.. it was a very good atmosphere.. of course that depends very much on the 
doctor himself I mean the way he can generate confidence of course- thats a psychological aspect (of the 
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process). We were all very optimistic that this would go very well. I would say that I cxpcricnccd no 
personal problems with that, I was not afraid. not at all, it was just a matter of course. Tbat's how it Is. 
Me: Somehow then erjust sort of.. the right thing to do. 
John: Oh yes.. there's a problem that you have no other choice but er.. you were very glad also that you wcrc 
accepted as a donor (laughing). 
Me to Margeret: Did you find it also an open communication? 
Margaret: Yes, but I do think that I may have shut out some of the information that I didn't want to know 
about. You know it was umm.. well basically I was very ill.. so I was not- I was restricting what I 
wanted to use my brains to cope with and somehow I did not er.. I mean I had free access to all kinds of 
information and all kinds of literature but I deliberately did not want to study the risks or anything or ask any 
questions about that because I just didn't want to know.. This seemed to be the solution. But I've bccn 
thinking about this later on - the information and of course all the information that had to do with the 
surgery itself would be with the actual operation and where it had to be faulty - was to what might happen or 
could happen or would happen afterwards because that is of course very difficult to give full information about 
because it's so individual. Some people experience great problems and some people have no problems or very 
few problems and in a way I'm quite grateful that they didn't point out all the various things that would happcn 
to me because then I think I would have been less enthusiastic about the whole procedure but as these things 
happened afterwards now I'm here and now I can cope with them as they arrive- so I was perfectly satisfied with 
the information but then again I know that we might not be quite the average case because first of all we had 
very good access to the doctor - but maybe everybody has that -I don't know, but then we had access to 
other doctors as well because I live with a doctor and we have friends who are doctors and so on and so 
forth - so their was an infinite source of information all over the place and we're also used to proccssing 
information because of our work we process enormous amounts of information all the time so that may have 
put us in a kind of advantageous position. But generally I felt very safe and very comfortable... I think these 
are competent people who know what they are doing later.. "I think these are competent people who know what 
they are doing. 
John: Yes, both before and during and after the operation you felt safe. 
Margaret to me: But may I ask a question? Although you are doing the quesdoningI (we laugh). Then to 
John she says: You say that you had no choice and I think that I understand what you mean but Isn't that 
sort of contrary to what the situation should be. I mean when.. isn't it supposed to be that before people 
become living donors.. shouldn't he have a choice.. I mean you felt compelled to do this.. or what do you mean 
by 'had no choiceT 
John: I think first of all of course you have a responsibility as a father, you have to live up to that and you 
have to do the best for your own child.. that's one thing and er.. if I had been asked and given the possibility 
to say yes or no I would feet there's no question of yes or no in a situation like ours. This was, as I tried 
to put it, as a matter of course and on that point there was no question of a choice. We never had thought 
of doing anything.. I was I would say very blessed that I was able to do this sort of thing. It generated great 
happiness. Onecould say beforehandwe should do it together, we should fixit, andLhen the question 
was clear, there were no obstacles it was go ahead. Itwas a very greatday 
Later con-dng back to the issue of choice I say: What I get a picture from, from earlier what you said and 
thinking from before also, is that.. umrn.. when you say you have no choice that can be taken in two ways 
and I take it one way (here) .. because some people would say they have no choice and this mean't that they 
were like forced or pressured... 
John (listening): yes but I didn't mean it that way. 
Me continuing: yes. like this is a different kind of feeling of no choice.. you know that it was just the right 
thing. 
John: Yes at that stage it (the choice) didn't exist and that way I was not given the choice in a positive way. 
Me: Umm, umm. 
Margaret: I have been thinking a bit about that - both my parents have a terrible sense of duty- you know a 
sense of duty to life in general.. and er er.. I saw that particularly right before we had the surgery.. and you 
know I knew that things could go wrong and I thought that that would be absolutely awful -I couldn't live 
with that but then I sort of remembered the situation at the summerhouse. I was sitting on the tcrrace over 
breakfast and I sort of put this question sort of timidly and I just remebered they both jumped in their chairs 
and said'please I want to do this. ' This spontaneous reaction was my proof that this was really something they 
wanted to do and not something they felt they should do from any kind of negative duty.. so I sort of cling 
to that (laughing) that was very important to me. 
John adds that they (he and Margarefs mum) had known the question would arise for a very long Lime (i. e. 
sort of chance to prepare for being asked) 
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b) Feelings about he donation afterwards. 
John: of course this is a wonderful experience it's not that so you want to to come into a situation 
where you have that sort of experience but you are in the situation and of course then it's enormously 
positive. 
c) Quality of care. 
Nothing to add. 
d) Quality of donor recipient relationship. 
Me: I wonder how you've both taken this in your relationship, how has it been for your 
relationship? 
John: Oh we have always been very close.. I feel we are closer than before. 
Margaret: Well I feel the same way we've always been close but we are closer than before and I think also that 
these past few years we've been talking about different things than we've been able to talk about before. To 
some extent we've always been talking freely about most things but you know it's even easier to talk about 
more fundamental personal things - feelings. Yes it's a feeling that we have done something together not 
many other people have and it worked out and here we are. But I can very easily see that if you don't have a 
very good relationship with a parent.. and the parent is doing this for you and there has been a very 
conflicting relationship. 
John: Yes er.. if you do that from a feeling of duty then it must be a horrible thing to do for both the parent- 
the donor- and also the recipient. 
Margaret: Yes because it's such an intimate thing to do also, if your relationship is not patterned (stable? ) it 
could create animosity. 
e) Quality of life (other aspects). 
John: oh the pain was very small and I was very happy. 6 days after the operation and I was out of the 
hospital... no complications whatsoever.. I wish every other donor would come through as easHy. 
Margeret says she had some problems - an infection and rejection.. sick for many weeks.. but in a "matter of 5 
or 6 months" she was back to work. 
Me: Did you have any side effects at all? 
Margaret: Ah tremendous - many, many side effects - all kinds of things ..... I have chronic eye infections, I have skin infections,.... shakings ..... quite tiring but on the other hand. I was more dead than alive before 
so much better and I felt.. the most important thing in what you've given me-is that my brain functions 
again.. you know I feel I can think, I feel I'm creative and so on... before the surgery... I couldnt remember 
things which is terrible in academia you-know! (we both laugh) .. stuck on a lower level of functioning. 
fi Other aspects. 
Margaret: I felt this was truly a gift of love because you also when you receive a gift like that there's no 
way you can ever escape the question how can I ever repay this? You know there's no way of repaying such a 
gift ......... But then 
I felt so sure I mean when it's a gift of pure love there's no need to repay it because 
there's no measurement of these things.. They are beyond measurement and that also has made it easier for 
me to say thankyou and accept his because r.. there's just no way I can repay anyway so I don't have to bother 
about that -I just have to go on living and the best.. I felt that the best way I could repay this.. this wonderful 
gift really was to get well.. as well as I could as quickly as I could. So it was a tremendous incentive to.. to 
sort of recover. 
2B(iffl: Leicester. 
The Leicester interviews were conducted over a period of one and a half years beginning in the summer of 1992. 
Ile 22 interview participants were those available during this period from a sample of Leicester General 
Hospital's donors and recipients. The Leicester centre has had a fairly active living donor transplantation 
programme, particularly in recent years. The interviews were tape recorded and were conducted in some 
instances at the homes of the participants and in some cases in a private room at the Leicester General Hospital. 
Interview 1 and 2. 
John is the recipient and Helen, hissister, isthedonor 
1) Quality of decision making. 
John says, "I was told I was a good match with my sister... next best to a twin. I just knew I'd be ahight. 
I was excited about it. My sister was more than willing to give it to me. " I ask, "was she scared at the 0 
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time? " John replies, "yeh, I think she was, she was on the other end of the scale where it was a biggcr 
operation. " 
I ask, "how did it all come about because presumably there must have been a possibility for cadaver? 
" 
John, "well I s'pose there would ... well obviously 
I wasn't very well. My sister didn't like seeing me poorly. 
She says'well can't we do anythingTand the doctor says'well there is a possibility that you can donate kidneys' 
and me sister says 'well can we have some tests. ' My mum and sister had blood tests, my sister was 
better. My sister never once changed her mind.. the tests kept going and the results getting better and better. " 
I ask, "do you think she felt pressured at all, to donate? " John replies, "I don't know., she never told me 
she felt pressure. She never hinted to me that it was the right thing to do because it's your brother. Do you 
understand what I'm saying? " Ireply, "not just because its family. " John affirming says, 
"yeh, 
thaft right.. she never said she had to do it. " I ask, "I'm wondering about what you were told about the 
risks and benefits...? " John replies, "well you get to know about the drugs and things and that the 
transplants are not all successful.. they come and tell you obviously that it could fail - you tend to know 
because you've been living it - ooh years. " 
Helen, the donor said her decision was really "just a quick thing. " I asked her how she came to donate and she 
responded "well I don't really know. " Her motivation was not that clear during the interview but there did not 
appear to be any pressure and she did not regret her decision. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
- it's great it's like I could run a mile.... John says that after the transplantation, "you sort of go yeh! 
could get tucked into them foods ... chocolate and sweets 
(we laugh). " 
3) Quality of care. 
I ask, "how did you find the people working on the ward? " John says, "well with the people working on 
the ward they are like a family - you know and they're really great - even the mardy one! " (mardy is 
a dialect expression, for a moody, grumpy sort of person). I respond, "quite sort of personal? " John 
says, "it is yeh, I was thinking the other day if ever anyone was to ask what I missed about dialysis - and 
you don't miss much! (we laugh) it's the actual time with the staff. Bent over backwards to help you. 
Not an ounce of complaint anywhere... you have to take yer hat off to 'em, ... " 
4) Quality of donor - recipient relationship. 
I asked John how he felt toward his sister for donating he replies, "very close really... it's hard to explain 
really. I mean it was really good of her to do it. It's not an everyday thing it's a big thing.. you know a 
living organ. We've always been close anyway - you know big sis big broth.. we've been a good pair 
together. " 
I later ask, "has the transplant affected your relationship with your sister? " John replies, "no I don't think 
it has.. I never felt as if I'd had to do something for her.. I never thougbt'you gave me a kidney so I'm 
indebted to you.. does that sound bad?.. but ifs in the right context.. she doesn't expect me to be like 
that... she's my sister and we're close so I'd help her anyway but I'd help her because we are close not because 
she's given me a kidney. " I respond, "so it's not like paying her back, " John replies, "ych thafs right.. 
she's done a great thing for me and I know that, but thafs it. It's forgot sort of thing - not forgot, you 
can't never forget it but Ws not that we dwell on it.. never really felt I bad to pay her back. " 
The donor generally said she felt positively about donation but she did have a problem with the scar which hadn't 
healed well She felt somewhat embarrassed about sunbathing because of the scar. 
5) Quality of lifie. 
John mentions having extra hair growth from the drug regimen which he says can be difficult for womcn, 
he describes himself as in continued good health though notes that his white blood cell count has gone up. 
The donor was in good health apart from problems relating to the scar. 
6) Other Aspects. 
John said he had no cultural or religious difficulties with the idea of transplantation. John does not agrcc 
with the buying and selling of kidneys. 
Interview 
Alan's brother lives in a different country and was not accessible for interview. 
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1) Quality of decision making. 
Alan begins by saying he had had rows with his dietician and problems of feeling not supported. He was on 
dialysis for 8- 10 weeks before transplant. He continues, "I had problems getting information from the 
hospital.. my G. P. didn't know a lot about it either.. and only found out from my wife that I was having a 
transplant. He continues by saying that on dialysis he, "felt left in the dark.... there was no real 
information. " He also felt that he got no support from the kidney patients association before and during 
dialysis about which he was, "a bit pissed off... No support whatsoever.. I never saw anybody.. apart from the 
renal unit itself. " He later says that he is "very angry and really disappointed" about the association. 
He later says, "when I had my transplant they came in, my brother was tested and then er.. the day before 
the operation I was told what was going to happen. I would have thought it would happen a lot earlier.. to 
actually explain what was going to happen. " I respond, "so you wanted to understand the process and how it 
works. " Alan replies, "oh yes exactly - still have - see how it would affect my brother. It was just 
explained the day before the operation-.. I would almost say there was a lack of communication there. You 
see patients when they get a kidney from a dead person it's all a rush but I think that it's been explained 
beforehand.. see I don't know I've never really spoken to them we've never had real contact.. we've been 
kept slightly separate. I think one of the things missing is communication... they really still haven't told 
me the implications for my brother. I thought hat there was something missing beforehand. Not just 
sitting there and being told by the nurse - you know it would have been nice if there had been a doctor 
there. " 
He continues by speaking of the need for a certain sort of communication. I respond, "it's more than 
something mechanical it's something personal. " Alan responds, "personal yes - mean it's umm, it's like 
when my renal function went down -I don't know if it's anything to do with it but my sex life went down 
for about 2 years but nobody actually told me (about the possibility of this happening, why it happened 
etc. )... I mean I was 34,35 then. It was a shock to me .. they never really ask about things like that until 
you come out with it... and you get no proper information from the doctors either. Alan later says that 
although be felt the service was very good technically he feels that one doctor treated his brother like a 
"piece of meat. " 
The match, Alan explained, was so good ("almost like twins") that he doesn't need cyclosporine. I 
asked, "I'm wondering how the process came about o your brother donating. " Alan replied that he had 
initially been asked by a doctor if he had a brother who might be willing to take a test and maybe give a 
kidney. He was too scared to ask his brother initially but then asked and his brother said yes. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Alan says that neither he or his brother have regrets about he donation. 
3) Quality of care. 
"Apart from that, " Alan says referring to the information, "the service here from the doctors and nurses 
has been excellent and then he later says, "what the hospital have done for me is superb. " 
4) Quality ofdonor - recipient relationship. 
Alan feels closer with his brother since the transplant. Alan also speaks about his relationship with his 
wife. He says that she gave him, "a hell of a lot of support. " They had some difficulties in their 
relationship through the strain of everything. 
5) Quality of life. 
Alan is not on cyclosporine and takes a relatively low level of drugs. I asked Alan, "do you value life more 
now? " He replied, "yes and no, I value my life itself yes. On the other hand I occasionally think living 
in England is depressing.. I like my fife. Life has a different meaning now... it means a lot more to me now. 
You see before everything was going down and you don't know it - you see it happens slowly.. itjust goes 
down slowly. " 
6) Other aspects. 
Alan says, "I had to pay my brother's air fare and salary which was about 2000 - in that case I had no support 
whatsoever.. If (my wife) hadn't been there I don't know what I would have done... The factory was 
extremely good to me. " He later adds that the money he forked out for his brother to come over to England 
to donate the kidney "really broke us" and he would have liked help from the hospital with this. Alan feels 
that LDT should be expanded - more publicized. 
[Note: the money he gave to his brother only covered expenses and it is doubtful that it could have acted as any 
kind of inducement]. 
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Tnterview 4 and 5 
The donor, Elizabeth, and the recipient, Marge, are sisters. They were interviewed at separate dates. 
Elizabeth came to the interview with her husband. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
'I'm going to give Marge says that Elizabeth was very keen to donate, "she kept on and on about it saying, 
you a kidney, ' and I said, 'no you are not, ' it all started before I knew anything about it... when my sister 
came up for tests she met a doctor in the passageway of the ward and he said, 'how are youT and she said I'm 
fine but I'm just beginning to wonder wh I openedmy bigmouthsowide' and he saidnow look if you have y 
any second thoughts the whole thingis, off. NowareyousureT andshesaid, 'ofcourselam' butIthought 
it was wonderful that having come so far they were quite prepared to stop if she had second thoughts. " 
I asked Elizabeth, "did your sister think about receiving a kidney through the donor card system? " 
responds that Marge's namewasonthe list, "they phoned up and shecouldn go at that 
time because she'd got an infection - which was just as well wasn't it - because apparently it was a 100% 
match - mine was with hers. "
Elizabeth said that after she had offered she had thought, "oh no I've opened my great big mouth again" 
but added that after she had thought about it she did not have any doubts. Elizabeth explains that their brother 
had said, 'you can have one of my kidneys: ' "so I said, 'well look you can have one of mine, ' because I 
didn't think he would go through with it anyway. Then it was sort of a matter of waiting and 6 months later 
I bad tests and we fixed up a date... It was funny really I didn't think about it it was just sort of a natural thing 
to do. I had complete faith in everybody here. " She continues, "I didn't think I might die, I mean people 
exist on one kidney. I expect it will be a bit uncomfortable afterwards but uhmm she's always done a lot 
for me and it seemed to be a natural thing to do. " I asked, "so what about the brother? " Elizabeth replied 
that, "oh well he's rather arrogant - he and his wife are hypochondriacs. They've always got something 
wrong with them and he says - well I don't really know I never really talked to him about it - but Marge 
said, 'oh ifs something to do with insurance so I said, 'oh! get his priorities right (ironic laugh)'... 
He just came in for the first blood test that they did. " 
Elizabeth was not that concerned about risks - she said, "you know people make such a great fuss about it 
but really ifs not such a great thing. People have operations all the time - in fact iCs better really because 
you are fit when you go in. You get over it quicker. " 
I ask, "were the risks and benefits and things explained to you by the doctors? " Elizabeth responds, 
"well I don't remember anybody saying anything about risks um - no they just told me straightforward this 
is what will happen and if they thought there was any risk at all they wouldn't have done it... " 
[Note: I find this comment a little confusing. Does Elizabeth know there are risks? She seems to have 
known that every operation has a risk, does she also know there may be a small extra risk in just having one 
kidney? ]. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Elizabetff said, "I never think it wasn't the right thing to do. " I ask Elizabeth if it was quite rewarding 
to see the kidney working straightaway in her sister. She replied, "yes. " She later says, "I can't 
say I would have done it for a complete s=ger, in fact I'm sure I wouldn't. " 
3) Quality of care. 
Referring to the ward Marge says, "they were really wonderful every one of them, they were so supportive 
- ifs like a family in there. I've never seen another ward quite like it. " Marge feels that her sister was 
discharged too soon. Elizabeth says, "what struck me when I came in was the enthusiasm of everybody hcre 
they were just marvellous. " She later adds, "I always felt hospitals were so impersonal but this one 
couldn't have been better. "
4) Quality of donor recipient - relationship. 
I asked Marge how the transplant affected her relationship with her sister she replied, "well ies a very big 
thing to do, I don't know if there are many people who would do that.. we have always got on well.. I 
think we are closer. " Marge also describes the support of her husband as very important in enabling her to get 
through it. 
,I ask Elizabeth 
if the transplant has, "changed your relationship with your sister at all? " She responds, 
no we've always been very close. " I continue, I wonder has it brought you closer at all? " 
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Elizabeth responds, "um, probably better understanding. We're not at all the same - we always have got on 
well together. She doesn't approve of a lot of the things I do but then her way of life wouldn't suit me. " 
5) Quality of life. 
Elizabeth describes not being able to sleep after the operation, she was only in for a week but continued to 
have a dull ache in her back for about a month. She describes her health now as "fine" - she is now 68. 
Marge said that she didn't realize until after the transplant what a low quality of life she had been having. She 
later says, "it was like being reborn, I never would have believed that even in the first few days I could... I 
mean one of the first sensations was of being warm - to be glowing whereas before I'd always been so 
cold. " Marge is on aziathioprine, prednisilone, blood pressure tablets and tablets for calcium in the 
blood (overactive thyroid) "that's nothing compared to what I was on she says. " Marge describes the 
transplant as tremendous. 
6) Other aspects. 
"Were there any financial difficulties? " I asked, Marge replies that her husband was initially turned down 
for attendance allowance but eventually got it. She adds that she is very positive about live donations as a 
whole. 
Marge feels that commercialization has dangers and her husband suggests, "I think it would be better left well 
alone really. " Elizabeth felt that it hadn't really affected her financially. She felt there was nothing 
wrong with a stranger donating or with commerce in donation - "somebody gets paid and saves someone 
else's life. " 
Elizabeth in common with two other people I have interviewed describes having hallucinogenic experiences. 
In her case she thought she was dead, "all these brightly coloured lights behind my eyes... I think it must 
have been the drugs.. ooh it was horrible. Just sort of coming and going and not being able to focus on 
anything. I thought God I'm dead! Trying to get back and then drifting off to sleep again. I really 
thought I was dead at one time because I couldn't get hold of anything. I was frightened I thought God this 
is horrible. Bright yellows, oranges and greens. But then I went to sleep again and of course by the time 
you wake up again you're back. Thank God! " I ask, "what were they doing just sort of flashing? " 
Elizabeth replies, "yes, in lines, greens and oranges and then people's voices and you'd be alright for a 
minute and everything would be sort of back then off you'd go again... I don't remember anything about 
Friday. " 
Interview 6 and 7. 
Reza, thedonor, has given to his brother Hassan. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
I asked Reza if the medical staff had told him about the risks and benefits of the operation. He responded, 
"oh yeh they did, yeb they did say that. I had done some study on it before going to England and as far as I 
know you can have a quarter kidney and if it works alright you'll be fine, there won't be any 
problem ... obviously you have to be careful what you drink -I have drunk whisky and still been fine but I think lager and soft drinks is the best - there's no problem I don't feel anything different. " 4 
I asked Hassan, "bow did you feel about the idea of having a live donation? " He responded, "obviously I 
resisted it because when I went on a kidney machine in 1978 1 didn't want to go ahead - if something goes 
wrong. But that (a living donation) was always on offer but I didn't accept it, then in 1980 1 had a 
transplant that failed and the complications afterwards, but I still resisted it for another 4 years but you get to 
a point mentally that you can't go on with dialysis, you feel weak. So really I was ready by 1984 lets put 
it this way! Id seen a lot of people who had done it - in Iran they only do relative transplants. It was 
almost a perfect match it was that close. It was a major decision but I've never seen a record of anyone 
dying from a live donation... So if you like this was a comforting thought and also you felt safe in their 
hands. My operation was very straightforward but his was massive. They had explained everything to him, 
he had made up his own mind. " Hassan also later expressed concern about the possibility of getting 
A. I. D. S through having another cadaver donation and preferred LDT in that he wanted to have "as little as 
possible drug wise. " 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
I asked Reza, "how do yo feel about what you have done? " He replied, "I'm quite happy if he's o. k. - 
that's my main point - not just me, my brother, my mother, my father (are important to me) ... the main 
point is that he be in good health he can do what be wants to do because he was on dialysis 3 or 4 days a 
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week and didn't have any sort of freedom - he had to dialyse one day and rest one day - now he's not doing that 
you know be's doing what he likes to do. Before he couldn't eat, he couldn't drink he couldn't do anything 
and now he does what he likes - that's my main point. " I continued, "do you feel happy in what you 
have done, leaving your brother aside? " Reza exclaims, "oh yeh, of course, really happy, very happy 
if I had one more extra I could give to somebody else. " 
3) Quality of care. 
I asked Reza, "what was it like with the doctors and nurses? " He responded, oh they were fantastic - 
they did look after us really good, take care of me and my brother. Always we did appreciate them, really 
good, no problem. " 
I asked Hassan what the care was like at the hospital he responded, "The care was good, when I was on a 
dialysis machine in 1978 it was very good -I don't know if it's changed or not today. It was a happy 
atmosphere that they tried to create. " 
4) Quality ofdonor - recipient relationship. 
Reza said, "... we are more closer than before. I mean obviously we are family from a different country and 
we are close to each other and it doesn't make any difference to us whether we don't give the kidney or give the 
kidney, we stay close, love each other very much. Just one thing Hassan doesn't drink and now he 
starts I don't know why maybe my kidney! It doesn't make any difference to us (donating the kidney in our 
relationship). " 
Hassan speaking of his relationship with Reza says, "I hadn't seen him for 8 years before the transplant 
but we are close. It's been an experience for the whole family I think - it's made us more aware of each other 
than before. Everybody went for blood tests, everybody was happy to do it (offer to be a donor) - shows 
me how much they care for me - that's the ultimate test isn't it! " 
5) Quality of life. 
No concerns expressed by Reza. Hassan says he has recently had a stomach ulcer for the first time. He 
takes herbal treatments to deal with some of the side effects of the immunosuppressive drugs. The kidney 
is still functioning well. 
6) Other aspects. 
asked, "were there any difficulties financially? Did you have to pay foryour trip over andeverything 
else? " Rezaresponded, "ohyesIdid, Idid. I mean I don'tmind. " "Was that quite difficult 
financially? " Icontinued. Rezaexplained, "well at that time I wasjust sL ngworking... but it wasn't ard 
hard. I did love to do it but whether you like it or not it's something to do in our family - in our tradition. " 
Hassan found that financial help was not available and said, "thaes part of what affected my decision 
originally (not to have a living donor transplant at that stage). " I asked Hassan whether Reza had 
had any financial difficulties ne responded, "well when he came he stayed with us and then it became 
dangerous for him to go back so he stayed with us. We had some monies so we Could manage. " [from 
the ensuing conversation it was clear that they worked quite interdependently helping each other out with 
money working as an extended family]. 
I asked, "how was it with the culture and religion - attitudes toward transplant? " Reza responds, 
well I was born a Muslim but I'm not quite in the way the Muslim people are I don't go to the mosque I 
don't pray -I don't do all these rules - in the Islam way you must do in the way to help them (people) 
whether you give them money or food or part of your body. There's no problem on that (being a living 
donor). They might come and encourage you to do it. " 
Reza recommends family living donors because he thinks they have good results but he also thinks that 
outside the fan-dly is o. k. Hassan would not put any restriction of which classes of person could donate. 
Tnterview 8 an 
1) Quality of decision making. 
The recipient, Andrew, was at the time of the donation a minor. The family all knew of the kidney 
trouble for a long time. Colin, the donor, is Andrew's father. He says that he, "had little fear about 
taking on the operation, only a little apprehension beforehand. " He explains that he knew that donation 
carried a risk but added that he, "wasn't really worried about that. " He did not go into further detail. Colin 
adds that Andrew might have to wait a long time for a cadaver. 
48 
Andrew said that his father had decided, "off his own bat" to donate - probably because "he cared a lot for 
all of the kids. " 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Andrew explains that he wasn't sure why be decided to donate but felt good about his decision. 
3) Quality of care. 
Colin said he was, "very satisfied" with the quality of care at Leicester and both he and Andrew remarked how 
much cleaner the hospital here was than those in London. Andrew said that there were, "no problems with 
care on the ward" and that he was "very happy with it. " He got worried though when he was called to 
the operating theatre at 3p. m. when his father had been called at 2 p. m. He was worried that something had 
gone wrong for his father. (Note: this was some problem in communication, that he was unaware that the 
operations would be back to back not simultaneous). 
4) Quality of donor - recipient relationship. 
Colin feels that he has always been close with all his kids though he thought that this experience 
had brought he and Andrew "a little closer. " Andrew expressed that he also felt a little closer. 
5) Quality of life. 
Andrew said that he was not suffering "many" side effects - the main one being hair growth. He is taking 
cyclosporine, aziathioprine and antibiotics. He felt that he was leading pretty much a normal life now. 
6) Other aspects. 
Colin said he had not been greatly affected financially because he still got his basic pay as a postman. 
Andrew said that be did not like the idea of buying and selling of organs as it might lead to queue jumping 
which he said was "unfair. " 
erview 10 and 
The recipient, Andrea, was a minor at the time of the transplant and still is now. Ilie donor, Julie, is her 
mother. I interview them together. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
Julie says that her daughter's kidney was deteriorating and the doctors had said there was nothing they could do 
and she'd live between 3 and 12 months. When I asked Julie if she had considered the cadaver option 
shejustreplied, "I didn't want to do that. " Julie feels that they were not told about all the side effects she 
mentions especially moon face. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Julie feels that the good sides outweigh the bad sides. 
3) Quality of care. 
Andrea says that since the operation things have been fine with the hospital and Julie says that she feels that, 
"the doctors have generally been marvellous. " 
4) Quality ofdonor - recipient relationship. 
Nothing is expressed, however there seems to have been some conflict or stress between the parents before 
the operation, Julie says that since the operation she feels closer to her husband. 
5) Quality of life. 
Julie mentions moon face and hair growth as two of the side effects. She says that her scar has healed well, 
she hasn't felt any problems from the operation and has been more concerned for her daughter. Andrea has to 
shave again. She had stopped growing for a time before the operation and has now started again. 
6) Other aspects. 
No other comments. 
W "- ! Ann I -%- 
Ile donor, David, and recipient, Anne, are brother and sister. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
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David describes the extent of Anne's illness and says, "It started really that my dad was going to offer his 
and I've always been terrified of anything to do with hospitals... but without any hesitation I put my name 
forward as well and it went from there. Obviously they went for me first because of me being a lot younger 
than me dad - me dad was only a last resort because of his age.... I had time off work - going backwards and 
forwards from the hospital, luckily I got time off work I never stopped and thought if they had said no. 
Alright I know she wouldn't have been able to survive without one but obviously I had a family and I had 3 
little girls. Well I suppose if it comes to it me family comes first it's got to be you know - it wouldn't have 
been the right thing to do and it'd be on my conscience whichever way. " Later he says, "really. the 
operation once I'd madernymind up I didn'tworry about itatall... I suppose the last 2 or 3 hours before 
the operation I did start to worry a bit. " 
David then goes into a recurrent theme of the interview which was his worry and concern that he would not get 
paid for his time off work and would be left short. "Luckily" he says he got full pay in the end and got 
insurance money to cover the mortgage as well, "butitcould have gonethe other way be a IrM c use me r 
wasn't forced to pay me any money. " He continues, "the main worry was I got no help from 
anybody, no advice no nothing. I think you know somebody could have done something for us. The 
hospital said they were going to and thendidn't do a damn thing. They never did get back to me 
(after I'd asked them about compensation) all they seemed to be concerned with was getting me in their 
and getting my kidney. Apart from that the way they looked after you was first class, no complaints apart 
from they didn't seem to take no interest apart from getting you in and getting your kidney. " I 
respond, "so you didn'y worry about what was going to happen technically but...? " David replies, 
"no because they told me you can function just as well on one as you can two... it was a bit - worry over 
money. " 
Later David adds, "the persons who said they were going to help on the financial side .. didn't get back to 
me. Doctors and nurses were o. k. when I was there but they never made no effort - it can be offputting. I 
was lucky but if it wasn't for work being as good as they were and me being lucky - you don't get no social 
security or anything like that because it's self inflicted (social security is available but obviously he wasn't 
aware). Anybody else it could have put them off doing it. I think it would have done me at a different 
time.. When they ask people to donate to me they ought to have an adviser there because there's certainly 
nobody outside to help. " David later adds that he had lost a promotion at work because the hospital 
had not organized any early date despite being specifically asked to. 
David also later speaks of his sister's husband who wouldn't donate, "alright he! s terrified of hospitals but I 
don't see how he can be any more terrified than me - he said point blank that he wasn't going to give her a 
kidney. Well that didn't go down too well with me. " I respond softly, "you felt angry did you? " 
David says, "I did - ifs his flipping wife! I thought it was right selfish of him as far as I was concerned - 
his whole attitude. " 
In some sense it could be said the donor had been cornered into doing something that he felt it was somone else's 
responsibility to do but although be had negative feelings he also had positive one's. Ibe interview with 
Helen, therecipientý yielded some interesting information on this point. She was uncertain whether the 
donor had in fact donated freely. She also said she was no longer motivated to have sexual relations with her 
husband which she attibuted to the fact of donation. However it could be that his failure to offer to donate was 
what was really putting her off in terms of that failure perhaps indicating to her a lack of love. The interview 
with her intimated some unexpressed anger toward him and coldness emanating from this. Her choice not to 
engacre in sexual relations seemed to be a point blank refusal based on deteriorated relationship rather than any 
physiologically (transplant) influenced lessening of sexual desire [although this may also have been present]. 
Helen also discussed the problems she now had with her eyes and felt that she had not been told that problems 
with her sight could increase as a consequence of the operation. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
I askedDavid, "do you feel good about your decision? " Hereplies, "wellyes because theymightnot 
have got her one in time otherwise - she could have been gone by now, itwasas bad as that really, butnow 
she's going to be around for 7 years or so. " 
17he recipient had a worsening sight condition after the operation which she attibuted to the transplant and felt 
that she had not been sufficiently informed about beforehand as a possibility. Shehadadiabctcscondidon 
which appeared to connect into the eye condition. There was clear evidence that she was fairly depressed in 
some ways and it did not appear that she was enjoying her life much in terms of the strained relationships with 
family and the very bad sight. 
so 
3) Quality of care. 
Both donor and recipient were generally happy with the quality of care. 
4) Quality ofdonor recipient relationship. 
I asked David, I was wondering has it changed your relationship with your family and your sister? " 
David replies, "we've been a close family - it probably made a difference with my sister. She was 
showering me - she thinks she owes me now but as far as I am concerned she doesn't owe me nothing. She 
doesn't owe me a thing. " I continued, "how does it feel when she goes around getting things for you? " 
David, "weU she doesn't now but she brought a few expensive pieces. There's no need -I felt as if, well in 
a way guilty. She's my sister, she's family. I would have done it for anybody in the family - you would, 
everybody would. " 
5) Quality of life. 
David took only one week to get out of hospital. he describes the only problem with his health as, I feel 
the cold more.. I got septic a lot - working with meat - never went septic before the operation - somehow 
the slightest scratch and I go septic. At one stage at work I had seven fingers go septic. I kept going 
back and I rang up Leicester and had some tests at Boston and they couldn't find nothing wrong anyway I 
found out what it was in the end - the glands. Apart from that no after effects no side effects, no nothing. " Later David adds, "as far as the operation goes I didn't realize a big operation could be so simple. To 
me I was just so surprised - going into the hospital, waking up after the operation and within about 24 hours I was out and about walking - if I had 3 kidneys and had to do it again I would do. " 
David says of his sister, "she's a lot more mobile, she's a lot more healthier. She lost her eyesight 
through it though (can see only about 25% now) but she's bad problems with her eyesight for a few 
years now. She is virtually blind, she can see day ftom night and can read when things are right close up 
to her. She has her good days and her bad. She's been told it will never come back. They don't think it 
wiU deteriorate any more. " (she has diabetes and both eye and pancreatic problems are connected with thaL) 
Despite these suggested improvements it appeared that the recipient was in a state of depression: and that 
whatever the improvements in her life they were all relative and the overwhelming impression was that she was 
not enjoying her life. 
6) Other aspects. 
No cultural or religious difficulties with the idea of donation for David. He basically does not agree with buying and selling but adds that everybody has their price and it depends on your situation. 
Interview 
-14. 
Interview with Sandra whose donor father is abroad and could not be interviewed. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
Sandra was only dialysing for 3 weeks before the operation. I ask, "did your fatherjust offer immediately? " 
She replies, "yes, he did. " I continued, "how do you sort of feel about his decision? " Sandra 
responded, I didn't really think about it at the time it was as if I didn't have a choice in the matter. I mean I 
always accepted my father's word - that was part of our family and umm.. it was only after the operation 
that I realized what he'd been through. I mean it was just one of those things he had to do and that was it. No questions asked. " I asked, "did he seem to do it automatically or... " Sandra confirms, "yes, yes... 
I was his one and only child and that was it. He wanted to see me around a bit longer 
. 
(she laughs. ). " 
I questioned, "did you discuss at all, with the doctors or your father, having a kidney from a cadaver? " 
Sandra said, "no, not at all -I think because all the tests my father was going through everything was 
looking alright, we never even touched upon it. " 
I asked, "what did they explain to you about what was involved with the operation - was it a set of things . they explained about risks and benefits, what might happen? " Sandra responded, "just before Dr.. was 
explaining to me how much better I'd be and all that and yes he did mention that if anything went wrong 
it would be my father that they helped to keep alive - they wouldn't jeopardize his life. No they didn't go into 
too much detail on that score - not really. I know they did with my father - he had a good Ltking to and said, 
'don't say anymore it'll put me off - if it happens it happens that's it. ' That's the way I felt as well. " I 
responded, "did they say anything about the drugs at all - about any side effects. " Sandra responds "no" 
and says that she had weight problems with the steroids and regaining her appetite post - transplant. She 
adds that she would have liked to have had some kind of exercise routine and physiotherapy. 
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An alternative living donor could have been Sandra! s mother but she did not seem to be testcd or seriously 
considered. Later in the interview Sandra says that she thinks her mother would not have bccn able to cope 
with being a donor. Sandra has no brothers or sisters. 
2) Feelings after the donation. 
Nothing to add. 
3) Quality of care. 
I asked, "how did you find the doctors and the nurses and the medical care? " Sandra rcspondcd, 
"oh the medical care was wonderful. I mean often when you are in hospital you do get your up's and down's 
they all expected it, they were all very good. " Was it quite a relaxed atmosphere? " I inquircd. 
Sandra said, "yes I was in a room of my own and I felt it was my own little world. " 
4) Quality ofdonor recipient relationship. 
I asked, "was it strange the idea of having someone else's kidney - how did it feel? " Sandra said, "no, 
that didn't enter my mind at all. I Suppose it was something I needed to get well and be well and I never gave 
I continued, "do you think that it was strange when you reflect back? Sandra that a second thought. " 
responded, "uhurn, yes really - perhaps if it hadn't been my dad - if it bad been an unknown perhaps I would 
have thought about it more. It would certainly feel foreign then wouldn't itl" Sandra later says that she 
feels a lot closer to her father since the operation and thinks that is partly through the experience they have 
gone through together. 
Sandra described there being stresses and strains with her own family - she had continued to work full time 
and was very tirewd each evening when she got home from work and just wanted to flop down on the sofa and 
watch T. V. "a man is different yes you can work full time - you don't have to come home and do all the 
housework and start again you know" I replied, "so you had 2 full time jobs! " Sandra agreed, "ooh 
yeh, it was hard going, " and added that they would have been in financial difficulty had one of them 
stopped working. 
5) Quality of life. 
Sandra said that the operation went "smoothly. " She describes problems of weight which she says have 
remained. Sandra says that she values life more and feels that she definitely has a better quality of lift. 
6) Other aspects. 
I asked, "did it affect you financially at the time or your father? " Sandra answered no withregard to her 
father and continued, "I've been with the bank 10 years so I was entitled to 6 months sick leave with full 
pay so there was no real problem. " 
Sandra talked of there being "so much renal failure about these days. I don't know why; is it because we 
have got a different diet these days? (she asked rhetorically)" 
She adds that she wouldn't personally have taken a kidney from a friend, "if anything happened to them I'd feel 
so guilty. " 
She feels that doctors should decide transplant policy but that where money is involved there should be 
restrictions. 
Interview 15 and 16. 
in this instance the donor and recipient both came to the interview with their partner. Mark the donor came 
with his wife Helen. John the recipient comes with his wife Karen. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
Mark said, "there was a possibility that we'd be compatible. Basicany thought that it was a good idea. 
went through all the procedures to get checked out and that's it really. We discussed it betwccn 
ourselves to see what we should do (he says turning to his wife). " I asked, "were you worried? " "no, it's fair to say I wasn't worried at all -I had tota. belief ne fact tha d tors wou dn Mark replied, Ii th t oc I 't 
entertain it unless there was a good chance, and that they wouldn't do anything to me that they'd fcCI I couldn't 
cope with. I must admit that as it got a bit nearer me wife was feeling a bit worried - it was a lot harder for her. Helen comes in at this point saying, "I think what made it hard for us was that the 
hospital is 79 miles away - we had to come and stay in a hotel (she and John's wife) there were no facilitics for 
us to stay. " 
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Mark says that one of his two brothers had children which was a factor in them not donating. (Note: I am 
not clear why the other brother did not seem to be involved. Certainly however Mark and John look almost 
Re twins and were probably the best match. ) 
Mark added that he felt the hospital had explained to him about the time he may have to take off work after 
the operation. I continued, "what did you understand about the risks involved, what was told to you? " 
He replied, I do believe the doctors really tried to make you aware -I wouldn't say they tried to put you off 
but all the way through the tests it was pointed out to you what you were doing. " 
John says that he was on dialysis for about 2 months and during this time Mark was having blood tests for 
donation purposes. John said that the decision came from Mark himself, "I was on dialysis and Mark said 
I could have one of his kidneys. " I asked, "did you consider the idea of a cadaver? " John responded, 
"well I don't think it came into it -I would have had one. With Mark offering me his kidney it gave me 
a chance to have a better life sooner sort of thing rather than waiting 3 or 4 years maybe for another one. " 
John said of the hospital staff, "if you ask questions they'll always tell you - they've always got time for 
you - you can phone them up and they say if you don't think your right come in. " His wife adds, "the only 
complaint I've got about the whole thing - you only get a bit of paper and you read it and they tell you so 
much don't they - but you have said since that there's a lot of things that if you had known you would have 
never maybe gone for it - but there again you had your ups and downs didn't you. " John continues, "trouble 
is they get you in and boost you up and say here's the kidney - and we thought'that'll be alrighe then you 
have the transplant and like you say it gees punctured - why did it happen to me sort of thing when 
they said the kidney was a good kidney. They didn't know why the kidney ruptured anyway. " 
2) Feelings aj? er the donation. 
Mark said it was a bit of a shock when John's new kidney ruptured and he was "upset" but later he adds that 
put in the same situation again he would donate again. He feels that people made quite a fuss over him and 
adds that he thinks most people in his position would do the same thing. He is not sure whether he would 
have given a kidney to a stranger though. 
3) Quality of care. 
Mark feels that the atmosphere was very personal in the renal unit and says that the doctors and nurses were 
"very good" I asked John, "how did you find all the doctors and nurses on the ward? " He replied, "oh 
they were brilliant, we couldnt wish anything better. " John's wife adds, "even me who was not a patient - 
they didn't leave you out and itwasjust as if you were in a family, sofriendly. " 
4) Quality ofdonor recipient relationship. 
Mark feels that there's not much change in his relationship with John then adds, "I do feel that we are 
slightly further apart - not to any effect really - not that we've got problems. I'm still closer to him than 
the other two brothers. "
John feels that there has been no change in his relationship with Mark. John's wife adds that since having 
Mark's kidney John has a cup of coffee now and again which he never used to. 
5) Quality of life. 
Mark describes still having, "partial rungs along the scar and I get a twinge. I was a bit sore for a while. " 
John speaks of 2 rejection episodes the first of which he was in hospital 6 weeks for the second II days. 
The first time his kidney was quarterized and he lost around a third of it. Of the drugs John says, "I got 
a side reaction but as soon as they started lowering the cyclosporine it went away" he also says his hands 
may be getting colder Lhan usual in response to me asking if aziaLhioprine had been having any effect. 
John is now working as a full time houseworker and adds about paid work that he couldn't do it full time at 
least, "not at the job I was doing which was a fence erector which was fairly physical. " He later adds, 
I think the ruptured kidney did me more than anything confidence wise I think for a start you've always got 
that thing in the back of your mind if there's a twinge in your side. If nothing had happened to the kidney 
when I first got it I might be in a better frame of mind. " His wife adds, "since you've had this operation 
our sex life has gone to zilch because you've lost all - you don't have a great deal of feeling do you. " 
John says, "umm. " She continues, "and all these little things ought to be pointed out so that when they 
come it's not a frightening thing - oh no why have have you lost your sex drive - that causes more of a 
problem. We can't do anything about that we just struggle on don't we. I mean we don't care about that 
but some people might. I think you've got to know the in's and out's, counsel like the. donor or the 
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recipient and the family - like his father is a born worrier.. he's an epileptic and he really went hot over IL. If i He th as a we mention the thoughts of John going back to work I think he'd have a lairy fIL inks John hhd 
something big. I do think counselling would be a good thing... all the way through. " 
[Note: loss of sexual desire may have been a purely physiological consequence of the operation but may 
alternatively have been a consequence of change in the psychology of the relationship between the recipicnt and 
his wife. The swapping of job roles with him now doing domestic duties may have been experienced by him 
as esmaculation. There is in reality nothing intrinsically esmaculating about this change of roles but it can bc 
experienced this way influenced by societal pressure in this direction. Additionally she appeared dominecring of 
him in the interview and even'putting him down. ' This could even more be experienced as emasculation with 
dimunifion of sexual desire through repression of feelings such as anger towards her about being trcatcd that 
way, a feeling of ineptness and low self-esteern'through not being able to fully stand up for himself at this 
time]. 
Although John feels he's been up and down about having a transplant he now feels happy. His wfic says. 
"transplants are brilliant. " 
6) Other aspects. 
Mark said that it had been hard financially for John and his wife. John in his interview also says this and 
adds that be and his wife have swapped roles with her now being the main "breadwinner" and him 
doing the housework. Both John and his wife are against the buying and selling or organs - Johnsays, 
"that's going too far. " 
Interview 17 and 18 
james received an organ from his sister Melanie. 
1) Quality of decision making. 
James, therecipient, describes how it was difficult for him and his family to cope while he had all the heal th 
problems, "I didmiss outaloton one of my daughters being achild. " "It's been a strain on my family, 
before the transplant I came in because I couldn't stop being sick and that was probably the worst time. I was 
trying to keep it down and all they were doing was trying to inject people which didn't do any good at afl. The 
doctors seemed to have no time for me. I also feel that thafs wrong today. I felt that when I came to the 
clinic you got to know one doctor and all of a sudden he'd gone and a new doctor came along and he knew 
nothing about you and every time I felt I had to impress on the new doctor my capabilites of doing 
things. You had to get the message over again, again and again. That could be improved upon ..... I'm one 
of those people who likes to ask questions, it was frustrating. There was only one doctor who didn't talk 
down to you. They don't explain - sometimes you are left in the dark. " 
Melanie expressed that she was "happy with her decision" and did not feel obligated to donate but did it because 
she wanted to. She was in general very satisfied with the quality of information and communication. She had 
donated because she wanted to help him out of his situation. 
ý2) Feelings after the donation. 
Melanie was somewhat concerned after getting pregnant shortly after the donation but this did not present a 
problem in practice. 
3) Quality of care. 
, Melanie was happy with the quality of care. James expressed concerns about the attitudes of medical staff on 
the ward. 
4) Quality ofdonor recipient relationship. 
James ays, "I've never been close to my sister. I don't go and see her. now. Ile main reason is that hcr 
husband smokes.... I feel as though I owe her a great debt but I don't have to repay it. I can't get near to hcr 
because of the smoking -I can't put up with that. Can't be in the same room. I go and see them now and 
again. They don't smoke in my company. " James "doesn't know" why his sister donated - "she ncvcr told 
me" "I'd love to be closer to her" he adds. Melanie was concerned about James, feeling that he had got 
more "uptight" about things and somewhat fanatical. There was friction about the smoking. 
5) Quality of life. 
james said, "after the transplant I felt well straightaway. " Later he talks about feeling he hasdeprcssion 
saying he doesn't, "know the reasons for it.... I have no time to myself whether that is causing iny 
depression I don't know. Thing is you know your depressed but you can't do anything about it - or you don't 
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want to. " He connects it with the fact that be is taking drugs which involve suppression of his immune 
system, "that's one thing I can't understand I've been given a new life but I'm not happy. The reason I think 
it's the tablets is that I can be in the shop one day and I can be on such a high and I can joke and this that and 
the other. From being on such a high for half a day I'm right down a gravel pit - real mood swings. 
That's the side I don't like because the highs don't last long enough. So really the depressions are more 
and more frequent and it's becoming more long term. The other side of it is that when you are in hospital 
you're here so often with one thing or another with dialysis and now I don't feel a part of it anymore. When 
you are in hospital you are like part of a large family but I now feel cut off from it. You don't feel part of the 
]pace anymore and you lose contact with patients. I do feel doctors haveif t got enough time for you. It's 
not the patients problem that the doctor has only got 5 minutes for you. That's got to be sorted. The 
biggest fear is that if ever my transplant packs up what do I do? " Apart from these more psychologically 
oriented aspects of health James says, "I've been very well so far. " 
Melanie did not express any problems with her physical health in connection with the donation. 
6) Other aspects. 
Nothing added. 
vie 
1) Quality of Decision Making. 
The recipient Mick was 17 years old and started feeling rough all the time. Problems started from there with 
diagnosis of kidney disease. The transplant has lasted for 7 years. He felt that they had been told about risks 
including the possible side effects of drugs. 
Jim the donor (Mick's father) alikened donation to something instinctive "it was like if you had a child that was 
drowning you'd jump in to save them even if you couldn't swim. " He had made the decision almost 
immediately. (This doesn't ake into account the possibility of cadaveric "life savers" however, although it 
must be added that the recipient was young and had already been on the waiting list for 18 months). The donor 
said he hadn't been concerned about the risks "only about helping (the recipient) get right. " 
2) Feelings after the Donation. 
The donor's recovery involved only a7 day stay in the hospital after donation. 
3) Quality of Care. 
Both felt it was like being in "a big family. " The quality of care was "Al-like a hotel. " 
4) Quality of Donor Recipient Relationship. 
Both said there relationship was unaffected by the donation, although the donor's wife had worried about the 
donation. 
5) Quality of Life 
No problems were detailed by the donor. The recipient had had a rejection crisis and although it was a good 0 match the expectancy of graft survival was down because the kidney had black spots on it which the doctors said 
were related to the recipient smoking. The recipient noted the fact that 20 years previously he would have died. 
6) Other aspects. 
Both the donor and recipient were opposed to the idea of commercialization because it could be exploitative. 
The recipient had hallucinations which he found like near death experiences. He had seen an angel come down 
and bad felt that the T. V. was on when it wasn't and was able to predict exactly what was going to come on 
T. V. next. He had found this experience frightening and had tried to tell himself to "snap out of it" 
Interview 21-and 22 
1) Quality of Donor Recipient Relationship. 
Mark, the recipient, had Allports Syndrome leading to renal failure which precluded his brother from donating 
as he bad it also. The donor, John, was the recipients father. He had actually approached the hospital about 
the possibility of living donation. The recipient's mother had pulled out of the tests. No reason was given. 
The recipient's brother was coping far better with CAPD which was the reason why the recipient was chosen to 
receive the living donor organ. That decision was actually taken by the recipient's brother. It was a fairly 
major discussion in the family. "The risk part to me was paramount, to me I can understand his feeling of 
wanting to help his sons and I didn't want that to jeopardize his life by really being selfish as I saw it by taking 
that kidney. We'd been on the waiting fist for 18 months. The decision was really taken by my father and 
The recipient was out of the hospital 14 days after the operation and at work within 10 wccks. Mcdcscribes 
his health as fantastic. The change was miraculous. The recipient fears that the transplant will not last and 
hopes that medical technology has further advanced by the time it does, so that there will be an aftcrnatim 
He gets concerned when there are twinges. 
6) Other Aspects. 
There were financial concerns at the time relating to taking time off work. The donor-faLher was back working 
fairly shortly after the operation however. He ran a pub which put a pressure on his wife because she had to 
look after everything for a while. The recipient added that this had a positive effect of accelerating his parents 
giving up the pub which they had intended to anyway. The recipient and his brother were "fortunate" to be 
working for good companies where there pay was not affected. He didn't expect the hospital to help out 
financially and said if he had needed financial support hat would be the role of social security. The recipient 
paid for extra staff to cover at his parenfs pub during the period of illness. 
Recipient feels LDT is a good thing provided it doesn't put the donor at risk. Docsn'tagrce with recipient 
giving money to the donor because it affects judgment when money comes into the equation but be feels it Is 
o. k if the recipient wants to reward the donor in some way - it should totally be the choice of the recipient. 
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brother because at the time they recognized that I was in greater need. " This also related to it being easier for 
the recipients brother to continue jobwise. His concerns about the process related to the fact that donor 
nephrectomy was a complicated procedure, more so than the operation was for the recipient. "Anybody having 
surgery voluntarily is an idiot basically (laughing)! but I can recognize why he did it. " 
The recipient didn't feel donation involved a debt when it was done between family and knew his father didn't see 
it that way "in some ways he's glad to have the opportunity to prove his love. " The recipient feels 
"gratitude-respect.. but not debt. " 
The recipient said that he asked the doctors about the risks but their response was minimal. He felt that if they 
had said any more it would have warned him off. He thought that there was never any way any kind of ethical 
doctor would do that operation if there was any risk. "So really the doctor's being the expert, saying it was a 
safe operation then my faith was in them. Medically the doctors had said we could withstand that operation and 
their was minimal risk and so I had every confidence in them .... He's come through it with no problems at all. " 
The donor recounted the same story and then spoke of his motivation for donation "when I first volunteered for 
transplant I had two long interviews .. the first two he was making quite sure I was absolutely serious about it before he went to stage 3. When it got to stage 3 he said'well fine we'll go ahead but whose to have the 
kidney .. and I said well surely that's a medical decision for you not for me but I think (the final recipient) is the 
most ill and we discussed it at home and (the cadaver ecipient) said (the living donor recipient) is quite ill and 
should have the kidney ... Then I had a final interview with... who explained all the surgical circumstances risks 
whatever and explained the same thing to the recipient ... It was explained what was going to happen.. They went to a great deal of trouble to ensure I knew what was going to happen and I felt quite happy about that... I thought 
there approach was extremely good.. l had absolutely no inhibitions about it at all-The only inhibitions as far as (my son the recipient) was concerned was the physical aspect of the surgery he just doesn't like knives. Ihada 
problem in the surgery apparently. I was warned about this that I had a shortjaw and a narrow throat and they 
might have a problem but they'd get over that. Apparently I nearly didn't .. once they switched the ventilating system off I didn't start breathing again.. I was in intensive care for 24 hours apparently but it didn't have an 
effect on me .. I was up and about in a couple of days. 
2) Feelings ajler the donation. 
Nothing to add. 
3) Quality of care. 
The recipient felt that they hadn't done a very good job with his brother. He feels the hospital don't manage 
very well when something is going wrong "the ho , spital 
don't seem to want to get involved... In cases like my brother be needs one to one attention.. at the moment it's the hospital versus him and it shouldn't be that way. He's got to have an allay in hospital that he can say to 'look I'm just not happy' - someone thaCII take things up 
on his behalf. " He sees a conflict of interest between the business side of the hospital and the caring for people 
side "the only thing a patient can do is to kick up a fuss and make a nuisance of themselves.. thats the only way that he and I feel we can get what we want. " 
The donor also commented that while one or two doctors were very responsive others were not. He commented 
that there was no drive on the ward with itjustseeming to bean apathetic waiting period for transplant. He 
says with regard to his son receiving a cadaveric organ that he has "a very very severe crificism.. he had gone in for a check-up after saying things were wrong and the doctor didn't do anything about iL. it annoyed me.. the 
nurse said I'll see you in three weeks timeJ said'you can't leave him for three weeks without some attention 
and monitoring it's ridiculous and she more or less said well that's the system. So we waited and he was quite ill over christmas and we brought him in.. he saw one doctor who said it was depression at that time he'd lost 
nearly another stone at home ... Took him home on the Friday and on the Monday he looked that bad that we 
called the local doctor and he said 'well he's obviously very ill' so he rang the hospital and arranged for him, to 
come in on the tuesday .. we brought him in at 11 and he could hardly stand and this is the big criticism I've got 
we went to the reception area and the sister said go back to the waiting room and he could hardly stand so I went 
to the waiting room and I said well I'm not waiting any longer.. and.. came and said what on earth is the matter 
and I said 'we've been wating nearly an hour now and look at him so she immediately took him into her room.. 
and fetched the nurse and this little nurse I'm sure she saved his life she looked at him ... (and found) he'd been on the wrong bags (for dialysis) for a fortnight... and the doctor who had seen him previously had said it was 
depression 1 
4) Quality of Donor Recipient Relationship. 
Nothing to add. 
5) Quality of Life 
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Appendix 3: EUROTOLD Professional Questionnaire Materials. 
This appendix provides copies of the 2 major EUROTOLD professional questionnaircs discusscd In 
chapter 9 of the PhD and a full copy of the results relating to them. 
3A: Ouestionnaires. 
3A(i): Attitudes Questionnaire 
(spaces for answers have been condensed question 13 considering clinical matters Is 
omitted). 
A 55 year old patient is brought to your clinic to discuss living donor transplantation. Ile has 
been on dialysis for 2 years and has not been offered a cadaver kidney. Ile has no suitable 
fan-dly donors but he brings with him a 40 year old friend who has offered to donate a kidney. 
Would you: 
(a) tissue type and investigate the potential donor 
(b) refuse to consider the transplant 
2. A 50 year old Asian man with diabetic renal failure has been on dialysis for 5 years and Is 
starting to get retinopathy. He has not been offered a cadaver kidney. He has no suitable or 
willing donors in his immediate family. He wants to go to India to have a kidney from an 
unrelated donor. 
Should you: 
(a) let him go 
(b) offer him a blood group compatible cadaver kidney 
(c) leave him on the waiting list 
3. A 36 year old patient with chronic renal failure treated by haemodialysis for 2 years. Assuming 
comparably matched kidneys the ideal donor would be: 
(a) cadaver 








4. A 45 year old female with chronic renal failure (very recently diagnosed) attends at your centre 
with her 50 year old brother who is prepared to donate one of his kidneys to her. lie Is a6 
antigen match. There is currently no good matched cadaver kidney available. 
Would you 
(a) accept the brother now as a donor 
(b) wait for a cadaver kidney to become available. 
If you answered (b) to the above, please answer the following question. 
How long would you wait for a well matched cadaver kidney before using the brother as a 
living donor? 
(a) One year 
(b) Two years 







(d) Four years El 
(e) Five years 13 
M Longer 0 
5. A 20 year old student is about to start University when he is diagnosed as having renal failure. 
His creatinine is 500 and he will need to start dialysis in about 6 months. His parents both offer 
to donate kidney. His mother is a4 antigen match and his father is medically unfit due to 
hypertension. 
Would you: 
(a) transplant the mothers kidney prior to starting dialysis 0 
(b) wait until he had been on the cadaver list for 6 months 
before considering a parent donor 0 
(c) wait 2 years on dialysis before considering a parent donor C3 
A 70 year old female with ESRF is having difficulty coping with CAPD. She has good cardiac 
function and is not sensitised. Her 75 year old husband is blood group compatible and offers to 
donate a kidney. The patients 50 year old daughter also offers to donate a kidney, she is a4 
antigen match but has a resting BP of 150190. 
Would you accept: 
(a) the spouse donor 
(b) the daughter as donor after antihypertensive treatment C3 
(c) reject both living donors and leave on the cadaver waiting list 13 
7. A 14 year old boy has been on haernodialysis for 3 years but is experiencing severe 
psychological problems with needling. He is unsuitable for CAPD as a result of previous 
urological surgery as an infant. His mother is a single parent with three other children, one of 
them being his identical twin. The patient reacts strongly to mother on cytotoxic cross match as 
a result of previous transfusion. 
Would you: 
(a) transplant a kidney from the twin 
(b) await a good cadaver match 0 
(c) await a blood group compatible cadaver graft. 0 
A 40 year old builder is about to start dialysis. 11is two brothers offer to donate a kidney. Both 
are equally matched. 
Which of the two would you favour: 
(a) Brother aged 3 8, unmarried and longterm unemployed 
(b) Brother aged 56, married with 2 children and in employment 
9. A 20 year old man has been on dialysis for three years and is not coping well. I-lis only living 
relative is his mother who is willing to donate but has diet controlled diabetes. Would you: 
(a) accept the maternal donor kidney El 
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(b) leave the patient on the cadaver waiting list 0 
10. A 37 year old male with diabetic renal failure has been on dialysis for 5 years and Is starting to 
get retinopathy. He has a brother who is a3 antigen match. Tbcre are no other suitable family 
donors apart from his father who is aged 55 and a3 antigen match. 
Would you 
(a) transplant the brother's kidney 0 
(b) transplant he father's kidney 0 
(c) leave on the cadaver waiting list 0 
A 45 year old female has been on dialysis for 2 years without an offer of a cadaver kidney. 7be 
following are all willing living donors please rank the potential donors in order of preference. 
(a) Daughter age 25 with a4 antigen match 
(b) Husband (40 year old) who is blood group compatible only 
(c) Sister with 3 dependent children and a4 antigen match 
lst choice 13 
2nd choice El 
3rd choice C) 
Leave on the cadaver waiting list 0 
12. A 36 year old female patient with 3 children aged 18,10 and 8 is having difficulty coping with 
regular haemodialysis. Her husband, eldest child and sister are all willing potential donors, 
please rank these potential in order of preference. 
(a) Her husband aged 38. He is a fit self-employed builder and is blood group compatible with 
wife. 
(b) Her 18 year old son is well and is a4 antigen match. 
(c) Her sister is a6 antigen match but has 4 dependent children 
and is recently divorced. 
ist choice 13 
2nd choice 
3rd choice C3 
Leave on the cadaver waiting list 0 
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3A(ii): Transplant Centre Questionnaire 
(spaces for answers have been condensed) 
Please indicate your speciality and grade: 
Surgery 13 Ncphrology 
Other speciality 
Consultant 








This questionnaire has been designed by the EUROTOLD project to gain background information about 
transplant centres. 
Your responses are entirely confidential and you will not be required to identify yourself by name. 
This questionnaire is being administered in many hospitals both in the UK and continental Europe, the 
results will be available towards the end of the project in December 1995. 
If you have any questions about this questionnaire or about the project in general please contact the 
Secretariat 
Our NEW telephone and fax numbers are: 
Tel. +44 116 258 8080 
Fax. +44 116 249 0064 
For Office use only 
Centre Code: 
1. What is the catchment population (in millions) of your local renal transplant centre? 
2. How many patients do you currently have on you transplant waiting list? 
3. When did your unit first perform cadaver kidney transplants? 
4. How many cadaver kidney transplants has your unit performed since the programme started? 
5. How many cadaver kidney transplants did the unit perform in 1993? 
1994 
6. What was your transplant rate per million population in 1993? _ 
1994 
cl Anaesthesia Cl 
7. Do you have a living donor transplant programme? 
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Yes cl 
When did your unit first perform a living donor kidney transplant? 
How many living donor kidney transplants have you performed in total? 
How many living donor transplants did you perform in 1993? - 
1994? 
No cl 
8. If the answer to question 7 is no, have you had one in the past? 
No C) Yes C3 why has it been discontinued? 
9. Do you foresee the expansion of a living donor kidney transplant programme at your ccntre? 
Yes cl No cl Maybe 0 Under what 
circumstances7 
10. Does the law of your country prevent the use of living donors? 
Yes 0 No El 
When do you consider patients for cadaver transplantation? 
Before dialysis is needed? 
When dialysis is needed? 
Only after patient has been on dialysis for a certain length of time? 
please specify how long 
ONLY ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF YOU HAVE 
A LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANT PROGRAMME 
12. Do you have written guidelines on the use of living donors ? 
No C3 Yes C3 Would it be possible to have a copy? 
13. Do you have a written protocol that is used for the evaluation of the donor? 
No C3 Yes C3 Would it be possible to have a copy? 
14. When would you consider the use of a living donor transplant? 
Before dialysis is needed? 
When dialysis is needed? 
When a patient is put on the cadaver transplant waiting list? 
Only after patient has been on the waiting list for a certain length of 
C3 





15 Who would you consider as potential donors? 
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Parent C3 Grandparent C) 
Sibling C3 Son/daughter 11 
Spouse C3 Friend 0 
Relatives through marriage 0 Others 0 
please specify 
16. How do you identify prospective donors? 
Patient approaches members of their family C3 
Spouse or parent of patient approaches members of the patient's family C3 
Transplant coordinator approaches members of the patient's family C3 
A member of the nephrology staff approaches members of the patient's family 0 
Others please specify 0 
17. Who is the primary source of information to donors and recipients about living donor 
transplantation in your centre? 
18. Are there any other sources of information available? 
19. Who discusses with the donor 
(a) the potential benefits or alternatives for the recipient 
(b) the potential risks involved for the donor? 
(a) 
(b) 
20. Are there any other sources of information relating to the items in question 18 available such as 
leaflets, pamphlets, videos, support groups? 
21. Are the financial implications discussed with the donor? 
Yes 0 No 0 By whom? 
22. Is there any financial help available for donors? 
No 13 Yes C3 Please xplain 
ONCE A PATIENT HAS EXPRESSED A WISH TO CONSIDER A TRANSPLANT 
FROM A LIVING DONOR WHAT PROTOCOL DO YOU FOLLOW? 
23. Who do you ABO-blood type first, second, third ? 
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Genetically related family members ri 
Non-genetically related family members C1 
Others please specify who ri 
24. Do you tissue type and cross match all prospective donors that have an ADO-blood match? 
Yes 0 No 0 If no, how do you select donors at this stage? 
25. Do you require a minimum level of HLA matching between donor and recipient? 
No El Yes 0 please specify 
26. Could you place a tick against the procedures you routinely give to prospective donors? 
a. History and physical examination - 
0 
b. Complete blood count -0 
C. Comprehensive blood chemistry - 
0 
(Na. K. Cl. C02- Ca. Blood urea Nitrogen. 
Creatinine. Cholesterol. Triglyceride. 
Phosphate. Total bilirubin. Alkaline 
phosphatase Lactate dehydrogenase 
Aspartate aminotransferase. Alanine 
an-dnotransferase. Uric acid. ) 
d. Fasting blood sugar CI 
e. Glucose tolerance test 
f. Haemaglobin AIC -0 
g. Serological test for syphilis -. 
0 
h. Hepatitis B surface antigen -0 
i. Hepatitis B surface antibody 0 
j. Hepatitis B core antibody 0 
k. HIV antibody - 
0 
1. Renal arteriograrn 
M. 24 hour urine 
(Creatinine. Protein. Calcium. 
Oxalate. Cysteine. Uric acid. ) 
n. Urinalysis by nephrologist -0 
0. Urine culture (if evidence --J3 of bacteriuria or pyuria) 
P. Pregnancy test 
q. Tuberculin skin test -0 r. Electrocardiogram 
S. Chest roentgenogram 
t. Urine osmolality ----JO (after overnight thirst) 
U. Intravenous pyelograrn 
V. Pelvic examination 
W. Stress multigated acquisition scanO 
X. Pulmonary function tests 
27. If there any other procedures you routinely give to prospective donors? could you list them below? 
WHAT ARE YOUR CRITERIA FOR EXCLUDING A DONOR? 
28. Age; minimum 
maximum 
29. Do you try to match the ages of donor and recipient? 
No , Cl 
Yes - Cl 
If yes what is the maximum age difference you would accept? 
30. Do you exclude donors who require antihypertensive drugs to nonnalize blood pressure? 
Yes 0 No 0 





32. Does a family history of hypertension exclude a normotensive donor? Yes 0 No C3 
63 
33. Does diet controlled diabetes exclude a donor? 
34. Does insulin dependent diabetes exclude a donor? 
35. Do kidney stones or evidence of kidney stones exclude a donor? 
36. What is the minimum serum creatinine concentration at which you would 
accept a donor? mg/dL 
37. After over-night thirst what minimum level of urine concentration you 
would accept? mosm/L 
38. Do you exclude donors with unexplained microscopic haernaturia? 
39. Do you exclude donors with proteinuria? Yes 
0 
Yes 0 No 0 
Yes 0 No 
Yes Cl No 
Yes 0 No Cl 
cl No 
If Yes what level of protein do you accept9 
40. Obesity ? at what % above ideal body weight would you exclude donors? 
41. Does evidence of deep vein thrombophelbitis or thromboembolic disease exclude donors? 
Yes 0 No cl 
42. Do you obtain psychiatric/psychological evaluation for all potential donors? 
Yes C3 No C3 
43. If Yes when? Before ABO-blood typing 11 
Before fissue typing 13 
Before donor work up tests C3 
After all exclusion criteria 
have been met 13 
44. Is the psychiatric/psychological evaluation of prospective donors undertaken by the recipient's 
physician? 
Yes 0 No C3 If No, who evaluates the prospective donor? 
45. Do you routinely test all potential donors for IRV antibody? 
Yes El No C3 If No What specific groups of people do you test? 
46. What is the average length of time between a patient first considering a kidney from a living donor 
and them actually having the operation? 
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MOM: LIVING DONOR HEALTH REGISTRY 
ED OF DONOR 
D' 
YY 
Date of Birth: Donor sex: M/FDate of Donation: 
Health Insurance 0 
Marital Status: ............................... 
Dependent Children 
(ages): ...................... Occupation: ............................................... 
Relationship to Recipient: Parent El Sibling C3 Other E3 please 
specify ........................................................ 
RELEVANT PAST MSTORY (Please tick) 
Hypertension 0 Smoker 0 Blood Transfusion El Date 
Blood Donation 13 Date ........ 
Diabetes: Insulin dependent 0 Diet controlled 0 




I ................................................................................................................................................................... I 
PRE-DONATION STATUS 
Blood Group: ...................... Rh: .................... HLA typing 
locus: A/B .................. DR: ................ Other: ............................ 
(subtypes of A if known) 
BP lying/standing .............. / ........... Creatinine: ................. (mmol/1) Glycosuria 0 Protein Urea 0 GFR: 
Infection (if present, specify): ........................................................................................................ 
Virology: CMV +/- 0 HBs Ag +/- 0 
AT OPERATION (Please tick) 
Prophylaxis: Heparin: O Antibiotics: C3 Mannitol: C] Steroids: O Others (please 
specify): .............................................. 
ANATOMICAL DETAILS 
Kidney: IJR Incision: Loin/Ventral 12th rib removed: all/part/none Capsular lesion: Yes/No 
ein l/>1 Artery: 1/>l Ureter: l/>1 
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Bench Surgery C3 please 
specify ................................................................................................................................ 
POST DONATION STATUS 
Post-op complications:. Yes/No Infection: Wound 0 Chest Cl Urine Cl 
Thrombroembolic 0 Other 
............................................... 
AT TIME OF DISCHARGE 
DDMMYY 
Date of Discharge: BP lying/standing: .......... / ........... 
Creatinine ....................... mmol/L 
Wound Hernia 0 Repaired C3 
Date ............... DDMMyy 
Date of Death: Cause of 
Death ............................................................................................... 
Date .................... 
Name ................................................ Transplant 
Centre: ....................................................................... 
(Please print) 
qail to: EUROTOLD (LDHR) Department of Surgery, Leicester General Hospital, Leicester, LE5 4PW, 
IM 
....... ................................................................... o ........................................................... 
6. Relationship 
If you have legislation relating to LDT does the law restrict the categories of person who may donate? 
Yes 0 
which of the following categories of person are prevented by law from being 
donors? 
parent Q distant relative 13 stranger C3 




If you have legislation relating to LDT does the law outlaw commercial trade in organs and tissues? 
Yes 13 
Can you give details? 
.............................................................. ....................................................................... No El 




We would value any other information you have which you feel may benefit this project. 
...................................................................................................................................... No 13 
and 
the substance of what information is to be disclosed and by whom 
Yes El 
Please give details? 
...................................................................................................................................... No C3 
(ii) Whether you have legislation relating to LDT or not is there general legislation, case law or 
other material relating to the issue of consent to medical treatment particularly in terms of disclosure of 
information and voluntariness? 
Yes 0 
Can you give details? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
No 0 
Could you please estimate how the issue of consent for potential donors and recipients 
might be dealt with in practice if it were a question brought before the courts? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
Laws relating to capacity to consent are likely to be very relevant to us. Questions 4 and 5 in 
particular relate to this issue. 
Minors (children). 
If you have legislation relating to LDT does it provide a minimum age or other criteria concerning young 
persons as live donors? 
Yes El 
Can you give details? 
No cl 
Whether there are criteria or not and whether you have legislation or not how is the matter of young persons 
as living donors likely to be dealt with by the courts in practice? For instance what might be the n-dnimum 
age for a donor that a court might find acceptable, or would this depend on maturity of the individual person 
at issue? 
Mental Disability. 
If you have legislation relating to LDT does it have provisions concerning persons suffering from mental 
disability? Can you give details? 
If there are no specific provisions in legislation governing this matter how is the matter of persons with 
mental disability as living donors likely to be dealt with by the courts in practice? For instance would 
certain restrictions be imposed? Would the court seek to ascertain the feelings of the mentally disabled 
person? Could donation go ahead against the feelings of the mentally disabled person? 
lb, 
15 
Wiv): LEGAL Questionnaire 
(the spaces between quesions have been condensed). 
1. Legislative Provision 
Is there legislation which specifically regulates transplantation and particularly LDT (living donor 
transplantation in your country)? 
Yes 13 
Can we have a translated copy along with other relevant infonnation such as 
Parliamentary debates and interpretation in the courts in practice? 
No 0 
Can you give possible explanations as to why there is not direct legislation of 
this kind? 
...................................................................................................................................... Could you give us details of any professional guidelines, working parties, codes 
or committees on transplantation which influence or regulate the use of 
living donors in practice? 
2. Clinical Conditions / Criteria 
if you have legislation relating to LDT does it specify clinical conditions or criteria that must be met for a 
living donor transplant to proceed? For example: - 
a) It must be the best alternative for the recipient 
b) It is allowed only when there is no appropriate cadaver organ availableC] 
C) It is allowed only where no serious risk to the health of the donor is apparent 
d) It is allowed only subject to the approval of a committee in the case of 
i) all donors 
0 
OR 
ii) certain categories of donor (please specify which groups) U 
....................................................................................................................................... 
e) Other conditions or criteria (please specify) 
................................................................. o ....... 0 ........ o ................................................... 
Whether you have legislation or not are there guidelines, working parties, codes or other materials 
specifying clincial conditions/criteria (if yes please give details)? 
Consent 
The issue of consent to medical treatment is usually regarded as an important part of the process of LDT. In 
particular the EUROTOLD group wishes to understand the legal and ethical dimensions of disclosure of 
information and voluntariness in donation. Any information you have relating to general consent provisions 
and/or legislation dealing specifically with consent in LDT would be valuable to us. 
(i) If you have legislation relating to LDT does it provide general criteria relating to the issue of 
consent in terms of- 
a) the form by which consent is to be obtained 
Yes C) 
Please give details? 
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3A (v) LEGAL CODING SYSTEM 
TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION 
fcoding for analysis of Centre and Attitudes Questionnaire Results) 
Scale = very permissive toward LDT to very restrictive. 
Clinical Conditions 
Law requires LDT used if no other viable option -5 
Law requires LDT to be likely to produce a better result/than cadaveric transplantation -3 
Law requires histocompatibility between donor and /recipient .I 
Law requires a high level of histocompatibility -4 
Law requires authorisation by an independent conunitee -2 
Law requires authorisation by independent physicians -I 
Class of Donor 
Law excludes donation by non-closely genetically related -4 
Law restricts very strongly .3 
Law restricts to a degree -2 
No provisions re: unrelated donors 0 
Law facilitates but no restrictions +2 
Minors as Donors 
Law allows all minors to donate kidneys +2 
Law allows minors with capacity to donate +I 
Law permits donation subject to some restrictions 0 
Law permits donation subject to strong restrictions -I 
Law prohibits minors from donating -2 
3A(vi): ATTITUDE OUESTIONNAIRE - CODING (GENERAL) 
1. General Most positive score = most positive attitude towards LDT. 
2. Related/Unrelated The more liberal towards unrelated donors, the higher the score (Q. nos. 
1,2,6,11 & 12) ie. the most liberal regarding LDT generally. 
3. Dialysis/Pre-dialysis Higher the score the more liberal towards LDT in terms of 
favourability toward transplant pre-dialysis (Q. nos. 5& 8). (Q. 8 is 
ambiguous). 
4. Age Higher the score the less age is a factor ie. broader age range 
acceptable. (Q. nos. 1(? ), 4(? ), 6,7,10,11 & 12). 
jype of Relationship Difficult to code : either it overlaps with (2) above or cannot be 
properly coded. 
6. Dialysis vs Transplant Plus and minus. The higher the plus score, the more favourable 






Q. nos. (a) +3 (b) = -1 
2 (a) = +2 (b) = -1 (c) = 0 
6 (a) = +3 (b) = 0 (c) = -1 
Ranking off 11 (a) = +3 (b) = +2 (c) = +2 (d) = -1* 
husband 12 (a) = +2 (b) = +1 (c) = +1 (d) = -1* 
3 Dialysis/Pre-dial ysis 
Q. nos. 5 (a) = +3 (b) = 0 (c) = -2 
4 (a) +2 (b) = -2 
4 Age 
Q. nos. 6 (a) = +3 (b) = -1 (c) = -1 
7 (a) = +3 (b) = -2 (c) = -2 
10 (a) =0 (b) = +1 (c) = 0 
Ranking of 11 (a) =0 (b) = 0 (c) = 0 (d) =0 
daughter 
Ranking of son12 (a) = +3 (b) = +1 (c) = +1 (d) = -2 
This is an assessment based on first choice only 
Assumes no answer if not prepared to use either 
6 Dialysis vs Transplantation 
Q. nos. I (a) = +2 (b) 0 
2 (a) +2 (b) = +2 (c) = -2 
4 (a)= +1 (b) = .1 (re: (b), obviously the 
greater number of years, the higher the mi nus score). 
5 (a) = +2 (b) = +1 (C) = ' -2 
6 (a) = +2 (b) = +2 (c) = -2 
7 (a) = +2 (b) = -3 (c) = -2 
9 (a) = +2 (b) = -1 
10 (a) = +2 (b) = +2 (c) = -2 
11 (a) +1 (b) +1 (c) +1 (d) -2* 
12 (a) +1 (b) +1 (c) +1 (d) -2* 
Based on first choice only 
3B: Results. 
TRANSPLANT CENTRES QUESTIONNAIRE 
Cadaver tx summary - all centres 
n av-pop(m) av-wait start-cad av-tot-cad av-cadrate liv-legal not 
AR 1 3.0 5.0 1991 22.0 1.7 1 0 
AU 4 1.6 191.2 1970 837.0 44.0 3 1 
BE 5 1.2 143.4 1963 909.8 34.7 2 3 
CY 1 0.5 70.0 1987 122.0 34.0 1 0 
CZ 2 1.1 106.5 1961 357.5 24.9 2 0 
DE 4 1.0 73.2 1967 946.0 50.9 4 0 
ES -1 1.5 65.0 1968 197.0 6.0 1 0 
FR 12 1.7 158.8 1963 939.5 68.6 10 2 
GE 14 2.3 282.6 1967 863.3 23.6 13 1 
GR 1 3.0 954.0 1983 265.0 7.2 1 0 
HO 4 1.8 187.5 1967 856.5 36.9 4 0 
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HU 4 2.4 306.0 1973 476.5 23.5 1 3 
IT 8 2.5 306.6 1966 395.9 13.8 5 3 
NO 1 4.2 135.0 1969 1955.0 29.0 1 0 
PO 4 3.2 1530.0 1965 728.0 23.1 3 0 
RO 1 10.0 30.0 -1 NA NA 1 0 
SK 2 1.6 180.0 1991 115.0 10.0 2 0 
SP 10 2.0 113.4 1965 427.8 38.4 5 5 
SW 3 1.7 82.7 1964 1142.0 30.7 3 0 
UK 20 2.0 146.0 1963 917.3 29.0 20 0 
Forsee expansion of Id prog.? 
Ye s No Maybe 
AR 10 0 
AU 20 2 
BE 13 1 
CY 10 0 
cz 10 1 
DE 31 0 
ES 10 0 
FR 72 3 
GE 73 4 
GR 00 1 
HO 31 0 
HU 00 1 
IT 61 1 
NO 01 0 
PO 31 0 
RO 10 0 
SK 10 1 
SP 32 4 
SW 20 1 
UK 11 1 8 
% consider cadaver BEFORE dial needed = 40 
% WHEN = 51 
% AFrER period of dial =9 
% And by country: 
Before dial. needed When dial. needed After 
period dial. 
AR 1 0 0 
AU 1 3 0 
BE 3 2 0 
CY 0 1 0 
Cz 0 2 0 
DE 3 1 0 
ES 0 1 0 
FR 9 3 0 
GE 2 10 2 
GR 0 0 1 
HO 2 1 0 
HU 3 1 0 
IT 1 4 3 
NO 1 0 0 
PO 0 4 0 
RO 0 0 1 
SK 0 1 1 
SP 4 6 0 
sw 1 2 0 
UK 9 9 1 
Correlations with legal scores: 
Consider legal Forsee expansion 
1. Clin conds 0.3042 0.24763 
2. Restr. on non-close rel. -0.0513 0.00704 
3. Restr. on risks 0.2242 0.29439 
4.1-3 combined 0.3468 0.35363 
5. Minors 0.0389 0.00563 
6. Status of law -0.2694 -0.43385 
7. Financial comp. -0.4859 -0.30734 
8. Time law in place -0.2216 -0.16173 
9. Overall -0.3057 -0.37462 
Living donor centres only 
n start-liv av-tot-liv av-li vrate Min age Max age 
AU 3 1973 58.0 4.7 15 75 
BE 4 1963 143.3 4.0 IS 70 
CY 1 1986 135.0 22.0 21 75 
cz 1 1990 5.0 NA 20 60 
DE 4 1968 103.2 11.2 1 75 
ES 1 1972 43.0 4.3 18 70 
FR 10 1052 75.1 5.8 18 70 
GE 12 1970 27.9 1.9 6 75 
GR 1 1983 326.0 11.0 25 75 
HO 4 1968 101.0 5.1 10 80 
HU 2 1974 42.0 0.6 '18 60 IT 8 1967 101.9 3.6 16 5 
NO 1 1969 1241.0 18.6 18 NA 
PO 3 1966 26.3 0.8 16 75 
RO 1 1980 34.0 NA 30 70 
SK 2 1994 3.0 NA 18 60 
SP 6 1965 77.3 3.7 18 75 
SW 3 1964 289.7 12.8 18 75 
UK 20 1961 86.7 2.2 16 80 
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When consider for living donor transplant? 
n Pre-dial. At dial At cad list After cad list 
AU 3 2 1 0 0 
BE 4 2 1 0 0 
CY 1 0 1 0 0 
Cz I 1 0 0 0 
DE 4 4 0 0 0 
ES 1 0 1 0 0 
FR 10 8 0 0 1 
GE 12 3 4 4 1 
GR 1 0 0 0 1 
HO 4 3 0 1 0 
HU 2 1 1 0 0 
IT 8 4 4 0 0 
NO I 1 0 0 0 
PO 3 0 3 0 0 
RO 1 0 0 0 1 
SK 2 0 0 1 1 
SP 6 3 1 0 2 
SW 3 1 2 0 0 
UK 20 12 3 2 1 
What relatives will they consider? 
n Prnt SbIg 
n Prnt Sbg S p'sRI(nir. )G/pnt Sn/dgh Frnd Oth 
AU3 3 3 10 2 1 0 0 
BE 44 4 21 3 3 1 0 
CY 11 1 11 1 1 1 0 
Cz II 1 00 0 0 0 0 
DE 44 4 42 3 1 0 1 
ES II I I1 0 0 1 0 
FR 10 9 9 00 2 4 0 0 
GE 12 12 12 41 4 6 0 0 
GR 11 1 10 1 0 0 0 
HO 44 4 21 2 3 1 0 
HU 22 2 00 0 2 0 0 
IT 88 8 73 4 4 0 0 
NO 11 1 11 1 1 0 0 
PO 33 3 30 2 1 0 0 
RO I1 1 00 1 0 0 0 
SK 22 2 22 2 2 0 0 
SP 66 6 20 3 3 0 0 
SW 33 ý3 31 3 2 0 1 UK 20 20 20 16 6 13 10 5 1 
Exclusion criteria: 
1= Antihypertens. drugs 
2=Family hypertens. 
3=Diet controlled diabetes 
4=Ins. dep. diabetes 
5=Kidney stones 
6=Unexplained micros. haernaturia 
7= Proteinuria 
8=Deep vein thromb. 
n 12 345678 
AU 330233333 
BE 431344442 
CY 1 00 011011 
cz 1 10 111110 
DE 4 30 243442 
ES 1 10 111111 
FR 10 10 08 10 8697 
GE 12 90 712 91111 8 
GR 1 00 111110 
HO 4 20 34 1-4 41 
HU 8 70 676884 
NO 1 10 111111 
PO 3.30 233331 
RO 1 10 011111 
SK 2 20 022212 
SP 6 30 565466 
SW 3 20 232121 
UK 20 13 0 13 18 17 14 16 11 
Correlation with legal scores: 
Consider spouse Min age 
1. Clin conds -0.071 0.099 
2. Restr. on non-close rel. 0.280 0.059 
3. Restr. on risks -0.174 0.388 
4.1-3 combined 0.011 0.304 
5. Minors 0.235 -0.431 
6. Status of law 0.129 0.064 
Mean values for other variables: 
I =Min age 
2=Max age 
3=Max syst bp 
4=Max diast bp 
5=Max obesity 
6=Waiting time (months) 
n123456 
AU 3 18 58 148 95 28 3 
BE. 4 18 65 140 90 28 4 
CY 12175 160 90 NA NA 
CZ 120 60 160 100 NA NA 
DE 4 12 73 150 105 20 3 
ES 118 70 150 95 20 2 
FR 10 18 61142 8620 3 
GE 12 17 68 150 9028 3 
GR 12575140 9020 6 
HO 41775156 9128 4 
HU 21855145 9020 3 
IT 81865154 9327 4 
NO 1 18 NA 140 90 35 5 
PO 3 17 67 153 100 37 2 
RO 130 70 150 90 NA NA 
SK 2 18 60 161 9125 2 
SP 6 19 65 152 93 31 3 
SW 3 2175 145 93 20 8 
UK 20 19 68 151 89 29 5 








7. Financial comp. -0.243 -0.111 0.067 
8. Time law in place -0.036 0.144 -0.386 
9. Overall 0.127 -0.123 -0.280 
LD PROGRAMMES ONLY: 
" Written guidelines: 36-05 
" Written protocol : 66.67 
% Consider liv. don. BEFORE dial needed = 60 
% WHEN = 29.33 
% AMER period of dial = 10.67 
Would consider as potential donor (%) 
Parent 98.84999999999999 Sibling 98.84999999999999 
Spouse 57.47 Rel by marr. 22.99 
G/parent 54.02 Son/daught 52.87 
Friend 10.34 Other 3.45 
Used in approaching prospective donors (%) 
Patient 71.76000000000001 Spouse/parent 38.82 
Tx coord. 11.76 Neph. staff 45.88 
% Discuss financial implications: 43.53 % Financial help available: 
% Require min HLA match: 53.49 
Min age: 130 Max age: 40 80 
% Attempt age match:, 19.77 
Exclusions (%) 
Antihypertensive drugs for bp 76.73999999999999 
Diet controlled diabetes 67.44 
Kidney stones 82.56 
Proteinuria 90.7 
Max obesity levels (%): 10 50 
36.05 
Family history hypertension 1.15 
Ins. dependent diabetes 96.55 
Unexplained micro. haemauria'81.40000 
Dp vein thrombophelb/embol 64.2900000 
% Donor psych. evaluation: 32.18 
% HIV test donors: 96.5 10 
Mean wait to Id tx (months): 3.8 
ATTITUDES SUMMARY 
Number of questionnaires= 311 
Responses (%) (Note that for some questions it is reasonable to answer yes to more than one response, so 
percentages need not sum to 100). 
Ql 55-year-old with friend... 
(a) Type and investigate 40.84 
(b) Refuse to consider 58.2 
Q2 50-year-old wants India 
(a) Let go 24.12 
(b) Offer cadaver tx 23.79 
(c) Leave on list 54.66 
Q3 Ideal donor for 36-year-old 
(a) Cadaver 43.41 
(b) Liv rel. 56.59 
Q4 45-year-old with brother... 
(a) Accept brother 77-48999999999999 
(b) Wait for cadaver 21.54 
If (b), mean wait (yrs) before use brother = 3.09 
with distn: 
12 34 56 
1024103109 
where code 6 implies 6 or more years. 
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Q5 20-year-old with 4 match mother.. 
(a) Tx mother pre dial. 57.23 
(b) Put on list for 6 months 26.05 
(c) Put on list for 2 years 15.43 
Q7 14-year-old with twin... 
(a) Accept twin 36.01 
(b) Wait for good cadaver match 39.23 
(c) Wait for bld gp, comp. cadaver 25.4 
Q9 20-year-old with diabetic mother... 
(a) Accept mother 19.29 
(b) Leave on list 79.73999999999999 
Q6 70-year-old with husband/daughter... 
(a) Accept spouse 13.83 
(b) Accept daughter after antihyptn tmt. 11.58 
(c) Leave on list 
72.98999999999999 
Q8 40-year-old with 2 brothers... 
(a) Accept 38-year-old, unmarried... 74.28 
(b) Accept 56-year-old, married... 20.58 
QIO 37-year-old with brother/father... 
(a) Accept brother 24.12 
(b) Accept father 50.8 
(c) Wait for good cadaver match 27.33 
Q1 1 45-year-old female... Choose from 
1.4 antigen match daughter 
2. Bld gp comp husband 
3.4 antigen match sister 
4. Leave on list 
Option I selected first/second/third/not at all M: 
26.09 11.04 6.69 56.18 
Option 2 selected first/second/third/not at all (%): 
17.06 8.699999999999999 11.7162.53 
Option 3 selected first/second/third/not at all (%): 
29.77 10.03 5.35 54.85 
Option 4 selected first/second/third/not at all (%): 
27.09 43.14 6.35 23.42 
Largest inter-question correlations: 
4a 5a 0.483 4a 5c -0.537 
4b 5a -0.48 4b 5c 0.512 
Q12 36-year-old female... Choose from 
1. Bld gp comp husband 
2.4 antigen match son aged IS 
3.6 antigen match sister 
4. Leave on list 
Option I selected first/second/third/not at all (%): 
26.33 8.33 7.67 57.67 
Option 2 selected first/second/third/not at all (%): 
12.67 12.33 6.33 68.67 
Option 3 selected first/second/third/not at all 
33.67 5.67 6 54.66 
Option 4 selected first/second/third/not at all 
27.33 46.33 6.33 20.01 
Related/unrelated score analysis: 
Higher scores indicate more positive attitude to unrelated tx. 
Overall related/unrelated score summary 
n mean sd 
AL 1 2.0 0.0 
AR 2 8.0 4.2 
AU 4 1.0 2.4 
BE 16 -0.2 4.4 
CY 1 -3.0 0.0 
CZ 4 -2.8 2.1 
DE 7 4.1 2.1 
ES 1 -2.0 0.0 
FR 24 -1.0 3.6 
GE 25 0.2 4.5 
GR 2 0.0 2.8 
HO 4 1.2 5.9 
RU 27 0.2 2.7 
IT 10 3.7 3.3 
NO 1 7.0 0.0 
PO 104 4.0 4.6 
RO 1 -4.0 0.0 
SK 3 7.0 3.6 
SL 6 -1.7 1.0 
SP 20 1.0 3.2 
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SW 6 3.8 2.0 
UK 42 2.1 4.1 
Rel/unrel score by speciality (n, mn, sd): 
Surgeon 100 2.2 4.5 
Nephrologist 161 1.7 4.3 
Other 50 2.8 5 
Correlations with centre statistics: 
Wait list/m Cad rate/m Tot cad LD rate/m Tot LD 
-0.047 -0.083 0.191 0.175 0.249 
Mean, sd score for 164 people at centres with LD program= 1.47 4.09 
Mean, sd score for 34 people at centres without LD program-- -1.09 3.1 
T-test= 3.444 p= 0.0005999999999999999 
Dialysis/pre-dialysis score analysis: 
Higher scores indicate more liberal attitude to pre-dial tx. 
Overall dial/prc-dial score summary 
n mean sd 
AL 1 5.0 0.0 
AR 2 2.0 0.0 
AU 4 1.8 4.3 
BE 16 0.6 4.5 
CY 1 5.0 0.0 
CZ 4 3.5 1.7 
DE 7 4.4 1.5 
ES 1 2.0 0.0 
FR 24 3.1 3.0 
GE 25 1.7 3.7 
GR 2 2.0 0.0 
HO 4 5.0 0.0 
HU 27 1.1 3.3 
IT 10 5.0 0.0 
NO 1 5.0 0.0 
PO 104 2.8 2.8 
RO 1 2.0 0.0 
SK 3 1.0 4.6 
SL 6 1.8 3.3 
SP 20 0.8 3.8 
SW 6 5.0 0.0 
UK 42 3.1 2.9 




Correlations with centre statistics: 
Wait list/m Cad rate/m Tot cad LD rate/m Tot LD 
0.043 0.007 0.213 0.232 0.215 
Mean, sd score for 164 people at centres with LD program= 2.93 3.16 
Mean, sd score for 34 people at centres without LD program-- -0.26 3.14 
T-test= 5.379 P= 0 
Age-attitude score analysis: 
11igher scores indicate age less of a factor 
Overall age-attitude score summary 
n mean sd 
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AL 1 2.0 0.0 
AR 2 2.0 1.4 
AU 4 -0.2 2.6 
BE 16 0.6 5.2 
CY 1 3.0 0.0 
CZ 4 -0.8 4.3 
DE 7 -0.9 1.5 
ES 1 -2.0 0.0 
FR 24 0.3 3.6 
GE 25 0.2 4.7 
GR 2 -2.0 2.8 
HO 4 0.2 3.9 
HU 27 -1.1 3.3 
IT 10 4.0 2.9 
NO 1 7.0 0.0 
PO 104 3.2 3.4 
RO 1 1.0 0.0 
SK 3 -1.0 2.0 
SL 6 -1.3 1.6 
SP 20 -1.6 3.9 
SW 6 -1.2 1.6 
UK 42 1.2 4.4 
Age-attitude score by speciality 
(n, mn, sd): 
Surgeon 100 1.3 4.4 
Nephrologist 161 1.1 4 
Other 50 1.1 3.6 
Correlations with centre statistics: 
Wait list/m Cad rate/m Tot cad LD rate/m Tot LD 
-0.024 -0.059 0.302 0.037 0.165 
Mean, sd score for 164 people at centres with LD program-- 0.7199999999999999 4 
Mean, sd score for 34 people at centres without LD program= -2.56 3.17 
T-test= 4.488 p= 0 
Dialysis/transplantation score analysis: 
Higher scores indicate more positive attitude to tx. 
Overall dial/tx score sunimary 
n mean sd 
AL 1 1.0 0.0 
AR 2 5.0 0.0 
AU 4 -1.8 5.6 
BE 16 -5.4 9.2 
CY 1 11.0 0.0 
CZ 4 2.8 5.9 
DE 7 2.7 1.4 
ES 1 -1.0 0.0 
FR 24 -2.2' 6.7 
GE 25 -3.0 10.1 
GR 2 -2.0 2.8 
HO 4 1.5 3.0 
HU 27 -3.3 6.4 
IT 10 7.4 2.8 
NO 1 10.0 0.0 
PO 104 5.3 5.9 
RO 1 -3.0 0.0 
SK 3 5.7 4.5 
SL 6 -2.3 4.1 
SP 20 -4.2 8.1 
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SW 6 1.7 2.6 
UK 42 0.9 8.3 
Dial/tx score by speciality (n, mn, sd): 
Surgeon 100 1.8 8 
Nephrologist 161 0.7 7.5 
Other 50 1.1 8.6 
Correlations with centre statistics: 
Wait list/m Cad rate/m Tot cad LD rate/m Tot LD 
-0.014 -0.055 0.165 0.215 0.234 
Mean, sd score for 164 people at centres with LD program= 0.34 7.43 
Mean, sd score for 34 people at centres without LD program-- -7.68 7.43 
T-test= 5.726 p= 0 
Correlations with legal scores: 
Rel/unrel Dial/pre dial Age DiaVtx 
1. Clin conds -0.1226 0.4266 0.08664 0.14992 
2. Restr. on non-close rel. 0.1245 -0.0394 -0.00372 0.15832 
3. Restr. on risks -0.3525 -0.1307 -0.31818 0.25756 
4.1-3 combined -0.2018 0.2921 -0.07254 0.09912 
5. Minors 0.1784 0.4314 0.18623 0.34493 
6. Status of law 0.0495 0.0867 0.10633 0.19678 
7. Financial comp. -0.0655 -0.4510 -0.17508 0.41689 
8. Time law in place -0.2167 0.0613 -0.23959 0.00646 9. Overall 0.0233 0.2213 0.08234 0.20840 
Question 13 Summary 
The tables below show, by potential donor, the percentage 
of respondents selecting codes 1-5 for each recipient: 
Recipient A= 5-year-old boy 
Recipient B= 18-year-old girl 
Recipient C= 40-year-old woman 
Recipient D= 70-year-old man 
Codes: I= Tx contraindicated 
2 Tx possible with appropriate treatment 
3 Tx suitability requires discussion 
4 Tx is appropiate 
5 Unsure 
Total number of respondents is 184 
I Blood Pressure 148/90 46M 
------------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 41 27 21 47 
Choice 2: 16 26 32 14 
Choice 3: 21 21 16 23 
Choice 4: 14 24 30 14 
Choice 5: 8 2 2 3 
2 Breast Cancer 20 years ago 53 F 
---------------------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 68 59 50 58 
Choice 2: 1 1 22 
Choice 3: 17 22 23 26 
Choice 4: 7 13 20 11 
76 
Choice 5: 765 
3 Trace of proteinuria 57 F 
------------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 60 47 39 53 
Choice 2: 5 8 11 5 
Choice 3: 24 35 37 31 
Choice 4: 4 8 10 7 
Choice 5: 5 3 4 4 
4 Two previous urinary infections 26 F 
------------------------------ 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 19 11 14 46 
Choice 2: 24 33 31 18 
Choice 3: 25 21 22 20 
Choice 4: 26 32 30 12 
Choice 5: 6 3 3 3 
5 Maturity onset diabetes 68M 
---------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 89 82 70 62 
Choice 2: 2 4 11 11 
Choice 3: 5 9 11 18 
Choice 4: 1 3 4 7 
Choice 5: 3 2 3 2 
6 Previous history hepatitis A 33 M 
------------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 17 13 14 44 
Choice 2: 6 7 74 
Choice 3: 16 15 16 22 
Choice 4: 53 62 60 28 
Choice 5: 8 3 33 
7 HIV -ve, Haemophiliac 25 F 
----------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 90 90 90 92 
Choice 2: 2 2 2 1 
Choice 3: 4 5 6 5 
Choice 4: 2 2 2 2 
Choice 5: 1 0 0 0 
84 dependent children 42 M 
------------------------------ 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 34 29 30 62 
Choice 2: 1 1 11 
Choice 3: 33 38 40 22 
Choice 4: 26 28 25 
Choice 5: 7 5 44 
9 Treated depression 76 M 
---------------------------------------- 
* 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 78 74 63 64 
Choice 2: 3387 
Choice 3: 11 14 17 17 
Choice 4: 77 11 11 
77 
Choice 5: 2111 
10 Unemployed 31 M 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 12 8 8 37 
Choice 2: 2 2 21 
Choice 3: 14 12 18 29 
Choice 4: 66 76 70 31 
Choice 5: 6 2 23 
II Serving army officer 30M 
--------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 15 11 13 43 
Choice 2: 2 2 21 
Choice 3: 14 13 18 26 
Choice 4: 65 72 65 26 
Choice 5: 5 2 25 
12 IV drug user 23 F 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 92 93 91 92 
Choice 2: 2 2 2 1 
Choice 3: 3 4 7 6 
Choice 4: 1 0 0 1 
Choice 5: 2 1 1 1 
13 Myocardial infarct. 5 years ago 54 F 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 72 64 58 71 
Choice 2: 5 6 73 
Choice 3: 17 22 24 16 
Choice 4: 2 4 76 
Choice 5: 4 4 44 
14 Previous deep vein thrombosis 68 M 
---- - -- - -------- --- ----- -- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 70 56 46 54 
Choice 2: 9 14 17 11 
Choice 3: 16 22 28 25 
Choice 4: 1 5 78 
Choice 5: 4 3 22 
15 Bilateral calf claudication 70 F 
-------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 89 86 80 80 
Choice 2: 2 1 3 3 
Choice 3: 4 7 10 12 
Choice 4: 1 1 2 1 
Choice 5: 5 5 5 4 
16 Smokes 40 per day 52 F 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Cho . ice 1: 54 42 35 53 
Choice 2: 88 11 9 
Choice 3: 23 31 36 25 
Choice 4: 12 17 17 10 
78 
Choice 5: 3113 
17 Enuresis 14 M 
------------ 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 72 70 76 84 
Choice 2: 5 5 33 
Choice 3: 7 9 86 
Choice 4: 10 12 10 7 
Choice 5: 5 4 21 
18 Self employed builder 18 F 
------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 17 16 31 59 
Choice 2: 2 2 21 
Choice 3: 26 24 26 16 
Choice 4: 48 54 36 20 
Choice 5: 6 4 54 
19 Epilepsy 16 M 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 61 62 67 81 
Choice 2: 9 7 53 
Choice 3: 11 10 12 8 
Choice 4: 15 17 12 7 
Choice 5: 4 4 32 
20 Winter bronchitis 78 M 
----------------------------- 
Recipient A Recipient B Recipient C Recipient D 
Choice 1: 81 77 71 68 
Choice 2: 3 5. 8 9 
Choice 3: 5 7 10 8 
Choice 4: 7 8 9 12 
Choice 5: 4 4 2 3 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Estimated living-cadaver tx ratio (1993/1994) 
(Centres with complete info. only) 
n Mean ratio (%) Min Median Max 
BE 4 3.2 0.0 2.3 8.2 
CY 1 64.7 64.7 64.7 64.7 
cz 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DE 4 24.3 14.1 21.3 40.4 
ES 1 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 
FR 9 7.7 0.0 4.0 23.9 
GE 11 8.1 0.0 . 5.7 24.6 
GR 1 153.5 153.5 153.5 153.5 
HO 4 15.0 7.1 11.8 29.2 
HU 2 1.2 0.0 1.2 2.3 
IT 8 27.6 0.0 22.4 104.0 
NO 1 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9 
PO 3 2.1 0.0 1.4 4.8 
SK 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SP 6 7.6 1.2 3.7 29.0 
SW 
,3 
41.9 33.7 36.4 55.8 
UK 19 7.2 0.0 5.4 31.8 
Forsee expansion of Id prog.? 





SW: 25 19 18 
UK: 18 18 20 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 18 2118 25 20 212116 
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what relationships considered in LDT as percentages 
n Prnt(%) Sib(%) Spsc(%) Rel(m)(%) Glpmt (%) S/d(%) Fmd(%) Other(%) 
AU 3 100 100 33.3 0.0 66.7 33.3 0 0.0 
BE 4 100 100 50.0 25.0 75.0 75.0 25 0.0 
CY 1 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 0.0 
Cz 1 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
DE 4 100 100 100.0 50.0 75.0 25.0 0 25.0 
ES 1 100 100 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
FR 10 90 90 0.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 0 0.0 
GE 12 100 100 33.3 8.3 33.3 50.0 0 0.0 
GR 1 100 100 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0 0.0 
HO 4 100 100 50.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 25 0.0 
HU 2 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0 0.0 
IT 8 100 100 87.5 37.5 50.0 50.0 0 0.0 
NO 1 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0 0.0 
PO 3 100 100 100.0 0.0 66.7 100.0 0 0.0 
RO 1 100 100 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0 0.0 
SK 2 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0 0.0 
SP 6 100 100 33.3 0.0 50.0 50.0 0 0.0 
SW 3 100 100 100.0 33.3 100.0 66.7 0 33.3 
UK 20 100 100 80.0 30.0 65.0 50.0 25 5.0 
By speciality: 
Overall numbers: 
39 Surgery, 49 Nephrology, 2 Anaesthesia and 7 Other 
With LD progs: 
36 Surgery, 39 Nephrology, 2 Anaesthesia and 6 Other 
Percentages: 
Forsee expansion? 
Surgery Nephrology Anaesthesia Other 
Yes 56.76 45.83 10083.33 
No 10.81 22.92 0 0.00 
Maybe 32.43 31.25 016.67 
Law prevents? 
Surgery Nephrology Anaesthesia Other 
Yes 12.82 20.41 0 42.86 
No 87.18 79.59 100 57.14 
When consider cadaver donor tx? 
Surgery Nephrology Anaesthesia Other 
Before dial 46.15 41.67 0 33.33 
When dial 38.46 52.08 100 66.67 
After dial 15-38 6.25 0 0.00 
When consider living donor tx? 
Surgery Nephrology Anaesthesia Other 
Before dial 62-86 56.76 0 33.33 
When dial 25-71 18.92 100 16.67 
At list 5.71 8.11 0 50.00 
After list 5.71 16.22 0 0.00 
Who consider? 
Surgery Nephrology Anaesthesia Other 
Parent 100.00 97.44 100 100.00 
Sibling 100.00 100.00 100 83.33 
Spouse 69.44 46.15 0 50.00 
81 
Rel by marr. 30.56 15.38 0 33.33 
, G/parent 66.67 1 53.85 0. -0.00 Son/daught 52.78 48.72 0 83.33 
Friend 16.67 5.13 0 0.00 
Other 2.78 5.13 0 0.00 
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Appendix 4: Background Materials on Carl Rogers and the Person 
Centred Approach., 
4A: Introduction, 
The person centred approach has been referred to on a number of occasions throughout the PhD including 
chapters 4,5 and 8. The approach was a key part of the process of interviewing of living donors and 
recipients. This appendix provides a brief outline of the person centred approach. 
4B: The Person Centred AiDDroach 
Rogers initially described his approach as client-centred in recognition of the fact that his work in psychotherapy 
and counselling was focused around the needs of the client who was regarded as sovereign over her own process 
by the therapist as distinct from the therapist taking an authoritarian stance. Later however in recognition that 
the same way of working was applied to a variety of aspects of human interaction (such as teaching, therapeutic 
groups, business, partners/couples etc. ) the approach was renamed person-centred. 
Rogers felt that given the inherent capacity of the organism to grow if be provided the appropriate conditions be 
would act as an agent of change for those be was working with such that they might come to progressively let 
go of that which was standing in between them and further evolution. 
"If I can provide a certain type of relationship the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use 
the relationship for growth and change and personal develoipment will occur. "I 
Rogers initially tended to describe this type of relationship in general terms of having integrity and respect f6r 
the inherent value of persons. While this remained part of his perspective he later began to describe a 
facilitative relationship as necessarily characterized by three attitudes which integrated together formed a 
constructive way of being with other persons. These conditions were congruence (being 
real/authentic/genuine), empathy (attimement with the process of the other person) and unconditional positive 
regard (a warmth and prizing of the value of the other person). The following is a detailed ver-batim extract in 
which Rogers discusses the three core attitudes in detail. 
2 
"The order in which these therapeutic conditions are described has some significance because they are logically 
intertwined. In the first place, the therapist must achieve a strong, accurate empathy. But such deep 
sensitivity to the moment-to-moment "being" of another person requires that the therapist first accept, and to 
some degree prize, the other person. That is to say, a sufficiently strong empathy can scarcely exist without a 
considerable degree of unconditional positive regaid. However, since neither of these conditions can possibly 
be meaningful in the relationship unless they are real, the therapist must be, both in these respects and in 
others, integrated and genuine within the therapeutic encounter. Therefore, it seems to me that genuineness or 
congruence is the most basic of the three conditions. I shall try to describe it's meaning. 
We readily sense this quality of congruence in everyday life. We all know persons who always seem to operate 
from behind a front, who play a role, who tend to say things they do not feel. They are exhibiting 
incongruence. We tend not to reveal ourselves too deeply to such people. On the other hand, we all know 
individuals whom we trust because we sense that they actually are as they present themselves to be, openly and 
transparently - that we are dealing with the person himself, not a polite or professional facade. This is 
genuineness. 
Genuineness in therapy means that the therapist is his actual self during his encounter with his client. Without 
facade, he openly has the feelings and attitudes that are flowing in him at the moment. This involves 
self-awareness; that is, the therapists feelings are available to him - to his awareness - and he is able to live 
them, to experience them in the relationship, and to communicate them if they persist. The therapist 
encounters his client directly, meeting him person to person. He is being himself, not denying himself. 
Since this concept is liable to misunderstanding, let me state that it does not mean that the therapist burdens his 
client with overt expression of all his feelings. Nor does it mean that the therapist discloses his total self to his 
1 Rogers, 'On Becoming a Person; A Iberapist's view of Psychotherapy, ' Constable, 1961 at p33. 
2 H. Kirschenbaum and VI. Henderson (ed), Carl Rogers Dialogues, Constable, 1989,11 - 16. 
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client. It does mean, however, that the therapist denies to himself none of the feelings he is experiencing and 
that he is willing to experience transparently any persistent feelings that exist in the relationship and to let these 
be known to his client. It means avoiding the temptation to present a facade or hide behind a mask of 
professionalism, or to assume a confessional-professional ttitude. 
It is not simple to achieve such a reality. Being involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the flow of 
experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change. So, if 
I sense that I am feeling bored by a client and if this feeling persists, I think I owe it to him and our 
relationship to share my feeling with him. The same will hold if my feeling were fear, or if my attention were 
so focused on my own problems that I could scarcely listen to him. But, as I attempt to share such feelings 
with him, I want also to be constantly in touch with what is going on in me. If I am, I will recognize that I 
am expressing my own feeling of being bored and not some supposed fact about him as a boring person. When 
voiced as my own reaction, such an expression can lead to a deep relationship. But my feeling exists in the 
context of a complex and changing flow, which also needs to be communicated. I would like to share with 
him my distress at feeling bored and my discomfort in expressing it. As I do, I find that my boredom arises 
from my sense of remoteness from him and that I would like to be in closer touch with him; and even as I try 
to express these feelings they change. I am certainly not bored as I wait with eagerness, and perhaps a bit of Z) 
apprehension, for his response. I also feel a new sensitivity to him now that I have shared this feeling which 
has been a barrier between us. I am far more able to hear the surprise, or perhaps the hurt, in his voice as he 
now finds himself speaking more genuinely because I have dared to be real with him. I have let myself be a 
person - real, imperfect - in my relationship with him. 
It should be clear from this lengthy description that the concept of congruence implies that it is helpful to be 
genuine even when negative feelings toward the client are involved. It would probably be most helpful if these 
feelings did not exist in the therapist. However, our theory imlies that it would be more harmful if these 
negative feelings were hidden. Even with such negative attitudes, which seem so potentially damaging but 
which all therapists have from time to time, I am suggesting that it is preferable for the therapist to be real than 
to put on a false posture of interest, concern, and liking that the client is likely to sense as false. 
It is not easy for a client, or for any human being, to entrust his most deeeply shrouded feelings to another 
person. It is even more difficult for a disturbed person to share his deepest and most troubling feelings with a 
therapist. The genuineness of the therapist is one of the elements in the relationship that make the risk of 
sharing easier and less fraught with dangers. 
Unconditional Positive Regard. 
The second condition that seeems to me essential for therapeutic movement and change is an unconditional 
positive regard for the client. This means that the therapist communicates to his client a deep and genuine 
caring for him as a person with human potentialities, a caring uncontaminated by evaluations of the patient's 
thoughts, feelings, or behavior. The therapist experiences a warm acceptance of his client's experience as a 
part of that person and places no conditions on his acceptance and warmth. He prizes the client in a total, 
rather than a conditional, way. He does not accept certain feelings in the client and disapprove of others. He C, feels an unconditional positive regard for this person. This is an outgoing, positive feeling without 
reservations and without evaluations. It means making no judgments. It involves as much feeling of 
acceptance for the client's expression of painful, hostile, defensive or abnormal feelings as for his expression of 
good, positive, mature feelings. For us as therapists, incidentally, it may be easier to accept painful and 
negative feelings than the positive and self confident feelings that sometimes come through. Thes latter we 
almost automatically regard as defensive. But unconditional positive regard involves a willingness to share 
equally the patienes confidence and joy, or his depression and failure. It is an unpossessive caring for the client 
as a separate person, which allows the client freely to have his own feelings and his own experiencing. One 
client describes the therapist as "fostering my possesion of my own experience and that I am actually having it; 
thinking what I think, feeling what I feel, wanting what I want, fearing what I fear; no 'ifs, ' 'buts, ' or 'not 
reallys. "' This type of acceptance, I hold, can lead to a relationship that both facilitates the negagement of the 
client in the process of therapy and leads to constructive personality change. 
Unconditional positive regard, when communicated by the therapist, serves to provide the nonthreatening 
context in which the client can explore and experience the most deeply shrouded elements of his inner self. The 
therapist is neither paternalistic, nor sentimental, nor superficially social and agreeable. But his deep caring is 
a necessary ingredient of the "safe" context in which the client can come to explore himself and share deeply 
with another human being. 
(short part omitted). 
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Accurate Empathetic Understanding. 
The ability of the therapist to perceive experiences and feelings accurately and sensitively, and to understand 
their meaning to the client during the moment-to-moment encounter of psychotherapy, constitutes what can 
perhaps be described as the "work" of the therapist after he has first provided the contextual base for the 
relationship by his self-congruence or genuineness and his unconditional positive regard. Accurate empathic 
understanding means that the therapist is completely at home in the universe of the client. It is a 
moment-to-moment sensitivity in the here and now, in the immediate present. It is a sensing of the client's 
inner world of private personal meanings as if it were your own, while never forgetting that it is not yours. 
Accurate sensitivity to the client's being is of primary value during the moment-to-moment encounter of 
therapy; it is of limited use to the individual if the therapist only arrives at this insightful and empathic 
understanding of the client's experience after the interview. Such a delayed insight may be of value if the 
therapist has a further chance to respond to the same theme, but it's value would be in formulating the 
moment-to-moment response to the client's immediate living of this later relationship. 
71be ability and sensitivity required to communicate these inner meanings again to the client in a way that allows 
them to be "his" experiences are the other major part of accurate empathic understanding. To sense the client's 
fear, his confusion, his anger, or his rage as if it were a feeling you n-dght have (but which you are not C, 
currently having) is the essence of the perspective aspect of accurate empathy. To communicate this perception 
in a language attuned to the client, which allows him to more clearly formulate and sense his fear, confusion, 
rage, or anger, is the essence of the communicative aspect of accurate empathy, 
An accurate empathic grasp of the client's conflicts and problems perhaps contrasts most sharply with the more 
usual diagnostic formulation of the client's experiences. This diagnostic understanding which is so different but 
so common, involves the implication, "I understand what is wrong with you. " or "I understand the dynamics 
that make you act this way. " Such evaluative understandings are external and sometimes even impersonal. 
Although they may at times be very useful in developing and understanding of the self as an object, they are in 
sharp contrast to an accurate and sensitive grasp of the personal meanings and perceptions that form the client's 
private world. External and evaluative understanding tends to focus the client's being on himself as object or 
upon intellectualizations that remove him from an ongoing contact with the experiencing going on within him. 
Empathic understanding when it is accurately and sensitively communicated, seems crucially important in 
enabi 
, 
ing the client more freely to experience his inward feelings, perceptions and personal meanings. When he 
is thus in contact with his inward experiencing, he can recognize the points at which his experience is at 
variance with his concept of himself and, consequently, where he is endeavouring to live by a false conception. 
Such recognition of incongruence is the first step towards it's resolution and the revision of the concept of self 
to include the hitherto denied experiences. This is one of the major ways in which change becomes possible 
and a more. complete integration of self and behavior is inaugurated. " 
The focus on these conditions by the therapist allows for the totality of the other person to be accepted and 
understood. At it's best this is a kind of spiritual healing with the therapist allowing herself to be a vehicle for 
healing energies to pass through her. It is thus not surprising that Jupp has found that congruence and 
empathy are strongly present in persons in an altered states of consciousness. 
3 
3 Jupp A. C. 1976 Parapsychology and the Counsellor. Unpublished dissertation (Diploma of Advanced Study 
of Education) University of Keele. 
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ICU-transplant unit links 23 
LDT, impact of increased use of 48 
LDT, increased procurement by use of 30-32 
non-heart beating donors 20 
presumed consent 27-29 
procurement area size 23 
routine enquiry and required request 28-29 
systems of procurement 26-28 
trade, impact of 49 
Non-heart beating donors 20 
Non-therapeutic procedures, law for 141 
Objections to transplantation 25 
Optimum remedium 49,337-8,95-6 
recommended regulation of LDT and 33 7-8 
use of TX limited to situations where 95-96 
use of LDT limited to situations where 96 
Pancreas vessel length 43 
Person-centred approach 
practitioner-patient relationship 129 
Philosophical theories 6-7 
justifications for LDT and 333-335 
Primum non nocere 50,94 
Procedural requirements and valid consent 115-123 
additional requirements 118-122 
recommended regulation and 339-340 
written formalities 116-117 
Professional attitudes and practice, survey of 309-332 
Professional research ethics 13-14 
Psychological/psychiatric trauma 44-5 
Psychological benefit 44-8 
Rational Decision-making 124-5 
Spousal donation 
law relating to 174 
Waiting list trends 17-18 
Unconscious motivation in donation 157-159 
Voluntariness 157-182,289-298 
choice of LDT and 289-292 
direct pressure and 295-6 
donor-recipient relationship, law of 177-181 
donor status, law relating to 175 
independent authorisation of LDT, law of 174-175 
post donation regret of decision 158,292-293 
proactive/reactive approach and 295-296 
professional attitudes/practice and 328 
prisoners and law of voluntariness 175-176 
recommended regulation and 344-345 
unconscious motivation in donation 157-9,293-5 
undue influence, law of 165-167 
voluntariness in practice 157-164 
voluntatiness, law of 164-181 
voluntariness, types of external influence 159-164 
withdrawal of consent, law of 173-174 
Waiting list trends 17-18 
Xenotransplantation 3 
